Unpresentable Members: The Theology and Radical Phenomenology of the Sexual Flesh by Pearl, Justin
Duquesne University
Duquesne Scholarship Collection
Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Spring 5-10-2019
Unpresentable Members: The Theology and
Radical Phenomenology of the Sexual Flesh
Justin Pearl
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/etd
Part of the Christianity Commons, Continental Philosophy Commons, Ethics in Religion
Commons, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Studies Commons, Other Feminist, Gender,
and Sexuality Studies Commons, and the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion
Commons
This One-year Embargo is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.
Recommended Citation
Pearl, J. (2019). Unpresentable Members: The Theology and Radical Phenomenology of the Sexual Flesh (Doctoral dissertation,
Duquesne University). Retrieved from https://dsc.duq.edu/etd/1789
  
 
 
UNPRESENTABLE MEMBERS: 
THE THEOLOGY AND RADICAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SEXUAL FLESH 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Submitted to the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts 
 
 
 
Duquesne University 
 
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
By 
J. Leavitt Pearl 
 
May 2019 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by 
J. Leavitt Pearl 
 
2019 
 
 iii 
 
 
 
 
UNPRESENTABLE MEMBERS: 
 
THE THEOLOGY AND RADICAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SEXUAL FLESH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By 
 
J. Leavitt Pearl 
 
Approved April 5th, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
Dr. Marie Baird Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Theology 
(Committee Chair) 
  
  
  
_______________________________ 
Dr. George Worgul Ph.D. S.T.D. 
Professor of Theology 
_______________________________ 
Dr. Lanei Rodemeyer Ph.D. 
Associate Professor of Philosophy 
  
  
  
  
 
________________________________ 
Dr. James Swindal Ph.D. 
Dean, McAnulty College 
 
  
________________________________ 
Dr. Marinus Iwuchukwu Ph.D. 
Chair, Theology Department 
Associate Professor of Theology 
 
 iv 
ABSTRACT 
 
UNPRESENTABLE MEMBERS: 
THE THEOLOGY AND RADICAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE SEXUAL FLESH 
 
 
 
By 
J. Leavitt Pearl 
May 2019 
 
Dissertation supervised by Dr. Marie Baird 
Unpresentable Members begins with a wager: that a proper account of the flesh and its 
sexual character may not only prove philosophically fertile within its own limited domain, 
but may also provide insight into the theological question of the proper role and place of 
gender and sexual difference within communities, particularly Christian religious 
communities. In this regard, this dissertation has two distinct goals: one phenomenological 
and one theological. Phenomenologically, it offers an account of the manifestation of 
concrete sexual determinations not only as they objectively appear across the “body-
object” (Körper, le corps) but with equal importance as they manifest within the subjective 
affectivity of the flesh (Leib, la chair). Here, the text is particularly centered on the radical 
phenomenologies of Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion, two theologically-inflected 
phenomenologies that offer a powerful reconception of bodily-ownness, and yet 
 v 
nevertheless replicate the worst patriarchal and heteronormative prejudices of their 
predecessors. Theologically, Unpresentable Members employs this account of the flesh in 
order to construct an account of community that resists oppressive forms of social and 
religious marginalization—particularly the oppression of sexual minorities and other 
representatives of gender and sexual difference. In this regard, the present dissertation 
brings together, for the first time, three discourses: radical phenomenology, queer theory, 
and theology.  
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Am I to become profligate as if I were a blonde? Or religious as if I were French?  
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Dismemberment: By way of an Introduction 
 
The life of Spirit … wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds 
itself. 
 G. W. F. Hegel 
 
Sexual difference is probably the issue of our time, which could be our ‘salvation’ 
if we thought it through. 
Luce Irigaray 
 
 
§1. The Question of Sexuality 
 
The decades since Luce Irigaray suggested that sexual difference is probably “the issue” of our 
time seem to have only confirmed her thesis. In the last forty years, feminist demands for equal 
rights and equal pay have only intensified; the gay and lesbian liberation movements carried sexual 
orientation into the streets; prominent transgender activists and celebrities have thrust gender 
identity into the center of the public discourse; and the questions of sexual violence and consent 
have become seemingly permanent fixtures of the nightly news cycle. 
 Theology and religion have in no way been immune to this tumult; “institutional 
Christianity,” as Sarah Coakley suggests, “is in crisis about ‘sexuality’.”1 Mainline protestant 
denominations—including Episcopalians, Congregationalists, Presbyterians, and Methodists—
face schism over the questions of gay marriage and gay ordination.2 The Catholic church lives 
under the shadow of near constant revelations of clergy sexual abuse and coordinated coverups. 
                                               
1 Sarah Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay ‘On the Trinity’ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2013), 1. 
 
2 In the words of Tonstad, “that we live under the regime of sexuality is show perhaps most emphatically by the 
many church schisms taking place over just such issues.”  Linn Marie Tonstad, God and Difference: The Trinity, 
Sexuality, and the Transformation of Finitude (New York: Routledge, 2016), 224. 
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All while feminist and queer theologies continue to push the boundaries of theological discourse 
in unexpected directions.  
Indeed, much of this dissertation was written while I worked with youth at a congregation 
in suburban Pittsburgh that was in a discernment process to leave the Presbyterian Church USA 
(PCUSA) in response to the denomination’s 2015 vote to amend their regulations on marriage to 
read: marriage is a “unique commitment between two people, traditionally a man and a woman.”3 
While the congregation ultimately voted to remain within the denomination, the fractures only 
widened. In early 2018 the congregation split, as those unhappy with the vote left, together with 
the pastor, to form a new church in the conservative ECO Presbyterian denomination. This crisis, 
which may bring an end to a one-hundred and thirty year old congregation, highlights the 
imperative nature of constructing a sexual theology worthy of the challenges of the contemporary 
world.   
The present investigation begins with a wager: that a proper account of the body, or more 
specifically, the flesh, and its sexual character may not only prove philosophically fertile within 
its own limited domain, but may also provide insight into the theological question of the proper 
role and place of gender and sexual difference within communities, particularly Christian religious 
communities.  
In this regard, this dissertation has two distinct goals: one phenomenological and one 
theological. Phenomenologically, it seeks to offer an account of the manifestation of concrete 
                                               
3 The new language reads, in full: “Marriage is a gift God has given to all humankind for the wellbeing of the entire 
human family. Marriage involves a unique commitment between two people, traditionally a man and a woman, to 
love and support each other for the rest of their lives. The sacrificial love that unites the couple sustains them as 
faithful and responsible members of the church and the wider community.  
 
In civil law, marriage is a contract that recognizes the rights and obligations of the married couple in society. In the 
Reformed tradition, marriage is also a covenant in which God has an active part, and which the community of faith 
publicly witnesses and acknowledges.” 
 
 xiv 
sexual determinations not only as they objectively appear across the “body-object” (Körper, le 
corps) but with equal importance as they manifest within the subjective affectivity of the flesh 
(Leib, la chair). Here, the dissertation is particularly centered on the so-called “radical 
phenomenology” of Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion, two theologically-inflected 
phenomenologies that offer a powerful reconception of bodily-ownness, and yet nevertheless 
appear to replicate the worst patriarchal and heteronormative prejudices of their predecessors. 
Theologically, this dissertation will seek to employ this account of the flesh in order to construct 
an account of community that resists oppressive forms of social and religious marginalization—
particularly the oppression of sexual minorities and other representatives of gender and sexual 
difference.  
I will therefore here follow, as best as I am able, the footsteps of queer theology, insofar as 
it is this theology that has more clearly and directly than any other, exposed the sexual and 
embodied character of all theological thinking. “Theology is a sexual act, a sexual doing,”4 as 
Althaus-Reid remarks, and it was “the queer theologians … [who]  introduced the body into 
theology, bodies in love, bodies entangled in ethics of passion—transgressive bodies at that.”5  
In this regard, the present dissertation can be understood as an attempt to bring together, 
for the first time, three discourses: radical phenomenology, queer theory, and theology. For radical 
                                               
4 Marcella Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology: Theological Perversions in Sex, Gender and Politics (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 36. 
 
5 Marcella Althaus-Reid, The Queer God (New York: Routledge, 2003), 48. 
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theology has, since its inception, explored theological themes and motifs;6 while queer theology7 
and queer phenomenology8 have applied the insights of queer theory to theology and 
phenomenology respectively. Yet, a consideration of radical phenomenology from the perspective 
of queer theory—particularly with a sensitivity to the theological consequences of this work—has 
until now not been attempted. It is the aim of the present dissertation of fill this conspicuous gap 
in the literature.  
 
                                               
6 For a summary of these reflections, see, e.g.: Dominique Janicaud (ed.), Phenomenology and the ‘Theological 
Turn’: The French Debate (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000); Bruce Ellis Benson and Norman Wirzba 
(eds.), Words of Life: New Theological Turns in French Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2010); Christina Gschwandtner, Postmodern Apologetics?: Arguments for God in Contemporary Philosophy (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2013); Tarek R. Dika and W. Chris Hackett (eds.), Quiet Powers of the Possible: 
Interviews in Contemporary French Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016); and Emmanuel 
Falque, Crossing the Rubicon: The Borderlands of Philosophy and Theology (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2016). 
 
7 The literature of queer theology is much too large to summarize, but the following texts have been particularly 
influential on the present work: John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in 
Western Europe from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1980); James B. Nelson, Body Theology (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992); Althaus-
Reid, Indecent Theology (2000); Althaus-Reid, The Queer God (2003); Patrick S. Cheng, Radical love: An 
Introduction to Queer Theology (New York: Seabury, 2011); Tonstad, God and Difference (2016); Linn Marie 
Tonstad, Queer Theology: Beyond Apologetics (Eugene: Cascade Books, 2018).  
 
8 The literature in queer phenomenology, or at least in the intersection of queer theory/trans studies and 
phenomenology is considerably smaller. Key texts include: Judith Butler, “Performative acts and gender 
constitution: An essay in phenomenology and feminist theory,” Theatre Journal 40 (1988): 519–531; Henry S. 
Rubin “Phenomenology as method in trans studies,” GLQ 4 (1998): 263–281; Sara Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: 
Orientations, Objects, Others (Durham: Duke University Press 2006). Julia Horncastle, “Queer orientation: 
Selfhood and poetics,” Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, Vol. 23, No. 6 (Dec. 2009): 903–920; 
Gayle Salamon, “Justification and Queer Method, or Leaving Philosophy,” Hypatia Vol. 24, No. 1, Oppression and 
Moral Agency: Essays in Honor of Claudia Card (Winter, 2009): 225-230; Gayle Salamon, Assuming a Body: 
Transgender and Rhetorics of Materiality (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Lanei M. Rodemeyer, 
“Husserl and queer theory,” Continental Philosophy Review (2017), doi:10.1007/s11007-017-9412-x; Lanei M. 
Rodemeyer, Lou Sullivan Diaries (1970-1980) and Theories of Sexual Embodiment: Making Sense of Sensing 
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2018).  
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§2. Ἀσχήμων: the Dysmember and Dismemberment  
The two methodological streams of this dissertation—phenomenological and theological—will be 
united through Paul’s language of the ἀσχήμων (1 Cor. 12.23)—variously translated as “uncomely 
parts” (KJV), “unpresentable parts” (NIV), or “less respectable members” (NRSV). Drawing upon 
Paul’s usage, ἀσχήμων will be taken in a dual sense, bridging the phenomenological and 
theological considerations, as a term that denotes both the sexual determinations of the individual 
body (e.g. genitalia), and homologously, those members of social or political communities who 
are “unpresentable”—that is to say, who are cast out or granted only restricted access to the 
religious community (e.g. women and sexual minorities). 
 This introduction will serve to frame the discourse, by setting out this key term in 
something like a word study. In context, the passage in which this term appears reads as follows: 
Now concerning spiritual gifts, brothers and sisters, I do not want you to be 
uninformed. …  Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are 
varieties of services, but the same Lord; and there are varieties of activities, but it 
is the same God who activates all of them in everyone. To each is given the 
manifestation of the Spirit for the common good. …  All these are activated by one 
and the same Spirit, who allots to each one individually just as the Spirit chooses. 
For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, 
though many, are one body, so it is with Christ. For in the one Spirit we were all 
baptized into one body—Jews or Greeks, slaves or free—and we were all made to 
drink of one Spirit. Indeed, the body does not consist of one member but of many . 
If the foot would say, “Because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body,” that 
would not make it any less a part of the body. And if the ear would say, “Because 
I am not an eye, I do not belong to the body,” that would not make it any less a part 
of the body. If the whole body were an eye, where would the hearing be? If the 
whole body were hearing, where would the sense of smell be? But as it is, God 
arranged the members in the body, each one of them, as he chose. If all were a 
single member, where would the body be? As it is, there are many members, yet 
one body. The eye cannot say to the hand, “I have no need of you,” nor again the 
head to the feet, “I have no need of you.” On the contrary, the members of the body 
that seem to be weaker are indispensable, and those members of the body that we 
think less honorable we clothe with greater honor, and our less respectable members 
[ἀσχήμονα] are treated with greater respect [εὐσχήμονα]; whereas our more 
respectable members do not need this. But God has so constituted the body, giving 
 xvii 
the greater honor to the inferior member, that there may be no division within the 
body, but the members may have the same care for one another. If one member 
suffers, all the members suffer together with it; if one member is honored, all rejoice 
together with it. Now you are the body of Christ and individually members of it.  
(Corinthians 12.12-27)9 
 
As noted above, the NRSV renders ἀσχήμονα: “less respectable members.” While Paul here 
undoubtedly has in mind genitalia, this coyer translation “is not bad since discretion on the part of 
Paul calls for discretion in our own language.”10 Yet, while this is a passable translation, it is 
perhaps overly reliant upon its synonymous parallel, wherein special honor [τιμήν] is granted these 
dishonored members [ἀτιμότερα]. Whereas this second paradoxical contrast, where the 
dishonorable is honored, is dependent upon socio-cultural perspectives or opinions—what might 
be called, for lack of a better word, “subjective” assessments—a more precise rendering of 
ἀσχήμων might draw forward its aesthetic or even ontological significance. For, while it is 
certainly the case that its ἀσχήμων and its opposite, εὐσχήμονα, carry a social weight—as attested 
by Mark 15, where Joseph of Arimathea is marked as a “prominent [εὐσχήμων] member of the 
council”; or Acts 13 and 17’s marking of “prominent [εὐσχημόνων] women” within the early 
church—a deeper translation of ἀσχήμων should recognize its root in σχῆμα: form, figure, or as 
its transliteration would suggest: schema.  
Whereas honor [τιμήν] marks a social assessment of value, the σχῆμα of a member—
whether positive [εὐ] or negative [ἀ]—denotes its formal characteristic. In Philippians 2.8, Jesus 
the Christ takes on the very “form [σχήματι]” of a human; in 1st Corinthians 7, Paul anticipates the 
passing away of the “form [σχῆμα] of the present world order.” In like manner, εὐσχήμων and 
                                               
9 Unless otherwise marked, all translations in this dissertation are taken from: The Division of Christian Education 
of the National Council of the Churches of Christ in the United States of America, New Revised Standard Version 
Bible (1989). Minor changes or variations from the NRSV are my own.  
 
10 Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians in The New International Commentary on the New Testament 
(NICNT), eds. Ned B. Stonehouse et al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1987), 609. 
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ἀσχήμων reflect the formal characteristic of their respective members—rightly-formed in the first 
case, malformed or disfigured in the second.  
 One can trace this usage of ἀσχήμων as that which is formally malformed or disfigured 
throughout ancient Greek literature. Thus Herodotus describes Gelon, who faced with the 
arrogance of the Spartans, refuses to be provoked to an “unseemly answer” [ἀσχήμονα ἐν τῇ 
ἀμοιβῇ].11 For Plato, ἀσχήμων marks that which is “repugnant” [τῶν ἀσχημόνων] because it is 
monstrous; that is to say, it marks that which breaks proper form by bringing together what should 
by nature and right be opposed.12 Likewise, Hippocrates, will employ the term in a medical context 
to refer straightforwardly to physical “deformity” [ἀσχήμονα].13  
 For Aristotle, this formal or aesthetic disorder is explicitly granted a moral character. Thus, 
in the Nicomachean Ethics, the term refers to the morally bankrupt “uglier character” 
[ἀσχημονέστερος] of the exaggerator.14 Likewise, Euripides employs the term to mark that which 
is “unseemly” [ἀσχήμονες], such as an undignified death by hanging: “unseemly [ἀσχήμονες] is 
the noose ‘twixt earth and heaven: even of thralls ‘tis held a death of shame. Noble dagger is and 
honourable, and one short instant rids the flesh of life.”15 
                                               
11  As a translation note, most contemporary translations render the double negative here as a positive: “nevertheless 
I will answer you with courtesy.” Herodotus, The Histories, trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt (New York: Penguin Books, 
1954/2003), 471 (7.160). 
 
12 “Soc: Now, look at the pleasures that go with these types of maladies, what kinds of conditions they are. Pro: 
What types do you mean? Soc: Those pleasures of a rather repugnant type [τῶν ἀσχημόνων], which our harsh 
friends hate above all. Pro: What kinds? Soc. For example, the relief from itching by rubbing, and all of that sort that 
needs no other remedy. But if this condition should befall us, what in heaven’s name should we call it, pleasure or 
pain? Pro: That really would seem to be a mixed experience, with a bad component, Socrates.” Plato, “Philebus,” 
trans. Dorothea Frede in Complete Works, Ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1997), 435 (46a). 
 
13 Hippocrates, “On Joints”  in Hippocrates Vol. III, trans. E. T. Withington (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1928), 251 (27).  
 
14 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics” in The Complete Words of Aristotle, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 1779 (1127 b13). 
 
15 Euripides, “Helen,” Euripides: In Four Volumes, Vol. 1, trans. Arthur S. Way (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1912/1978), 491 (299-302). 
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This moral condemnation takes on clear sexual connotations in the Politics, where Aristotle 
argues that the children of the polis should be banned from the stage, where “indecent” 
[ἀσχήμονας] performances will be produced: “clearly we should also banish pictures or speeches 
from the stage which are indecent [ἀσχήμονας]. Let the rulers take care that there be no image or 
picture representing unseemly actions, except in the temples of those gods at whose festivals the 
law permits even ribaldry.”16 This sexual connotation is repeated in Josephus, who employs the 
term to describe a soldier exposing himself to a group of Jews, thereby triggering civil unrest: “and 
a Roman cohort stood over the cloisters of the temple … one of the soldiers pulled back his 
garment, and cowering down [bending over] after an indecent manner [ἀσχημόνως], turned his 
breech to the Jews, and spake such words as you might expect upon such a posture [τῷ σχήματι].”17 
It is precisely the intention of the present dissertation to hold these three components of the 
ἀσχήμων—formal, moral, and sexual—together. The ἀσχήμων represents that which is 
“unpresentable” because its breaks with right form, because it corrupts good morals, and because 
it engages in what is sexually illicit. The ἀσχήμων is the sexual member in every sense. Or rather, 
insofar as it is ἀ-σχήμων, that is, the loss of form, or, morally speaking, the corrupt or disordered 
member; I will suggest the translation “dys-member.”18 The dysmember is, as Althaus-Reid 
describes the nomadic queer, “the image of the unstable or irredeemable body of a theological 
subject who lives amidst insecurity and risk.”19  
                                               
 
16 Aristotle, “Politics” in The Complete Words of Aristotle, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 2120 (1336 b14-17). 
 
17 Josephus, “The Jewish War” in The New Complete Works of Josephus, trans. William Whiston (Grand Rapids: 
Kregel Publications, 1999), 744 (II.12).  
 
18 From the Greek prefix δυσ- “hard, bad, unlucky, etc., …; destroying the good sense of a word, or increasing its 
bad sense.” Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Seventh Edition (New York: Harper 
and Brothers, 1889), 453. 
 
19 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 50. 
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Moreover, the dysmember is that which is structurally excluded from the community. It is 
the irreducible reminder that renders every body—whether the sexual body of the individual or the 
body politic of the community—not-whole. In this regard, the dysmember is that which every logic 
of wholeness and sameness must excise from the body; the dysmember must be cut out, for the 
good of the community. The dysmember is “unpresentable,” precisely because its uncomfortable 
presence provokes the dissolution of the fantasy of the One-body. Thus, discomfort with the 
dysmember motivates the dismemberment of the body—whether rhetorical, social, or literal. 
Phenomenologies and theologies of the body that seek to render the body as the wholeness of self-
presence must dismember themselves, symbolically casting off that which disrupts this unity of 
theory. Religious and political communities which seek the homogeneity of sexual and social 
unanimity must dismember themselves, literally casting out those who disrupt their communal 
uniformity.20  
Like a queer theology, a radical phenomenology and theology of the sexual flesh must 
“come to terms first of all with the forgotten body parts and dismembering ceremonies to which 
persons or communities have been subject in the past,”21 and in the present. It is the aim of the 
present dissertation to employ the methodologies of phenomenology and theology in order to bring 
the dysmember to the foreground, to make it the explicit subject of an investigation, in order to 
expose it as a site of liberation and redemption.  
                                               
 
20 In this way, communities attempt to convert what John Boswell calls “inferior insiders”—denigrated members of 
the community—into “inferior outsiders,” denigrated individuals expelled from the community. Such inferior 
outsiders are “not tolerated at all (they are killed, or banished, or incarcerated) or are relegated to nonexistence 
conceptually.” John Boswell, “Homosexuality and Religious Life: A Historical Approach,” in James Nelson and 
Sandra Longfellow (eds.), Sexuality and the Sacred: Sources for Theological Reflection (Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994), 362-363. 
 
 
21 Ibid. 
 
 xxi 
 
 
§3. The Path to be Followed 
The first chapter, “Phenomenology: Having a body, Being a Body,” briefly lays out the history of  
the phenomenology of the body, first as it appears in Husserl, before turning to the French tradition 
that anticipates radical phenomenology. In particular, the chapter will expose the ways in which 
questions of gender and sexuality have been bound up with investigations into embodiment almost 
from the beginning of the phenomenological movement.  
 The second chapter, “Michel Henry: Transcendental Asexuality,” takes up precisely where 
the previous chapter left off, exploring the way in which Michel Henry’s phenomenology sought 
to radicalize the account of embodiment and the flesh introduced by his predecessors. Once this 
account of fleshly incarnation is laid out, the chapter exposes key patriarchal and heteronormative 
prejudices that subtend Henry’s thinking, submitting them to a critique drawn primarily from the 
French feminist tradition that was working concurrently with his own developments.  
 The third chapter, “Jean-Luc Marion: The Saturated Flesh,” lays out the specific ways in 
which Jean-Luc Marion’s more recent phenomenological work follows and diverges from Henry, 
particularly in regards to his account of the flesh. Following the model of Chapter 2, once this 
account has been laid out, key patriarchal and heteronormative prejudices—most conspicuously 
in his account of the child—are drawn forward, and a critique is leveled from the perspective of 
queer theory, particularly the work of Lee Edelman. 
The fourth chapter, “Nuptial Theology in the Communio School and Radical 
Phenomenology,” traces the clear influence of ressourcement theology—particularly that of Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, Karol Wojtyła (John Paul II), and Joseph Ratzinger (Benedict XVI)—upon 
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radical phenomenology. Specifically, the chapter seeks to expose the way in which rather specific 
claims regarding the nature of women, sexual difference, and procreation are directly drawn from 
this theological tradition.  
The fifth chapter, “A Radical Phenomenology of the Sexual Flesh,” suggests that the 
problems identified in Henry and Marion are not simply reducible to the importing of theological 
categories. Rather, it is here argued  that the ground for these misrepresentations of women and 
queer folk are motivated by phenomenological failures in Henry and Marion’s account of the flesh. 
That is, a monadic tendency within radical phenomenology is identified, which views the flesh as 
a total self-presence, given to itself without gap or remainder. Against this view an alternative 
account of the constitution of the flesh, drawing both from the radical phenomenology of Jacob 
Rogozinski and Lacanian psychoanalysis is offered as an alternative, which recognizes the 
structural incompleteness and precarity of incarnation. 
The sixth chapter, “Studies on the Sexual Member,” works out the logic of the previous 
chapter by examining three phenomenological studies of sexual embodiment: acute male 
impotence, anal pleasure, and polymorphous perversity. Through this trajectory, the chapter aims 
both to lay out the key characteristics of each of these various phenomena, and to challenge the 
model of sexual development proffered by Freud—thereby opening up the possibility of a wider 
understanding of sexual embodiment.  
 The seventh chapter, “Membership and the Body of Christ,” moves away from the 
phenomenological methodology that had dominated the early chapters and instead employs a 
theological methodology—influenced by both ressourcement and queer theologies. Under this 
method, the chapter works from the general notion of the communal body or corpore politico to 
the uniquely Christian notion of the body of Christ. Here, specifically, the notion of the body of 
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Christ is worked out in three registers: the physical body of Christ (Jesus of Nazareth), the 
resurrected body of Christ, and the eucharistic body of Christ. In each instance, the analysis 
attempts to highlight key embodied characteristics of the body of Christ, as well highlighting the 
particular role of sexuality in each manifestation.  
 The eighth chapter, “The Cut and the Body of Christ,” functions as the pair of the seventh, 
picking up a fourth and final conception of the body of Christ: the communal or social body of 
Christ, that is, the church. In this chapter, careful analysis is given to the various accounts of the 
body of Christ in the Pauline corpus, as well as its treatment among early interpreters—particularly 
Cyprian and Augustine. These analyses seek to highlight the deeply ambivalent nature of this 
symbol for liberative work in sexual politics, suggesting both that the notion of the body of Christ 
should not be appropriated in a naive manner, while also suggesting that it may provide useful 
tools in an emancipatory project. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Phenomenology: Having a Body, Being a 
Body 
 
 
We stand amazed before consciousness, but ‘the truly surprising thing is rather the 
body.’ 
Gilles Deleuze 
 
 
Since its inception in 1900, phenomenology—particularly the transcendental phenomenology of 
Edmund Husserl—has been haunted by a consistent accusation: it is marked by an ethereal 
character, it has forgotten materiality. Through phenomenology’s concern for the region of 
consciousness, the formal structure of logic, and the transcendental Ego—this criticism generally 
argues—the fleshy, dirty corporeality of everyday life has been lost. Through its repetition of a 
Cartesian dualism, it is further suggested, transcendental phenomenology has forgotten that we are 
not merely subjects, souls, or Egos, but also human bodies—with all of the innumerable associated 
complexities of race, gender, ability, sexuality, and so forth.  
It is first and foremost the aim of this introductory chapter to disabuse the reader of this 
wholly selective reading of phenomenology. Rather, what will subsequently be shown is, first, that 
phenomenology has, since its very inception, been marked by a deep preoccupation with the 
question of embodiment; and second, that this engagement has taken the form of an undeniable 
trajectory within phenomenology—one that has increasingly situated these concerns together with 
the related questions of sexuality and eroticism. Simply put, far from ignoring either the body or 
sexuality, the former emerges as a central theme of phenomenological research at the latest in 
1907, and the latter as early as 1943.  
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Mapping this trajectory is essential for the foregoing research, as it will situate and 
contextualize the distinct character of Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion’s phenomenological 
reflections on sexuality and the flesh in the following two chapters. Moreover, it will likewise lay 
the groundwork for much of the work in later chapters, work which will not only critique certain 
formulations in Henry and Marion from the perspective of contemporary scholarship, but will also 
seek to return to key notions in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological accounts of the 
constitution of the body.  
While countless thinkers could be brought forward to construct this phenomenological 
genealogy, space has necessitated its limitation to five central figures. The first section will 
exclusively engage with the work of Edmund Husserl, most notably his posthumously published 
manuscript Ideas II. The second and third sections will center the work of the first generation of 
French phenomenologists: viz. Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, and 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty. This limitation undeniably carries its own weaknesses: ignoring, for 
example the key phenomenological investigations into race and post-colonialism—epitomized by 
the work of Trần Đức Thảo and Frantz Fanon—and the inestimable role of Didier Franck’s Flesh 
and Body for the French reception of Husserl in the second half of the 20th century. Nevertheless, 
these figures will provide a basic framework for understanding the phenomenological milieu in 
which Henry and Marion developed their phenomenologies of the body. In Husserl we will find 
that phenomenology has, since its inception, reserved primacy of place for the body, which 
functions as a quasi-transcendental condition for the constitution of the objective world. In the first 
generation of French thinkers we will find the gradual replacement of the transcendental Ego with 
the body, as well as the emergence of sexuality as a key component of embodiment. 
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§I. Edmund Husserl: The Quasi-Transcendental Body 
 
A. Does Edmund Husserl Have a Body?: 
 
Already from the 1913 publication of Ideas I, Husserl’s “transcendental turn” drew swift criticism 
for its rationalism, its formalism, and its abstract quality. Such criticisms first arose among his 
early contemporaries—such as Roman Ingarden22 and the “Munich Circle” (e.g. Adolf Reinach23 
and Johannes Daubert)—and later among existential-phenomenological thinkers including Jean-
Paul Sartre,24 Emmanuel Levinas,25 and, most prominently, Martin Heidegger.26 In each instance, 
these thinkers rebelled against Husserl’s turn to the pseudo-Kantian language of the Ego and 
                                               
22 For an account of the principal critiques leveled by Ingarden against Husserl, see: J. N. Mohanty, “Roman 
Ingarden’s Critique of Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology” in Phenomenology: Between Essentialism and 
Transcendental Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 32-45. 
 
23 See, e.g.: Adolf Reinach, Phénoménologie Réaliste, trans. Dominique Pradelle et al (Paris: Librairie 
philosophique J. Vrin, 2012). For an English translation of the first chapter, see: Adolf Reinach, The Apriori 
Foundations of the Civil Law: along with the lecture, “Concerning Phenomenology,” ed. John F. Crosby (Frankfurt, 
Paris, Lancaster, New Brunswick: ontos verlag, 2012), “Concerning Phenomenology” (trans. Dallas Willard), 143-
166. 
  
24 Sartre, for example, marks Ideas I’s conception of the transcendental-I as a needless reversion (“il est revenu”)—
after the substantive steps forward in the Logical Investigations and the lectures On the Phenomenology of the 
Consciousness of Internal Time—into an outdated paradigm: “The transcendental I thus has no raison d’être.” Jean-
Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Sarah Richmond (London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 7. 
For more on Sartre’s relation to Husserl, see: “§II. From the Transcendental Ego to Le Corps Propre” below. 
 
25 Levinas’ reading of Husserl is complex, due in part to a discovery of a “difficulty or fluctuation” in Husserl’s 
desire to ground phenomenology in “concrete life” and his competing desire to ground it in abstract theorization. As 
he writes, “while asserting the primacy of theory for Husserl, we have also emphasized that his essential thesis 
consists in locating being in concrete life.” Emmanuel Levinas, The Theory of Intuition in Husserl’s 
Phenomenology, trans. André Orianne (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1995), 158. In a later work, 
Levinas will critically describe Husserl’s account of intentionality as “neutralized and disincarnate.” Emmanuel 
Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2001), 27-28. 
 
26 For a detailed examination of the relationship between this “first schism” (1905-1913) and this “second schism” 
(1927-1933), wherein it is argued that “the first schism anticipated the second and the second recapitulated the first, 
so that, although the first could have occurred without the second, the second would not have happened as it did 
without the first,” see: George Heffernan, “A Tale of Two Schisms: Heidegger’s Critique of 
Husserl’s Move into Transcendental Idealism,” The European Legacy 21:5-6 (2016), 556-575. 
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Transcendental Idealism27 in favor of the realist paradigm of the Logical Investigations and the 
early lectures On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. As Heidegger wrote 
in 1963, “even after the Ideas was published, I was still captivated by the never-ceasing spell of 
the Logical Investigations.”28  
While each of these thinkers would ultimately depart from Husserl in a unique direction, it 
is nevertheless clear that, for a number of these thinkers, a central threat of transcendental idealism 
was potential repercussions in the phenomenology of the body. By emphasizing the Ego or the 
transcendental Ego, it was suggested, Husserl had relegated the body to a secondary status, 
recapitulating the traditional Cartesian problematic of the soul and the body. Ingarden’s critique 
of Husserl’s Ideas I is emblematic of this concern: “the problem of the relations between soul and 
body—which is as old as European philosophy—has not been solved by Husserl and was not, in 
my opinion, taken by him even one step beyond the traditional state of the problem in spite of 
                                               
27 See, e.g., Husserl’s engagement with the language of Transcendental Idealism in §40-41 of the Cartesian 
Meditations. “Phenomenology,” he there writes, “seems to be rightly characterized also as transcendental theory of 
knowledge.” He will clarify this assertion writing that “carried out with this systematic concreteness, 
phenomenology is eo ipso ‘transcendental idealism,’ though in a fundamentally and essentially new sense. It is not a 
psychological idealism … nor is it a Kantian Idealism. … On the contrary, we have here a transcendental idealism 
that is nothing more than a consequentially executed self-explication in the form of a systematic egological science, 
an explication of my ego as subject of every possible cognition, and indeed with respect to every sense of what 
exists.” Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: an Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorian Cairns (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 81, 86. 
 
28 Martin Heidegger, “My Way to Phenomenology” in On Time and Being trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1972), 78. Heidegger likewise writes that “from the beginning and always stood outside the 
philosophical position of Husserl in the sense of a transcendental philosophy of consciousness” (Martin Heidegger, 
“Was ist das Sein selbst?” [12 September 1946], GA, 16.423, as translated by and cited in Heffernan, 568). In the 
words of Heffernan, “There can be no doubt that Heidegger viewed the transformation of descriptive 
phenomenology into transcendental phenomenology accompanied by transcendental idealism as performed in 
Husserl’s Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy as a ‘wrong path’ and that he did this 
at the time at which it happened.” Heffernan, 564. 
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undoubted progress in the research on the so-called ‘givenness of the body’ (Husserl’s 
Leibgegebenheit).”29 Similar concerns can be found in Daubert30 and Reinach.31  
The strong version of this critique—that Husserl simply failed to acknowledge the body or 
grant it a key role—is belied by the prominent role of the body in his analyses of perception and 
spatiality as early as the 1907 lectures Thing and Space.32 It is there that Husserl first articulated 
his distinction between the Leib—the lived body, animate body, or flesh—and the Körper—
objective bodies (both living and not) in the spatiality of the world. Three characteristics remain 
central to Husserl’s conception of the Leib throughout these early lectures.33 First, the body 
functions as a spatial zero-point, a locus away from which one cannot move. “These things, that 
are co-perceived,” he writes, “always also include the Ego-Body, which, as a body [Körper], is 
likewise in space, in the space of the total perception. It stands there as the ever-abiding point of 
                                               
29 Roman Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, trans. Arnór Hannibalsson (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 69-70. 
 
30 “The experience of what is physical and of what is spatial cannot simply be gathered from any intuition 
whatsoever; it originates from a primordial [quellhaft] experience of my own body which moves in space and which 
does so while already in action and interaction with other bodies in space.” Johannes Daubert, “Daubertiana A I 3” 
(Unpublished notes, 1930-1931), 35v. As cited in: Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, “Against Idealism: Johannes 
Daubert vs. Husserl’s Ideas I,” Review of Metaphysics 39 (1985): 763-93. 
 
31 As MacIntyre writes, “for Husserl there is no essential relationship between my having or being a body and my 
being the subject of conscious experience. Yet on Reinach’s account of social acts, a condition of the possibility of 
such acts is that inner mental awareness and outward bodily expression are parts of a single unified act. Subtract 
what is bodily and what we would be left with is not with a purely mental act, but no act at all.” Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue, 1913-1922 (Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 61. 
 
32 Edmund Husserl, Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1997). 
 
33 This categorization partially overlaps with that discussed by Sara Heinämaa who describes three fundamental 
characteristics of the Leib in the following manner: “First, living bodies are given to us as fields of sensation. … 
Second … the living body is its motility. … Third, the living body functions as the fixed point in perceptions of 
direction, distance, and movement.” Sara Heinämaa, Toward a Phenomenology of Sexual Difference: Husserl, 
Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 29. 
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reference, to which all spatial relations seem to be attached.”34 Second and third, Husserl describes 
the Leib as the “bearer” of the Ego and as the locus of kinesthetic sensation.35   
Nevertheless, as central as the Leib remains throughout these early analyses, Husserl 
perhaps remains susceptible to a weaker version of this critique—that while he acknowledges the 
body, he relegates it to a merely accidental position. This critique is ostensibly justified by two of 
Husserl’s claims regarding the Leib. First, the Leib is not essentially or eidetically bound to the 
Ego or the transcendental Ego. Rather, the body merely “bears” or is “bound” to the transcendental 
Ego. Second, Husserl positions the Leib within the region of constituted spatio-temporal objects 
of consciousness. It is, he writes in Thing and Space, “primarily a thing like any other, insofar as 
it (although only to a limited extent) can also be constituted like any other thing.”36 As a constituted 
thing, the body (unlike the transcendental Ego) is susceptible to the bracket of the transcendental 
reduction—as Husserl subsequently demonstrates in his 1913 Ideas I.  
As in his earlier texts, Husserl’s investigation of the body in Ideas I begins with the body 
as a continual presence in the normal life. “The world of things and our body within it,” he writes, 
“are continuously present to our perception.”37 But, unlike his earlier writings, the ultimate goal 
                                               
34 Husserl, Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, 66. 
 
35 “This thing is precisely a Body [Leib], the bearer of the Ego; the Ego has sensations, and these sensations are 
‘localized’ in the Body.” Ibid., 137. This model of the body is likewise repeated in The Basic Problem of 
Phenomenology. These lectures, hosted in Göttingen in the winter of 1910/11, remain some of the most consistently 
cited texts by the later Husserl (Ingo Farin and James G. Hart, “Translators’ Preface” in Edmund Husserl, The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Ingo Farin and James G. Hart [Dordrecht: Springer, 2006], XIII), and offer one 
of the clearest accounts of Husserl’s transcendental methodology. Yet, Husserl here grants the body a central 
position, noting that, in the natural attitude, “every I finds itself as having an organic lived body [Leib]” (Ibid., 3.). 
Recapitulating Thing and Space, the Leib is here granted three roles: Serving as a spatial zero-point around which, 
and in relation to which, other physical bodies manifest—“everything, which is not lived body, appears to be related 
to this lived body” ( Ibid., 4.)—; serving as a site for the localization of “I-experiences,” as, for example, perceptual 
sensations; and functioning as that to which the transcendental-I is “tied” (Ibid., 92) or “bound” (Ibid., 96.).  
 
36 Husserl, Thing and Space, 242. And again, in 1910/11, “the body [Leib], for its part, is not an I, but rather a 
spatial–temporal ‘thing’.” Husserl, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 3. 
 
37 Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2002), 74 (§39) [emphasis added]. 
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of Ideas I is the immediate access to the “things themselves” [die Sachen selbst],38 that is, 
conscious phenomena as they give themselves to pure consciousness.39 Thus, for the Husserl of 
Ideas I, the omni-presence of the body, insofar as it stands between the phenomenologist and pure 
consciousness, is a problem to be solved.  
In order to solve this problem of access to pure consciousness, Husserl deploys an infamous 
thought experiment in §49 of Ideas I: the imaginative destruction of the world. In this experiment, 
Husserl introduces the notion of a non-empirical ego by imagining a total “nullifying of the 
world”—that is, imagining that the “possibility of non-Being which belongs essentially to every 
Thing-like transcendence”40 might become an actuality. Even in such an extreme experience, 
Husserl argues, “it is then evident that the Being of consciousness, of every stream of experience 
generally, though it would indeed be inevitably modified by the nullifying of the thing-world, 
would not be affected thereby in its own proper existence.”41 Thus, Husserl argues, “no real thing 
… is necessary for the Being of consciousness itself.”42  
In §54, Husserl redeploys this experiment in order to likewise annul the animate body. “Let 
us imagine,” he writes, “in the spirit of the foregoing exposition that the whole of nature—and the 
physical in the first instance—has been ‘annulled,’ there would then be no more bodies [Leiber] 
and therefore no men. … But my consciousness, however its states of experience might vary, 
                                               
 
38 It is important, given the similarity in English translation, to mark this as conceptually distinct from Kant’s “thing 
in itself” [Ding an sich].  
 
39 “How then,” he asks, “does and can Consciousness itself separate out as a concrete thing in itself, from that within 
it, of which we are conscious, namely the perceived being. ‘Standing over against’ consciousness ‘in and for 
itself’?” Husserl, Ideas, 74 (§39). 
 
40 Husserl, Ideas, 94. 
 
41 Ibid., 94. 
 
42 Ibid. 
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would remain an absolute stream of experience.”43 Through this imaginative experiment, Husserl 
understands himself to have established the phenomenological possibility of  “an incorporeal 
[leibloses] and, paradoxical as it may sound, an inanimate and non-personal consciousness.”44 
Through this second experiment, Husserl establishes the phenomenological possibility of 
distinguishing between transcendental consciousness and the body. Thus, he argues, the body can 
itself be submitted to the phenomenological reduction.45 
                                               
43 Ibid., 107. 
 
44 Ibid. 
 
45 The notions of the epoché and the phenomenological reductions form the core of Husserl’s “transcendental turn.” 
Merleau-Ponty suggests that “there is probably no other question over which Husserl spent more time” (Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith [New York: Routledge, 1962], xii); and Didier 
Franck will later mark the reduction as the “pivotal and the permanent theme of Husserl’s entire enterprise” (Didier 
Franck, Flesh and Body: On the Phenomenology of Husserl, trans. Joseph Rivera and Scott Davidson [New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2014], 29). Husserl first used the term “phenomenological reduction” in the 1905 Seefelder 
Manuscript, as well as his 1906/07 Lectures on Logic and Epistemology (See: Dermot Moran, Husserl’s Crisis of 
the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: an Introduction [Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012], 22-23; and Dermot Moran and Joseph D. Cohen, The Husserl Dictionary 
[London: Continuum, 2012], 107), but it will not find a full articulation until 1907’s The Idea of Phenomenology. 
There, Husserl insists that his epistemological project, seeking a certain foundation for science, must begin with a 
phenomenological reduction: “I must exclude all that is transcendently posited. … This means: everything 
transcendent (that which is not given to me immanently) is to be assigned the index zero, i.e., its existence, its 
validity is not to be assumed as such, except at most as a phenomenon of a claim to validity” (Edmund Husserl, The 
Idea of Phenomenology, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964], 4.). 
         In 1911, Husserl clarifies the transcendental reorientation inaugurated in 1905 with Philosophy as Rigorous 
Science. While he does not there use the language of the reduction, he nevertheless proposes a “science of 
consciousness that explores the psychic in respect of what is immanent in it,” and with careful consideration of its 
specific mode of “direct givenness” (Edmund Husserl, “Philosophy as Rigorous Science,” in Phenomenology and 
the Crisis of Philosophy, trans. Quentin Lauer [New York: Harper & Row, 1965], 93). In this methodology, one 
abstracts oneself from what Husserl calls a “phenomenological naiveté” (Ibid., 94), in which any number of 
“prejudices and preconditions” (Ibid., 102.), particularly those regarding the “empirical being in the ensemble of 
nature” (Ibid., 91.), are simply presupposed. As in the prior case, the basic moves of the phenomenological 
reduction, albeit without the later technical jargon, are present. This technical language will first appear two years 
later in Ideas I. 
         In Ideas I, the “naiveté” of the previous work is fleshed out into the “natural attitude,” the mode of positing 
within which phenomena are immediately incorporated into the metaphysically and axiologically dense schema of a 
spatial, temporal, and valuable “world.” Against this natural attitude, Husserl posits a scientific alternative, the 
phenomenological attitude. Here, “every thesis related to … objectivity must be disconnected and changed into its 
bracketed counterpart” (Husserl, Ideas, 58), that is to say, every posited characteristic of the phenomenon, 
everything that is not immediately given to consciousness, must be methodologically set aside.  
By reducing all phenomena to what is absolutely given to consciousness prior to all metaphysical, 
theoretical, or naive positings, Husserl understands himself to have granted access to a new domain of philosophical 
inquiry; the only domain, to be sure, within which philosophy might attain scientific rigor: the domain of immanent 
consciousness.  
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This submission of the body to the transcendental reduction was taken by many of 
Husserl’s contemporaries and later critics as evidence of a fundamental disregard for the body. 
Thus, even if the strong version of the critique failed to hold—as Husserl undoubtedly centers the 
body in his writings—the weaker version ostensibly stands. For Husserl, the body is merely 
accidental. Were this the summation of Husserl’s account of the body, then one might conclude 
with his early critics that Husserl’s account of the body is impoverished; to recall Ingarden’s 
critique, one might suggest that the problem of the body was not “taken by [Husserl] even one step 
beyond the traditional state of the problem.”46   
Yet, as the defenders of Husserl are quick to note, this is by no means the end of Husserl’s 
consideration of the unique role of the body. On the one hand, Husserl will not diverge from his 
fundamental conception of the body as distinct from the transcendental Ego. The body, for Husserl, 
remains couched in the language of property. The body is something which is possessed; it is 
“mine” (mein),47 it is not “me.”48 Even in his most radical moments, he is unlikely to affirm, as 
does the later French phenomenological tradition, “the problem of the body is that it is an I: not 
                                               
46 Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, 70. 
 
47 See, e.g.: Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: 
Second Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 223, 224, 259. For ease and concision of space, 
subsequent citations will simply refer to “Husserl, Ideas II.” 
 
48 It is worth noting, even if only in passing, that much of the subsequent tradition of phenomenological reflection on 
the body is precisely oriented toward the rejection of this “property” thesis. As  Luijpen paradigmatically writes, “it 
is not possible to apply to my body what, according to Marcel, can be said of the object of ‘having.’ I ‘have’ a car, a 
pen, a book. In this ‘having’ the object of the ‘having’ reveals itself as an exteriority. There is a distance between me 
and what I ‘have.’ What I ‘have’ is to a certain extent independent of me. I can dispose of it or give it away without 
ceasing to be what I am—a man [sic]. The same cannot be asserted of my body, at least not without so many 
restrictions that ‘having’ is deprived of its strict sense. My body is not so far removed from my conscious self as is 
the ashtray on my desk. Likewise, my body is not something external to me like my car. I cannot dispose of my 
body or give it away as I dispose of money or give away my golf clubs. All this stems from the fact that my body is 
not ‘a’ body but my body, not in the same way as my golf clubs are mine, but in such a way that my body embodies 
me.” William A. Luijpen, Existential Phenomenology (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1960), 188. 
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some ‘thing’ that we may or may not possess, but something we are.”49 It is nevertheless the case 
that the account of the body found in his subsequent writings—particularly his most sustained 
treatment of the body in Ideas II—presents an account of the body which highlights that it is not 
merely one constituted “thing” within the world of spatial-thingly objects. Rather, the body plays 
an equally important constituting role. Far from merely accidental, the body stands as a condition 
of possibility for any objective world whatsoever.  
 
B. The Constituted Body: 
 
In Ideas II, Husserl seeks to bridge the seemingly insurmountable gap between the immanent 
region of pure consciousness opened up by Ideas I and the everyday, material-sensible world as 
understood by the natural sciences. Central to this project is a deep understanding of the Leib, 
understood as medium between these two spheres; the Leib is situated “between the rest of the 
material world and the ‘subjective’ sphere.”50 But, this mediating role requires that the Leib stand 
in a precarious position, both a constituted phenomenon and a necessary component in the 
constitution of “higher objectivities.”51  
The unique constituting-constituted character of the Leib becomes increasingly apparent 
throughout Ideas II. By the third chapter of Section One, Husserl already suggests that the Leib 
may be a necessary (rather than contingent) component in the constitution of spatial-thingly 
objects. This suspicion emerges from the need for a receptive figure capable of receiving the 
                                               
49 Jean-Yves Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute, trans. Mark Raftery-Skeban (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2004), 7. 
 
50 Husserl, Ideas II, 169. 
 
51 Ibid., 160. 
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sensible givenness of aesthetic sensations. This suspicion can be understood as a specific 
application of Husserl’s broader polar, intentional framework.52 As Husserl writes: 
It pertains in general to the essence of every cogito that a new cogito of the kind 
called by us ‘Ego-reflection’ is in principle possible, one that grasps, on the basis 
of the earlier cogito (which itself is thereby phenomenologically altered), the pure 
subject of that earlier cogito.53 
 
That is to say, to every form of givenness encountered in phenomenological reflection, there must 
also correspond something like a subject-pole capable of receiving this particular mode of 
givenness. Ultimately, Husserl insists, every cogito is intentionally referred to the transcendental 
Ego: “everything objective, in the broadest sense of the word, is thinkable only as correlate of a 
possible consciousness or, more precisely, a correlate of a possible ‘I think’ and consequently as 
referable to a pure Ego.”54 Nevertheless, a central claim of Ideas II is that the transcendental Ego 
on its own cannot account for the constitution of the spatial world or spatial things. What is needed 
instead is an intermediary “Ego-like” structure that would permit this constitution of a spatial-
thingly world. It is the Leib which is granted this mediating role, due to its unique relationship to 
sensible intuitions. In order to understand this particular relationship, it is necessary to situate the 
discussion of the Leib in relation to the larger, overarching argument of the text. 
Central among the aims of Ideas II is the recognition that the natural-scientific world is not 
immediately given, but rather emerges through a complex series of constitutions, ultimately 
reducible to the sensible impressions of the hyletic flux. “We are always,” Husserl insists:  
                                               
52 “It belongs as a general feature to the essence of every actual cogito to be a consciousness of something. … All 
experiences which have these essential properties in common are also called ‘intentional experiences’ (acts in the 
very wide sense of the Logical Investigations); in so far as they are a consciousness of something they are said to be 
‘intentionally related’ to this something.” Husserl, Ideas, 67.  
 
53 Ibid., 107. 
 
54 Ibid. 
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Led back further analytically and arrive finally at sense-objects in a different sense, 
ones which lie at the ground (constitutively understood) of all spatial objects and, 
consequently, of all thing-objects of material reality, too, and which lead us back 
again to certain ultimate syntheses, but to syntheses which precede every thesis. … 
Here, with the pure datum of sensation, we encounter a pregivenness which yet 
precedes the constitution of the object as object.55 
 
Yet, this return to “sense intuitions” or “sense things”56 is, on its own, unable to complete Husserl’s 
project of tracing the “idea of the essence of nature”57—and ultimately all theoretical acts—back 
to “pre-given objectivities which do not spring from theoretical acts but are constituted in 
intentional lived experiences.”58  
What Husserl recognizes is that the originary givenness of the sense-thing—the thing 
insofar as it is not yet intersubjectively constituted as an Object [Objekt] in the technical sense—
always refers itself back to a subject capable of relating to this aesthetic intuition. “The qualities 
of material things, such as they present themselves to me intuitively,” he suggests, “prove to be 
dependent on my qualities, the makeup of the experiencing subject, and to be related to my Body 
[Leib].”59 For Husserl, the primordial sensorial givenness, while ultimately reducible to a hyletic 
flow, nevertheless cannot be intuitively given without the mediating influence of an aesthetic body. 
It is necessary to bridge the gap between the constituting transcendental Ego and the “full 
givenness of the thing,” insofar as it gives itself sensibly.60  
                                               
55 Husserl, Ideas II, 24-25. 
 
56 Ibid., 60. 
 
57 Ibid., 3. 
 
58 Ibid., 9. 
 
59 Ibid., 61. In Husserl scholarship, it has become conventional to translate Leib as “Body” and Körper as “body.” 
These translations can be assumed for all citations of Husserl’s texts. 
 
60 Ibid., 60. 
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The transcendental Ego cannot play this role for two reasons. First, it lacks the self-
referential kinesthetic sensations necessary for the localization of sensible impressions. Second, it 
is not itself spatially situated. These two characteristics therefore become central to Husserl’s 
account of the Leib. In this regard the constitutive role of the Leib must begin with an account of 
the Leib’s own constitution. For Husserl, the lived body or Leib cannot be assumed as a natural 
given; “when we approach the constitution of the natural Object … we may not presuppose [the] 
Body as a fully constituted material thing.”61 Instead, the Leib itself undergoes a constitution that 
can be re-traced through phenomenological reflection.  
In order to undertake this task, Husserl seeks to identify a phenomenon through which the 
constitution of the body would be made manifest. He settles upon the analysis, later recapitulated 
in a simplified form by Merleau-Ponty,62 of the experience of one hand touching the other. He 
begins: 
Touching my left hand, I have touch-appearances, that is to say, I do not just sense, 
but I perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth hand, with such a form. The 
indicational sensations of movement and the representational sensations of touch, 
which are Objectified as features of the thing, ‘left hand,’ belong in fact to my right 
                                               
61 Ibid., 151. 
 
62 “It is no different, in spite of what may appear to be the case, with my tactile body, for if I can, with my left hand, 
feel my right hand as it touches an object, the right hand as an object is not the right hand as it touches: the first is a 
system of bones, muscles and flesh brought down at a point of space, the second shoots through space like 
a rocket to reveal the external object in its place. Insofar as it sees or touches the world, my body can therefore be 
neither seen nor touched. What prevents its ever being an object, ever being ‘completely constituted’ is that it is that 
by which there are objects. It is neither tangible nor visible in so far as it is that which sees and touches. The body 
therefore is not one more among external objects, with the peculiarity of always being there.” Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, 105. Commenting on this simplification, Al-Saji writes: “Merleau-Ponty reads the 
touching-touched experience as a relation of subject and object—of for-itself and in-itself which are mutually 
exclusive to one another. In this context, my hand can be either absolute subject, ‘alive and mobile,’ touching and 
exploring the world; or it can be touched by my other hand, and descend into a passivity that does not even feel itself 
as such. It seems that the touched hand loses its affectivity; it cannot feel its being touched while my other hand 
consciously palpates it. At that moment, the touched hand becomes an object, a ‘bundle of bones and muscles.’ Its 
power to touch, and its awareness of itself, is there only in memory and anticipation, waiting for the next instant 
when it can regain this power and, touching the other hand, reduce it to the status of an object.” Alia Al-Saji, 
“Bodies and sensings: On the uses of Husserlian phenomenology for feminist theory,” Continental Philosophy 
Review 43 (2010):13–37, 21. 
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hand. But when I touch the left hand I also find in it, too, series of touch-sensations, 
which are ‘localized’ in it.63  
 
This analysis begins with the recognition that each of these hands can rightly be understood as an 
object among every other spatial-thingly object. This Leibkörper, insofar as it is conceived apart 
from its relationship to sensation, is Körper, a mere object: “if I speak of the physical thing, ‘left 
hand,’ then I am abstracting from these sensations.”64 Nevertheless, such a move is an abstraction. 
What differentiates the Leibkörper from other bodies in the material world is that it is constituted 
“in a double way.”65 As well as being “a physical thing, matter,” it is also constituted with equal 
primordiality in relation to these sensations that “I find on it, and I sense ‘on’ it and ‘in’ it.”66 If 
one does not abstract away from these sensations, Husserl suggests, “then it is not that the physical 
thing is now richer, but instead it becomes a Body [Leib].”67 What Husserl discovers through his 
analysis of the touching hands, is that the constitution of the Leib must be understood through its 
relation to sensation68—or more precisely, through the relationship of two distinct modalities of 
sensation.   
 The specific mechanism by which the Leib is constituted is a process through which 
sensations—paradigmatically, but not solely, tactile sensations—are incorporated into a spatial 
framework. Husserl names this process localization: the Leib “becomes a Body only by 
                                               
63 Husserl, Ideas II, 152. 
 
64 Ibid. 
 
65 Ibid., 153. 
 
66 Ibid. 
 
67 Ibid., 152. 
 
68 As Al-Saji writes, “the lived Body is thus distinguished by its possession of sensations.” Alia Al-Saji, “The site of 
affect in Husserl's phenomenology: Sensations and the constitution of the lived body,” Philosophy Today 41 (2000): 
51-59, 54. 
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incorporating tactile sensations, pain sensations, etc.—in short, by the localization of the 
sensations as sensations.”69 This process of localization describes the incorporation of external 
sensations into what might be called—to borrow Merleau-Ponty’s later terminology—the Leib’s 
body image or corporeal schema (Körperschema).70  
This incorporation requires that the various hyletic “sensation-fields”71 (touch, sight, 
hot/cold, aural, etc.) be drawn together with fields of kinesthetic sensations, such that when I move 
my hand, these external sensations vary in a predictable manner. The same applies for other sense-
fields as well: “the eye, too, is a field of localization. … The same applies to hearing. The ear is 
‘involved’.”72 Certainly, localization in these cases does not function in the same manner as tactile 
localization—“the sensed tone is not localized in the ear”73—but it is nevertheless the case that 
movements of the eye or ear, for example, produce predictably variable changes in sensation. This 
fact constitutes the motivational character of kinesthetic sensation: the kinesthetic sensations 
“motivate those apprehensions” of hyletic sensations. I move my eye to the right and objects move 
across my visual-field to the left. As I move my ear closer to a sound, it gets predictably louder.74  
 Husserl names this richer, passive synthesis of hyletic and kinesthetic sensation: sensings 
[Empfindnisse]. This neologism, Empfindnisse, as Al-Saji notes, “brings together the notions of 
                                               
69 Husserl, Ideas II, 159. [emphasis added] 
 
70 “My whole body for me is not an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space. I am in undivided possession of it 
and I know where each of my limbs is through a body schema in which all are included.” Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, 112-113. 
 
71 Husserl, Ideas II, 162. 
 
72 Ibid., 156. 
 
73 Ibid. 
 
74 “In seeing, the eyes are directed upon the seen and run over its edges, surfaces, etc. When it touches objects, the 
hand slides over them. Moving myself, I bring my ear closer in order to hear.” Ibid., 61. 
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both Erlebnis (lived experience) and Empfindung (sensation).”75 By turning to this language of 
sensings, she continues, “sensation is productively redefined, away from Husserl’s earlier 
understanding of sensation in terms of senseless and undifferentiated hyle calling for 
apprehension.”76 That is to say, the turn to Empfindnisse represents Husserl’s attempt to think 
sensation outside of an empirical or representational model. Rather, sensings are always manifest 
in a double manner, both kinesthetic/lived and affective/impressional (hyle or Empfindung).  
 This dual character of sensings is central to Husserl’s account of the constitution of the 
Leib. For Husserl, the Leib is precisely the constituted unity that emerges from the passive 
synthesis and localization of these various sensings. As Al-Saji writes, these “sensations form an 
overlapping and interpenetrating multiplicity, and it is this interwoven multiplicity that allows the 
formation and animation of the Body as Leib.”77 Moreover, this constitution of the Leib permits 
the body to stand “between the rest of the material world and the ‘subjective’ sphere”78 precisely 
because the body is doubled at this primordial level. Having been constituted by Empfindnisse 
which are the synthesis of hetero-affective impressions and auto-affective kinestheses, the 
Leibkörper itself manifests in a double way, as both a subjective and an objective phenomenon—
a lived experience of bodily being (Leib) and at the same time a thing among things (Körper).  
This constituted character is sometimes read as a rejection of the body’s constitutive 
capacity: a phenomenon must be either constituted or constituting, ontical or ontological, it cannot 
be both. This reductive approach is not the case for Husserl. Rather, as was already seen above, he 
                                               
75 Al-Saji, “Bodies and sensings,” 18. 
 
76 Ibid., 18-19. 
 
77 Al-Saji, “The site of affectivity in the phenomenology of Husserl,” 53. 
 
78 Husserl, Ideas II, 169. 
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remains clear: although it is itself passively constituted through the localization of sensations and 
the synthesis of sensings, the Leib is also a necessary constituent in “the constitution of Objects as 
spatial things.”79 
 
C. The Constituting Body: 
 
Having been constituted through the localization of sensations, the Leib becomes the zero-point 
(the “here”) around which and in relation to which the sensed world is constituted. “Provisionally, 
we must say: I have all things over and against me; they are all ‘there’—with the exception of one 
and only one, namely the Body, which is always ‘here’.”80 This unique role of the Leib—as the 
“zero-point”81 of orientation within the spatial world—allows one to make sense of Husserl’s 
insistence upon the necessity of the body for the constitution of the spatial thing. Simply put, the 
Ego cannot function, on its own, as the site for the localization of sensations because the 
transcendental Ego does not have a site, it is not spatially located, it has no “here.” This “here” is 
absolutely necessary for the constitution of spatial objects because, as eidetic reflection reveals, 
perspective and constitution-by-adumbration are necessary features of the constitution of 
perceptual objects.82  
                                               
79 Ibid., 160. 
 
80 Ibid., 166. 
 
81 “The Body [Leib] then has, for its particular Ego, the unique distinction of bearing in itself the zero point of all 
these orientations.” Ibid., 166. 
 
82 “Besides its distinction as a center of orientation, the Body [Leib], in virtue of the constitutive role of the 
sensations, is of significance for the construction of the spatial world. In all constitution of spatial thinghood, two 
kinds of sensations, with totally different constituting functions, are involved, and necessarily so, if representations 
of the spatial are to be possible. The first kind are the sensations which constitute, by means of the apprehensions 
allotted to them, corresponding features of the thing as such by way of adumbration.” Ibid., 62. 
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Because the transcendental Ego lacks any sort of spatial character, the constitution of a 
spatio-thingly world points back to the eidetic necessity of a body, the universal perceptual organ 
of the Ego. As Husserl writes, the Leib is “the medium of all perception; it is the organ of 
perception and is necessarily involved in all perception,”83 or again, “in all perception and 
perceptual exhibition (experience) the Body is involved as freely moved sense organ, as freely 
moved totality of sense organs.”84 In the constituting of a spatial world, the transcendental Ego 
finds itself spatially manifest through an “organ of the spirit.”85  
 In his phenomenological analysis of the Leib, Husserl discovers an intimate relation 
between the Leib and the Ego, for whom the Leib functions as a  “system of organs.”86 Husserl 
names the synthesis by which these two are brought into relation, animation. This animation has 
two principal effects. From the perspective of the object-pole, the perceptual experiences of the 
Leib are now granted full “psychic significance”—the perceptual experiences of the Leib are 
intentionally constituted as meaningful. From the perspective of the Ego-pole, the Leib manifests 
as “an organ of the will,” as an “I can” that is capable of undertaking free acts.87  
Having been animated in this manner, the constitution of the objective world emerges as 
the reciprocal side of the constitution of the Leib itself. Just as the Leib is constituted through the 
localization of sensations motivated by kinestheses, so too is the objective world—the “Object 
                                               
83 Ibid., 61. 
 
84 Ibid. 
 
85 Ibid., 102. 
 
86 Ibid., 168. Or, as he writes in his Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis,  “an entire system of 
compatibly harmonizing organs of perception” Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: 
Lectures on Transcendental Logic, trans. Anthony J. Steinbock (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 50. 
 
87 “Only Bodies are immediately spontaneously (‘freely’) moveable, and they are so, specifically, by means of the 
free Ego and its will which belong to them.” Husserl, Ideas II, 159. 
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counter-pole”—itself simultaneously constituted through this self-same process of localization.88 
In this reciprocal constitution, the auto- and hetero-affective sensings draw these two constituted 
poles together; they are revealed as “the way my Body lives in, and experiences, the ‘redness’ of 
the thing, the roughness of the surface—as vibrations of its own being.”89  
 
D. The Ego-Like Body: 
 
Because the animation of the Leib grants it a key role in the constitution of objectivities, this 
animation draws the Leib into an ambiguous relationship with the transcendental Ego. In the 
constitution of an Objective world, the Ego must deputize the Leib as what Husserl calls an “Ego-
like” structure. “Everything properly ‘subjective’ and Ego-like, lies on the side of the spirit,” 
Husserl writes, “whereas the Body is called ‘Ego-like’ only in virtue of this animation, and its 
states and qualities are only thereby called ‘my’ qualities, subjective, of the Ego.”90 This term—
“Ego-like”—perfectly captures the extent to which Husserl appears torn between two ways of 
conceptualizing the nature of this relationship between the Ego and the Leib. On the one hand, 
Husserl recognizes that the Leib holds a key constitutive role in phenomenological life. Yet, on 
the other, he appears deeply reticent to grant the Leib the full subjective significance of the 
transcendental Ego. 
                                               
88 Writing of this double character of sensation, Husserl writes: “my hand is lying on the table. I experience the table 
as something solid, cold, and smooth. Moving my hand over the table, I get an experience of it and its thingly 
determinations. At the same time, I can at any moment pay attention to my hand and find on it touch-sensations, 
sensations running parallel to the experienced movement, I find motion-sensations, etc. Lifting a thing, I experience 
its weight, but at the same time I have weight-sensations localized in my Body. And thus, my Body’s entering into 
physical relations (by striking, pressing, pushing, etc.) with other material things provides in general not only the 
experience of physical occurrences, related to the Body and to things, but also the experience of specifically Bodily 
occurrences of the type we call sensings.” Ibid., 154.  
 
89 Al-Saji, “The site of affectivity in the phenomenology of Husserl,” 53. 
 
90 Husserl, Ideas II, 102. 
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The weight of the relationship between the Leib and the Ego can be identified in a 
particularly revealing appendix to Ideas II. There, Husserl develops the distinction between the 
Ego and constituted objects, or as he there calls them: the “over-and-against” or the “non-ego.” As 
he opens the appendix: “everything originally proper to the subject is unified in the Ego and 
belongs consequently on the side of the Ego. Everything else is over and against it. We have here 
with respect to all constituted ‘things’ and ‘matters,’ an asymmetrical, non-reversible relation.”91   
Throughout this appendix, it is clear that Husserl is unsure how to deal with the Leib. On 
the one hand, he is certain that objectivities constituted through the Leib are non-ego.92 But does 
the same conclusion apply to the Leib itself, insofar as it too is constituted? Or, does the unique 
role of animation put the Leib, insofar as it is Ego-like, “on the side of the ego”? Whichever route 
Husserl chooses to follow will not only be determinative of the relationship between the Leib and 
the Ego, but will likewise remain key for understanding the relationship between the analyses that 
dominate Ideas I and Ideas II.  
 Husserl’s solution to this problem is threefold. First, he emphasizes the constituted 
character of the Leib and highlights its continuity with the world of constituted, material beings. 
Second, he marks the Leib as something that the transcendental Ego “has” as its property or 
possession. Third, he renders the relationship between the Leib and the Ego—the “Ego-like” 
character of the Leib—through the language of the “gift.” 
 Husserl most clearly marks this first point in §57 of Ideas II where he is tasked with 
determining the distinction between the “personal Ego” and the “pure Ego.” There, Husserl insists 
                                               
91 Ibid., 330. 
 
92 “It is now evident and beyond discussion that what is most proper to the Ego is something experienced in or at the 
Body, that it is something unified with the Body in the manner of a constituted stratum within a constituted 
Objectivity. Each such Objectivity and stratum indeed belongs on the side of the not-Ego, the over-and-against, 
which has sense only as the over-and-against of an Ego.” Ibid., 331. 
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that the personal Ego must be distinguished from the pure Ego, because whereas the former is 
itself closely bound to the Leib, the pure Ego is essentially distinct or independent of the Leib.  
The Body is in that case something I have, hence in the broadest sense something 
over against me just like everything pregiven, foreign to the Ego, in analogy with 
the things of my environment. To be sure, the Body has here (as we already saw 
earlier) a particular subjectivity; it is proper to me in a special sense: it is the organ 
and system of organs of the Ego, the organ of perception, the organ of my effects 
on the “outside,” on the extra Bodily environment, etc. I myself, however, am the 
subject of the actual “I live”: I undergo and I do, I am affected, I have my own 
“over and against.”93 
 
Yet, even in this case, there remain clear moments of wavering. The Leib is “just like” other 
constituted objectivities; yet it is likewise “proper to me in a special way.” Even when Husserl 
self-consciously seeks to demarcate the Leib from the pure Ego, the precise manner of their 
distinction is not obvious. Because of this ambiguity, the essential difference appears to stand not 
on the correlation between the Leib and the environment—a correlation always already 
undermined by the unique constitutive role of the Leib. Rather, the essential difference between 
the two—taken in the rigorous sense of an eidetic difference—is marked by the use of the language 
of “having” versus the language of “being.”  
Whereas the Ego is something that I am, something that, properly speaking, “lives” its 
experiences, the Leib is merely something that the I (or my transcendental Ego) has. It is merely 
the “organ and system of organs of the Ego.” This possessive language runs throughout Ideas II. 
“The subject also ‘has’ his Body, and as it is said, his psychic lived experiences are ‘bound to the 
Body,”94 and again, more succinctly: “I am not my Body, but I have my Body.”95 While Ideas II 
lacks a rigorous analysis which would establish this distinction, Husserl is here likely presupposing 
                                               
93 Ibid., 259. 
 
94 Ibid., 129. 
 
95 Ibid., 99. 
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the analyses of §54 of Ideas I, discussed above: wherein an imaginative variation of the 
annihilation of the entire transcendent world established the formal distinction between the 
transcendental Ego and the Leib.  
The subjectivity of the Leib must therefore be understood as originally proper to the 
transcendental Ego. The act of animation wherein the Leib is endowed with its Ego-like character 
is a contingent act wherein the Ego “gifts” the Leib with subjectivity. The Leib, Husserl writes, is 
“an intuitively constituted Objectivity … consequently the special status of the Body is by grace 
of the Ego (or of Ego-like originary intuition).”96  
* * * 
While this account of the “Ego-like” body is unlikely to appease those who would demand a total 
identification of the Ego and body, it does give the lie to those who would suggest that the body 
was insufficiently theorized by Husserl. Rather, as is clear throughout Ideas II, if not already in 
Thing and Space, from the very foundation of phenomenological thinking in Edmund Husserl, the 
body has played a prominent role. Never merely one object among others, the body stands as a key 
bridge between the pure region of immanent consciousness opened up by Ideas I and the 
transcendent region of nature, as studied by the empirical sciences.97 By situating this Leib in this 
precarious position of both a constituted and constituting phenomenon, the Leib is able to keep 
one foot in both regions. On the one hand, being passively constituted by the localization of 
sensations, the Leib can account for the passive or receptive character of the Ego. Through the 
Leib, the Ego can have access to the sensations necessary for the manifestation of a spatio-material 
                                               
96 Husserl, Ideas II, 224. 
 
97 As Husserl writes, inaugurating Section Two’s turn to the pure Ego, “let us now proceed to investigate the essence 
of the soul, the human or animal soul, as it is, in its connection with the material Body, an Object of natural-
scientific research.” Husserl, Ideas II, 96. 
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world. Only through the Leib can the Ego find itself affected by the world of transcendent objects. 
On the other hand, as an “Ego-like” entity, the Leib is also animated by the pure Ego. It is free, 
can will, act, and think (see: Ideas II §38). In this regard, it is only through the body that the active 
characteristics of the Ego are granted the ability to affect the world. The body is precisely the 
system of organs through which the Ego can reach out into and affect the transcendent world.  
 
§II. The Living Body in French Phenomenology 
 
 
In the genealogy of radical phenomenology’s account of the sexual flesh, the first generation of 
French phenomenologists—particularly Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de 
Beauvoir, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty—play an indisputable role. The following two sections will 
mark two significant transformations within the phenomenological thinking of the body 
inaugurated by these thinkers. In the present section, it will be shown how Husserl’s transcendental 
Ego is gradually erased from phenomenological discourse and eventually replaced by the 
immanent manifestation of the body itself; any problem solved by the transcendental Ego, these 
thinkers will gradually suggest, can be more directly solved by the body itself. In the following 
section, it will be shown that the body cannot be properly understood unless its nearly inescapable 
saturation by sexuality is recognized. For, as Merleau-Ponty famously remarked, “sexuality is co-
extensive with life.”98 
 
                                               
98 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 196. 
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A. The French Husserl 
 
In order to understand the account of the body generated by this first generation, it is necessary to 
recognize their work as a product of a distinctively French reception of Husserl—a reception 
uniquely centered on one text: the Cartesian Meditations. 
In 1929, Husserl delivered two lectures at the Sorbonne, entitled “Introduction to 
Transcendental Phenomenology.” These lectures constituted the first formal introduction of 
phenomenology to the French context. In the lectures—later expanded as the Cartesian 
Meditations, and translated into French by Gabriella Peiffer and Emmanuel Levinas in 1931—
Husserl recontextualizes his phenomenology “if not ingratiatingly, at least with a degree of 
dexterity”99 into a Cartesian idiom. As he writes in the opening moments, “one might almost call 
transcendental phenomenology a neo-Cartesianism,” even if, Husserl will immediately insist, 
phenomenology “is obliged—and precisely by its radical development of Cartesian motifs—to 
reject nearly all the well-known doctrinal content of the Cartesian philosophy.”100 In this short 
text, one finds an at-times novel account of phenomenology. Nevertheless, Husserl will shortly 
thereafter characterize it as his magnum opus, writing in a letter to Roman Ingarden in 1930: 
This is to be the main work of my life, an abridgment of my philosophy I have 
developed, a fundamental work of method and of a philosophical problematic. It is 
for me, at least, in light of the conclusion and ultimate clarity that I have developed, 
something with which I can die in peace.101 
 
                                               
99 Michel Foucault, et al. “Considerations on Marxism, Phenomenology and Power. Interview with Michel Foucault; 
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100 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 1. 
 
101 Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden: Mit Erläuterungen und Erinnerungen an Husserl, ed. Roman 
Ingarden (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 59. As cited in Franck, The Flesh and Body, 14. 
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The heart of the Meditations is the Fifth Meditation, which Franck rightly notes, “is almost 
as important as the first four together.”102 Titled “Uncovering of the Sphere of Transcendental 
Being as Monadological Intersubjectivity,”  this fifth section undertakes “a peculiar kind of 
epoché,”103 one which “disregard[s] all constitutional effects of intentionality relating immediately 
or mediately to other subjectivity”104 in order to return to a sphere of radical ownness.  
This focus upon the monadological sphere of ownness together with a Cartesian tenor—
the “radicalness of [Descartes’] spirit”105—, results in a uniquely “egological” appropriation of 
Husserl within France. As Michel Foucault later reflects:  
It is absolutely true that at the time that I was studying the only form, the only two 
forms of philosophy that seemed possible to us, I don’t even say that they were 
dominant, the only two domains of possibility were Hegel—and Marx—and then 
there was phenomenology, which had always functioned in France, always 
developed as a philosophy of the subject. … once Husserl arrives in France, once 
he is finally recognized in France, and gives lectures under the auspices of the 
Société Française de Philosophie, what does he talk about? What does he do? The 
Cartesian Meditations! Which means that France only knew Husserl via an angle 
which I am not sure was, or represented, the main line of phenomenology. Because 
in particular, the whole fundamental problem of phenomenology was ultimately a 
problem of logic: how to found logic. We were not so familiar with all that in 
France.106 
 
For the French readers of Husserl, phenomenology first and foremost represented a new 
philosophy of the subject, an egology which, while meaningfully distinct from its Cartesian and 
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Kantian forebears, was directly situated within their shadow. Nevertheless, even given this focus 
upon the philosophy of the subject, the French tradition was far from neglecting the body in favor 
of the Ego. Rather, quite to the contrary, almost from the beginning the French tradition sought to 
radicalize the relationship between the Ego and the body through two complementary 
reorientations: a diminishment—eventuating in an erasure—of the transcendental Ego, and the 
substitution of this Ego with the body itself. The first of these steps is exemplified in the work of 
Jean-Paul Sartre.  
 
B. The (R)ejected Ego 
In his 1936 The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre sought to rescue the phenomenological project 
by casting the Husserlian Ego out of the sphere of ownness. Like his countryman Robespierre, 
who proclaimed that “Louis must die so that the country may live,”107 Jean-Paul Sartre likewise 
sought to save the most profound insights of phenomenology by decapitating phenomenology’s 
own illegitimate regent, the transcendental Ego. According to Sartre, this revolution was 
undertaken with ease; one can “quite simply eject” the deposed Ego from the immanent sphere of 
ownness “like some noisy visitor.” Indeed, for Sartre, the Ego is “perfectly all right outside.”108 
In this early essay, Sartre echoes his predecessors—both the early “Munich circle” and 
Martin Heidegger—pitting Husserl’s early Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time and the 
Logical Investigations against the post-transcendental-turn writings (particularly Ideas I).109 In 
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these early texts Husserl remains convinced that the empirical ego can be ultimately reduced to 
the unified flow of conscious experience: “the phenomenologically reduced [empirical] ego is 
therefore nothing peculiar, floating above many experiences: it is simply identical with their own 
interconnected unity.”110 The transcendental Ego, on the other hand, is quite simply and 
unceremoniously set aside: “I am quite unable to find this ego, this primitive, necessary centre of 
relations.”111 Nevertheless, in his subsequent edition of The Logical Investigations Husserl will, 
perhaps playfully, remark “I have since managed to find it.”112 Indeed, the missing Ego of The 
Logical Investigations takes pride of place in Ideas I where it will be identified as the “pure subject 
of the act,”113 which “no reduction can get any grip on.”114 
In The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre sets himself the task of recovering this earlier 
Husserlian position, inverting Ideas I and once again submitting the ego to the reign of 
consciousness: “the Ego is not the proprietor of consciousness,” he writes, “it is its object.”115 That 
is to say, rather than functioning as a primordial, immanent pole of every act of consciousness, 
Sartre suggests that the Ego itself is simply one more product of consciousness’ own constituting 
capacity: “it is a transcendent pole of synthetic unity, like the object-pole of the unreflected 
attitude. But this pole appears only in the world of reflection.”116 Having characterized the Ego as 
                                               
110 Edmund Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Routledge, 2001), 205. 
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113 Husserl, Ideas, 163. 
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115 Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, 45. 
 
116 Ibid., 21. As Barnes writes, “When consciousness tries to turn back upon itself and contemplate itself, it can 
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a constituted product of reflection, the Ego is therefore cast out of the immanence of primordial 
consciousness and into the constituted world of transcendent objects—“neither formally nor 
materially in consciousness: it is outside, in the world; it is a being in the world, like the Ego of 
another.”117  
In his magnum opus, Being and Nothingness, Sartre recapitulates and clarifies this thesis: 
often derisively condemning the notion of the transcendental Ego as a “useless and disastrous” 
hypothesis.118 Situating his previous claims within his present phenomenological ontology, he 
insists that “the Ego does not belong to the domain of the for-itself.”119 Rather, “the Ego appears 
to consciousness as a transcendent in-itself, as an existent in the human world, not as of the nature 
of consciousness.”120 That is to say, the transcendental Ego is not found within the “absolute 
immanence”121 or “presence to itself”122 of consciousness. On the contrary, insofar as the Ego is a 
product of reflection, it is an object like every object of the world. For Sartre’s existential 
phenomenology, this fact serves to propel the subject into the world, highlighting the Being-in-
the-world that is factically central to every subject. “If the Ego and the world are both objects of 
consciousness, if neither has created the other,” Barnes comments, “then consciousness by 
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establishing their relations to each other insures the active participation of the person in the 
world.”123  
 This ejection of the deposed transcendental Ego inaugurates, but fails to culminate the 
French radicalization of phenomenology. For, the ultimate aim of their phenomenological project 
is not only the erasure of the Ego, but ultimately the substitution of the body for the Ego.  
 
 
C. From Transcendental Ego to Living Body 
 
This turn to the body does not emerge as a rejection of Husserl, but as a radicalization of the 
account of the Leib found in Ideas II and the Cartesian Meditations. In the fifth meditation, for 
example, the Leib plays a prominent role in the sphere of ownness. As Husserl writes, “among the 
bodies belonging to this ‘nature’ and included in my peculiar ownness, I then find my flesh [Leib] 
as uniquely singled out—namely as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely a 
flesh [Leib].”124 As Didier Franck will later attest—but in a move consistent with the earlier French 
tradition—“the sphere of ownness [is] anchored in my flesh. … Flesh is the condition of the 
possibility of the thing, or better, the constitution of flesh is presupposed by all constitution of 
things. … This means that flesh is the universal medium for the givenness of bodies within the 
sphere of ownness.”125 By reading this priority of the flesh in a radical manner, the French 
reception of Husserl consistently amplifies the constitutive role granted the flesh in Husserl’s Ideas 
II, until it finally supplants the constitutive role of the transcendental Ego itself.  
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As in the previous case, this French tradition again begins with Jean-Paul Sartre. Emerging 
from the pseudo-Hegelian ontology of Being and Nothingness, Sartre identifies a tripartite 
manifestation of the body: the body for-itself, the body for-others, and the body “for myself as 
known by the other.”126 For the purpose of the present investigation, it is the first manifestation of 
the body that is particularly relevant. Here, the for-itself—that is, consciousness—is manifest in 
its facticity as body. “Being-for-itself must be fully body,” Sartre suggests, “there is nothing behind 
the body.”127  
 This body is understood as facticity insofar as its precise configuration remains contingent. 
But while the specific characteristics of the body are contingent, embodiment itself is not. Rather, 
the body is the for-itself made form: “we could define the body as the contingent form which is 
assumed by the necessity of my contingency.”128 Thus incarnation is not incidental to human 
existence, but a necessary transcendental feature: “for human reality, to be is to-be-there … it is 
an ontological necessity.”129 This necessity hinges on the ontologically foundational role of the 
body; it is only on the grounds of embodiment that the world and its “things”130 manifest to 
conscious being (for-itself).  
 Nevertheless, because Sartre’s broader ontology associates the for-itself with negation and 
nothingness—the for-itself is the “being by which nothingness comes to things”131—Sartre 
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131 Ibid., 57. It is necessary that nothingness be identified with the for-itself, because, “Nothingness can be conceived 
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unsurprisingly refrains from a positive account of the body-for-itself: “the body-for-itself is never 
a given which I can know … it exists only in so far as I escape it by nihilating myself.”132 The 
body is not a positive given precisely insofar as it is only manifest through the resistance of objects 
in the world: we do not perceive the body-for-itself, “we perceive the resistance of things.”133 
Moreover, in the same way, a bodily sense is never directly given, “any sense in so far as it is-for-
me is an inapprehensible.”134 Instead, the senses are reflectively constituted from the apprehension 
of various objects.135 Thus, Sartre turns against Maine de Biran’s famous thesis of the “sensation 
of effort.” Such a sensation, he insists, “does not really exist. For my hand reveals to me the 
resistance of objects, their hardness or softness, but not itself.”136  Ultimately, within Being and 
Nothingness the body-for-itself is therefore phantasmatic, reduced to the status of a mere sign of 
one’s being-in-the-world.137 A positive account of the body will necessitate a turn to Sartre’s 
contemporary, Merleau-Ponty, and his phenomenological analyses of perception.  
 Unlike Sartre’s Hegelian inflected phenomenological ontology, Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of the body directly draws upon Husserl’s account of the Leib in Ideas II. In fact, 
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Merleau-Ponty would be the first international scholar to visit the newly established Husserl 
Archive at Leuven in April 1939, with the express intention of consulting Husserl’s Ideas II.138 
Although Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception only explicitly cites the then 
unpublished manuscript one time,139 its influence on the production of Merleau-Ponty’s early 
thinking is undeniable. Throughout this early period, Merleau-Ponty’s aim will be to “re-establish 
the roots of the mind in its body,”140 thereby revealing the primacy of the living body—le corps 
vivant, as Merleau-Ponty will often render Leib—as the principal site and condition for the 
constitution of phenomena.  
 The first manuscript to emerge following Merleau-Ponty’s discovery of Husserl’s Ideas II 
is the oft neglected The Structure of Behavior. With this thesis, Merleau-Ponty sought to challenge 
behaviorist psychology through a synthesis of gestalt psychology141 and phenomenological 
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insights.142 While much of the text serves to elucidate technical disputes within the study of reflex, 
conditioning, and related behaviors, the text does establish a number of central theses regarding 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body. Already in his analysis of animal behavior and critique of 
Pavlov, for example, Merleau-Ponty insists that nothing would “be served by saying that behavior 
‘is conscious’ and that it reveals to us, as its other side, a being for-itself (pour soi) hidden behind 
the visible body.”143 While the terminology suggests a critique of Sartre,144 what is already 
apparent in The Structure of Behavior is a more general rejection of anything like a consciousness, 
mind, or Ego, insofar as it is understood as temporally, logically, or ontologically prior to 
embodiment. Simply put, Merleau-Ponty flatly “rejected Husserl’s notion of the transcendental 
ego.”145 In place of this transcendental Ego, as Sallis suggests, “Merleau-Ponty is substituting a 
bodily or sensible for-itself.”146 Thus, finally, the body is not something that one “has,” as we have 
seen Husserl continued to insist throughout his career, but something one “is.”147   
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 Merleau-Ponty gives his fullest account of this lived body that one “is” in Phenomenology 
of Perception. The heart of Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body is the recognition—following 
Husserl, albeit in a simplified form—of the multivalent manifestation of the body; the body is 
simultaneously both object and subject; it is “for us an in-itself.”148 As this language suggests, this 
account of the body is once again intended as a critique of the Sartrian ontology. Simply put, in 
order to disrupt the dualism of the in-itself and the for-itself, Merleau-Ponty draws forward the 
body as a limit phenomenon—both an object (in-itself) and a subject (for-itself)—which reveals 
the limit of this distinction.  
Merleau-Ponty begins his analysis with the “body as object,” as it is manifest within the 
mechanistic sciences. In analyses that follow and expand upon the studies of behavior in The 
Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty shows that the body consistently “evades”149 any simple 
reduction to objective materiality. This evasion is a result of the intentional structure of the body; 
the body—like the transcendental Ego it is understood to efface—“rises toward the world.”150 
Roughly following Husserl’s distinction between Körper and the Leib, Merleau-Ponty understands 
this intentionally directed body to be meaningfully distinct from the objective body. Whereas the 
objective body manifests within objective space, one’s lived body (le corps vivant)—also 
periodically designated as “one’s own body” (le corps propre), “phenomenal body” (corps 
phénoménal) or “body schema/image” (schéma corporel)151—is constituted through an entirely 
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distinct synthesis whereby it is not merely “in space,”152 but instead finds its own “bodily being” 
in a “primitive spatiality” defined not by the objective distance of a res extensa, but by the 
perceptual and practical spatiality of lived experience.  
Phenomenological evidence for this distinction is drawn from the examination of phantom 
limb syndrome (and its converse, anosognosia). In phantom limb syndrome one finds a disjunction 
between the objective body—missing a limb—and one’s body schema. What is at issue in the case 
of phantom limb syndrome, Merleau-Ponty argues, is therefore not a misplaced representation, 
which would itself still be an objective manifestation: “the phantom arm is not a representation of 
the arm, but the ambivalent presence of an arm.”153 Indeed, the phantom member reveals a 
disjunction not between mental representation and material reality, but between the objective body 
and the subjective experience of the body—le corps vivant.  
Like Husserl before him, Merleau-Ponty seeks to ground the constitution of le corps vivant 
in sensation and movement. Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty refuses to reduce the constitution of the 
body to “tactile sensations.” Instead, drawing upon the existential influence of Heidegger and 
Sartre, he suggests that “what unites ‘tactile sensations’, in the hand and links them to visual 
perceptions of the same hand, and to perceptions of the other bodily areas, is a certain style 
informing my manual gestures … and contributing, in the last resort, to a certain bodily bearing.”154 
Thus, in a surprising turn, it is not the individual sensations or kinesthesis which constitute le corps 
vivant, but conversely, le corps vivant functions as a “law of [their] constitution.”155 It is a certain 
                                               
152 Ibid., 171. 
 
153 Ibid., 94. 
 
154 Ibid., 174 [emphasis added]. 
 
155 Ibid., 114. 
 
 36 
bodily comportment or “style,” a pre-reflexive motility discovered and manifest in the concrete 
movements and gestures by which it engages the world, which is granted a constitutive primacy. 
Thus, while le corps vivant exists within “one and the same world”156 as the objective body, it is 
granted a quasi-transcendental privilege: “there would,” for example, “be no space at all for me if 
I had no body.”157 In its dialogical and dialectical relationship to the world, le corps vivant permits 
phenomena to manifest.  
 This understanding of the body as something one “is,” rather than something one “has” 
will be likewise echoed by Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s contemporary, Emmanuel Levinas.  In the 
early Existence and Existents, he will explicitly critique the Husserlian language of ownership, 
writing that “the body of possession is finally resolved into a set of experiences and cognitions. … 
I am my pain, my breathing, my organs. … I do not have a body, but am a body.”158 Or, more 
strongly in Totality and Infinity, “the body as naked body is not the first possession; it is still 
outside of having and not having.”159  
Yet, in a manner even more radical than his existential contemporaries, Levinas aims to 
fully extricate the body from any notion of self-constitution, whether the constitution of a 
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transcendental Ego or the “gestural” constitution of Merleau-Ponty’s bodily comportment. The 
body, he suggests: 
Is not a thing among things which I ‘constitute’ or see in God to be in a relation 
with a thought, nor is it the instrument of a gestural thought. … The body naked 
and indigent is … irreducible to a thought, of representation into life, of the 
subjectivity that represents into life which is sustained by these representations and 
lives of them; its indigence—its needs—affirm ‘exteriority’ as non-constituted, 
prior to all affirmation.160 
 
For Levinas, the body is always already marked by its encounter with the material world that 
nourishes it.161 The body is certainly passively constituted, but this is not the constitution of an 
Ego. Rather, the body emerges from a material relation that always already precedes the Ego: “to 
be a body is on the one hand to stand, to be master of oneself, and, on the other hand, to stand on 
earth, to be in the other, and thus to be encumbered by one’s body.”162 This material conception 
of bodily constitution permits Levinas not only to collapse the Sartrian dualism between the body 
in-itself and the body for-itself (as had Merleau-Ponty), but likewise to collapse even Merleau-
Ponty’s own distinction between le corps vivant and the objective body. For Levinas, any possible 
dualism within the manifestation of the body is overcome by the body’s own material origin: “there 
therefore exists no duality—lived body and physical body—which would have to be reconciled. 
                                               
160 Ibid., 127. While “exteriority” here is laying the framework for the ethical shift in subsequent passages, and the 
introduction of the “face of the Other” as the figure of transcendence and exteriority par excellence, Levinas here 
understands “exteriority” as the encounter with a world or reality that anticipates the constituting subject and 
functions as the condition of possibility for such a subject. Thus, for example, he undertakes a phenomenology of 
the jouissance of eating, wherein food or nutrition is discovered as a condition that preexists the constitution of the 
subject. Therefore, in a manner that is intended to anticipate the constitution of the subject by the Other, Levinas 
here finds the subject constituted by a material world. 
 
161 See: Ibid., 127-130. 
 
162 Ibid., 164. 
 
 38 
The dwelling which lodges and prolongs life, the world life acquires and utilizes by labor, is also 
the physical world where labor is interpreted as a play of anonymous forces.”163 
The ultimate result of this French tradition’s complementary movements—the diminution 
of the Ego and the amplification of the body—is an increasing commitment among French 
phenomenologists that the role reserved for the Ego in Husserl’s phenomenology may be realized 
by the flesh itself. Insofar as the Ego is demoted to a mere “material me”164 within the world, and 
the living body is simultaneously recognized as a necessary (and perhaps even sufficient) 
component in the constitution of objective phenomena and unification of conscious life, then a 
tendency to either erase the transcendental Ego or absorb it into the flesh becomes almost 
unavoidable. As Merleau-Ponty summarizes the position:  
The body is no longer merely an object in the world … It is on the side of the 
subject. … As Descartes once said profoundly, the soul is not merely in the body 
like a pilot in his ship; it is wholly intermingled with the body. The body in turn, is 
wholly animated, and all its functions contribute to the perception of objects—an 
activity long considered by philosophy to be pure knowledge.165  
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§III. Phenomenology and the Sexual Body 
 
A: Husserl On Sexuality 
 
In §55 of The Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl lists a number of problems that emerge from 
the phenomenological analysis of “communal life,” setting an agenda for future phenomenological 
research. Among the listed problems are birth, death, and “the problem of the sexes.”166  Yet, as 
Sara Heinämaa has noted, “Husserl’s work does not include a phenomenological analysis of 
sexuality or sexual difference.”167 
 Certainly, this claim should not be taken in an absolute sense, for as Heinämaa herself notes 
in a subsequent footnote, Husserl’s “Universal Teleology,”168 offers an analysis of sexual drive 
[Geschlechttrieb].169 Nevertheless, Heinämaa’s basic point stands. Husserl barely considered 
sexuality, and when he did, his analyses left much to be desired. 
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In “Universal Teleology,” Husserl attempts to offer an account of the sex drive “viewed 
transcendentally.”170 The primary theses of the text, as explicated by Elliston, are threefold: “T1 
Sex is a social act; T2 Sex seeks copulation; and T3 Sex is heterosexual.”171 Yet, as subsequent 
commentaries—including Elliston and Al-Saji—have shown, each of these three theses appear 
marred by naturalistic commitments that, methodologically speaking, should have been bracketed 
by the phenomenological reduction.  
 The first thesis—“Sex is a social act”—emerges from Husserl’s goal-driven account of 
drive. In the case of hunger, for example, the drive is directed toward the object of food—even if 
this object is indeterminate; that is, my hunger is not necessarily directed toward any particular 
food. In the same manner, Husserl suggests, the sexual drive is directed. The object of this drive, 
“its enticing, exciting goal … is the other.”172 Thus, sexuality is an eidetically intersubjective 
phenomenon. Yet, this ostensible characteristic may not be as certain as Husserl assumes. Further 
reflection seems to suggest non-intersubjective manifestations of sexuality. “Whatever one’s 
moral scruples or reservations,” Elliston notes, “masturbation (along with fetishism and bestiality) 
are clearly forms of sexual activity.”173 It seems therefore, that Husserl’s first thesis is too narrowly 
constructed; restricting alternative sexual manifestations without phenomenological evidence.  
 Husserl’s second and third theses fare no better. Husserl’s argument in the second case—
“Sex seeks copulation”—foregrounds a key development of “Universal Teleology.” Just as 
individual conscious acts are intentional, Husserl here argues, so too is there something like a 
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global directedness that links together the distinct manifestations of human drive: “shouldn’t we 
or mustn’t we posit a universal intentionality of the drive?”174 There is, Husserl posits, a 
directedness of the drive writ large which remains analogous to the intentional structure of the 
individual act. Husserl names this intentionality “teleology.” In the case of the sexual drive, he 
argues, the universal object of the drive, its teleological aim, is reproduction. Thus, the properly 
sexual act must be that which aims toward such reproduction. While this teleology is particularly 
manifest in the pregnant mother, it is nevertheless universally present within the drive; “teleology 
encompasses all of the monads.” Thus, “what occurs in the motherly domain is not limited to it, 
but ‘is reflected throughout’.”175  
 Husserl’s third thesis—“Sex is heterosexual”—follows directly from the second. If the 
teleological aim of the sex drive is reproduction, then it must find its natural fulfillment in 
heterosexual copulation. “I can [attain fulfillment] only as a man in the actual reciprocal feeling 
or empathy with the woman,”176 Husserl presumes. Simply put, the sexual drive is “the drive 
toward the other sex.”177 
 The critical response to these theses is unambiguous. “Even if it is not taken to identify the 
goal of all social encounters,” Elliston argues, Husserl’s account “overstates the goal of even those 
that are sexual.”178 The result is an account of sexuality that unjustifiably restricts sexuality to its 
determinately heterosexual manifestations:179 “what is thereby ruled out by fiat is that homosexual 
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encounters can qualify as sexual, or that group sex … can even be counted as sex.”180 Al-Saji 
offers an even sharper critique, tracing Husserl’s account of reproduction to a “patriarchal and 
masculinist ‘natural’ attitude on sex”; a heterosexist “framework of reproduction that … 
imaginatively excludes other forms of sexuality.”181 
In a manner that will be tragically reiterated in subsequent phenomenologies—particularly 
Levinas, Henry, and Marion—Husserl has here failed to employ the very reduction that should 
grant access to the sex drive in its transcendental essentiality. Husserl, as Elliston notes, “has built 
into his definition of what sex is undefended assumptions of what it ought to be.”182 Echoing 
Merleau-Ponty’s assertion that “the most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the 
impossibility of a complete reduction,”183 Elliston insightfully concludes his critique with the 
recognition of the difficulty of the phenomenological method: “to disengage oneself from such 
preconceptions in order to examine them critically is indeed an infinite task.”184 
The subsequent phenomenological tradition will take Husserl’s task to engage “the 
problem of the sexes”185 seriously, producing significantly more material than Husserl’s short 
essay. More importantly still, these accounts of sexuality will explicitly link the problematics of 
sexuality to those of the lived body in its concrete affectivity—a link which, excluding his passing 
reference to “the physiology of pregnancy,”186 is ignored by Husserl’s “Universal Teleology.” 
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Nevertheless, as will be shown, these subsequent phenomenologists will likewise find it difficult 
to avoid the temptation to illegitimately import their own naturalistic preconceptions into their 
ostensibly phenomenological investigations.  
 
 
B: Sexuality in the Constitution of the Body 
 
The first substantial, phenomenological treatment of sexuality in the French tradition can be found 
in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness. Following directly from his analysis of the body, Sartre turns 
to the phenomena of love, desire, and sexuality as a necessary supplement to his analysis of the 
body-for-others. Simply put, Sartre will attempt to show that the body cannot be understood in its 
multiplicitous manifestation unless the body is recognized as ontologically bound to sexuality. 
Thus, against the “existential philosophers”—among whom Sartre has Heidegger particularly in 
mind187—who “have not believed it necessary to concern themselves with sexuality,” Sartre 
suggests that “desire and its opposite, sexual repulsion, are fundamental structures of being-for-
others.”188  
Certainly, Sartre recognizes, the particular biological and desirous character of one’s 
sexuality is “in the domain of absolute contingency.”189 The particular sexual structures of one’s 
body—genitalia, chromosomes, hormones, etc.—as well as one’s sexual orientation (and the 
modern reader might presume gender identity) are contingent rather than transcendental or 
ontological; they belong to the domain of facticity. Yet, as in the case of the body—where the 
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specific bodily configuration is factical, but embodiment itself is transcendental—Sartre, refuses 
to draw the conclusion from this facticity that “the same must be true for sexual desire.”190 Rather, 
while the specific sexual configuration is factical, sexuality as such is not. For as we have seen, 
for Sartre, to be in-the-world is to be in the world as a body. Likewise, to be in the world is to be 
in the world with others, who are themselves manifest as body. But, this inter-corporeal relation is 
not a purely neutral relation, inter-corporeal engagement manifests primordially as a desirous 
relation (attraction or repulsion).191 Thus, he concludes, “we shall be able to say that the For-itself 
is sexual in its very upsurge in the face of the Other and that through it sexuality comes into the 
world,”192 or more succinctly, “sexuality appears with birth and disappears only with death.”193  
This insistence upon sexuality within the constitution of the body will be reiterated in 1945 
by Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. Like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty posits sexuality as 
a necessary constitutive feature of human embodiment. But, whereas Sartre emphasized the 
intersubjective character of sexuality, Merleau-Ponty uses sexuality in order to explicate the 
“affective life.” It is through affectivity, he argues, that “a thing or a being begins to exist for 
us”;194 phenomena do not emerge in a flat neutrality, but as pleasures and pains, attractions and 
repulsions.195 As Husserl already noted of the natural attitude, “without further effort on my part, 
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I find the things before me furnished not only with the qualities that befit their positive nature, but 
with value-characters such as beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant, 
and so forth.”196 It is therefore through the specifically sexual affects that the sexual-body and the 
“sexual world”197 co-constitute one another.  
It is certainly possible to live a life largely devoid of a sexual world, as Merleau-Ponty 
shows in an exaggerated form though the Schneider case, wherein “perception has lost its erotic 
structure, both spatially and temporally.”198 But, as Merleau-Ponty seeks to illustrate, the loss of a 
sexual world, even in a limited sense, can have serious, rippling repercussions for one’s being-in-
the-world as such: “a girl whose mother has forbidden her to see again the young man with whom 
she is in love, cannot sleep, loses her appetite and finally the use of speech.”199 This is because 
“sexuality has an existential significance,”200 it is “co-extensive with life.”201 Thus, Merleau-Ponty 
marks the loss of a sexual world as pathological,202 because, in his analysis, sexuality functions as 
a necessary constitutive of human embodiment: 
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All human ‘functions,’ from sexuality to motility and intelligence, are rigorously 
unified in one synthesis, it is impossible to distinguish in the total being of man a 
bodily organization to be treated as a contingent fact, and other attributes 
necessarily entering into his make-up. Everything in man is a necessity.203 
 
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty neither the constitution of the body nor the world can be understood apart 
from the diffuse saturation of sexuality: “existence permeates sexuality and vice-versa, so that it 
is impossible to determine, in any given decision or action, the proportion of sexual to other 
motivations, impossible to label a decision ‘sexual’ or ‘non-sexual’.”204 Sexuality is marked a 
“principle of indeterminacy” that is itself necessary and transcendental.  
 
 
C. The Problem of Sexual Difference 
 
Both Sartre and Merleau-Ponty’s accounts of sexual embodiment remain surprisingly silent on the 
issue of sexual difference. Differences in the phenomenological experience of sexual embodiment 
between men and women, for example, are largely overlooked. The result, for much feminist 
scholarship,205 is the implicit substitution of a determinately male body for the ostensibly 
“universal” subject of sexuality. Yet, this is not the case for Levinas, who, as early as his 1948 
Time and the Other, centralizes sexual difference in his phenomenology of Eros.  
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 For Levinas, Western philosophy, particularly within the Hegelian tradition—as 
epitomized by Sartre—is marked by an oppositional and conflictual conception of 
intersubjectivity. For these philosophies, individuals are pitted against one another in a struggle 
for recognition. As Sartre writes, “I am—at the very root of my being—the project of assimilating 
and making an object of the Other.”206  In ethical analyses that will culminate with the 
phenomenology of radical responsibility in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, 
Levinas seeks to discover an alternate mode of intersubjective relation that does not reduce the 
experience of the other to struggle, violence, and totalization.207 While this ethical analysis will 
ultimately conclude in the analytic of the Face (visage), already in Time and the Other Levinas 
begins to think a non-oppositional mode of intersubjective relation through a detailed analysis of 
the erotic encounter and the relationship of paternity—an analysis that will be largely affirmed and 
repeated in both Totality and Infinity (1961) and Ethics and Infinity (1982).208  
To encounter another in a non-oppositional mode is not merely to encounter the other as 
alter-ego—another me, reducible to a logic of the same—but as truly other (autrui), as the Other 
(le Autre). For Levinas, this otherness is uniquely manifest in nudity: “nudity is the true experience 
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of the otherness of the other.”209 This recourse to nudity has a dual meaning for Levinas. In the 
context of ethical responsibility, for example, nudity will often be paired with poverty to suggest 
vulnerability: “the body naked and indigent…”210 Yet, nudity also points toward another mode of 
non-oppositional encounter: the erotic caress. In Eros one aims at the Other as an object of need 
and desire, but one which is not reduced to objectivity: “the possibility of the Other appearing as 
an object of a need while retaining his alterity, or again, the possibility of enjoying the Other … 
constitutes the originality of the erotic.”211  
What the phenomenology of the erotic encounter reveals is an essential necessity of 
alterity. “The pathos of the erotic relationship,” Levinas argues, “is the fact of being two, and that 
the other is absolutely other.”212 Yet, this absolute alterity cannot take on just any form. Rather, 
this absolute character points toward a specific mode of alterity: “the notion of the sociality of two, 
which is probably necessary for the exceptional epiphany of the face—abstract and chaste nudity—
emerges from sexual differences, and is essential to eroticism and to all instances of alterity.”213 
Moreover, for Levinas the sexual difference that underlies the erotic relation is asymmetrical. The 
unique mode of the beloved (Aimée) object of erotic desire is granted a concrete name: the 
feminine. “The plane of eros allows us to see that the other par excellence is the feminine.”214 
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In Levinas’ analysis, the feminine is granted this unique role not only because of a 
biological or ontic alterity between man and woman; indeed, “alterity is in some way [femininity’s] 
nature.”215 That is to say, the ontological structure proper to femininity is represented by the fact 
that the feminine is described “as of itself other, as the origin of the very concept of alterity.”216 
Thus, in Time and the Other Levinas will name the feminine the “absolutely contrary contrary… 
absolutely other.”217  
Before turning to enactment of erotic desire in the caress, it will be helpful to briefly note 
persistent charges of androcentrism that have been levelled at Levinas, almost since the inception 
of Time and the Other. The most significant responses to Levinas have been levelled by Simone 
de Beauvoir (who will be covered below) and Luce Irigaray. Both thinker’s fundamental objection 
can be summarized by Irigaray’s “The Fecundity of the Caress,” which takes Levinas to task for 
                                               
215 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 65. 
 
216 Ibid., 66. Again, “femininity … appeared to me as a difference contrasting strongly with other differences, not 
merely as a quality different from all others, but as the very quality of difference.” Levinas, Time and the Other, 36. 
 
217 Levinas, Time and the Other, 85.  This account of the feminine is not limited to Levinas’ philosophical writings, 
but can be found in a slightly altered form in his Talmudic studies. There Levinas is particularly interested in 
resisting the account of women’s liberation proffered by feminism—“the revolution which thinks it has achieved the 
ultimate by destroying the family so as to liberate imprisoned sexuality” (Emmanuel Levinas, Nine Talmudic 
Readings, trans. Annette Aronowicz [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990], 170). For the Levinas of this 
Talmudic context, true liberation requires the risk of a “daring question: how can the equality of sexes stem from the 
priority of the masculine?” (Ibid., 173). Toward this end, Levinas affirms that “from the beginning he [God] wanted 
two equal beings. [But] to create a world, he had to subordinate them one to the other. There had to be a difference 
which did not affect equity: a sexual difference. ... Real humanity does not allow for an abstract equality, without 
some subordination of terms. Subordination was needed, and a wound was needed; suffering was and is needed to 
unite equals and unequals” (Ibid., 173). The result of this analysis is a reduction of femininity—and sexual 
difference tout court—from the ontological status granted it in Levinas’ philosophical texts, to an accidental or ontic 
status. “The feminine as such is only secondary,” he insists, “the sexual is only an accessory of the human.” (Ibid., 
170). It is therefore in the context of these Talmudic commentaries—together with Levinas’ writings on Judaism in 
Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism—that Derrida will comment: “the work of EL seems to me to have always 
made alterity as sexual difference secondary or derivative, to have subordinated the trait of sexual difference to the 
alterity of a wholly other that is sexually unmarked. It is not woman or the feminine that he has made secondary, 
derivative, or subordinate, but sexual difference.” Jacques Derrida, “At This Very Moment in This Work Here I 
Am” in Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume 1, ed. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 
180. For a sustained analysis of Sexuality in Levinas’ Talmudic commentary, see: Deborah Achtenberg, “Bearing 
the Other and Bearing Sexuality: Women and Gender in Levinas’s ‘And God Created Woman’,” Levinas Studies 
Vol. 10 (2016): 137-154. 
 
 50 
forgetting the subjectivity and consciousness of the woman, rendering woman as Other and 
therefore as “object.” As she parodies Levinas’ approach, “beloved woman. Not female lover. 
Necessarily an object, not a subject with a relation, like his, to time.”218 Simply put, insofar as the 
object of the erotic encounter is explicitly marked as necessarily the feminine, Levinas presupposes 
that the philosophical subject is itself masculine.219  
Certainly Richard Cohen has suggested a more generous reading, emphasizing “that the 
issue is important but certainly not as simple as de Beauvoir, in this instance, makes it out to be, 
because for Levinas the other has a priority over the subject.”220 Yet, this response is largely belied 
by Levinas’ account of femininity and its persistent recourse to stereotyped tropes of femininity—
associating femininity with mystery,221 frailty/weakness,222 the home (as opposed to labor),223 etc.  
Returning to Levinas’ analytic, the concrete phenomenon that Levinas draws forward in 
order to draw out the phenomenality of the erotic encounter is the “caress.” Levinas is not unique 
in undertaking this analysis, as Sartre had already undertaken a similar analysis of the caress in 
                                               
218 Luce Irigaray, “The Fecundity of the Caress” in Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Tina Chanter 
(University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001), 126. 
 
219 “Poser l’altérité absolue comme féminin signifie déjà que le sujet philosophique est masculin.” Paulette Kayser, 
Emmanuel Levinas: la trace du féminin (Paris: PUF, 2001), 31; or again, “on this subject, let us note in passing that 
Totality and Infinity pushes the respect for dissymmetry to the point where it seems to us impossible, essentially 
impossible, that it could have been written by a woman. Its philosophical subject is man (vir).” Derrida, “Violence 
and Metaphysics,” 320-321 n. 92. 
 
220 Richard A. Cohen, translator’s footnote in Time and the Other, 85 n.69. See, also: Heinämaa, Toward a 
Phenomenology of Sexual Difference, 88-92. 
 
221 “Its mystery constitutes its alterity.” Levinas, Time and the Other, 87. 
 
222 “The movement of the lover before this frailty of femininity…” and “the frailty of femininity…” Levinas, 
Totality and Infinity, 257, 262. 
  
223 “The other whose presence is discreetly an absence, with which is accomplished the primary hospitable welcome 
which describes the field of intimacy, is the Woman.” Ibid., 155. 
 
 51 
Being and Nothingness,224 and both Henry and Marion—as we will see below—will likewise 
situate a phenomenology of the caress at the heart of their phenomenologies of Eros. For Levinas, 
the caress is uniquely distinguished from similar phenomena (e.g. touch)225 insofar as it 
“transcends the sensible.”226 In this regard, the caress is distinguished from mere perception; it is 
in no way identifiable with the bodily sensings (Empfindnisse) analyzed by Husserl in Ideas II. 
Rather, the caress seeks to appease the “metaphysical desire”227 for absolute alterity. Thus, the 
caress “aims at neither a person nor a thing”228 —beings which can be “reabsorbed into my own 
identity as a thinker or a possessor.”229 Instead, the caress seeks a pure experience of the Other 
beyond conceptualization or language, “irreducible to intentionality.”230 In this experience, one 
encounters the Other “beyond the face,” which is the mere existent par excellence. Instead the 
caress aims at an erotic unification of love. But the Same cannot in principle be united to the 
absolute Other. Therefore it is necessary that love overflow in a positive fecundity: the child. “The 
same and the other are not united but precisely … engender the child.”231 
                                               
224 For Sartre, the caress is the means by which desire seeks to appropriate the body of the Other, to reveal the body 
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incarnation reveals to me my own incarnation; that is, I make myself flesh in order to impel the Other to realize for-
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flesh causing her to be born as flesh … a double reciprocal incarnation.” Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 508. See, 
also: Helena Dahlberg, “On Flesh and Eros in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness,” The Humanistic Psychologist, 40 
(2012): 197–206. 
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What Levinas discovers through the introduction of the child is a final figure of the Other, 
a figure that manifests as the paradox of paternity: the child is me, and is not me. As he writes in 
Time and the Other, “the son … occurs as a possibility beyond the possible!”232 Through this 
experience of fecundity, the totalization of the self-same not only encounters alterity as an external 
blow, as in the case of the feminine, but as a fracture internal to the self. In fecundity transcendence 
pierces the heart of immanence. The result of this paradoxical fracture is the advent of a futurity 
beyond conceptuality; “the absolute future, or infinite time”233 is anticipated in the caress,234 but 
only manifest in the Other that is also I, the other who will outlive me.235  
Critiques of Levinas’ account of fecundity/paternity/filiation tend to follow directly from 
those aimed at his account of sexual difference. Insofar as he already presumed a determinately 
male subject, he likewise posits fecundity’s liberatory potential as the liberation of the male 
subject, the father.236 This androcentrism is redoubled by Levinas’ insistence upon the masculine 
child. Paternity is not merely the case of the relationship between the father and the child, but 
between the father and the son: filiation is a matter of “the father-son relationship, … the son’s 
relation with the father…”237 The masculine particularity of this relationship is highlighted by 
Derrida, who asks a series of insightful questions: “Is ‘son’ another word for ‘child,’ a child who 
could be of one sex or the other? If so, whence comes that equivalence, and what does it mean? 
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And why couldn’t ‘daughter’ play an analogous role? Why would the son be the work beyond ‘my 
work,’ more or better than the daughter, than me? If there was as yet no difference from this point 
of view, why should ‘son’ better represent, in advance, this indifference? This unmarked 
indifference?”238 It remains unclear what possible justification Levinas might muster in defense of 
this un-thematized choice.  
 Finally, it is necessary to note a certain heteronormativity implicit in Levinas’ account of 
fecundity. First, insofar as it explicitly marks Eros as the male caress of the feminine, Levinas’ 
account of the erotic encounter presupposes a heterosexual union. While Levinas remains silent 
on the question of queer eroticism, his insistence that the feminine stands as the paradigmatic 
figure of absolute Other strongly suggests that Eros, insofar as it is a move into absolute alterity, 
beyond the face, could not manifest within a male homosexual relationship, for example. In that 
instance, it seems, the “sameness” of the erotic partners would necessitate a fall into the totalization 
of the same. Second, while Levinas will not mark the fecundity of the child as a necessary 
requirement of Eros,239 it does seem that the child (or more specifically, the son) is a necessary 
requirement for the full liberation (or “trans-figuration”) of the self.240 Insofar as biological 
reproduction is not a consequence or possibility within many queer relationships—e.g. many 
homosexual relationships, as well as heterosexual relationships  which include transgender 
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partners—it seems that the final act of transcendence is posited as the sole domain of straight, 
cisgender men.  
While this heteronormative logic is merely implicit in Levinas, its consequences can be 
found in an explicit form in subsequent proponents of his philosophy. As will be extensively 
examined below (Chapter 3), Jean-Luc Marion will directly recapitulate this argument in analyses 
that remain explicitly heteronormative. For Marion, queer sexuality is built upon the expulsion of 
the Other: “homosexuality [is] the ultimate refusal of dissimilarity.”241 In a similar vein, the 
philosopher and theologian Enrique Dussel reveals the heteronormative potential of Levinas in his 
“Philosophy of Liberation,” in which he seeks to synthesize a Marxist theory of liberation with a 
Levinasian account of otherness. Toward this end he not only highlights economic oppression, but 
also gendered oppression—advocating for the liberation of women. Nevertheless, this liberation 
is constructed upon biologically essentialist grounds. “Liberation is real sexual distinction: the 
male affirms his phallic openness (with what risk that may entail) and the woman equally affirms 
her clitoral-vaginal and mammary-oral openness (in her dimension as wife and mother; 
4.2.6.2).”242 The homophobic character of this essentialism is explicitly marked in a passage 
(excised from the English translation) which reads “liberation is not the pure negation of 
domination by the denial of sexual diversity (as when feminism promotes homosexuality, test-tube 
babies, etc.),”243 or again, a few years later, “feminist homosexuality ends up summing up all 
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perversions … [it is] a radical loss of [the] sense of the reality of the Other.”244 Thus, while Levinas 
himself remains silent on the issue of queer sexuality, the logic of his analysis of Eros is clearly 
manifest in these subsequent thinkers. As long as women are defined as the “absolutely contrary 
contrary”245 and reproduction is valorized as the only means of liberation, then the erotic analytic 
can only reproduce patriarchal and heteronormative oppression. 
 While this work has been targeted for critique by contemporary thinkers, Levinas also 
faced a serious challenge from his own contemporary, Simone de Beauvoir. In 1949 de Beauvoir 
undertook The Second Sex as a project at once personal,246 political, and philosophical. The aim of 
The Second Sex was to engage directly with sexual difference by asking the question: “what is a 
woman?” The answer that de Beauvoir discovers is incredibly complex, drawing as it does from 
feminist literature, psychoanalysis, Marxism, Hegelian philosophy, and—most important for the 
discussion at hand—existential phenomenology.  
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 The central thesis of de Beauvoir’s text, one which falls directly from Levinas, is that 
woman has been made Other. Certainly, this is not to suggest as many all-too-quick readers have 
argued, that de Beauvoir believes in a naive fashion that woman is Other, or even less that she 
defends this positioning. Rather, the heart of The Second Sex is a critique of such a myth of the 
“eternal feminine.”247 Woman is not Other in- or for-herself. Rather, woman is Other only from 
the masculine perspective: “man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him.”248 It is in 
fact Levinas himself who is drawn forward as a paradigmatic case of androcentric thinking. In a 
key footnote, she writes of Time and the Other:  
I suppose that Levinas does not forget that woman, too, is aware of her own 
consciousness, or ego. But it is striking that he deliberately takes a man’s point of 
view, disregarding the reciprocity of subject and object. When he writes that woman 
is a mystery, he implies that she is a mystery for man. Thus his description which 
is intended to be objective, is in fact an assertion of masculine privilege.249 
 
For de Beauvoir, the presumed otherness of women is a product of men’s false sense of 
universality. Failing to take into account women’s lived experience [l’expérience vécue], men 
misunderstand women. Further failing to account for their own gendered situation, men assume 
this misunderstanding is the reality of women—women simply are mysterious, are Other. Thus, 
as Heinämaa suggests, “the Feminine is not just an end result of idealizing thinking but results 
from the reiteration of unnoticed androcentric valuations.”250  
 For de Beauvoir, this rendering of woman as absolute Other is not merely wrong; it is self-
refuting. In their radical pursuit of alterity, thinkers like Levinas and Sartre have failed to recognize 
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the necessary reciprocity of human relations. In such a phenomenology, “woman thus seems to be 
the inessential who never goes back to being the essential, to be the absolute Other, without 
reciprocity.”251 This masculine understanding of the Other seeks two diametrically opposed aims: 
“[the man] hopes to fulfill himself as a being by carnally possessing a being, but at the same time 
confirming his sense of freedom through the docility of a free person.”252 Man wants to capture—
whether literally or figuratively—the woman, and thereby objectify her. Yet, at the same time, 
man wants to be freely chosen (loved). Sartre explicitly thematizes this paradox, ultimately 
concluding that there is only one resolution: the lover must set the terms of the beloved’s 
freedom—“in love the Lover wants to be ‘the whole World’ for the beloved.”253 De Beauvoir 
identifies an internal inconsistency, the necessary failure of this project. As Heinämaa summarizes 
her argument, “the idea of an absolute other is self-refuting. This is because the self-other relation 
is essentially—necessarily—reciprocal: I see an other only if I see a living body which is able to 
see me as a body.”254 Undertaking an eidetic analysis, de Beauvoir suggests a structural 
relationship between subject and other. Every experience of the other is necessarily bound to a 
recognition that, simultaneously, the Other is for-itself a subject for whom I am an object. There 
can be no absolute Other, because every other is relative to a certain subject position, a certain 
situation. “There can be no intersubjective relation if there is only one subject.”255  
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 While de Beauvoir articulates this sharp critique of her contemporaries, The Second Sex is 
by no means limited to this negative project. Quite to the contrary, de Beauvoir seeks to offer a 
positive account of feminine existence. Moreover, as Heinämaa’s Toward a Phenomenology of 
Sexual Difference has definitively shown, this account is both explicitly embodied and 
phenomenological. This confluence of embodiment and phenomenological investigation is key to 
de Beauvoir’s argument, for it gives lie to critiques which have often misunderstood her recourse 
to bodily difference as a bioscientific reductionism. To the contrary, de Beauvoir concludes her 
discussion of the “data of biology” by explicitly rejecting such an approach.256 As she writes: 
We must view the facts of biology in the light of an ontological, economic, social, 
and psychological context. … The body of woman is one of the essential elements 
in her situation in the world. But that body is not enough to define her as woman; 
there is no true living reality except as manifested by the conscious individual 
through activities and in the bosom of society.257 
 
De Beauvoir considers a few alternative approaches that might situate female embodiment within 
its social context, including psychoanalysis and historical materialism, but ultimately finds these 
alternatives wanting. Instead, de Beauvoir relies upon an existential phenomenological approach.  
 The starting point for The Second Sex is therefore a phenomenological investigation into 
the meaning of woman’s lived body [corps vivant, corps vécu].258 The account of the body implied 
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by this analysis is precisely that traced above—from Husserl’s Leib, to Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and 
Levinas’ lived body. As de Beauvoir herself notes: “the body is not a thing, it is a situation, as 
viewed in the perspective I am adopting—that of Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty; it is the 
instrument of our grasp upon the world, a limiting factor for our projects.”259 Generally, 
scholarship has emphasized the unique role of Sartre’s analyses of the body in Being and 
Nothingness. Thus Judith Butler, for example, paradigmatically writes that “we can see in The 
Second Sex an effort to radicalize the Sartrian program to establish an embodied notion of 
freedom.”260 Yet, while one should certainly not underestimate the influence of Sartre, Heinämaa 
has shown that it is not primarily Sartre’s, but Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body that most 
directly influenced de Beauvoir: “Merleau-Ponty presented a viable alternative to Sartre’s 
‘phenomenological ontology’ troubled by the problems of solipsism and dualism.”261  
 From Merleau-Ponty, de Beauvoir develops the notion of the lived body as a situation. Yet, 
as an analysis of sexual difference, The Second Sex is unfulfilled by Merleau-Ponty’s neuter 
conception of embodiment. Rather, de Beauvoir seeks to show the unique mode of embodiment 
characteristic of women’s experience. While the full description of women’s embodiment is 
beyond the scope of the present discussion, one key feature should be highlighted. For Merleau-
Ponty, the central feature of the living body is its activity within the world: “consciousness is in 
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the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’.”262 Yet, through phenomenological 
analyses of traditionally feminine experiences—such as menstruation and pregnancy—de 
Beauvoir seeks to show that feminine embodiment is not merely marked by activity, but equally 
by passivity. As she writes of pregnancy, for example, “in any case giving birth and suckling are 
not activities, they are natural functions; no project is involved, and that is why woman found in 
them no reason for a lofty affirmation of her existence—she submitted passively to her biologic 
fate.”263 And again, of menstruation, “it is during her periods that she feels her body most painfully 
as an obscure, alien thing.”264 Certainly, as de Beauvoir repeatedly insists, this discussion should 
not be misunderstood as a reduction of feminine experience to biology; “human society is never 
abandoned wholly to nature.”265 Nevertheless, this discussion is intended to unveil the unique 
meaning of the woman’s body. As she summarizes this finding, “woman, like man, is her body; 
but her body is something other than herself.”266 What de Beauvoir seeks to show is not that men 
are active, and women are passive. Indeed, it is one of the chief roles of the myth of the “eternal 
feminine” to mask the passivity of masculine embodiment.267 Rather, de Beauvoir argues that the 
experience of bodily alienation characteristic of both men and women in illness, dysphoria, and 
other acute scenarios, takes on a more persistent or periodic form in women’s embodiment. Thus, 
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feminine being-in-the-world takes on a distinct character from the masculine experience that not 
only tends to lack this more persistent form of passivity, but also tends to cover over its own 
passivity, casting it mythologically onto the feminine Other: understood as “matter, passivity, 
immanence, … flesh.”268 
 This attempt to phenomenologically uncover the meaning of feminine embodiment is often 
accused of a gender essentialism. Yet, it is worth reminding oneself that de Beauvoir is not seeking 
a metaphysically static account of sexual difference. Indeed, sexual difference itself is not even 
understood by de Beauvoir as an ontological necessity.269 To the contrary, de Beauvoir seeks to 
uncover the meaning of feminine embodiment within the contemporary situation. Thus, she 
consistently emphasizes that woman is not a being, but a becoming.270 As she famously stated, 
“one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.”271 Yet, against many readings of de Beauvoir 
which correlate this famous dictum with contemporary theories of social construction,272 de 
Beauvoir offers less a genealogy or archeology of sexual difference, than a genetic phenomenology 
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of sexual difference. Thus, what is revealed by her analysis is not an eternal essence of femininity, 
but the specific possibilities of being granted to women insofar as they find themselves within a 
patriarchal world: “woman is not a completed reality, but rather a becoming, and it is in her 
becoming that she should be compared with man; that is to say, her possibilities should be 
defined.”273 
* * * 
 
Having traced a genealogy of the phenomenology of the body, particularly in the work of Husserl 
and the early French tradition, it should now be clear that, despite the internal disagreements over 
precise details, this development has followed a clear trajectory. First, the phenomenological 
tradition has increasingly recognized the primacy of lived embodiment within the constitution of 
the world, and second, it has increasingly recognized the priority of sexuality and sexual difference 
in this constitution of the body’s relation to the world and others.  
 In the following two chapters it will be shown that the radical phenomenologies of Michel 
Henry and Jean-Luc Marion tend to reflect this broader tradition both at its strongest and its 
weakest moments. Like the preceding tradition, they emphasize the unique constitutive role of the 
body. Moreover, each of these subsequent thinkers have developed a complex analysis of sexuality 
and eroticism. Yet, at the same time, they will tend to draw forward some of the most troubling 
patriarchal and heteronormative aspects of this earlier tradition as well. For example, Levinas’ 
account of the caress will be found almost explicitly recapitulated in both Henry’s Incarnation and 
Marion’s The Erotic Phenomenon. The result of this repetition is that Henry—having failed to 
recognize de Beauvoir’s critique—tends to echo Levinas’ own androcentric mode of thinking: 
ignoring possible varieties of sexual embodiment, proffering an account of the universal male, and 
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rendering the feminine as structurally other. Marion, likewise repeats the most troubling aspects 
of Levinas’ account and, like Dussel, renders Levinas’ implicit heteronormativity as an explicit 
homophobia.  
 Nevertheless, as radical phenomenologies, these two thinkers will also offer new ways 
understanding the flesh; opening the door to a more complex account of affectivity and givenness 
which has proven philosophically and theologically fecund. Thus, the aim of the following 
chapters will not merely be the dismissal of Henry and Marion as irredeemably heteronormative. 
Rather, identifying the distinct advantages of their accounts of the flesh and the body, it will seek 
to identify the precise points at which their analyses have gone wrong. This precision will open 
the possibility of a fusion of radical phenomenology and queer theory in the second half of the 
dissertation, a fusion that will seek to retain the benefits of radical phenomenology, while casting 
aside its history of androcentric and heteronormative thinking around sexuality and eroticism. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Michel Henry: Transcendental Asexuality 
 
Sexes must vanish & cease To be when Albion arises from his dread repose.  
William Blake 
 
 
§I: Radical Phenomenology 
A. From Onto-Phenomenological Monism to Radical Phenomenology 
 
In order to approach Michel Henry’s “radical phenomenology”—or as he will sometimes prefer 
“material phenomenology”1—it may be best to begin with a biographical note. In 1943, during the 
Second World War, Henry found himself involved with the resistance movement known as the 
“Free French Forces.” Operating as an undercover agent in Lyon, Henry found that his very 
survival necessitated that he obscure his true motivations, beliefs, and feelings. This powerful 
experience of subterfuge produced the guiding conviction of his subsequent philosophical career: 
the truth of reality does not reside in the visible world where appearances deceive and words can 
lie, but rather, as Scott Davidson remarks, “one’s true identity withdraws from the visibility of the 
public realm and resides in the secrecy of a clandestine, underground life.”2  
 Henry’s lifelong philosophical project may be understood as an attempt to unpack this 
guiding intuition, articulating it through the language of phenomenological philosophy. From the 
very beginning, in Le Bonheur de Spinoza (The Happiness of Spinoza), until his final The Words 
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of Christ, Henry’s firm conviction remains—as will be seen below—that immanence, what he 
calls by various names—“internal = interiority = life = invisible = pathos”3—is the true nature of 
Being and the true essence of manifestation.  
Nevertheless, this introduction may be served not by turning directly to Henry’s positive 
contribution, but rather to his reconstruction of the dominant strain of Western philosophy, what 
in 1963 he has already named “ontological monism” (or as he will later prefer, “phenomenological 
monism”).4 Most directly, onto-phenomenological monism refers to any philosophical system that 
seeks to reduce the diversity of manifestation to a single modality: what Henry will call the 
“horizon of visibility that is the world, that is Time, and … history.”5 What draws together 
visibility, time, history—and one should add spatiality, representation, and objectivity—is the 
privileged role of ek-static distance or separation, that is transcendence or alienation.6 For the 
onto-phenomenological monist—both idealist and realist—“alienation is the essence of 
manifestation.”7 Whether a philosophical system is centered on “Being,” “consciousness,” or 
                                               
3 Michel Henry, Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky, trans. Scott Davidson (New York: Continuum International 
Publishing, 2009), 7. 
 
4 “At the time, I called it ontological monism, but it should instead be called phenomenological monism.” Michel 
Henry, “Material Phenomenology,” in Quiet Powers of the Possible: Interviews in Contemporary French 
Phenomenology, eds. Tarek R. Dika and W. Chris Hackett (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 121. See, 
e.g. “the horizon of phenomenological monism” in Michel Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, trans. Karl 
Hefty (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 136. I will here follow commentators who have coined 
“onto-phenomenological monism” as a means of addressing both his early work and later preference.  
 
5 Michel Henry, I am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, trans. Susan Emanuel (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), 11. 
 
6 §4 of Incarnation offers an example of a way in which Henry links together many of these terms: “the world’s 
appearing consists of the ‘outside itself,’ in the coming outside of an Outside, … everything that shows itself in this 
shows itself on the outside—as exterior, as other, and as different. Exterior, because the structure of the Ek-stasis in 
which it shows itself is exteriority; other, because this ek-static structure is the structure of a primordial alterity 
(everything outside me is other than me, everything outside itself is other than itself); different, because this Ek-
stasis is equally a Difference; it is the operation that, hollowing out the gap of a distance, makes different everything 
to which appearance is given with the help of this distancing—in the horizon of the world.” Henry, Incarnation, 39. 
 
7 Michel Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, trans. G.J. Etzkorn (New York: Springer, 1973), 70. 
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“God,” manifestation necessitates an internal splitting, the creation of distance as the necessary 
condition of phenomenality. Thus, in the words of the 17th century theosophist Jacob Boehme—a 
particularly common target of Henry’s criticism8—“that cannot enter into particular existence … 
which cannot be comprehended, which dwells in itself and possesses itself; but [in order to attain 
existence] it proceeds out of itself, and manifests itself out of itself.”9 
Within Henry’s philosophical milieu, this phenomenological prejudice was most readily 
apparent in Jean-Paul Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, where self-alienation is granted primacy of 
place. As Sartre there writes, “the being of consciousness qua consciousness is to exist at a distance 
from itself.”10 Yet, Henry discovers the tendency toward onto-phenomenological monism 
throughout the Western philosophical canon: in ancient Greek thought, Kant, Schelling, Husserl, 
Heidegger,11 Merleau-Ponty and to a lesser extent Descartes, Fichte, and Schopenhauer. Indeed, 
                                               
8 This is primarily due to the influential role that Boehme would play in the development of German ontology, via 
his influence on Fichte and Hegel. See: Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 85-86, 132, 138-140; Michel Henry, 
Marx: A Philosophy of Human Reality, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983), 
44-45, 56-58; Michel Henry, From Communism to Capitalism: Theory of a Catastrophe, trans. Scott Davidson 
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), 99; and Henry, Incarnation, 44-45. 
 
9 Jacob Boehme, Six Theosophic Points and Other Writings, trans. John Rolleston Earle (Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan Press, 1958), 62. 
 
10 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New 
York: Pocket Books, 1956), 125 [emphasis Sartre’s]. Likewise, of Being, he writes, “the presence of being to itself 
implies a detachment on the part of being in relation to itself.” Ibid., 77. In the case of Sartre, this recourse to 
alienation and opposition is a clear product of a Kojevian-influenced reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. 
For Henry’s critique of Hegel’s account of manifestation, see the appendix to The Essence of Manifestation: §§71-
77. 
 
11 Heidegger perhaps serves as Henry’s deepest philosophical opponent. As Jean-Yves Lacoste writes, Henry is 
“probably the most anti-Heideggerian of all the phenomenologists.” Jean-Yves Lacoste, “Foreword” in Michel 
Henry, Words of Christ, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2012), 
ix. Like Sartre after him, Heidegger affirmed that the self was unveiled through a “reflection” whereby the self could 
“radiate back from [beings].” Dasein, he argues, “never finds itself otherwise than in the things themselves, and in 
fact in those things that daily surround it. It finds itself primarily and constantly in things because, tending them, 
distressed by them, it always in some way or other rests in things. … The Dasein does not need a special kind of 
observation, nor does it need to conduct a sort of espionage on the ego in order to have the self; rather, as the Dasein 
gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world itself, its own self is reflected to it from things.” Thus, 
Heidegger continues, “Transcendence is a fundamental determination of the ontological structure of the Dasein.” 
Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1988), 159, 162. 
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Henry will ultimately conclude that this prejudice is nearly unanimous within Western thinking.12 
Ontological monism simply is “Western metaphysics, with its origin in Greek truth, [where] the 
only recognized mode of manifestation is ek-static, which after its Kantian elaboration becomes 
the essence of representation.”13 
Nevertheless, Henry’s argument is not that onto-phenomenological monism fails in its task 
of elucidating transcendence—it quite rightly recognizes this mode of givenness as distanciation 
or alienation—but rather, he critiques the way in which its assumption of the sole reign of 
transcendence serves to efface the possibility of a more primordial region, what he will call radical 
immanence, or simply, “life.”14  For Henry, immanence is the true “essence of transcendence.”15 
Nevertheless, Henry is unsatisfied to merely deduce the necessity of a primordial region of 
Being through a sort of transcendental deduction; he does not only seek to defend the thesis that 
there exists a region prior to the phenomenality of the representative world. Indeed, as he argues, 
such a conception is by no means foreign to ontological monism. Kant, for example, argues that 
the phenomenal world is rightly surrounded by the noumenal world of the thing-in-itself. But, 
while thinkable, the noumenal world is nevertheless empty. “In the end,” Kant writes:  
                                               
 
12 Among Henry’s few exceptions are the Christian Patristics, Meister Eckhart, Spinoza, Maine de Biran, Marx, 
Levinas, and Kandinsky. In light of this almost overwhelmingly negative appraisal of the history of occidental 
thought, Henry will write that “c’est contre [la totalité du champ philosophique], en pratiquant une immense 
antithèse, que j'ai en quelque sorte travaillé.” Michel Henry, “Narrer le pathos,” entretien avec M. Calle-Gruber, La 
Revue des Science Humaines, vol. 95 n. 221 (1991): 310-311. 
 
13 Michel Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993), 165. 
 
14 Thus, for example, Henry states, “my phenomenology of life is not intended to be a substitute for the 
phenomenologies of the world. The phenomenology of the world has its own proper role. There are extraordinary 
descriptions of this world in Husserl and Heidegger, but their phenomenology is unilateral.”  Henry, “Material 
Phenomenology,” 120-121.  
 
15 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 249. 
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We have no insight into the possibility of such noumena, and the domain outside 
of the sphere of appearances is empty (for us), i.e., we have an understanding that 
extends farther than sensibility problematically, but no intuition, indeed not even 
the concept of a possible intuition, through which objects outside of the field of 
sensibility could be given, and about which the understanding could be employed 
assertorically. The concept of a noumenon is therefore merely a boundary concept, 
in order to limit the pretension of sensibility, and therefore only of negative use.16 
 
In like manner, Fichte’s 1804 Wissenschaftslehre announces the “Absolute,” what he names life. 
But nevertheless, this Absolute is denied its own phenomenality: “for us the oneness beyond is 
nothing in itself, although it is posited as in itself; rather it exists only through the light and in the 
light, and (is) its projection … [and] when we observe the light, the light is objectified, alienated 
from us and killed as something primordial.”17 Thus, Henry aims not only to affirm an immanent 
region heterogenous to the ek-static transcendence of the world. Rather, the task of a radical 
phenomenology is to further uncover the unique mode of givenness [mode de donation] of this 
immanence.18  
Henry’s critique of Husserl provides an instructive case study in onto-phenomenological 
monism. Henry’s deepest reflections on Husserl can be found in his 1990 Material 
Phenomenology, where Henry compares his radical phenomenology to Husserl’s “hyletic 
                                               
16 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 350. 
 
17 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, The Science of Knowing: J. G. Fichte’s 1804 Lectures on the Wissenschaftslehre, trans. 
Walter E. Wright (New York: State University of New York, 2005), 62 [emphasis added]. Thus, in the words of 
Tilliette, according to Henry, Fichte was “si proche par sa découverte de l’absolu immanent, mais retombé dans 
l’erreur moniste de la connaissance aveuglée.” Xavier Tilliette, “Phénoménologies autonomes: Michel Henry & 
Jean-Luc Marion,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 60 (2004): 473-484, 475. 
 
18 “A radical phenomenological thought must interrogate the manner in which the transcendental power, which gives 
every thing, is itself given.” Michel Henry, Material Phenomenology, trans. Scott Davidson (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2008), 22 [emphasis added].  
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phenomenology”19 and offers his most sustained critique of Husserl, and treatment of his own 
relationship to the founder of phenomenology.  
This engagement begins with a distinction first explicitly articulated by Husserl in §§85-
86 of Ideas I. There Husserl juxtaposes two forms of phenomenology, each corresponding to a 
distinct field of givenness: intentional phenomenology and hyletic phenomenology. Hyletic 
phenomenology, Husserl writes, is oriented toward “all the experiences which in the Logical 
Investigations were designated ‘primary contents,’ … [that is], sensory contents such as the data 
of colour, touch, sounds, and the like.”20 Or, as Husserl will now call them, the sensile hyle (ὕλη). 
Distinct from these “concrete data” or “formless material,” are the “immaterial forms” which 
constitute the objects of intentional phenomenology, what Husserl will now call the intentional 
morphe (μορφή). Whereas the former function as the mere material of experience, the intentional 
morphe include all phenomena which bear a meaning or a sense [Sinn],21 and can therefore be 
phenomenologically examined for their noetic and noematic content. 
While Husserl will hold that both forms of analyses are possible, he will nevertheless 
strictly bias intentional phenomenology. Thus, while hyletic phenomenology “has a value in 
itself,” Husserl insists that “it stands clearly below noetic … phenomenology.”22 Indeed, the vast 
                                               
19 This is in response to a question issued by Didier Franck three years earlier, while preparing a special issue of 
Philosophie devoted to Henry’s work, wherein Franck asked Henry “to clarify the relation between [Henry’s] 
‘material phenomenology’ and Husserl’s ‘hyletic phenomenology’.” Scott Davidson, “Introduction” in Henry, 
Material Phenomenology, xii. 
 
20 Edmund Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (London and 
New York: Routledge Classics, 2012), 174. 
 
21 The intentional morphe are the meaningful experiences constituted by a “‘bestowal of sense’ which takes place in 
the noetic phases.” Ibid., 177. 
 
22 Ibid., 180. Or again, “phenomenological reflexions and analyses which specifically concern the material may be 
called hyletically phenomenological, as, on the other side, those that relate to noetic phases may be referred to as 
noetically phenomenological. The incomparably more important and fruitful analyses belong to the noetical side.” 
Ibid., 178 [emphasis added]. 
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majority of Husserl’s subsequent phenomenological investigations will be devoted to intentional 
content. Insofar as Henry’s radical or material phenomenology bears a noticeable similarity to 
Husserl’s hyletic phenomenology, it is precisely this bias that Henry will target in Material 
Phenomenology, aiming not only to resist the denigration of hyletic phenomenology, but to 
completely invert the priority: “material phenomenology, as I conceive it,” Henry there writes, 
“results from a radical reduction of every transcendence that yields the hyletic or impressional 
component as the underlying essence of subjectivity,”23 or again, “hyle is more essential than 
morphe for the determination of the object.”24  
In his defense of hyletic phenomenology, Henry first notes a tendency in Husserl to efface 
the unique givenness of the impressional hyle. Simply put, rather than recognizing the unique 
phenomenality of the impression, Husserl reduces it to a mere component of intentionality, thereby 
subsuming the hyle within the morphe. As Henry notes, under Husserl’s analyses, “the hyle 
becomes originally and in itself lacking … of the capacity to carry out the work of manifestation 
in and by itself.”25 The result of this “dejection” of the impression is its “ejection” into the sphere 
of transcendence, the horizon of visibility; the hyle become mere “sense data.” Thus, by the time 
that Husserl writes Ideas II, affectivity will be stripped of its unique givenness and bound together 
with objects, as an “act of feeling.” Affects are there found “in the object itself”; they are 
“predicates of objects,”26 lacking any capacity to manifest themselves from themselves.27 Thus 
                                               
23 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 9. 
 
24 Ibid., 18. 
 
25 Ibid., 11. 
 
26 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second 
Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 16. 
 
27 This reduction of the impression to the horizon of visibility—that is, transcendence—is most clearly recognizable 
in Husserl’s account of the “empty feeling.” As he writes, “Just as there is, however, a sort of representing from afar, 
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ultimately, for Husserl, all phenomenology (rightly bearing the name) is intentional 
phenomenology, that is, phenomenology of the transcendent.28 
According to Henry, this is a problem precisely because it betrays the phenomenological 
project itself. For Henry, the phenomenological enterprise seeks “to describe phenomena 
themselves, … as they are given and consequently in their givenness itself.”29 “The object of 
phenomenology,” he writes, drawing upon the Husserl’s 1907 The Idea of Phenomenology, is “the 
object in its How [Wie],” that is “in the how of its givenness.”30 Yet, he suggests, Husserl has here 
rejected the givenness of the hyle not due to a phenomenological insight or eidetic necessity, but 
due to a pre-phenomenological prejudice: onto-phenomenological monism.  
As Henry will seek to illustrate, Husserl’s analyses themselves often reveal precisely the 
opposite of what his ideological perspective demands. Indeed, as Husserl will note: 
The reference to the phenomenological reduction, and similarly to the pure sphere 
of experience as ‘transcendental,’ depends precisely on our finding in this reduction 
an absolute sphere of materials and noetic forms, to whose interlacings, nicely 
articulated in accord with as immanent essential necessity belongs this wonderful 
conscious possession of something definitively or definably given in such and such 
a way.31 
 
As Henry glosses the consequences of this passage, intentionality—this wonderful conscious 
possession of something—“always requires what is wholly other than itself: the sensation, the 
                                               
an empty representational intending which is not a being in the presence of the object, so there is a feeling which 
related to the object emptily; and as the former is fulfilled in intuitive representing, so is the empty feeling fulfilled 
by way of the delighting.” Ibid., 11. Here feeling—the impression or hyle—is submitted to the reign of objectivating 
distance, the horizon of transcendence or alienation.  
 
28 Insofar as intentionality represents a directedness toward “something over against consciousness itself as in 
principle other, irreal, transcendent.” Husserl, Ideas, 207. 
 
29 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 16. 
 
30 Ibid. 
 
31 Husserl, Ideas, 207 [emphasis added]. 
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impression. The latter must first be given in order for any experience whatsoever to take place.”32 
Thus, the task of a hyletic—or a material/radical—phenomenology must not be the erasure of the 
unique mode of givenness of the affective material or the impressional hyle. It is rather the task of 
a radical phenomenology to discover this unique givenness that not only manifests itself, but 
likewise functions as the foundation of all transcendent phenomenality: “everything that is given 
is given to us, so to speak, two times. The first givenness, the Empfindung, … and then, … [it is] 
given a second time in and through intentionality, as a transcendent and irreal thing, as its ‘vis-a-
vis’.”33 Whereas, “‘transcendental’ phenomenology, is limited to the description of this second 
givenness,” it is the first mode of givenness that Henry’s radical phenomenology seeks to uncover 
in its unique manifestation. In order to uncover this more primordial phenomenon, Henry will 
develop a methodology that aims to radicalize Husserl’s phenomenological reduction: this he 
names “the radical reduction.” 
 
B. The Radical Reduction 
  
The radical reduction, as Henry suggests in The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, is not completely 
unique to his own radical phenomenology. For, apart from its obvious precedence in Husserl, 
Henry also discovers a “radical reduction” at the heart of Cartesian philosophy.34 The Cartesian 
methodology constitutes a reduction, Henry argues, precisely because it seeks to bracket appearing 
beings (l’étants)—what Martin Heidegger will call the ontic—from the act of appearing itself 
(l’être)—the ontological or transcendental. As Henry writes, “the cogito's phenomenological 
                                               
32 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 17. 
 
33 Ibid., 16. 
 
34 “Cartesianism is a phenomenology.” Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 25. Further, “the radical 
problematic introduced by … Cartesianism moves entirely in an attitude of reduction, which is precisely what makes 
it radical.” Ibid., 22. 
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reduction begins this differentiation, the separation of appearance’s appearing from what appears,” 
or in Descartes’ language, the videor/cogitatio from the videre/cogitatum.  
 It is precisely the task of returning from appearance to its very act of appearing, from what 
is given to its givenness, that Henry takes to be the task of his radical reduction. Husserl quite 
rigorously sets out this task in The Idea of Phenomenology, where he describes the 
phenomenological reduction as a method for attaining the “absolute data” of the immanent; 
“everything transcendent (that which is not given to me immanently) is to be assigned the index 
zero, i.e., its existence, its validity is not to be assumed as such.”35 Yet, it remains ambiguous what 
is to be understood by immanence. As Husserl notes: “the phenomenon of sound perception, even 
as evident and reduced, demands within the immanent a distinction between appearance and that 
which appears. We thus have two absolute data, the givenness of the appearing and the givenness 
of the object.”36 We here have, in Henry’s language, a first and a second givenness. But Husserl 
remains clear on this point, continuing “the object within this immanence is not immanent in the 
sense of genuine immanence.”37 The object—what Husserl will later designate as the morphe, or 
the object of intentional phenomenology—is not genuinely immanent [reell Immanente]; for 
genuine immanence refers to that which “presents nothing else, ‘points’ to nothing ‘outside’ itself, 
… [it is] self-givenness [Selbstgegebenheit].”38 But, Husserl will almost immediately substitute 
for this radical project, a reduction that instead privileges this “second givenness”—the givenness 
of the object, rather than the givenness of its appearing. By making this substitution, Henry argues, 
                                               
35 Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 4. 
 
36 Ibid., 9. 
 
37 Ibid. 
 
38 Ibid., 3. 
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Husserl introduces a “perversion of the concept of immanence,”39 whereby “the mode of givenness 
of the transcendence of the pure gaze,” is granted “the false title of ‘immanence’.”40 Henry 
therefore understands the radical reduction as a retrieval of this earlier conception of the 
reduction—a radical reduction discovered by Descartes and Husserl, but ultimately  abandoned by 
both in favor of the object/videre/cogitatum.  
 Henry’s radical reduction therefore aims—to use Husserl’s language—at the genuinely 
immanent. In this reduction everything that appears within the horizon of visibility is bracketed; 
“if we bracket every empirical or worldly image … there remains a pure … affective tonality.”41 
This not only includes the general thesis of existence and the positings of the natural attitude, as 
in Husserl’s phenomenological reduction, but also the second givenness—“which is the ek-static  
givenness in the perception of the now.”42 That is, everything that is given in intentionality, both 
the noetic and the noematic content is entirely bracketed. Simply put, in Henry’s radical reduction, 
everything that is marked by distance or transcendence—even the “immanent transcendence” 
described by Husserl in the Cartesian Meditations43—is placed out of play in order that the 
                                               
39 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 55. 
 
40 Ibid., 57. For a Husserlian response to this argument, see: Jeffrey Hanson and Michael R. Kelly, “Michel Henry 
and The Idea of Phenomenology: Immanence, Givenness and Reflection” in The Affects of Thought, eds. Jeffrey 
Hanson and Michael R. Kelly (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 62-84. As they there write, “Husserl does indeed 
develop different senses of immanence in these lectures, but the claim could be made that he does so rather more 
purposefully and defensibly than Henry recognizes. Henry does detect a recognizable ‘shift’ in The Idea of 
Phenomenology, but the precise nature of this shift can be interrogated further, revealing not so much an illicit 
substitution of one notion of immanence for another but a deepening recognition of what immanence necessarily 
entails,” 73. 
 
41 Henry, Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 243. 
 
42 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 25. 
 
43 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, §47. 
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givenness or appearing of the phenomenon, what Henry calls the essence of phenomenality, might 
be manifest in its phenomenological purity.44 As Henry describes the reduction:  
The radical reduction reduces appearing itself. Within appearing, it sets aside this 
range of light that we call the world in order to reveal that without which this visible 
horizon would never become visible, namely, the auto-affection of its 
transcendental exteriority which actualizes itself in the pathos of Life that is never 
outside.45 
 
 Insofar as this reduction brackets everything that manifests within the distance of the 
horizon of the world, its phenomena manifest without distance or gap. That which is given is 
nothing other than the act of givenness itself, and this act likewise in no way differs from that 
which receives the givenness. It is an “original givenness [la donation originelle] in self-givenness 
[l‘autodonation].”46 It is in this self-givenness that the self gives itself from itself to itself, in its 
own self-affectivity.47 Henry names this self-givenness in affectivity: Life.48 
 
C. Self-Affectivity, the Essence of Life 
“Immanence and affectivity are the two essential characteristics of life.”49 Insofar as Henry 
identifies immanence, self-givenness, and self-affectivity with Life, his radical phenomenology 
                                               
44 Insofar as Henry radicalizes the critique beyond Husserlian recognition, Rivera suggests—in an assertion 
representative of critiques of Henry—that “Henry has moved beyond the concept of ‘suspension’ or ‘bracketing,’ 
rather than having realized more fully the reduction itself.” Joseph Rivera, The Contemplative Self After Michel 
Henry: A Phenomenological Theology (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 2015), 135. 
  
45 Michel Henry, “The four principles of phenomenology,” trans. Joseph Rivera and George E. Faithful, Continental 
Philosophy Review 48 (2015): 1-21, 11. 
 
46 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 519. 
 
47 “To be the feeling of self means to have a content, not any content whatever, it means to have as content what one 
is himself [sic], his own reality.” Ibid., 517. 
 
48 Given Henry’s subsequent conflation of Life and God—“the first fundamental equation of Christianity: God is 
Life—he is the essence of Life, or if one prefers, the essence of Life is God” (Henry, I am the Truth, 27)—Rivera 
argues that  “the radical reduction so premised by Henry is necessarily a theological reduction.” Rivera, The 
Contemplative Self After Michel Henry, 142. 
 
49 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 204. 
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might be rightly identified as a philosophy of life. But, for Henry, the meaning of the living being 
shares little in common with the bios of the biological sciences: it “differs totally from what 
biology studies.”50 Whereas “life” in the biological sciences refers itself to “neurons, electrical 
currents, chains of amino acids, cells, or chemical properties,”51 these constituents remain 
phenomena, ontic beings “wholly foreign to phenomenality.”52 For Henry, on the other hand, Life 
refers to the transcendental condition of phenomenality, the first givenness—the genuine 
immanence of the hyle, impression, or Empfindung—which is most readily manifest in the self-
affectivity of the living individual (le vivant). Thus, to be living here designates the self-feeling by 
which the living individual feels itself to be living, its self-affectivity.53 
In these affections or impressions—such as joy, suffering, anxiety, boredom, etc.—there is 
no difference between that which feels, that which is felt, and the feeling itself. Rather, “feeling 
… ‘reveals itself’ in such a way that that which it reveals in this revelation which constitutes it is 
itself and nothing else.”54 In self-affectivity one feels oneself without gap; here, “life refers to life, 
spirit to spirit, wherein the absolute is related to itself, there is no place whatever for objective 
                                               
 
50 Henry, I am the Truth, 34. 
 
51 Ibid. 
 
52 Ibid. 
 
53 “To be affected by itself, to affect itself, is to constitute itself as self-affection. Self-affection is the constitutive 
structure of the original essence of receptivity.” Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 233. One might find a 
precedence for this account in Heidegger’s reading of Kant’s 2nd Critique: “We must elucidate this state of affairs 
phenomenologically. It pertains in general to the essential nature of feeling not only that it is feeling for something 
but also that this feeling for something at the same time makes feelable the feeler himself and his state, his being in 
the broadest sense. Conceived in formally universal terms, feeling expresses for Kant a peculiar mode of revelation 
of the ego. In having a feeling for something there is always present at the same time a self-feeling, and in this self-
feeling a mode of becoming revealed to oneself. The manner in which I become manifest to myself in feeling is 
determined in part by that for which I have a feeling in this feeling.” Heidegger, The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, 132.  
 
54 Ibid., 553. This “affectivity is not a phenomenon or some thing which manifests itself, rather it is manifestation 
itself and its essence.” Ibid., 533. 
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knowledge which would occur there only as a ‘cleft’ [faille], which would only destroy the spiritual 
world.”55  
This is the essence of the unique phenomenality of immanence. Whereas transcendence 
depends upon the gaps or fissures of representivity—the “cleft” between subject and object, noesis 
and noema, intention and intuition—genuine immanence marks a direct givenness of the self to 
itself, without the distanciation of the horizon of the world. In Henry’s theo-poetic language, “the 
content of Life—what it experiences—is Life itself, [it] refers back to a more fundamental 
condition, to the very essence of ‘Living,’ to a mode of revelation whose specific phenomenality 
is the flesh of pathos, pure affective material, in which any cleavage, any separation, finds itself 
radically excluded.”56 In this manner, the phenomenality of affectivity serves as an “arch-
revelation” of Being, the manifestation of “a reality-in-itself, totally foreign to the world of 
representation, excluded from its phenomenological mode of presentation and content.”57  
 Self-affectivity is therefore marked by a primordial ipseity; each affection is mine, or more 
precisely, it is me. As Heidegger of all thinkers argues, “what is phenomenologically decisive in 
the phenomenon of feeling is that it directly uncovers and makes accessible that which is felt, and 
it does this not, to be sure, in the manner of intuition but in the sense of a direct having-of-
oneself.”58 Thus, Henry argues, “the difference which is instituted among our various feelings is a 
difference in the unity of life such as takes place concretely with the ceaseless passage from one 
modality to another as modalities of a single life.”59 That is not to suggest that the experience of 
                                               
55 Ibid., 402. 
 
56 Henry, I am the Truth, 30. 
 
57 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 133. 
 
58 Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 133. 
 
59 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 618. 
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the self in its radical immanence-to-itself is univocal. On the contrary, Henry seeks to describe a 
differentiation, but one without gap or cleft. In a manner that explicitly draws from Husserl’s 
account of the Ur-impression, which finds itself “engaged in continuous alteration,”60 the affective 
tonalities of the self manifest in a continuous flux, inescapably present to the self, but nevertheless 
always new and renewed.61 In this radical receptivity or passivity of the self to itself, one 
experiences not only the intoxication of joy, but also the terror of suffering.62 
Indeed, Henry will consistently emphasize the quasi-dialectical “oscillation” between 
suffering and joy, the two “fundamental tonalities”63 of affectivity. Thus, he writes in The 
Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, for example:  
Suffering and joy are not two modes of affectivity. Together they constitute the 
unique essence of being, as life, as the original self-experience in self-growth of 
self-delight. Nor are suffering and joy two separate, self-sufficient tonalities. 
Rather, they are the eternal transition from one to the other since self-suffering in 
its actualization is always a growing from and delighting in self, since delight has 
no site or phenomenological actuality except the suffering of that suffering.64  
 
                                               
 
60 Edmund Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness (1905), trans. James S. Churchill 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966), 50. For Henry’s account of the Ur-impression, see: Henry, 
Incarnation, 55-59. 
 
61 “All our impressions pass, … and are … constantly modified, not into the non-being of the immediately past 
where they vanish, but into another and always ‘new’ impression—sickness into well-being, desire into satisfaction, 
worry into rest, suffering into joy, and despair into beatitude.” Henry, Incarnation, 57.  
 
62 Thus, Henry suggests, for example, that it is this inescapability of self-feeling, particularly in the mode of 
suffering, that constitutes the transcendental condition for suicide—whether literal or figurative—the only possible 
escape from the self-givenness of life. “The horror of life always results from [suffering] … It is rather within itself, 
in one of the tonalities by which it necessarily happens … that the crazy idea of no longer experiencing what it 
experiences, of dismissing its own condition of being alive is rooted … suffering is trapped in itself.” Henry, 
Barbarism, 67. 
 
63 “Life is the eternal movement of the passage from Suffering to Joy.” Henry, Seeing the Invisible, 122. Henry will 
elsewhere designate other affective tonalities as “fundamental,” such as anxiety, as will be seen below. 
 
64 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 232 [emphasis added]. 
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Nevertheless, the unique status of suffering and joy should not be overemphasized, as Henry insists 
upon a complex pantheon of affective tonalities in the self-givenness of life. Not only suffering 
and joy, but also hunger and thirst, boredom, anxiety, pain, pleasure, despair, fatigue, and drive—
in fact, insofar as affectivity functions not only as “content,” but also as the “form” of 
manifestation,65 every experience is founded in the impressionality of affectivity: “this is precisely 
what affectivity is: the universal form of all possible experience in general, the ontological and 
transcendental dimension which constitutes the foundation of the reality of everything which is.”66  
Thus it is not only the obvious experiences of pathos which depend upon affectivity, but every 
experience whatsoever.67 For the perceptual experience there is a self-affectivity of the sense: for 
every sight a seeing, for every sound a hearing, for every touch a feeling. For the intellectual 
experience there is an “affectivity of thought.”68 For every intentional act of whatever kind—
whether of perception, intellection, imagination, memory, etc.69—every act is bound together with 
a more primordial manifestation in the immanence of affectivity. 
                                               
65 Affectivity is “that which constitutes the condition of every affection and experience, of everything which is 
capable of being given us, the Being-given itself considered as such in its intrinsic possibility and its own reality, 
this is what we call a Form, the transcendental element of the real and what is ontological in it.” Henry, The Essence 
of Manifestation, 510-511. 
 
66 Ibid., 511. 
 
67 “There is no need for distinguishing certain affective Erlebnisse from others which would not be affective; rather, 
all our experiences, insofar as they are different ways of living, bear within them that which is precisely the first 
characteristic of every life and every experience and which we call, for lack of better terms, an affective tonality.” 
Michel Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, trans. Girard Etzkorn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1975), 144. 
 
68 Ibid., 142. 
 
69 “The affective tonalities which are bound to these acts of perception, imagination, and memory, and invariably 
determine them, are in no way contingent with respect to such acts, they are their reality and the modes of their 
realization.” Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 485. 
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 Henry often draws clear connections between this notion of the self-affective Life and the 
cogito (whether Cartesian or Nietzschean70); he will even go so far as to identify it with the “soul” 
as affirmed in Descartes and critiqued by Kant.71 Certainly, as Ezio Gamba rightfully notes, “he 
does not have any space for the soul as a transcendent substance, as an object.”72 Nevertheless, 
this recourse to the language of the ego, the cogito, and the soul can lend itself to an ethereal quality 
in Henry’s philosophy. Therefore, it might be suspected, given his emphasis upon radical 
interiority, that Henry affirms the Cartesian priority of the “knowledge of soul” over the 
“knowledge of body.” But the truth is quite the opposite. While Henry seeks a recovery of radical 
immanence, he nevertheless continuously insists that “the mode in which it presents itself to us is 
our body.”73 Simply put, the “original body is soul, in the Cartesian sense of the word; it is 
immanence and life.”74 Thus, already by 1948, while composing the Philosophy and 
Phenomenology of the Body, the central figure of immanence will be the subjective experience of 
the originary body. As he would later write: 
It may seem paradoxical, in order to make legitimate this concept of a radical 
interiority and thereby the concept of the soul, to make an appeal to the body. This 
paradox diminishes once the idea of a subjective body comes to light. Actually 
when the body is interpreted, no longer in a naive and unilateral way as an object, 
but also as a subject and perhaps as the true subject, … then the analysis of the body 
                                               
70 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, chapters I-III and VII-VIII respectively. See also, Michel Henry, “Does 
the Concept ‘Soul’ Mean Anything,” trans. Gerard Etzkorn, Philosophy Today, vol. 13 n. 2 (1969): 94-114. 
 
71 For Henry’s challenge to Kant’s critique of rational psychology in the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason,” see: Michel 
Henry, “Destruction ontologique de la critique Kantienne du paralogisme de la psychologie rationnelle,” Studia 
Phaenomenologica IX (2009): 17-53.  
 
72 “Il ne peut y avoir aucun espace que le concept de l’âme comme substance transcendante, comme objet.” Ezio 
Gamba, “L’âme dans la pensée de Michel Henry,” in La vie et les vivants: (re)lire Michel Henry, eds. Grégori Jean 
et al (Louvain: Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2013), 78 [translation my own]. 
 
73 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 133. 
 
74 Ibid., 176. 
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thus understood in its original subjectivity may have some semblance of leading us 
to this interiority which we seek.75 
 
It is to this notion of the embodied flesh that we will now turn. 
 
§II: The Erotic Flesh 
A. The Objective Body and the Subjective Flesh 
 
The questions of incarnation have functioned as a central problematic for Henry since the 
beginning. “We know,” he writes, “that man is an incarnate subject”;76 but what does it mean to 
be an incarnate being? What is the essence of our body? How does are body differ from the mere 
objects of the world? Already in 1948 he devoted his work to an articulation of the body understood 
not as a contingent, ontic being within the world, but as a transcendental condition of 
manifestation. This work, originally envisioned as a chapter of The Essence of Manifestation,77 
would instead by developed as a self-standing manuscript and published almost twenty years later 
as Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body. While these initial investigations would be 
supplemented and nuanced by subsequent works, most importantly Incarnation: A Philosophy of 
Flesh (2000), his dualistic account of the body is there already worked out in surprising detail.  
In many ways Henry’s account of the body bears a striking resemblance to his 
contemporaries, particularly Merleau-Ponty.78 Like these other thinkers, Henry avoids the 
                                               
75 Henry, “Does the Concept ‘Soul’ Mean Anything,” 104. 
 
76 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 7. 
 
77  Just as “Destruction ontologique de la critique Kantienne du paralogisme de la psychologie rationnelle,” 
Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body was excised from The Essence of Manifestation due to the latter’s 
already unwieldy scope (Rivera, The Contemplative Self After Michel Henry, 353 n. 10). 
 
78  Though, as he notes in the preface to the second edition, “le contenu de ce premier travail ne doit rien aux 
recherches contemporaines de Merleau-Ponty, que j’ignorais à cette époque.” Michel Henry, “Avertissement à la 
seconde édition” in Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps: Essai sur l’ontologie biranienne 2nd edition (Paris: 
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temptation to reduce the body to a single modality; instead the body—as he will later write—
“splits strangely in two.”79 For Henry, the body is the paradigmatic figure of the duplicity of 
appearing—“our body offers us the crucial experience in which the duality of appearing is 
decisively confirmed”;80 The body is both objective and subjective, both ontic and ontological.81 
As he will later write in Seeing the Invisible:  
On the one hand, I live this body internally, coinciding with the exercise of each one 
of its powers—I see, I hear, I feel, I move my hands and eyes, I am hungry, I am 
cold—in such a way that I am this seeing, this hearing, this feeling, this movement 
or this hunger. … On the other hand, I also live this same body externally, because 
I am able to see it, touch it, and represent it as one represents an object.82 
 
Undoubtedly, Henry is here influenced by Husserl’s analyses of the body in Ideas II (see: 
Chapter 1), particularly his distinction between the Leib and the Körper, as well as a variety of 
bodily specifications within these broader categories: such as the sensing body, organic body, 
“biological body, living body, and human body.”83 Nevertheless, in Philosophy and 
                                               
Presses Universitaires de France, 1965/1987), i. Nonetheless, despite Henry’s assertion in this preface that his 
conception of the subjective body is “radically opposed” [s’opposaient radicalement] to his contemporaries, 
something of an affinity will be noted by Henry in “Does the Concept ‘Soul’ Mean Anything?,” 105-108. But, even 
in this later work, Henry will continuously privilege Maine de Biran over Merleau-Ponty, being particularly critical 
of Merleau-Ponty’s late work on the flesh of the world. For the complex relationship between these two thinkers’ 
competing notions of embodiment, see: Henry, “Does the Concept ‘Soul’ Mean Anything?,” 105-114; Henry, 
Incarnation, §21; and Renaud Barbaras, “The Essence of Life: Drive or Desire?” trans. Darian Meacham, in Michel 
Henry: Affects of Thought, eds. Jeffrey Hanson and Michael R. Kelly (New York: Continuum, 2012). 
 
79 Henry, Incarnation, 116. 
 
80 Ibid., 151. 
 
81 For a detailed analysis of this distinction, see: Jean-Michel Maldamé, “Michel Henry et la philosophie de la 
chair,” BLE CV (2004): 73-82. There Maldamé will mark the distinction as follows: “Michel Henry distingue 
nettement entre la chair et le corps. Un corps inerte ne sent ni n'éprouve rien. Il ne se sent pas ni ne s'éprouve pas lui-
même, il ne s'aime ni ne se désire. Par contre, le propre du corps humain est de percevoir les qualités, voir les 
couleurs, entendre les sons, respirer une odeur, mesurer du pied la dureté du sol, de la main la douceur d'une étoffe.”  
 
82 Henry, Seeing the Invisible, 5. 
 
83 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 8. For the complex relation between Husserl’s and Henry’s 
respective notions of the body and flesh, see: Michael Beat, “L’âme entre corps et esprit: le concept Husserlien de 
soubassement à la lumière de la phénoménologie matérielle de Michel Henry,” Revue de théologie et philosophie, 
142 (2010): 37-51; and Rémy Gagnon, “La philosophie de la chair de Michel Henry. Vers une onto-phénoménologie 
de l'individualité,” Symposium 14:2 (2010): 66-77; and Rolf Kühn, “Corporéité et vie charnelle: Résultats et 
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Phenomenology of the Body, Henry adopts Maine de Biran—who he will later call “one of the 
most profound philosophers of all time”84—as his primary interlocutor.85 For, according to Henry, 
the traditional approach that depends upon the distinction between the Leib and the Körper—the 
constituting body and the constituted body—is too “limited … [for], they are both worldly 
bodies.”86 Instead, following de Biran, Henry seeks to institute a deeper ontological distinction 
between an originary flesh and any manifestation of the body within the visibility of the world. 
The central focus of this work is de Biran’s deep challenge to both rationalism (Descartes, 
Leibniz, and Kant) and empiricism (Locke, Hume, and Condillac). Most centrally, Henry 
recognizes de Biran as the first philosopher to have rejected the universal conviction of occidental 
philosophy, “that the being of our body belongs to the world.”87 Instead, de Biran inaugurates a 
genuinely new mode of conceptualizing the body as a “subjective body.”  
For de Biran, there are two modes of knowledge:  
In the first form of knowledge, being is given us through the mediation of a 
phenomenological distance, it is transcendent being. Maine de Biran calls this 
knowledge “exterior knowledge.” In the second form of knowledge, being is given 
to us immediately, in the absence of all distance; and this being is no longer any 
being whatever, it is the ego, whose being is uniquely determined according to the 
manner in which it is given to us. Maine de Biran calls this second form of 
knowledge “reflection.”88 
 
                                               
perspectives de la phénoménologie matérielle,” in Michel Henry, eds. Jean-Marie Brohm and Jean Leclercq 
(Lausanne, Suisse: L’Age d’Homme, 2009), 186-195. 
 
84 “Plus profonds philosophe de tous les temps.” Michel Henry, “Œuvres, t. II : Influence de l'habitude sur la faculté 
de penser by Maine de Biran,” Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger, 178, no. 3 (1988): 338-339, 338 
[translation my own]. 
 
85 As indicated by the subtitle of the French edition, inexplicably excised from the English: “Essai sur l’ontologie 
biranienne.”  
 
86 Henry, Incarnation, 156.  
 
87 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 8. 
 
88 Ibid., 12. 
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While it is quite tempting, particularly following Hegelian philosophy, to read “reflection” as a 
mediated knowledge, lending itself to a phenomenological distance, Henry goes to great length to 
establish the immediacy of reflection in de Biran’s usage. For de Biran, reflection refers to an 
“unrepresentable idea”89 that “in no way sees itself as object.”90 Indeed, this notion of reflection 
will be most readily apparent in de Biran’s famous “feeling [or sensation] of effort,”91 wherein 
during an act of movement one not only feels the resistance of external bodies, but likewise has an 
immediate sensation of the body’s own inner force of action. Thus, for example, to lift one’s hand 
is distinct from having one’s hand lifted by another; not only because of the presence of sensation 
(the pressure of the other’s hand lifting from below), but also due to the lack of an inner sensation 
of effort (I do not feel myself lifting).  
 In these two modes of knowledge, Henry finds precisely the alternative to onto-
phenomenological monism that he seeks. For de Biran, the body is not first and foremost known 
by its external manifestations—biological, behavioral, etc.—but by the unique immanent 
givenness of the body to itself. Indeed, one-hundred and fifty years before the French reception of 
Husserl, de Biran would seem to suggest a collapse of the ego into the subjective experience of the 
lived body. As Henry writes: “the teaching of Maine de Biran may be summarized in these words: 
A body is subjective and is the ego itself.”92 But this ostensible similarity may be misleading, for 
quite against his predecessors and contemporaries, who begin by casting the ego out of its 
transcendental sphere and into the transcendence of the world—as epitomized by Sartre’s The 
                                               
89 Maine de Biran, Mémoir sur la décomposition de la pennsėe, in Oeuvre de Maine de Biran, Vol. 3, ed. Tisserand 
(Paris: Alcan, 1932), 156. 
 
90 Ibid., 71. 
 
91 Ibid., 217. 
 
92 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 11. 
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Transcendence of the Ego—Henry takes the opposite approach and attempts to identify an 
originary manifestation of the body within the transcendental sphere: 
The Biranian determination of subjective movement is … a radical critique of the 
Cartesian conception of the body, because by tearing away, not the idea, but the 
very being and reality of movement from the sphere of transcendent being, it 
defines the real body, and not the idea of the body, as a subjective and 
transcendental being.93 
 
By drawing upon this distinction, between the “real body” which is transcendental subjectivity, 
and the mere idea of the body, thrown into the irreality of the ek-static horizon of the world, Henry 
develops the dualistic conception of the body that he will maintain with only limited alteration 
throughout his subsequent career.  
 Henry names this latter conception of the body—as manifest within the world and its 
transcendence—the objective body, or eventually, simply “the body” (le corps). This term stands 
in for any objective manifestation of the body as an object in the world—including the biological 
body of the medical sciences, the body as living organism, or the body as brute matter. Since each 
of these manifestations of the body appear within the horizon of visibility, they are united insofar 
as they are necessarily constituted by intentional acts and their associated sensible intuitions; that 
is to say, they presuppose the structures of the transcendental ego.94 Simply, if the body is 
understood as a being within the horizon of the world, then it cannot at the same time be identical 
with the transcendental condition of that horizon.  
 Within the ontological monism of Western society, it is presumed that this objective 
manifestation of the body is the sole manifestation of the body. This conviction, Henry suggests, 
                                               
93 Ibid., 57. 
 
94 Understood in this way, Henry insists that “the body is no longer the radically subjective and immanent ‘I can’ 
that I am and that is identical to my ego.” Henry, Material Phenomenology, 110. 
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emerges from an abstraction that, following Husserl’s Krisis, he will call the Galilean reduction.95 
Under this reduction, “Galilean science has separated from itself everything that is subjective and 
even subjectivity itself.”96 Rather than addressing itself to the sensible life-world, Galilean science 
insists that “the real universe is made up of extended material bodies,”97 and therefore all true 
knowledge of the universe must take the form of geometrical relations between extended 
substances. On the level of the human body, this reduction “substitutes for the sensible body a 
body unknown until then—the scientific body.”98 For Henry, this reduction constitutes an 
abandonment of the truth of life, that we are living beings who experience ourselves in our 
ownmost intimacy and that we experience the world through innumerable sensible givens. 
Moreover, Henry insists that this scientific body always depends on the prior givenness of the 
horizon of Being, whose essence is nothing transcendent. That is to say, insofar as all science 
presupposes the sensible experience of living beings—the scientist or investigator—the objective 
body depends upon a more primordial manifestation of the body within life.99 “My body is always 
                                               
95 “Galileo’s categorical assertion is that the sensible body that we take to be the real body—that we can see, touch, 
feel, hear, which has colors, odors, tactile and sonorous qualities, etc.—is only an illusion, and that the real universe 
… is made up of extended material bodies, and this extended matter constitutes precisely the reality of these bodies, 
and, at the same time, of the universe” (Henry, Incarnation, 97). As Galileo writes, “when I think of a physical 
material substance, I immediately have to conceive of it as bounded, and as having this or that shape, as being large 
or small in relation to other things, and in some specific place and at any given time, as moving or at rest … I cannot 
separate it from these conditions by any stretch of the imagination. But whether it is white or red, bitter or sweet, 
noisy or silent, and of a pleasing or unpleasant colour, my mind does not feel compelled to bring this in order to 
apprehend it.” Galileo, Selected Writings, trans. William R. Shea and Mark Davie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 119. 
 
96 Henry, Barbarism, 102. 
 
97 Henry, Incarnation, 97. 
 
98 Ibid. 
 
99 Far from being able to furnish us with any clarification of such knowledge, a science like biology rather finds its 
bases in such knowledge; biology cannot be counted on to explain what it presupposes as the condition for its 
possibility and as the ontological horizon within which it can find its objects, furnish its explanations, and before all 
else, pose its problems.” Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 5. 
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there and sensuously prominent,” Henry writes, “while the original body is this sensibility itself to 
which both the constituted body and the reduced world of the sphere of ownness are present.”100  
In this quest to determine the original body in its primordial givenness and radical 
immanence to itself, Henry not only aims at the transcendental condition of the objective body, 
but the ultimate transcendental condition. Thus, he enacts a “splitting of the transcendental 
body”101 (dédoublement du corps transcendental): “the transcendental body, which opens us to the 
sensed body (whether it is a question of our own or of things), rests upon a corporeity far more 
originary, which is transcendental in a final, non-intentional, non-sensible sense, the essence of 
which is life.”102 
Following de Biran, Henry will first name this most primordial manifestation of the body 
the “subjective body” (le corps subjectif) or the Archi-body (Archi-corps). But, by 1983, he will 
adopt the language of “the flesh” (la chair).103 The flesh is the subjective and affective 
manifestation of the body to itself; it is the mode in which the body feels itself and its own 
capacities. It is not the eye, but seeing itself, not the hand, but grasping as such. Thus, as suggested 
above, Henry understands the flesh to be identical to the ego; it is “a body which is an ‘I’.”104 More 
specifically, insofar as the flesh is shown to be the very manifestation of the ego to itself, the auto-
                                               
100 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 110. 
 
101 Ibid., 116. 
 
102 Ibid., 117. 
 
103 This linguistic shift is perhaps due to the influence of Nietzsche (“As far as I can glean, the use of the term ‘flesh’ 
first begins with Henry’s confrontation with Nietzsche in Genealogy of Psychoanalysis. Henry deploys the term 
with greater regularity after his critical reading of Husserl in Material Phenomenology and his appropriation of the 
topos of incarnation in the Gospel of John in the late 1990s.” Rivera, The Contemplative Self After Michel Henry, 
353 n. 21.), or possibly following Didier Franck’s interpretation of the Husserlian Leib as la chair in Flesh and Body 
(Didier Franck, Flesh and Body: on the Phenomenology of Husserl, trans. Joseph Rivera and Scott Davidson [New 
York: Bloomsbury], 2014). 
 
104 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 8. 
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affection of the self is likewise the auto-affection of the flesh. Therefore, it likewise constitutes the 
transcendental condition of the ek-static givenness of the world, serving as the transcendental 
condition of everything that manifests within the sensible horizon of that world, including the 
objective body.105 This, for Henry, is the essence of life; to live is not simply to feel oneself as 
living, but more specifically to experience one’s affective flesh—simply put, “this living auto-
impressionality is flesh.”106 
 
B. The Failure of Sexuality and the Erotic 
 
Despite his consistent recourse to self-affection, Henry does not understand the flesh in purely 
solipsistic terms: “auto-affection,” Jean-Luc Marion notes, “was never an autism.”107 Rather, for 
Henry as for his contemporaries, the questions of intersubjectivity are central. Yet, following his 
distinction between the flesh and the body, Henry likewise aims to substitute a notion of “pathos-
with” for the Husserlian “association” of the fifth Meditation or the Heideggerian “mit-sein”—
                                               
105 In this regard, Henry follows Husserl’s analyses in Ideas II.  
 
Insofar as this conception of the flesh is understood in sharp distinction—even opposition—to the body, it has drawn 
forth considerable criticism from defenders of the body. Perhaps most importantly, Emmanuel Falque has repeatedly 
targeted Henry for his forgetfulness of the real fleshliness of the flesh, the blood and bones of incarnation. For 
Falque, Henry remains principal among those French philosophers who have advocated a “stampede toward the 
flesh” (and away from the objective and organic body)—particularly within the French phenomenological tradition. 
Emmanuel Falque, The Metamorphosis of Finitude: An Essay on Birth and Resurrection, trans. George Hughes 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 77; see also, Emmanuel Falque, “y a-t-il une chair sans corps?,” 
Transversalités 81 (2002): 43-74; and Emmanuel Falque, Les Noces de l’Agneau: Essai philosophique sur le corps 
et l’eucharistie (Paris: Les Éditions Du Cerf, 2011), 23-27. For a broader overview of Falque’s critique of the 
preceding tradition, see: Christina Gschwandtner, Postmodern Apologetics?: Arguments for God in Contemporary 
Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 199-206. For Henry’s response to Falque’s critique, see: 
Michel Henry, “À Emmanuel Falque,” Transversalités 81 (2002): 105-117. 
 
106 Henry, Incarnation, 62. 
 
107 “L’auto-affection n’avait rien d’un autisme.” Jean-Luc Marion, “Avant-propos” in Michel Henry, 
Phénoménologie de la vie I: De la phénoménologie (Paris: PUF, 2003), 8 [translation my own]. As Marion 
continues, “L'affection par soi se laissait affecter elle-même par toutes les autres consciences auto-affectées que 
l'amitié lui attirait.” Ibid. 
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both of which on his account presuppose that the intersubjective relation must manifest within the 
ek-static horizon of the world.108 Thus, he writes, “before intentionally grasping the other as other 
and before the perception of the other’s body, every experience of the other in the sense of a real 
being with the other occurs in us as an affect.”109  
The preeminent form of pathos-with, for Henry, is the erotic encounter, wherein one aims 
at an intermingling with the flesh of the other.110 Nevertheless, Henry also consistently denigrates 
“sexuality.” While a clear distinction between the sexual and the erotic is not employed in a 
consistent enough manner to constitute a law, it nevertheless constitutes a general principle and 
useful heuristic. For Henry, the erotic generally refers to an affective encounter with the other in 
the flesh, while sexuality refers to an objective relation to the body of the other. Nevertheless, as 
will become increasingly clear, this distinction does little to rescue even the erotic from its essential 
and ultimate disappointment. 
                                               
108 “For Husserl, it is intentionality that gives us access both to others and to everything that for us can be asserted as 
being. … [Likewise] Heidegger himself knows no other kind of phenomenality than [the essence of intentionality], 
specifically this original self-externalization of pure exteriority that he calls by different names, for example the ek-
static horizon of temporality.” Ibid., 238-239. For Henry’s account of intersubjectivity, see: Henry, “Pathos-with” in 
Material Phenomenology, 101-134; Henry, Incarnation, 237-252; and the volume edited by Jean Leclercq, “Michel 
Henry: Texts inédits sur l’expérience d’autrui” Revue Internationale Michel Henry 2 (2011). E.g. “quand bien même 
on dirait que l’expérience d’autrui est une expérience de son corps—ce qui n’est pas vrai—le problème reste posé 
car: ce n’est pas dans le monde que je puis avoir l’expérience du corps d’autrui (pour lui),” Ibid., 77. Henry will 
likewise commend Levinas for a similar conception. As he writes in a letter to Bernard Forthomme, “je suis, d’autre 
part, tout à fait d’accord avec ce que vous dites de la philosophie d’Emmanuel Levinas le seul à avoir pensé la 
relation à autrui dehors du monde.” Michel Henry, “Lettre à Bernard Forthomme,” Studia Phænomenologica IX 
(2009), 55.  
 
109 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 115. 
 
110 “L’eros henryen n’est en dernière instance ni auto-référentiel ni autiste main éminemment dialogique.” Natalie 
Depraz et Frédéric Mauriac, “La fécondité de la phénoménologie de la vie de Michel Henry pour les approches en 
deuxième personne,” in Jean Leclercq (ed), “Michel Henry: Texts inédits sur l’expérience d’autrui” Revue 
Internationale Michel Henry 2 (2011): 180-196, 186. Moreover, “le phénomène érotique n’est pas seulement un 
exemple—au sens d’un cas ou d’une illustration—de l’expérience métaphysique d’autrui, mais que c’en est aussi la 
version ‘exemplaire,’ le modèle par conséquent, dont tout autre expérience d’autrui participe en quelque sorte pour 
autant qu’elle en est une, pour autant qu’elle est, par conséquent, une tell ‘expérience métaphysique’.” Grégori Jean, 
“Les ambiguïtés de l’érôs,” in Jean Leclercq, (ed), “Michel Henry: Notes sur le phénomène érotique” Revue 
Internationale Michel Henry 4 (2013): 22. 
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The overarching unity of Henry’s discussion of sexuality is the inevitability of failure 
(l’échec).111 Already in The Essence of Manifestation, sexuality is a “vain repetition”;112 sexuality  
is always already “the failure of sexuality” (l’échec de la sexualité).113 In essence, sexuality 
becomes paradigmatic of the limits of representation and objectivity. Whereas love (l’amour), 
desire, or libido are affective sentiments, auto-affections rightfully given from themselves to 
themselves, the “reduction of love to sexuality”114 represents a bastardization of this affect, 
whereby it is cast out of its proper intimacy in affective pathos-with, and into the cold irreality of 
the world.  
This denigration of sexuality is already perfectly clear in Philosophy and Phenomenology 
of the Body. There, thinking in Husserlian and Schelerian terms, sexuality is constituted within the 
transcendence of the horizon of visibility as a “sexual intentionality.” Yet, Henry identifies an 
immediate failure implicit in all sexual intentionality. “Insofar as it directs itself toward sex, 
                                               
111 He offers, “the interpretation of desire and sexual activity as always and necessarily ending up in failure.” Henry, 
Incarnation, 212. 
 
112 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 455. 
 
113 Ibid. This notion of an inevitable “failure” at the heart of sexuality is similarly affirmed by psychoanalytic 
readings of sexuality. Thus for example, when Jacques Lacan insists that “there is no sexual relationship,”  he can at 
the same time reinterpret this as “the essence of the object is failure.” Although, two notes are here worth specifying, 
first Lacan uses rater, “to fail,” and raté, “failure,” rather than Henry’s l’échec. Second, whereas Henry reads this 
failure non-dialectically, Lacan suggests that this is an at least potentially productive failure. (Jacques Lacan, On 
Feminine Sexuality: The Limits of Love and Knowledge, Encore: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan Book XX, trans. 
Bruce Fink [New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998], 57-58). Thus, not only sexual difference, but subjectivity 
itself emerges from an attempt to deal with the failure of sexual relation. As Žižek parses this notion, “there is 
nothing outside of this failure; subject and language are themselves the outcome of this primordial failure.” Slavoj 
Žižek, Incontinence of the Void: Economico-Philosophical Spandrels (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2017), 58. 
 
Additionally, Henry’s non-dialectical notion of failure presents a particularly keen risk to queer folk. For, as Heather 
Love notes, for example, “same-sex desire is marked by a long history of association with failure, impossibility and 
loss. … Homosexuality and homosexuals serve as scapegoats for the failures and impossibilities of desire itself” 
(Heather Love, Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2009], 21). For a more positive appraisal of “failure” from a queer perspective, see: Jack Halberstam, The Queer Art 
of Failure (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011). 
 
114 Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 197. 
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understood as a being-there and as an object,” Henry writes, “sexual intentionality encounters an 
obstacle prescribed by ontology.”115 Unlike, for example, perceptual intentionality, sexual 
intentionality is marked by an ontological aporia; it is in-principle unfulfillable. The formal 
unfulfillability of sexual intentionality emerges from its self-contradictory character. On the one 
hand, the proper object of sexuality is the absolute subjectivity of the other.116 Yet, this subjectivity 
is approached through the realm of objective being, a realm essentially foreign to absolute 
subjectivity.117 Therefore, sexuality is defined in terms of a fundamental frustration. Because 
sexual intentionality lacks access to the interiority of subjectivity, it retains no reality; it is a mere 
representation. As Henry insists, “when the anxiety of sex is dissipated there is nothing left, except 
an objective determination. The Subjectivity which had been aimed at has vanished.”118  
This relegation of sexuality to objectivity—and its correlate inability to access absolute 
subjectivity—follows from its relegation to the body rather than the flesh. Henry is explicit on this 
point: “the ontological status of our objective transcendent body is the foundation which makes 
the existence of a sexual world possible.”119 As Henry will later write, in Material Phenomenology, 
                                               
115 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 214. As he noted in his preparatory notes: “voilà l’échec de 
l’amour physique, lorsqu’il obéit à cette intentionnalité-là.”  Michel Henry, “Notes sur le phénomène érotique” in 
Jean Leclercq, (ed), “Michel Henry: Notes sur le phénomène érotique” Revue Internationale Michel Henry 4 (2013): 
32. 
 
116 “The intentionality presiding over the determined form assumed by us in our sexual life is oriented toward its 
transcendent terminus as toward something absolute.” Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 213. 
 
117 “Nevertheless, that which it finds in this experience is not the absolute but only a presence without life, that 
which is realized by the pure and simple being-there of a transcendent element.” Ibid., 214. 
 
118 Ibid. 
 
119 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 214. Or again: “It will be objected that the human body 
presents itself to man [sic] with characteristics which have varied throughout the course of history, characteristics 
which lead to such varying habits concerning nourishment, for example, clothing, sexuality, as well as the numerous 
‘modes’ related thereto. However, this is not the original body, but various ways in which man represents this body 
to himself and behaves toward it.” Ibid., 4 n. Sexuality is here cast off from the flesh and placed together with 
culturally determined characteristics such as clothing; it is thereby relegated to mere representation. 
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in sexuality “the caress follows the trail of the other’s pleasure. It calls upon the other’s pleasure 
but what it touches is the other’s body-object. It does not touch the other’s original body, which is 
radically subjective and radically immanent.”120 In general, discussions of sexuality throughout 
Henry’s middle-period will largely presuppose this intentional framework and the reduction of 
sexuality to objectivity.121  
 This critique of sexuality culminates in Incarnation. There Henry recognizes that the body 
is necessarily embedded in a sexual world and as such “our body is always marked by sexual 
difference”122—a mark which manifests, for Henry, most conspicuously in concrete “sexual 
                                               
This relegation of sexuality to the representational realm of history or habit interestingly anticipates poststructuralist 
accounts of sexuality that will emerge in the 90s, particularly those surrounding the work of Michel Foucault and 
Judith Butler. One might, for example, consider the surprising similarity between Henry’s claim that “the body of 
biology is in a certain sense a cultural object, and as such it is essentially historical, both regarding its appearance 
and its modifications which are none other than those brought about by the very development of science” (Ibid., 4)  
and Butler’s assertion that “the universal conception of the person, however, is displaced as a point of departure for 
a social theory of gender by those historical and anthropological positions that understand gender as a relation 
among socially constituted subjects in specifiable contexts. This relational or contextual point of view suggests that 
what the person ‘is,’ and, indeed, what gender ‘is,’ is always relative to the constructed relations in which it is 
determined. As a shifting and contextual phenomenon, gender does not denote a substantive being, but a relative 
point of convergence among culturally and historically specific sets of relations.” Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: 
Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 14. 
 
120 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 131.  
 
121 In The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, for example, Henry ties sexuality to Schopenhauer’s will-to-live, writing 
that “the generative organs are will’s headquarters; the sexual needs and all the others express the will-to-live’s 
ceaseless claim on us” (Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 166). But this binding of sexuality to life is 
immediately abrogated by the subsumption of the will to representation: “however, will’s immanence in body, or 
their identity, … is incompatible with the thesis that forces will, abandoned to the unconscious, to seek its 
phenomenal reality outside itself, precisely in the body, but a body that now belongs to representation’s sphere, to 
life’s ‘world’” (Ibid. [emphasis added]). Moreover, the scarcity of reference to sexuality in a text devoted to the 
genealogy of psychoanalysis is striking: “son [l’érôs] absence de Généalogie de la psychanalyse est à cet égard 
significative.” Jean, “Les ambiguïtés de l’érôs,” 20. 
 
Likewise, in From Communism to Capitalism Henry will critique the wage system’s reduction of the worker to their 
labor time, that is, the necessity that one sell their body, and thus themselves. Yet, even while reaffirming the 
indissolubility of the human person from their body (to sell the body = to sell oneself), he nonetheless reaffirms the 
relegation of sexuality solely to the objective manifestation of the body. “Needs for food, sex, and other things point 
back to a nature—in this case to a body—that is interpreted as an empirical and natural given” (Henry, From 
Communism to Capitalism, 24).  
 
122 Henry, Incarnation, 204. Even if only implicitly: “this mark remains long implicit: In innocence, for example, the 
difference is lived in ignorance.” Ibid. 
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determinations.” Yet, these determinations of sexual difference remain nothing more than 
objective facts, essentially divorced from the living affectivity of the flesh and its eros. Focusing 
upon the experiences of anxiety123 and shame that often accompany the exposure of these 
determinations—e.g. nudity or sexual activity124—Henry here reiterates his earlier assertion of the 
centrality of failure in sexuality. But, importantly, he here moves to intensify this failure.  
 Whereas in Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, the failure of sexuality is centered 
on the inability of sexual intentionality to grasp the subjectivity of the other, its inability to 
reconcile the body of the other with his or her absolute subjectivity, in Incarnation, this anxiety 
and failure is redoubled. It not only emerges from an inability to reconcile the other’s body and 
flesh, but likewise, the inability to reconcile this difference within oneself. Thus “the failure of 
desire”125 and the related anxieties of sexuality are reduplicated in the gap between one's own flesh 
and body. Turning to Kierkegaard’s language of “the soul”—which here should be understood as 
the affectivity of one’s original corporeity—Henry presents the anxiety of sexuality in terms of a 
failure to properly reconcile the relation between one's soul (flesh) and body. “Anxiety as such,” 
he writes, “is the result of the paradoxical synthesis, in the spirit, of the soul with a sexually 
differentiated objective body.”126 
                                               
123 The emphasis upon the language of “anxiety,” now paired with failure, comes from Henry’s reading of Søren 
Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety (trans. Reidar Thomte [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980]) which 
plays a key role in the third part of Incarnation. It is important to note that anxiety is not univocally negative for 
Henry: “in itself, anxiety is not culpable” (Ibid., 203). But anxiety, insofar as it creates desire (Ibid., 202 [although 
Henry perhaps later rejects this thesis Ibid., 217]), also creates the possibility for the “leap into sin” (Ibid., 203), 
which is, for Incarnation, nothing other than the leap into sexuality—“in this respect, one can say that the sexual, 
which is understood here as sin…” (Ibid., 204). 
 
124 See, e.g.: Ibid., 215. 
 
125 Ibid., 208. 
 
126 Ibid., 215. “Spirit” here, drawing from both Kierkegaard and Merleau-Ponty, appears to be a stand-in for the 
holistic human person, the unity of the subjective flesh and the objective body. “To the extent that anxiety arises 
from the synthesis of the soul and body, such a synthesis, however unimaginable and paradoxical it may be, must be 
possible. Kierkegaard entrusts this possibility to a third in which the two elements are united, and ‘this third is the 
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Nevertheless, despite its recourse to the language of failure common throughout his earlier 
corpus, Incarnation does offer a partial answer to the problematic of sexuality from the perspective 
of immanence and the flesh. For, as Henry writes in Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 
“the entire philosophy of sexual love has to be re-done beginning with the data of the philosophy 
of the subjective body.”127 There should be, together with the sexual intentionality of sexuality, 
another “form of our sexual life,”128 one which “finds its most fundamental ontological 
presupposition in the theory of the subjective body.”129 In Incarnation, Henry attempts to offer 
precisely such a rethinking, which will here be designated as the erotic.130  
 For Henry, the erotic gives itself as the peak manifestation of intersubjectivity. In dialogue 
with Merleau-Ponty's notion of the “chiasm,”131 the unity of the touching and the touched, Henry 
situates the erotic caress within the immanence of the flesh; “being-touched,” he writes, “is a 
modality of our original flesh.”132 This emphasis upon the erotic touch marks Henry's indebtedness 
to Levinas' phenomenology of the “caress,” which both “is sensibility,” but nonetheless, 
                                               
spirit’.” Ibid., 195.  
 
127 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 218n. An analogous call to a radical phenomenology of 
sexuality is likewise implied at the closing of I am the Truth. There, Henry laments those “who have been liberated 
by making them think their sexuality is a natural process, the site and place of their infinite Desire,” Henry, I am the 
Truth, 275. This lament echoes similar concerns in Barbarism. Henry, Barbarism, 82-83. 
 
128 Ibid., 218n 
 
129 Ibid. 
 
130 This notion of the erotic is deeply entangled with Henry’s related notions of libido, which is immanently 
experienced as “an affective tonality before it is the grasping of determined axiological qualities of the opposite or 
of one’s own sexuality.” Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 644. 
 
131 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible: Followed by Working Notes, trans. Alphonso Lingis 
(Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 130-155. 
 
132 Henry, Incarnation, 207. 
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“transcends the sensible.”133 For Levinas, the essence of the caress is that it “grasps nothing.”134 
This incapacity of the erotic caress to “grasp” an object easily translates into Henry's onto-
phenomenological dualism. As a modality of the flesh, the erotic manifests on the plane of radical 
immanence, never appearing to the ek-static sight of objectivity. The erotic caress “grasps nothing” 
precisely because, in the immanence of radical interiority, there is no-“thing” to grasp.135 “The 
young woman’s hand,” Henry writes, “belongs to an original flesh; only in belonging to this flesh, 
and never as an object or thingly body, is it capable of being touched and entering into the erotic 
relation.”136 
 This distinction holds not only for the hand of the caress, but for embodiment as such: in 
“eroticism, corporeity as an objective element disappears completely. This is purity.”137 Thus, 
what Henry identifies under the language of the erotic is a direct encounter with the other within 
the radical immanence of subjectivity, within the affectivity of life. In this pathos-with, completely 
foreign to the givenness of the world, one has a non-intentional encounter with the other.138  
 The erotic therefore radically differs from Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body’s 
                                               
133 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1961), 
255. 
 
134 Ibid, 261. 
 
135 “But it is also clear that such ‘seeing’ is out of the question here. Seeing is only possible in a ‘world.’ Seeing 
presupposes the distancing of what must be seen and thus its coming-outside—more precisely, the prior coming 
outside of ‘Outside’ itself, the formation of the world's horizon. It is the coming-outside of ‘outside,’ the 'outside-
itself' as such, that constitutes the visibility of everything that, situated in the ‘Outside’ before our gaze, will be 
susceptible of being seen by us, as a being-seen as such. And this concerns not only sensory seeing but equally so 
intelligible seeing, any form of experience in which one accedes to what is experienced as an en-face or as an ‘ob-
ject’.” Henry, I am the Truth, 25. 
 
136 Henry, Incarnation, 206 [emphasis added]. 
 
137 “l’érotisme, la corporéité comme élément objectif disparaît complètement. C’est cela la pureté.” Henry, “Michel 
Henry: Texts inédits sur l’expérience d’autrui,” 80 [translation my own]. 
 
138 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 124. 
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sexual intentionality. Indeed, just as every intentionality presupposes a first givenness in 
affectivity, the truly erotic encounter represents the ontological condition of any possible sexual 
intentionality. In this manner, the erotic encounter bypasses the aporia of sexual intentionality. 
Rather than seeking the absolute subjectivity of the other in the objectivity of the world—a 
Sisyphean task—genuine eroticism is the direct encounter with the flesh of the other in 
immanence.  
 This immanence makes it all the more surprising that, on Henry’s account, even when it 
remains at the level of the flesh, even when it is a properly erotic relation in the immanence of life, 
even when it is not yet reduced to the “nihilism” of sexuality, the erotic relation nevertheless 
inevitably fails: “in considering the erotic relation, either in its immanent achievement, or in its 
worldly appearing, we have recognized how in each case it is wrapped in anxiety and in each case 
leads to failure.”139 This failure, Henry remains clear, does not result from an external impetus (a 
“distraction”); Henry is not here describing the “fall” of the erotic into the sexual—though he will 
elsewhere. Rather, “maintaining our attitude of reduction,” he nevertheless discovers an impasse: 
“the failure of sexual desire, far from being able to be overcome in the affective relation to the 
other, on the contrary condemns this affective relation to reproduce that failure in itself, thus 
leading it to advance its own failure.”140 While the flesh that is my own and the flesh of the other 
can truly touch, can come into contact, they nevertheless constitute a barrier or limit. I cannot 
experience the other as they experience themselves; nor can they experience my self-givenness as 
I experience myself. The flesh of the other constitutes a limit or boundary line that cannot be 
                                               
139 Henry, Incarnation, 222. This is even more noteworthy, given that in Philosophy and Phenomenology of the 
Body, he had explicitly suggested that such an account would provide “the possibility of a love without anxiety.” 
Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 218n. 
 
140 Henry, Incarnation, 213. 
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crossed. 
 
C. Concrete Sexual Determinations 
 
This failure of sexuality not only strikes the erotic encounter, but is likewise determinative of the 
status of the flesh itself. For Henry proffers a distinctly monadic account of the flesh. Simply put, 
in its true interiority, the flesh manifests without sexual members—without, to use Henry’s 
language, sexual determinations. These sexual organs or members are instead cast out of the 
originary immanence of affectivity and into the objectivity of the world.  
 This is not to suggest that sexuality finds no proper basis in immanence. For love, desire, 
and libido are all properly speaking affective tonalities of our originary flesh. Yet, in the erotic 
encounter, these original impressions are objectified. As Henry writes of the hand, for example, 
insofar as it is “considered as an objective organ, as part of the worldly body, the hand is incapable 
of touching and sensing anything at all, … the subjective power of touching alone can do this.”141  
That is to say, the hand considered in its true immanence, simply is “the radically subjective power 
of prehension.”142 In order to appear within the objectivity of the organic body or the world, this 
original impression must be objected, cast into exteriority. It is precisely this process that Henry 
understands to be determinative of sexuality, insofar as sexuality appears in anything like a sexual 
organ, an erogenous zone, or any other member. Thus, for example, while Henry reads the 
Schopenhauerian will as roughly analogous to the immanence of life, he nevertheless affirmatively 
cites Schopenhauer’s assertion that “the body objectifies in the genitals the will to propagate.”143 
                                               
141 Ibid., 141. 
 
142 Henry, Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 326. “Described in its pure subjectivity and reduced to this, the ‘hand’ is 
nothing but the subjective power of touching and grasping.” Henry, Incarnation, 143. 
 
143 Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation Vol. 1, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1958), 334. Cited in Henry, Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 176. 
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Here “objectifies” or “réalise-t-il extérieurement”144 should be understood in the strong sense as 
an externalization, a representation, a casting into the horizon of visibility of the world: it is the 
“will's illusory doubling in the objective body.”145  
 It is this which unites Henry’s account of sexual determinations. Sexual determinations 
stand as an objectification—even a “fall” in all of its Christian connotations—of the original 
affectivity of eros. In them, “the erotic relation is reduced to an objective sexual relation; and that 
is how it now comes about, as a performance and a set of objective phenomena.”146 Thus, for 
example, “sensible tactile zones, or erogenous … zones”147 are found on the “thingly body.” Or 
again, in the sexual caress, one touches “the other at the most ‘sensible’ point of their body, the 
extreme point of its sexuality—‘there,’ which means on their own thingly body as it is shown in 
the world.”148 Simply put, the sexual member always manifests in the phenomenological mode of 
objectification.  
Henry refers to this objectification as the naked body; naked, not necessarily in a literal 
sense, but insofar as it is exposed to the visibility of exteriority: “thus unveiled in the objectivity 
of the world, naked, sex no longer offers anything more than this contingent and absurd 
appearance.”149 Exposed in this manner, the body cannot be experienced as anything but absurd. 
This is true for any member which, exposed to the light of visibility, is exposed as irreducibly 
                                               
144 Michel Henry, Généalogie de la psychanalyse: le commencement perdu (Paris: PUF, 1985), 216. 
 
145 Henry, Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 176. 
 
146 Henry, Incarnation, 218 [emphasis added]. 
 
147 Ibid., 163. 
 
148 Ibid., 214. “There,” in this instance, is a clear allusion to the “Da-” of Heidegger’s Dasein, that is, being-in-the-
world. Hence, Henry’s association of the “there” with the horizon of the world. This connection is emphasized 
elsewhere, where Henry will refer to the “sexed body, which is its being-there.” Ibid., 202. 
 
149 Ibid., 223. 
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contingent or arbitrary. There is no “why” for the particular configuration of the body. As Henry 
notes, “doubtless, the nose, the eye, the members, etc., manifest themselves to us as determinations 
concerning which no justification, for example, a functional one, suffices to hide their strange 
configuration or absurd characteristic from the view of a lucid mind.”150 And while this absurdity 
strikes every member exposed to the light, it is given a particular resonance in the case of the 
sexual member. Henry therefore finds it necessary to highlight “the contingency and therefore 
absurdity of sexual difference, and above all of sexual determination as such.”151  
 Simply put, it is the experience of the absurdity of the synthesis of the originary flesh with 
an objective body which provokes the distinctive anxiety of sexuality.152 Or more precisely, it is 
not simply the correspondence of the originary flesh and the objective body that produces this 
anxiety, but the flesh’s correspondence with “this body there in the world, with its determinations 
and its objective sexual configurations.”153 For Henry, anxiety “emerges in the presence of an 
objective sexual determination, it is in the spirit that it feels anxiety at not recognizing itself in a 
sex.”154  
Thus in a very real sense it is sexual determinations, insofar as they are always conceived 
as objective sexual determinations, that are responsible for the failure of desire—that is, the failure 
of both sexuality and the erotic. “It is the duality of appearing, and more precisely the objectivity 
of sexual determinations and thus of the erotic relation itself which is responsible for the absurdity 
                                               
150 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 190.  
 
151 Henry, Incarnation, 223. 
 
152 As Courtel notes, “ L'esprit ne s'angoisse donne pas devant le corps, devant ses fonctions et son destin, il 
s'angoisse devant la synthèse qu'il est, il s'angoisse d'être ‘ça’.” Yannick Courtel, “Chair et différence sexuelle chez 
Michel Henry,” Revue des sciences religieuses 83:1 (2009), 83. 
 
153 Henry, Incarnation, 214 [emphasis added].  
 
154 Ibid., 217. 
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of these determinations as well as for the failure of desire.”155 Therefore, all that remains after this 
failure of desire, is an “unimaginable synthesis”156 in the spirit of the originary flesh wherein life 
experiences itself in itself and the objective sexed body; a synthesis which is unimaginable, 
because it can never overcome the “monstrous, ‘enormous’ difference that is established in it, 
between itself and its sexed body.”157 The sexual member is therefore the dysmember.  
Thus, despite the fact that Henry critiques Kierkegaard for “surreptitiously [treating the] 
body, and particularly sexual difference, as objective determinations, referring inevitably to the 
world’s ek-static appearing,”158 Henry ends up reproducing precisely this tendency. Having asked 
in Barbarism if a solution to scientistic (e.g. behaviorist) readings of sexuality might be cured by 
recognizing “the relation of the absolutely immanent, absolutely subjective, transcendental life to 
its incomprehensible objective double, to this body, with its sexual characteristics and its strange 
configuration?”159 Henry offers an undeniable “no.” According to Henry, such a response is 
“incomprehensible for this transcendental life.”160 Transcendental life always brackets sexuality.  
D: Transcendental Asexuality 
 
If all sexual determinations have been thrown into the objectivity of the world, then so too has 
sexual difference as such. One is not just a body, but always already a “sexually differentiated 
objective body.”161 Thus “between these [objective sexual] properties, and in spite of their 
                                               
155 Ibid., 223 [emphasis added]. 
 
156 Ibid., 202. 
 
157 Ibid., 198. 
 
158 Henry, Incarnation, 210.  
 
159 Henry, Barbarism, 83. 
 
160 Ibid. 
 
161 Henry, Incarnation, 215. 
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common phenomenological status, a difference is revealed: … It is … a man’s or woman’s 
body.”162 The question, Henry suggests, is therefore “one of knowing what this presence of the 
spirit in our own body means exactly, when this is defined by a set of objective properties, and in 
a singular way by sexual difference.”163 That is to say, what does it mean to be living flesh bound 
to a sexually differentiated body—a man’s or a woman’s body? The answer, perhaps unsurprising 
at this point, is that the synthesis of the flesh with sexual difference is an absurdity that provokes 
anxiety. For, insofar as sexual difference depends upon sexual determinations, it likewise depends 
upon their mode of phenomenality, which is the mode of exteriority and objectivity.164 As Henry 
summarizes this moment of recognition: “the discovery of one’s own body as an objective body—
and even more as an objective body marked by sexual difference—is identical to an affective 
disposition, the fact that such a body belongs to the mind is experienced as anxiety at the outset.”165 
 Nevertheless, the affective tonality of this anxiety is not univocal. Rather, Henry here 
comes close to affirming something like sexual difference within the flesh, insofar as sexual 
difference is revealed to the flesh in affectively unique ways. “It is in the immanence of our flesh,” 
he writes, “that sexual difference reveals itself originally in the form of distinct, pure impressions, 
some proper to female sensibility, unknown to male sensibility, and vice-versa.”166 This echoes a 
similar assertion in I am the Truth, where Henry suggests that being a woman is defined by an 
                                               
162 Ibid., 196. 
 
163 Ibid., 199. 
 
164 “What is inexplicably and ultimately absurd is the objective body as such, and its foreign organs, or even the 
functions for which these organs are means. … the body with its surprising configurations and sexual difference is 
absurd.” Ibid., 198. 
 
165 Ibid., 197. 
 
166 Ibid., 249. 
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“internal and lived unfolding of feminine ‘sexuality’.”167 But, in both cases this potential is 
immediately undermined by Henry in favor of a transcendental purity devoid of sexual difference. 
Thus, despite this initial promise, it is ultimately revealed that “this givenness to itself takes place 
in the same way, in the same, for man as for woman … [it] is identical in each.”168 There is, Henry 
notes, paraphrasing Paul, “neither male nor female.” Rather, “what we are dealing with in the 
relation to the other is never primarily, or solely, despite worldly appearance, a man or a 
woman.”169 Instead, as he will later argue, one is ultimately given to oneself—and given to the 
other—within the self-givenness of life “before every subsequent determination—before being 
man or woman.”170  
As Yannick Courtel, writes in “Chair et différence sexuelle chez Michel Henry”: “it is 
therefore necessary for us to conclude that the flesh is not sexuated … in its relation with absolute 
life, the flesh ignores sexual difference.”171 But, whereas Courtel rightfully marks this absence, 
tying it to the paradoxical synthesis of the flesh and the objective body, it is here possible to be 
                                               
167 Henry, I am the Truth, 251. 
 
168 Ibid. 
 
169 Ibid., 251. In the words of Hatem, “si j’ai même centre, par le contact, que l’Archi-Soi, alors j’accède à autrui 
non plus à partir de mon seul Soi, moyennant l’Archi-Soi, mais immédiatement, à partir du Centre common” Jad 
Hatem, Théologie de l’œvre d’art mystique et messianique: Thérèse d’Avila, Andreï Roublev et Michel Henry, 
Bruxelles Lessius Coll., “Donner raison,” 2006, 317 
 
170 Henry, Incarnation, 250. As Rivera glosses these passages, “prior to the moment any ethnic, economic, social, or 
even sexual difference may mark out my world as separate from yours, I experience you and you experience me in 
the eternal arrival of the Word.” Rivera, The Contemplative Self After Michel Henry, 284 [emphasis added]. Here 
there is a noteworthy correlation between Henry and Levinas, insofar as Levinas likewise posits the most originary 
encounter with the other prior to all other determinations. “The best way of encountering the Other is not even to 
notice the color of his eyes! When one observes the color of the eyes one is not in social relationship with the Other. 
The relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, but what is specifically the face is what cannot be 
reduced to that.” Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. 
Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), 85-86. 
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ignore la différence sexuelle.” Courtel, “Chair et différence sexuelle chez Michel Henry,” 80 [translation my own]. 
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even more precise. The flesh ignores sexual difference, in its relation to absolute life, because in 
this life there are no sexual determinations, no organs or members. In “the lover’s night”172 there 
is no skin, gender, secondary sexual characteristics, or genitalia. In Henry, the transcendental flesh 
has been, to use my own language, dis-membered. Thus, we might say of Henry, as Sartre once 
said of Heidegger, “his Dasein appears to us as asexual.”173  
§III: Consequences of the Erasure of Sexual Difference 
A. The Universal Man  
 
Henry’s insistence upon a transcendental asexuality motivates a few unfortunate tendencies in his 
account of gender and sexuality. Specifically, despite the ostensible sexually-neutral character of 
his account of the flesh, he nevertheless ends up presupposing a determinately male subject, 
reiterating problematic tropes of femininity, and variously erasing or denigrating non-traditional 
sexual relationships. In the final division of this chapter, these three tendencies will each be 
examined in turn.  
At first blush, Henry appears to unambiguously affirm the fundamental gender non-
specificity—and thus logical interchangeability—of the human person within the sexual or erotic 
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relation. Just as a phenomenology of the chiasm reveals an eidetic “reversibility”174 of the touching 
and the touched, so too does a phenomenology of the erotic caress. In the erotic relation the 
touching and touched are “absolutely symmetrical.”175 This symmetry of the caress likewise 
determines the symmetrical character of the erotic relation as such; thus,  “the only difference 
between the two cases of transcendental flesh …, is that the one is ‘active’ and the other ‘passive’; 
they are two modalities of one and the same capacity for power, so they are interchangeable, and 
the man and woman can exchange their roles.”176 This interchangeability seems to perfectly 
cohere with Henry’s broader framework, following from his marked preference for an asexual 
transcendental ego and his insistence upon the priority of the existentially unique, living person 
over every sociological category—including gender and sexual categories. Thus, in From 
Communism to Capitalism, for example, Henry will criticize Marxist class analysis for its 
effacement of the living individual; “what characterizes Marxism from a theoretical point of view,” 
he will there suggest, “is the replacement of the living individual with a number of abstract 
entities.”177  
Nonetheless, a rhetorical analysis of Henry’s discussion of sexuality, particularly in I am 
the Truth and Incarnation, suggests that, even granting his official statement regarding the 
symmetrical and interchangeable relation of the genders, Henry’s philosophical model of the 
human person bears the distinctive marks of the traditional “active male subject.” For these texts, 
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the male is subject; the female is object. The transcendental purity of the originary flesh is always, 
even if often only implicitly, “a pure man.”178 
Feminist scholarship has long marked this tendency of Western philosophy to introject the 
characteristics of socio-cultural masculinity into any notion of the “universal” human, so it will 
little serve this project to survey the entire tradition. Instead, given Henry’s French context, it will 
be helpful to limit discussion to three of his direct contemporaries: Simone de Beauvoir, Luce 
Irigaray, and Hélène Cixous. This limitation will highlight the fact that the present critique is not 
anachronistic, but rather reflects debates internal to Francophone philosophy, to which Henry 
would have had perfect access.  
 According to de Beauvoir, within the Western philosophical canon “there is an absolute 
human type, the masculine.”179 To be masculine is to be universal, to be universal is to be 
masculine. This tendency, according to de Beauvoir, emerges from the “subject”-centered 
character of Western thought: “he is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other.”180 But, this 
is not to suggest that this correlation between the universal/absolute and the masculine is in any 
sense natural. Rather, as Irigaray notes, “any theory of the subject has always been appropriated 
by the ‘masculine’.”181 Given Irigaray’s interest in political economy, this notion of appropriation 
should be taken in a quite literal sense. The masculine has made the “subject” propre (one’s own); 
it has been expropriated and has therefore become his property.182 The means of this expropriation 
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179 Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. H. M. Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), xxi. 
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is the maintenance of a certain posture or perspective: men “describe [the world] from their own 
point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth.”183 In so describing the world, “man defines 
woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being.”184 As 
Irigaray describes this asymmetrical relation: “the feminine has been construed only as the 
negative, inferior version or opposite of the masculine: always defined in relation to, against, and 
beneath the masculine, paradigmatically as object in contrast to the masculine subject.”185  
Having been defined against the supposed universality of the masculine, woman simply 
becomes “the sex,” always posed against masculine neutrality. This designation of woman as “the 
sex” has, for de Beauvoir, a clear genesis, one that is particularly relevant to a critique of Henry: 
the forgetting or erasure of sexual determinations.  
Woman has ovaries, a uterus; these peculiarities imprison her in her subjectivity, 
circumscribe her within the limits of her own nature. It is often said that she thinks 
with her glands. Man superbly ignores the fact that his anatomy also includes 
glands, such as the testicles, and that they secrete hormones.186 
 
Precisely as in Henry, this erasure of sexual determinations produces a subsequent erasure of 
sexual difference. As Irigaray notes, Western philosophy depends upon a “power to eradicate the 
difference between the sexes in systems that are self-representative of a ‘masculine subject’.”187 
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Thus, Henry’s tendency to implicitly center a masculine subject in his ostensibly universal 
analyses of the transcendental flesh is neither unique, nor unexpected. But rather, this tendency is 
deeply embedded in the Western philosophical tradition and falls from precisely the attempt to 
subordinate sexual difference to a transcendental subject that Henry explicitly marks as his project.  
Nowhere is this prejudice clearer than in a particularly odd thought experiment that marks 
the conclusion to I am the Truth. Anticipating analyses that will be undertaken with considerably 
more depth in Incarnation, Henry closes I am the Truth’s theological speculations with a turn to 
“the erotic relations between men and women.”188 There, amidst a critique of scientism and 
technology, Henry suggests that the reader consider the possibility—even inevitability—of “the 
simulation in the technical and scientific world of a procedure applied not only in the military 
domain but to social relations, for example the erotic relation.”189 Drawing from the idea of flight 
simulators, Henry there posits an “erotic simulation,” in which an artificially simulated woman’s 
body could be used as an outlet for sexual desire. For Henry, such an “erotic simulation” would 
enact a total erasure of the “living transcendental Self”; the fulfillment of the technologization that 
Henry traces to Galileo, but sees with particular intensity in modern capitalism: “science has 
reduced the living transcendental Self to a dead object of the Galilean field.”190  
A rhetorical analysis of this thought experiment suggests an implicit gender asymmetry at 
the heart of Henry’s paradigm. “Let us hypothesize that men can use a simulator,” he says, 
introducing the thought experiment. “The man (like the student pilot) is placed in a certain position 
and the appearance of a woman’s body is gradually unfolded…” he continues; “beneath his 
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touching, the appearance of the female body quivers…” Ultimately, this simulation is that wherein 
“a man who wants to embrace a woman…”191—as one embraces an object—finds fulfillment. 
Here, the man “uses,” “touches,” “embraces”—in sum, is the subject of an erotic encounter. The 
woman, or rather “the appearance of a woman’s body,” is entirely passive; she merely corresponds 
to the masculine subject’s activity as a passive recipient.192  
What is clear throughout this passage—as well as his broader corpus—is that Henry’s 
tendency to prioritize the masculine manifests most conspicuously at a strictly grammatical level. 
Thus, for an especially stark example, in the pages immediately following his thought experiment 
Henry embraces the apocalyptic and eschatological fervor of 1st Thessalonians and Revelation. In 
the increasing technologization of the world: “men [are] debased, humiliated, despised…” “Men 
[are] reduced to simulacra”; “men [are] chased out of their work and their homes”; “men [are] 
replaced by abstractions…”; “men [are] treated mathematically, digitally, statistically.” “Men [are] 
turned away from Life’s truth”; “men whose emotion and loves are just glandular secretions”; 
“men who have been liberated by making them think their sexuality is a natural process”; “men 
whose responsibility and dignity have no definite site anymore. Men who in general degradation 
will envy the animals. Men will want to die.”193  
Like the authors of his period, Henry’s texts rely almost exclusively on masculine nouns 
and pronouns throughout: “men [are] turned away from Life’s truth”;194 the philosophical subject 
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is “il”: “he is related to life,”195 he is the “Son with the Son” [fils dans le fils],196 the other is neither 
“a man or a woman: it is a Son.”197 This grammatical convention seems to reveal little beyond 
Henry’s social location: he is French, so he uses “il” as a general pronoun; he is Catholic so he 
uses “son [of God]” to speak of one’s relation to God.  
Nevertheless even if they are traditional, such conventions are not beyond repute. De 
Beauvoir, for example, will highlight the connection between this linguistic convention and the 
tendency to conflate the universal and the masculine. As she writes: 
A man never begins by presenting himself as an individual of a certain sex; it goes 
without saying that he is a man. The terms masculine and feminine are used 
symmetrically only as a matter of form, as on legal papers. In actuality the relation 
of the two sexes is not quite like that of two electrical poles, for man represents 
both the positive and the neutral, as is indicated by the common use of man to 
designate human beings in general; whereas woman represents only the negative, 
defined by limiting criteria, without reciprocity.198 
 
For Irigaray, this connection necessitates “a revolution in thought and ethics”199 as well as 
language. “We need to reinterpret … everything, beginning with the way in which the subject has 
always been written in the masculine form, as man, even when it claimed to be universal and 
neutral. Despite the fact that man—at least in French—rather than being neutral, is sexed.”200 Thus, 
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even if Henry is here employing the standard—albeit questionable—convention of his epoch, one 
might still note clear connections between this linguistic convention and a determinately masculine 
conception of the subject. 
Yet, more strongly, if one turns from I am the Truth to Incarnation’s phenomenological 
analysis of the caress, it will be clear there is good reason to believe this linguistic usage is not 
simply convention. Rather, throughout this analysis, Henry conspicuously inverts from exclusively 
masculine to exclusively feminine language in his account of the “other” of the erotic caress. Thus 
the recipient of the caress is “she” [elle] or even, with a remarkable regularity, the “young woman” 
[jeune femme].201 One finds “the young woman’s hand,” “the original flesh of the young woman,” 
“our dancer … the young woman.”202 This inconsistency suggests that Henry’s use of masculine 
language for the philosophical subject may not be strictly reducible to traditional convention. 
Rather, the subject of the caress—which, according to basic moves of Henry’s analysis, should 
remain in principle sexually generic—is in a non-trivial sense configured as determinatively male. 
The “object” or recipient of the caress, the passive partner of the erotic encounter, is figured as 
female.  
This privileging of the male subject in an analysis of the caress is not without precedence. 
As was already discussed in Chapter 1, Emmanuel Levinas’ Totality and Infinity offered a 
phenomenological account of the caress that has been roundly criticized for its explicitly gendered 
character. Instilling the traditional patriarchal family structure into his phenomenology of eros, 
Levinas there contrasts the “feminine”—the welcoming character of the home, epitomized in the 
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wife—with the masculine subject of the erotic relation.203 While Henry does not explicitly 
reference Levinas’ gendered analysis, it is without question that he has his contemporary in mind. 
Taken together with I am the Truth’s “erotic simulation,” these passages suggest that the 
philosophical and existential subject of Henry’s philosophy is figured as determinately male, 
whereas the passive object is figured as female. In this regard, the caress and the erotic simulation 
stand together. Thus, while for Henry the horror of the technologized modern world is that “a man 
or a woman is only an object,”204 his analysis appears to offer liberation for the man alone; woman 
remains an object, passive to the caress and the domination of the masculine subject. In the words 
of Hélène Cixous, “Active—is reserved for man”;205 “woman is always associated with passivity 
in philosophy. … Either woman is passive or she does not exist.”206 This specification of an active 
male subject and a passive female object is not unique within Henry’s project. Rather, it emerges 
together with some rather insidious, stereotyped notions of femininity.  
B. Tropes of Femininity 
 
Henry’s decision to employ traditional gender stereotypes is particularly unfortunate, as his 
philosophy is uniquely situated to think beyond these traditional tropes of femininity. For, these 
tropes have always emerged from a structured binary. “Thought,” as Cixous argues, “has always 
worked through opposition.”207 And yet, it is this oppositional—or perhaps dialectical—model of 
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philosophical thinking that Henry directly challenges in his critique of onto-phenomenological 
monism. Moreover, Henry’s line of flight from this oppositional model of thought is through an 
affirmation of affectivity. And this is precisely the route likewise suggested by Cixous, for whom 
women must write from a “direct contact with her appetites, her affects.”208  
Indeed, if one turns to a table of the gendered binary, such as that provided by Irigaray, the 
confluence between this table and Henry’s distinction between the two principal modes of 
givenness is rather illuminating. As Irigaray sets out the traditional paradigm: “be/become, 
have/not have sex (organ), phallic/non-phallic, penis/clitoris or else penis/vagina, plus/minus, 
clearly represented/dark continent, logos/silence or idle chatter, desire for the mother/desire to be 
the mother.”209 While certainly not an exact match, important points of intersection appear. For 
Henry, the first givenness in affectivity is marked by a certain conspicuous negativity, but only 
from the perspective of the world. Thus, where the world offers the “plus” of beings [les étants]—
“exteriority constitutes visibility”210—affectivity offers the “minus” of an absence, insofar as 
affectivity does not, nor eidetically speaking ever could, appear within the world’s visibility. 
Where the world therefore offers “clearly represented” phenomena, the invisible affective life 
offers nothing to be seen: “the invisible concerns the human being itself and his or her true 
reality.”211 Life is, Henry writes, “clandestine”;212 or, in the words of Irigaray, it is a “dark 
continent.” Likewise, “the invisible life,” Henry writes, “does not cease to be invisible and remains 
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forever in the dark.”213 Whereas the world offers the rationality of the spoken word [Greek Logos], 
life speaks with an altogether different Word [Johannine Logos214], a Word that can only appear 
to the world as a silence: “it is a silence where there cannot be any, because, where it is established, 
no sense is a work, no ear.”215 Moreover, insofar as “logos” stands for the theoretical attitude, 
Henry again seeks to cast such theory out of the immanence of life and into the world of 
representation. Borrowing his language from Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach, Henry writes, “I call 
‘praxis’ the knowledge of life. … By contrast, I call ‘theory’ the knowledge that defines this 
relation to the world.”216   
Taken together, these confluences suggest a remarkable overlap. The invisible, affective, 
practical, silent life that Henry champions seems a far cry from the theoretical, representational 
visibility of traditional phallocentric philosophy. And yet, Henry falls into precisely the same traps 
as his forbearers—or perhaps, forefathers—recapitulating gendered stereotypes of women as 
anxious, passive, and exaggerated in their “sexuality.” But for Henry, these three principles are 
not unconnected. Rather, Henry develops a clear causal chain that brings one from the particularly 
“sexual” or “sensual” character of the female form, through an intensified anxiety, into a quietist 
passivity.  
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In Incarnation, Henry will note that “the woman’s body is much more marked by sexual 
determination. … She is more sensual than the man.”217 This statement is noteworthy in two 
distinct regards. First, and most conspicuously, it is completely unclear what evidence, 
phenomenological or otherwise, is brought in support of the assertion that the feminine body is 
more sexual than the masculine. One wonders, as did de Beauvoir, by what possible standard the 
feminine is perceived to be particularly marked by sexuality. “She is called ‘the sex’,” de Beauvoir 
notes, “by which is meant that she appears essentially to the male as a sexual being. For him she 
is sex—absolute sex.”218 Why is this so? The answer, as we have seen, is that “man superbly 
ignores the fact that his anatomy also includes glands, such as the testicles, and that they secrete 
hormones.”219 The masculine lacks neither genitalia, erogenous zones, hormones, nor secondary 
sexual characteristics, but these are not included in what is “essential” to masculine being. Rather, 
as we have seen above, Incarnation’s erotic analytic is built upon the presumption of male 
universality; and insofar as the male is the generic, the female is necessarily constituted as the 
aberrant. To be male is to lack the mark of sexuality; the male precedes sexual differentiation, the 
male precisely is the “before man and woman.” In this sense, Henry broadly recapitulates the 
Aristotelian figure of women as a πεπηρωμενον male, that is, “defective” or “mutilated.”220 
At first glance, the correlation of Henry’s particularly marked feminine sexuality with 
Aristotle’s notion of feminine deficiency may appear exaggerated. But, turning to the second 
concern regarding this passage, it is worth noting that within the Henrian paradigm, the designation 
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of the female body as particularly sexual or sensual is by no means a merely descriptive claim. 
For, it is certainly true that Henry’s radical phenomenology may be read as a simple defense of the 
phenomenological and ontological priority of immanence over transcendence. As Henry writes in 
Material Phenomenology, “the second givenness, which is the ek-static givenness in the perception 
of the now, presupposes the first non-ek-static givenness in affectivity.”221 But, aside from this 
phenomenological and ontological claim, Henry also insists upon a normative priority: what he 
calls an “essential hierarchy.”222  
For Henry, the visibility of the world is not only phenomenologically secondary, but 
rather—in a move likely intended to ground the cultural criticism of Barbarism and the political 
intervention of From Communism to Capitalism—this visibility manifests as a terrifying violence 
and indifference. As he writes: 
An appearing of this sort turns away from itself with such violence, it casts itself 
outside with such force, … that everything to which it gives appearing can indeed 
never be anything but exterior in the terrible sense of that which, put outside, 
chased in some way from its true Dwelling, from its Homeland, and deprived of the 
goods most proper to it, is henceforth abandoned, without support, and lost. … Like 
the light Scripture speaks of and that shines on both the just and the unjust, the 
world’s appearing illuminates everything it illuminates without making a 
distinction between things or persons, in terrifying neutrality.223 
 
This normative hierarchy is nowhere more conspicuous than in Henry’s account of sexuality. For 
Henry, sexuality is constituted as a falling away or corruption of the original, pure erotic affects; 
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“this is the case for the erotic relation, when torn from life’s pathos, handed over to the world, 
reduced to what of it is shown in the world, across all the objective determinations of a thingly 
body; it is at the same time reduced to what in it can still become an object of desire—its 
sexuality.”224  
This hierarchy falls directly from the binary character of Henry’s phenomenological 
dualism—immanence/transcendence, flesh/body, erotic/sexual. To borrow a passage from 
Derrida’s Positions, in each of these binaries, “we are not dealing with the peaceful coexistence of 
a vis-à-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs the other 
(axiologically, logically, etc.), or has the upper hand.”225 For Henry, that which is sexual is lesser; 
one “falls” into sexuality when the authentic erotic relation is reduced to its visibility. Therefore, 
to directly associate the feminine body with marked sexuality is to implicitly situate the feminine 
more fully within the world, therefore transitively positioning the feminine below the masculine 
in the same normative hierarchy.  
Transitioning from this marked “sexuality” of the female body to an ontological increase 
in anxiety, Henry suggests that “because [the woman] is more sensual, she is more anxious. Her 
anxiety is more ‘feminine’ even than his.”226 Strangely, Henry seems to understand this movement 
from sexuality/sensuality to anxiety as a means of attenuating the negative bias of his prior 
assertion. Here he will argue that the increased sexuality of the feminine body “does not mean that 
she is more culpable than the man. … Nor does this mean that she is inferior, but, on the contrary, 
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here, spiritually superior—if anxiety is the sign of the spirit—the sign of our heterogeneity.”227 
But, this assertion appears to contradict the spirit, if not the letter, of Incarnation’s broader erotic 
analytic for two reasons. First, while anxiety is certainly an immanent affective tonality, sexuality 
is generally understood, as shown above, as a category of the objectified body—either organic or 
thingly. Since this hierarchy is not only descriptive, but also normative, sexuality is therefore a fall 
from the flesh's transcendental purity. Within this paradigm, it is unthinkable that a centering of 
femininity in the sexuality of the body could be understood as a positive characteristic, nor a 
spiritual superiority, even if—as productive of anxiety—its repercussions are extended into 
immanence. Simply put, within Henry’s account, greater sexuality corresponds to greater nihilism 
and an increased forgetting of life. Henry makes this point explicitly clear in an earlier section, 
again identifying femininity and anxiety, and designating their ultimate form as nothing other than 
weakness: “Anxiety then takes on its feminine form as weakness: even though it comes from the 
Self, it crushes it and leaves it powerless, left to drift in the anxiety that drowns it.”228 
At a more methodological level, Henry's critique of scientism in Barbarism aims to 
establish the impossibility of quantification and calculation within the immanence of life. Indeed, 
the modern tendency to reduce human life to statistics produces only “its gradual impoverishment, 
which reaches its highest point in mathematical treatment.”229  To speak of a quantitative increase 
in anxiety (immanent life) that is somehow directly proportional to an increase in sexuality 
(transcendent being) is, in Henry’s paradigm, to make a fatal category error—to fail to appreciate 
the ontological difference between immanence and transcendence. And insofar as there is a 
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movement between immanence and transcendence, it is always a movement from the former to 
the latter: from the reality of affective life to the irreality of the transcendent world. It is precisely 
this failure to respect this uni-directionality that, in Henry’s eyes, marks the utter failure of the 
modern scientific study of sexuality. “Doesn’t the reader of Kierkegaard’s The Concept of Anxiety 
know,” Henry asks, “a bit more about sexuality than someone who would have covered all of the 
past and future scientific treatises on the subject, with their cumbersome statistics?”230 For Henry, 
such statistics can teach us that “seven percent of French people have made love in a stairwell,”231 
but can teach us nothing of the erotic life, because quantification necessarily misses the auto-
affective character of eros.  
In the final move of Henry’s treatment of feminine sexuality, Henry suggests that this 
increase in anxiety spawns a quietist passivity. “The feminine character of anxiety,” he argues, 
“denotes not the fact that it is a woman’s, but the moment proper to all anxiety, where 
overwhelmed by it the Self loses all initiative.”232 Here Henry makes two important shifts. First, 
his claim that women are more anxious is inverted. It is not simply that women are more anxious 
than men, but rather that anxiety itself—and its correlate passivity—is feminine. This is an 
assertion that can be traced back to Henry’s earliest work, where he speaks of a distinctly “feminine 
attitude”233—in relation to passivity. Second, it is here that this analysis of feminine tropes reverts 
to the conclusions of the first and establishes a circularity—a vicious Ouroboros of gendered 
stereotypes. For, by positioning erotic anxiety as a stultifying anxiety, particularly one that 
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uniquely strikes the feminine individual, Henry marks femininity itself as passive. Given this 
particularly feminine passivity, it is not surprising that Henry’s analysis of the “erotic simulation” 
and the caress would ultimately find an objectified woman, who, as passive, functions as object to 
the active male subject of the phenomenological gaze. Trapped in her overt sexuality, burdened by 
uncontrollable anxiety, the Henrian woman cannot act, but can only be acted upon. One could not 
fault the woman, who presented with such a paralysis, responds as Cixous, “I resist: detest a certain 
passivity, it promises death for me.”234  
 
C. Profanation: on Non-traditional Sexuality 
 
Despite his numerous writings on the erotic experience, Henry offers little reflection on non-
traditional sexualities. This silence is most conspicuous in the case of sexual orientation. Simply 
put, at no point in his written work does Henry ever explicitly consider the possibility of a non-
heterosexual erotic encounter. Insofar as Henry has bracketed sexual difference from the 
immanence of the flesh, from the true seat of subjectivity and reality, this is not particularly 
surprising. For, just as the “universal man” emerged from an inadequate consideration of sexual 
difference, so too does an inadequate consideration of difference in sexual orientation tend to 
produce a “universal heterosexual.” Therefore, given Henry’s transcendental asexuality, it is 
unsurprising that his phenomenology of the caress or erotic simulation thought experiment both 
presuppose not only a masculine subject, but likewise a cisgendered heterosexual subject.235 
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Nevertheless, there are a few oblique references that may refer to non-heterosexual erotic 
relations, but these are invariably derogatory and dismissive. Thus, for example, Henry writes of 
“depraved” sexualities that are “against nature”236—references that, given their distinct echoes of 
the anti-queer rhetoric of his context, may very well refer to queer sexualities.237 These references 
follow a uniform structure: non-traditional sexualities are a product of the objectification of 
sexuality, the casting of the erotic onto the objective body and its horizon of visibility. Using a 
style of argumentation that is methodologically problematic,238 Henry describes this process as a 
“denaturing”239 [dénaturation] of life.  
The reduction of eroticism to objective sexuality … goes against the nature of life, 
and stipulates that it be consummated where its very existence is simply impossible, 
we would claim it follows from a decision. But every decision against nature 
assumes the form of violence because it implies an active negation that opposes the 
consistency and coherence of reality. This must be eliminated and destroyed. This 
active and deliberate destruction of reality, in this case life’s own reality, is 
nihilism.240  
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Insofar as this denaturing exacerbates the conflict between the living individual and their objective 
body, marked as it is by sexual difference, this denaturing ushers in the reign of anxiety. As Henry 
writes, “in the most depraved societies, when all moral rules and all ‘taboos’ are abolished, and 
when various forms of perversion are welcomed with immense favor … anxiety has not so much 
disappeared as put itself in charge.”241  
 This reign of objectivity and anxiety—wherein “life exposes itself, and thus affirms that it 
is nothing other, and nothing more, than [sexuality]”242—is given a variety of titles by Henry. It is 
the rule of an “indecent sex”243 [ce sexe indécent]. It is a “profanation”244 of life, that is always 
also a profanation by life: a “self-profanation.”245 It is “voyeurism”246 and “pornography.”247 These 
last two are particularly enlightening, as they mark the essence of Henry’s account of profanation: 
“in pornography an attempt to bring the objectivity of the erotic relation to its limit emerges, where 
everything is given to be seen—which then requires the vantage points on the behaviors and sexual 
attributes to be multiplied.”248 
 Here, and despite the consistent use of French feminism as a foil for Henry, there emerges 
an interesting parallel. For, since the middle of the last century, feminists have consistently 
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critiqued the ocular-centric character of masculinity, the recourse to sight as the sense par 
excellence.249 In Irigaray this tendency is named “specularity.” It is that “which confuses all 
individuality in the extrapolated operation of the specular.”250 But not all speculation and 
spectation is equal under the reign of specularity, rather, “it is in [the father’s] gaze that everything 
comes into being.”251 The father’s gaze, that is, the masculine gaze, here delimits the bounds of 
reality.252 This theory finds a practical outlet in the feminist anti-pornography movement. Here in 
thinkers such as Andrea Dworkin,253 one finds close parallels to Henry’s theory of pornography as 
specularity and objectification. Thus, as Catharine MacKinnon argues, “pornography creates an 
accessible sexual object. … This is not because pornography depicts objectified sex but because it 
creates the experience of a sexuality which is itself objectified.”254  
 Yet, this parallel with Henry should not be taken too far. For, while feminist critiques of 
specularity—at least at their best255—open up a space of liberation for oppressed sexual and gender 
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classes, Henry’s critique of objectivity primarily serves to discipline and shame non-normative 
sexual practices. Thus, Henry rhetorically targets fetishists,256 practitioners of sadism and 
masochism (S&M),257 and those engaged in polyamorous or open relationships.258 This fervor 
takes on its sharpest form in Henry’s critique of sex workers: for whom objectification is seen to 
take on its strongest form, economization.259 Thus, Henry writes, “the same radical project of 
objectification occurs in prostitution, which is not first and foremost a social fact, but is also a 
metaphysical act, whose ‘publicity,’ however limited it may be, remains the hidden telos (the 
prostitute is one who, just like money, concentrates this potential advertising in his being).”260 
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Moreover, just as Henry laments that all profanation is ultimately the self-profanation of life, he 
likewise holds his strongest ire for those who would willingly enter sex-work: “... right up to the 
kind of prostitution that one might call artificial to the extent that it is no longer a question of 
prostituting oneself for money, but for the pleasure of prostituting oneself—for the anxiety that 
every form of self-abasement purveys.”261 
This targeting of non-traditional sexual minorities—like Henry’s prior stigmatization of 
the feminine—does not merely reflect the personal biases or idiosyncrasies of Henry’s personal 
sexual ethic. Rather, they are directly motivated by his account of the flesh, which illegitimately 
expels all sexual determinations, and therefore all sexual difference, from the ultimate site of 
human subjectivity. Certainly, one can suggest external influences upon Henry’s account of 
sexuality—I will do precisely this in chapter 4’s discussion of the so-called “communio” school 
of Catholic theology. But, this adoption of theological and moralistic conceptions of sexuality is 
not self-grounding; it depends upon a prior phenomenological opening, that is, upon a 
phenomenology of the body.  
D. Life is not Anonymous 
For Henry, as we have seen, the heart of modern technocratic society is the “Galilean reduction,” 
wherein all that is living and sensible is stripped from reality. Science, he writes, “believes that it 
continues to operate in its own proper domain when it reduces … properties to their material 
physical substrate.”262 Parodying this scientistic reduction, Henry quips:  
Likewise, if it is a question of human sexuality, one will first define a certain 
number of behaviors, and they will be listed in terms of age, sex, class, and type in 
order to enumerate the circumstances in which they occurred. One will be able to 
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refine the definition of the types, categories, and conditions, to cross check them, 
to demonstrate their forms and structure, in short, to arrive at ever more 
sophisticated, scientific and objective results.263 
 
Having been reduced to its transcendent character, its objectivity and visibility—its specularity—
sexuality is here stripped of its true living reality. All that remains is the motion of objective 
materials, statistics, patterns, and behaviors. Yet, rather than opposing the relegation of sexuality 
to its transcendent manifestation, this is precisely the route that Henry's radical phenomenology 
has taken in its stripping of sexual determinations and sexual difference from the originary flesh. 
Thus, rather than constituting a decisive break with the onto-phenomenological monism of the 
Galilean reduction, Henry has admitted its central thesis, that sexuality is essentially reducible to 
its visible manifestation. Of course, this failure is partially moderated by the introduction of certain 
erotic, affective tonalities such as libido and desire. But even these affections remain secondary, 
insofar as within the original givenness of life to itself, there is not sexuality; life is “before being 
man and woman.” 
This failure seems to contradict the spirit, if not the letter, of Henry’s radical 
phenomenology insofar as Henry insists that “life is nothing anonymous or universal”;264 “there is 
no ordinary life.”265 By casting the sexual determinations and sexual difference of the individual 
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Against this tendency, Henry advocates a notion of Life that is always “mine.” Life is ipseity; that is, “the possibility 
of saying ‘me,’ ‘I’—more radically, the possibility that there exists something like a ‘me’ and an ‘I,’ a living ‘me’ 
and ‘I’ who are always a particular one, mine and yours” (Henry, I am the Truth, 134). As Gagnon writes: “la chair, 
et l’affectivité qu’elle distille (dont la souffrance et la joie sont les pôles de leur co-appartenance), est pour Henry la 
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out of the flesh, and therefore out of lived immanence, Henry has constructed an account of 
sexuality that is detached from its affective source. As Courtel puts it: “however, an idea is time 
and again repeated by Michel Henry: the flesh is never an anonymous flesh, the flesh is never the 
flesh of someone, it is always that of a living being. [Is the denial of sexual difference therefore a] 
contradiction?”266 While Courtel will follow Henry, answering “no, because the living being in 
question is a transcendental self,”267 I will take a harder line.  
For Henry, lived individuality is only accessible if one brackets: “every consideration 
pertaining to a professional, economic, social, intellectual, ethnic, or other condition”; only then 
can one disclose “what is unique in each one.”268 But, without an account that recognizes sexual 
determinations and sexual difference as essential and irreducible components of lived experience, 
Henry’s speculations regarding sexuality themselves become anonymous and universal. As 
Merleau-Ponty rightly recognized, “all human 'functions', from sexuality to motility and 
intelligence, are rigorously unified in one synthesis, it is impossible to distinguish in the total being 
of man a bodily organization to be treated as a contingent fact, and other attributes necessarily 
entering into his make-up.”269 Simply put, what Merleau-Ponty here recognizes is the inability to 
bracket sexuality from the human individual without fundamentally disrupting one's view of 
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person-hood itself, without losing the true ipseity of the individual. In the words of Frédéric Seyler, 
“by exclusively focusing on life, radical phenomenology seems to have forgotten existence and its 
everyday challenges for phenomenology, philosophy, and ethics.”270 Indeed, having bracketed 
sexual determinations and difference, one now finds, in place of the living individual who should 
ground a radical phenomenology, a universal heterosexual male. Other lived experiences of 
sexuality, and the individuals for whom these experiences are essential, find themselves denigrated 
and cast out of the true reality of lived immanence.  
Thus I find myself in a similar position to Rivera, who writes of Henry, “I see him as a 
kind of rival that is also a model, one whom I both appreciate and despise.”271 That is to say, 
despite the present critique, radical phenomenology should not be summarily dismissed as 
irreducibly patriarchal; there is much here to be appreciated. Instead, the aim of the following 
chapters—particularly chapter 5—will be to work out a solution to the problem of sexual 
determinations and sexual difference from within radical phenomenology. But, before turning to 
this constructive project, Henry’s project will first be juxtaposed with Jean-Luc Marion’s novel 
take on radical phenomenology, which, although it borrows greatly from Henry’s phenomenology 
of the flesh, nevertheless develops an importantly distinct—though itself not unproblematic—
account of sexuality and sexual difference.  
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CHAPTER 3 - Jean-Luc Marion: The Saturated Flesh 
 
 
Perhaps in the Parisian context, there can be no ultimate difference between 
radical and reactionary thinking. 
Thomas J. J. Altizer 
 
 
§I: A Phenomenology of Pure Givenness 
 
A. Reduction, Givenness, and Receptivity 
 
The term “radical phenomenology” is not spoken univocally. Rather, radical phenomenology 
marks a diverse range of approaches to phenomenology—certainly bound together by 
methodological overlap, common objects of interest, and similar general orientations—but 
nevertheless each offering unique nuances. As Simmons and Benson write, “there is value in 
viewing recent French phenomenology as a coherent and distinctive philosophical family. And, 
like all families, there are sure to be robust disagreement as well as underlying shared values and 
commitments.”1 It will therefore be helpful to begin this chapter by articulating the unique 
character of Marion’s phenomenology, as well as the precise ways in which his approach to radical 
phenomenology differs from that embodied by Henry.2  
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Henry employed a material phenomenology of radical interiority and pure self-affection in 
order to challenge the “ontological monism” of Husserl, Heidegger, and the preceding 
philosophical tradition. Marion’s radical phenomenology, on the other hand, is invested in a notion 
of radical heterogeneity. This account of heterogeneity is centered upon an account of 
phenomenological givenness; “Givenness,” Kevin Hart writes, “such is Marion’s maître mot.”3 
Drawing upon the Husserlian notion of gegebenheit (translated into the French as donation), 
Marion seeks to offer an explicitly anti-constructivist reading of phenomenology. “The 
phenomenological method,” he argues in Being Given: “even when it constitutes phenomena, is 
limited to letting them manifest themselves. Constituting does not equal constructing or 
synthesizing, but rather giving-a-meaning, or more exactly, recognizing the meaning that the 
phenomenon itself gives from itself to itself.”4 For Marion, Husserl’s famous call to return to the 
“things themselves” [Sache selbst]5 must be understood as a comportment that permits the 
givenness of the phenomenon to manifest itself without condition or mediation. The role of the 
phenomenologist is to resist the perennial temptation of consciousness: the desire to circumscribe 
or control the phenomenon, to grasp or take it.  
This comportment of radical receptivity manifests methodologically in Marion’s 
idiosyncratic reading of Husserl’s Principle of Principles:  
Every primordial dator Intuition [“originally given intuition”] is a source of 
authority for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in ‘intuition’ in primordial 
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form (as it were in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out 
to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself.6  
 
Counter to the most common interpretation of this principle, Marion does not see the Principle of 
Principles to have granted ultimate evidential priority to intuition as such. Rather, Marion identifies 
Husserl’s persistent recourse to the language of givenness [donation/gegebenheit] throughout the 
rendering of the principle. It is not any intuition whatsoever that functions as an “authority for 
knowledge,” but every “originally given intuition” [originär gegebende Anschauung]—an 
originally given intuition that should be accepted only in regards to the way in which it “gives itself 
out to be” [als was es sich gibt]. Simply put, for Marion, “the phenomenological breakthrough 
consists neither in the broadening of intuition, nor in the autonomy of signification, but solely in 
the unconditional primacy of the givenness of the phenomenon.”7  
Marion first attempted to formulate this radical priority of givenness in his 1989 Reduction 
and Givenness. The difficulty staged by this text is one of phenomenological access. Every 
phenomenon manifests within a horizon of visibility that mediates the phenomenon, delimiting the 
precise conditions by which it might manifest itself. What is needed to bring the principle of 
principles into fruition—to draw forward the givenness of the phenomenon in its purity—Marion 
argues, is a methodology that would permit one to bypass these mediating conditions. This 
methodology, he insists, is the phenomenological reduction: “this is confirmed by a final twist. 
The ‘principle of all principles’ comes up before and without the reduction being operative. And 
yet, without the reduction, no procedure of knowledge deserves the title of ‘phenomenology’.”8 
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This reduction increasingly takes on the status of an unconditional demand, “without it, everything 
collapses.”9 As the reduction provides the means by which the phenomenologist can 
methodologically set aside or bracket any condition that would seek to mediate or delimit the 
givenness of the phenomenon, phenomenological givenness and the reduction therefore become 
entangled in a principle of proportionality: “as much reduction, as much givenness.”10  
Yet, Marion is content neither with the Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological 
reduction nor with the Heideggerian existential reduction. Through neither articulation of the 
reduction, Marion argues, can the givenness of the phenomenon be directly accessed: “objectness 
(Husserl) and beingness (Heidegger) only offer specific and possible cases, but surely not the most 
legitimate ones, of the naming of givenness.”11 Whereas the aim of the reduction is the removal of 
every mediator between the phenomenological investigator and the phenomenon, both the 
Husserlian and Heideggerian reductions reinstate mediating conditions of phenomenality. These 
delimiting horizons, Marion argues, do not truly permit the manifestation of the pure givenness of 
the phenomenon as it gives itself to be. Tackling each of these reductions in turn, Marion ultimately 
suggests that a new conception of the reduction will be necessary: a “third reduction” to givenness 
itself.  
For the Husserl of Ideas I, the transcendental-phenomenological reduction provides the 
route out of the natural attitude and into the properly phenomenological attitude—unveiling the 
                                               
Marion is also commenting upon Husserl’s lack of use of the reduction in the first edition of the Logical 
Investigations.  
 
9 Jean-Luc Marion, The Rigor of Things: Conversations with Dan Arbib, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 73. 
 
10 Marion, Reduction and Givenness, 203. 
 
11 Marion, The Rigor of Things, 78. 
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proper objects of phenomenological inquiry. In the mundane horizon of the natural attitude 
phenomena manifest within a “world spread out in space endlessly, and in time becoming and 
become without end”12—a world that “gives itself to me as something that exists out there.”13 
Under the phenomenological reduction, this natural experience “undergoes a modification”14 
wherein this “general thesis” (of the spatio-temporal existence of the world) is methodologically 
bracketed or set aside in order that the things themselves (“reduced phenomena”) might be brought 
to the fore. Yet, for Marion, the reduced phenomenon that is produced by the phenomenological 
reduction fails to exhibit its givenness without condition.  
The horizon of this Husserlian reduced phenomenon is consciousness or transcendental 
subjectivity; which, as Heidegger notes, “is already presupposed [by Husserl] as the matter of 
philosophy.”15 The reduced phenomenon is “the phenomenon whose mode of Being is reduced by 
the reduction to what the primacy of consciousness imposes upon it.”16 What this consciousness 
imposes on the phenomenon is a particular mode of Being or phenomenality; “consciousness … 
predetermines, in advance and in conformity with the prevalence of pure presence in it, the mode 
of Being of the phenomena: these give themselves as they appear only on condition of appearing 
in the mode that consciousness silently imposes on them.”17 This silent condition of phenomenality 
                                               
12 Husserl, Ideas, 51. 
 
13 Ibid., 56.  
 
14 Ibid., 57.  
 
15 Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy,” in On Time and Being trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1972), 63. 
 
16 Marion, Reduction and Givenness, 54. Or, in the words of Heidegger: “the transcendental reduction to absolute 
subjectivity gives and secures the possibility of grounding the objectivity of all objects (the Being of this being) in 
its valid structure and consistency, that is, in its constitution, in and through subjectivity.” Heidegger, “The End of 
Philosophy,” 63.  
 
17 Marion, Reduction and Givenness, 52. 
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is the requirement of objectivity, “every phenomenon that is not reduced to that [objective] 
presence is of itself excluded from phenomenality.”18 The reduced phenomenon, therefore, is the 
object of consciousness.  
This limitation of givenness to the mode of Being particular to consciousness can be 
identified in a typical introduction to a phenomenological analysis in §15 of Ideas II:  
If we should touch on the thing itself, then it is required of us, assuming we wanted 
to grasp the essence of the thing and determine it conceptually, that we not be 
content with vague locutions and traditional philosophical preconceptions but 
instead draw from the very source of clear givenness. Thus we have to go back, as 
exemplary, to the consciousness in which things are given to us originally and so 
perfectly that we can be lacking nothing for grasping the universal essential form 
which prescribes the a priori rule for such objects.19 
 
For Marion, this reduction and its correlate reduced phenomena, fail to live into the radicality of 
the phenomenological impulse. Givenness has not been accessed in its purity, the “thing itself” has 
not been truly reached, because the horizon of the phenomenological reduction (the 
phenomenological attitude) still excludes those phenomena whose mode of givenness does not 
lend itself to objectification: “it thus excludes from givenness everything that does not let itself be 
led back to objectivity, namely the principal differences of ways of Being (of consciousness, of 
equipmentality, of the world).”20 
For Heidegger, the Husserlian reduction’s inability to approach the “originary givenness” 
of the phenomenon requires a radical reconceptualization of the phenomenological reduction and 
its correlate conception of the phenomenological self. This reorientation finds its clearest 
                                               
18 Ibid., 56. 
 
19  Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second 
Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 37 [emphasis added]. 
 
20 Marion, Reduction and Givenness, 204. 
 
 134 
formulation in a 1927 lecture course collected as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, where 
Heidegger explicitly marks out the divergence between his own reduction—what Marion calls the 
“redoubled reduction”21—and the reduction as understood by Husserl.  
For Husserl, phenomenological reduction, which he worked out for the first time 
expressly in the Ideas Toward a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological 
Philosophy (1913), is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the 
natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things 
and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic 
experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us, 
phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from 
the apprehending of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, 
to the understanding of the being of the being (projecting upon the way it is 
unconcealed).22 
 
For Heidegger, the role of the reduction was not to grant access to the consciousness of the 
phenomenon. More primordially, Heidegger aimed to grant access to the Being [Sein] of beings 
[Seiendes], and ultimately to grant access to Being [Sein] itself as a phenomenon. In this way, 
Heidegger seeks to radicalize an opening granted by the sixth Logical Investigation’s introduction 
of the categorial intuition of “Being.”23 Phenomenology, for Heidegger, is that science which 
grants a unique access to Being. Phenomenology is the proper route to a fundamental ontology, 
that is, an attempt to grasp the meaning of Being itself.24  
                                               
21 Ibid., 66. 
 
22 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1988), 21. 
 
23 See Logical Investigations §§44-45, where Husserl writes, for example, “it is in fact obvious from the start that, 
just as any other concept (or Idea, Specific Unity) can only ‘arise,’ i.e. become self-given to us, if based on an act 
which at least sets some individual instance of it imaginatively before our eyes, so the concept of Being can arise 
only when some being, actual or imaginary, is set before our eyes.” Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigations, 
347. 
 
24 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1962), 34.  
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Yet, as is already clear within the opening pages of Being and Time, a fundamental 
ontology will only be possible if approached from the perspective of Dasein—that peculiar entity 
who “in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.”25 Dasein is that being which essentially exists 
within a “world,” that being to whom the Being of beings primordially discloses itself.26 Whereas 
traditional renderings of the Heideggerian substitution of Dasein for Husserlian transcendental 
subjectivity tend to highlight its “worldly”—its “being-in-the-world”—as opposed to the 
worldlessness of the pure Husserlian consciousness,27 Marion instead privileges the theme of 
radical receptivity. Dasein, unlike transcendental consciousness, does not primarily constitute, but 
rather is that being who stands “in the truth of Being.”28 This receptivity—in its distinction from 
the traditional Western “subject”—is highlighted with increasing clarity throughout Heidegger’s 
oeuvre: being particularly evident following his transition from the language of Dasein to the 
language of “the clearing” in the early 1930s. Heidegger’s comments in “The Origin of the Work 
of Art” are exemplary of this development:  
In the midst of beings as a whole an open place occurs. There is a clearing. Thought 
of in reference to beings, this clearing is more in being than are beings. This open 
center is therefore not surrounded by beings; rather, the clearing center itself 
encircles all that is. … Beings can be as beings only if they stand within and stand 
out within what is cleared in this clearing. Only this clearing grants and guarantees 
                                               
25 Ibid., 32. 
 
26 “To Dasein, Being in a world is something that belongs essentially. Thus Dasein’s understanding of Being 
pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something like a ‘world,’ and to the understanding of 
the Being of those entities which become accessible within the world.” Ibid., 33. 
 
27 See, e.g.: “the most obvious sense of the rejection is the rejection of Husserl's absolute, transcendental 
consciousness. For Heidegger, Dasein is always within-a-world, whereas for Husserl the transcendental must be 
outside the world.” Marion Tapper, “The Priority of Being or Consciousness for Phenomenology: Heidegger and 
Husserl” Metaphilosophy Vol. 17, No. 2/3 (April/July 1986), 154.  
 
28 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism” in Basic Writings, trans. Albert Hofstadter, ed. David Farrell Krell 
(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 218. 
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to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves are not, and access to the 
being that we ourselves are.29 
 
For Heidegger, this receptive approach is more capable of manifesting phenomena in their 
originary givenness, because phenomena are not grasped or delimited by transcendental 
subjectivity: the truth of beings (phenomena) “is not a feature of correct propositions that are 
asserted of an ‘object’ by a human ‘subject’.”30 Heidegger instead turns to a mystico-poetic31 
language of radical receptivity. The true philosopher is that one who maintains a comportment  of 
“letting-be” [Gelassenheit] towards beings: “to let beings be as the beings which they are—means 
to engage oneself with the open region and its openness into which every being comes to stand.”32  
 For Marion, this Heideggerian development of the reduction and the phenomenological 
self marks a decisive step forward in phenomenology’s aim to open itself to the manifestation of 
the phenomenon as it gives itself to be. But the receptivity of Dasein and the Heideggerian clearing 
nevertheless still fail to finish the return to pure givenness.33 Like the Husserlian reduction, the 
Heideggerian reduction fails to manifest the givenness of the phenomenon without condition. 
While it recognizes the diversity of modes of Being among beings as well as the ontological 
                                               
29 Martin Heidegger, “The Origin of the Work of Art” in Basic Writings, trans. Albert Hofstadter, ed. David Farrell 
Krell (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 178. 
 
30 Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth” in Basic Writings, trans. John Sallis, ed. David Farrell Krell (New 
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993), 127. 
 
31 This mystical character is highlighted by Heidegger’s use of the language of gelassenheit (releasement)—
borrowed from the Medieval Christian mystic Meister Eckhart—in his description of the comportment of letting-be. 
See: Martin Heidegger, “Memorial Address” in Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans 
Fruend (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1966). For a comprehensive treatment of Heidegger’s relation to 
Christian mysticism, see: John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1977). 
 
32 Heidegger, “On the Essence of Truth,” 125. 
 
33 For Marion’s account of the late Heidegger, as an advance toward, but nevertheless inability to reach the radical 
receptivity sought by Marion—a subject beyond the scope of the present investigation— see, e.g.: Marion, Being 
Given, 34-39. 
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difference between Being and beings, it nevertheless limits itself to that which “is.” The 
Heideggerian redoubled reduction “excludes therefore that which does not have to be, in particular 
the preliminary conditions of the ‘phenomenon of Being’ (boredom, claim, etc.).”34 It is the aim 
of Marion to develop a still more radical conception of the reduction, a “third reduction” which 
might finally grant access to the givenness of the phenomenon without restriction. 
 Marion first sketches out the basic moves of the third reduction—what he will later 
designate the “erotic reduction”35—in the concluding section of Reduction and Givenness. Under 
this third reduction, the phenomenon is not only reduced from the general thesis, but reduced from 
every horizon of visibility, every condition, every determination. Through this radical reduction, 
Marion attempts to grant access to the pure givenness of the phenomenon before it is constituted 
as an object (Husserl) or a being (Heidegger). Such a phenomenon is not bound by the strictures 
of the constituting subject: that which sculpts, grasps, or controls the phenomenon. As he will later 
write, “ I reduce each thing to the given in it. And I know that I am performing this reduction 
correctly when I reach in each thing what I cannot myself give to myself.”36 Instead, givenness is 
permitted to manifest as it gives itself to be: “phenomenality is not grasped: it is received.”37  
What Marion discovers through this third reduction is that the basic structure of givenness, 
insofar as it can be called a structure, is that of the gift or the call. The third reduction, he writes, 
                                               
34 Marion, Reduction and Givenness, 204. 
 
35 Marion will shift from the “third reduction” to the language of the “erotic reduction” in 2003’s The Erotic 
Phenomenon (trans. Stephen E. Lewis [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007]), in order to mark a deep 
connection between givenness and the affectivity of desire and love. This language will be maintained in  
subsequent publications including, notably, In the Self’s Place: The Approach of Saint Augustine (trans. Jeffrey L. 
Kosky [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012]). 
 
36  Marion, In the Self’s Place, 285. 
 
37 Marion, Being Given, 264. 
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is the reduction of “every claim to the pure form of the call.”38 Within the purity of the call the 
phenomenon manifests itself, from itself, in its radical heterogeneity. “Givenness,” he writes, 
“goes farther than objectness and Being because it comes from farther away.”39 In light of this 
radical heterogenous account of phenomenological givenness, Marion is forced to reconceptualize 
the very nature the phenomenological self: “the reduction of each and every thing to the given 
implies obviously that the ego, so reduced, is reduced first to the rank of given—first gift, absolute 
and without remainder, unconditioned and thoroughly so.”40 Already in Being Given, Marion 
names this respondent “the gifted” (l’adonné). 
While much of Marion’s early career was devoted to a recovery of Cartesian thought for 
the contemporary world,41 he nevertheless suggests that the ego cogito and its philosophical heirs 
remain trapped in the logic of subjectivity that would foreclose any access to the phenomenon as 
it gives itself. Against the Cartesian cogito and its philosophical descendants—which Marion will 
trace through Heideggerian Dasein42—Marion develops the figure of “the gifted” as a figure of 
radical receptivity: a “successor to the ‘subject,’ … [that] receives itself entirely from what it 
receives.”43 In a series of passages that belie the influence of the Levinasian priority of the 
                                               
38 Marion, Reduction and Givenness, 196. 
 
39 Marion, Being Given, 39. 
 
40 Marion, In the Self’s Place, 286. 
 
41 See: Jean-Luc Marion, Cartesian Questions: Method and Metaphysics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1999); Jean-Luc Marion, Descartes’ Grey Ontology: Cartesian Science and Aristotelian Thought in the Regulae 
(South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, Forthcoming); Jean-Luc Marion, Descartes’ White Theology (South Bend: Saint 
Augustine's Press, Forthcoming).  
 
42 Marion, Being Given, 261. 
 
43 Ibid., 268. 
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encounter with the Other,44 as well as Jean-Louis Chrétien’s account of the call and the response,45 
Marion contends that the phenomenological subject does not function as the ultimate condition of 
possibility for the manifestation of phenomena. In a reversal of this traditional constructivist 
account, Marion insists to the contrary that the gifted is born in its response to a counter-
intentionality: that which “sees me first, because it takes the initiative.”46 In this ultimate act of 
receptivity, “the call gives me to myself … the I is only insofar as the call has always already 
claimed and therefore given to itself something like a myself/me.”47 To use Marion’s grammatical 
language, the self discovered by this radical phenomenology is a self in the dative.48  
Against the impulse to control or grasp, the gifted manifests as a “filter or prism,”49 a mere 
screen upon which givenness projects itself. “The receiver therefore does not only receive what 
gives itself,” Marion suggests, “it allows the given to show itself insofar as it gives itself.”50  This 
passivity or receptivity grants activity, construction, and constitution merely penultimate roles in 
                                               
44 See, in particular, Levinas’ two central volumes: Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on 
Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969); Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise 
than Being: or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1981). This 
influence granted, Marion will nevertheless insist upon a distinction between his conception of the self and Levinas’: 
“The ego does not even accede to itself for an other (Levinas) or as an other (Ricoeur); rather, it becomes itself only 
by an other—in other words by a gift: for everything happens, without exception, as and by a gift.” Marion, In the 
Self’s Place, 285. 
 
45 See, e.g.: Jean-Louis Chrétien, The Call and the Response, trans. Anne A. Davenport (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2004). 
 
46 Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies in Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 116. 
 
47 Marion, Being Given, 270. 
 
48 On this point, see: Ian Leask, “The Dative Subject (and the ‘Principle of Principles’)” in Givenness and God: 
Questions of Jean-Luc Marion, eds. Ian Leask and Eoin Cassidy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 182-
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49 Marion, Being Given, 264. 
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the self. The gifted is preceded by a heterogenous givenness that it does not ground; it is always 
already a respondent, is always anticipated by an Other that precedes it and calls it into itself.51 
 
B. Radical Phenomenologies 
 
Throughout this reconsideration of phenomenology, Marion consistently marks Henry as a 
profound philosophical inspiration. As he writes in the preface to Reduction and Givenness, “I 
would like to say to Michel Henry how much his faithful friendship and his example of 
philosophical probity have sustained me.”52 Nevertheless, as should be increasingly apparent, the 
two phenomenologists are marked by deep differences. Whereas Henry’s emphasis upon auto-
affective self-givenness results from an attempt to access the manifestation of life before all 
transcendence and exteriority, Marion’s more Levinasian-inflected phenomenology remains 
committed to a strong notion of otherness, a hetero-givenness that precedes any self. This obvious 
discrepancy appears to suggest an almost oppositional relation between the philosophers. But the 
reality requires a more nuanced analysis that can best be engaged through the debate surrounding 
Reduction and Givenness and the “fourth principle.” 
In “The Four Principles of Phenomenology,” Henry places Marion’s principle—“as much 
reduction, as much givenness”—into conversation with three phenomenological principles 
outlined by Husserl and Heidegger: “so much appearance, so much being,” “the principle of 
principles,” and “to the things themselves!” Although Marion’s principle significantly postdates 
these earlier principles, not emerging until 1989, Henry suggests that “its importance hits upon the 
entirety of phenomenological development,” where it functions, “as a hidden presupposition that 
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is always already at work.”53 Each of the first three principles, Henry suggests, contain 
indeterminate or ambiguous premises. These ambiguous premises—regarding the relation between 
appearance and Being, realism and idealism, and so forth—call into question the very status and 
possibility of phenomenology. Marion’s fourth principle on the other hand, through its clear 
grounding of phenomenality in givenness, provides a much needed clarification of the 
phenomenological project. For Henry, the recognition of this principle—and its correlate “third 
reduction” to the absolute givenness of the phenomenon—provides an essential tool in the return 
to the radical promise of phenomenology: the access to “objects in their How [Wie].”54 
 In a key footnote to Being Given, Marion returns the favor, suggesting that his own turn to 
phenomenological givenness finds a key predecessor in Henry’s Material Phenomenology. To cite 
the passage in full: 
I introduced this formulation [as much reduction, as much givenness] in the 
conclusion of Réduction et donation. It goes without saying that I would not dare 
elevate it to the rank of principle of phenomenology if Michel Henry had not 
validated it in his commentary (“Les quatres principes de la phénoménologie,” pp. 
3 and 26). In fact, one could also refer to Michel Henry himself if one wanted to 
acknowledge the principal role of givenness: “Because [ipseity] belongs, inasmuch 
as its self-givenness, to all givenness whatsoever ... , any being can have in this 
givenness, and through it alone, as phenomenon, a ‘self’” (Phénoménologie 
matérielle [Paris, 1990], p. 74).55 
 
What Marion identifies in Henry is an account of phenomenology that privileges givenness over 
intuition. “Without going so far as to speak of ‘murder’,” Marion writes, in reference to Henry’s 
critique of intuition, “one can certainly speak of a betrayal of phenomenality by intuition. By 
                                               
53 Michel Henry, “The four principles of phenomenology,” trans. Joseph Rivera and George E. Faithful, Continental 
Philosophy Review 48 (2015): 1-21, 2. 
 
54 Edmund Husserl, On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time (1893–1917), trans. John Barnett 
Brough (Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 121. 
 
55 Marion, Being Given, 330. 
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serving it and displaying its dignity, intuition lowers phenomenality to the status of mere 
fulfillment of the intentional aim at an object.”56 Simply put, for both Henry and Marion, intuition 
finds its justification in givenness and not vice versa. As Henry writes in Material Phenomenology, 
“the second givenness, which is the ek-static givenness in the perception of the now [intuition], 
presupposes the first non-ek-static givenness in affectivity, … the second givenness presupposes 
its realization elsewhere in the affectivity and impressionality.”57 Nevertheless, this ostensible 
commonality is undermined by marked differences in Henry and Marion’s respective accounts of 
givenness itself. These differences are already apparent in Henry’s analysis of Reduction and 
Givenness. 
While Henry commends Marion’s fourth principle as a step beyond Husserl and Heidegger, 
it is nevertheless the case, as Marion notes, that ultimately, “none of these four formulations 
receive Henry’s endorsement.”58 For Henry, while Marion’s principle makes a decisive step 
forward, by relativizing both Dasein and the transcendental Ego, it nevertheless fails to enact the 
total return to genuine immanence promised by the phenomenological project. Marion thinks 
givenness through the structure of the call and response. By maintaining this structure of the call 
and response, Henry argues, Marion’s phenomenology of givenness remains trapped within the 
very transcendent horizon of visibility that it seeks to escape. Even if Marion succeeds in 
overcoming the specific transcendent conditions of phenomenality in Husserl (consciousness) and 
                                               
56 Ibid. See, also: “For Henry, however, this amounts to ‘murder.’ The murder of what? Of everything that such a 
definition of phenomenality through intuition excludes. For intuition is meaningful only insofar as it functions to fill 
intentionality, because, since Kant, its task has been to give, as contrasted with the concept, which would remain 
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intentionality.” Jean-Luc Marion, “The Reduction and ‘The Fourth Principle’,” trans. Daniel Gillis, Analecta 
Hermeneutica 8 (2016): 41-63, 45. 
 
57 Michel Henry, Material Phenomenology, trans. Scott Davidson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 25. 
 
58 Marion, “The Reduction and ‘The Fourth Principle’,” 43. 
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Heidegger (Being), he nevertheless continues to think phenomenality through the most basic 
conditioning structure of the transcendent horizon of visibility: the distance or gap that Henry 
names the world. “The structure of the call borrows this disposition from an established mode of 
appearing, a mode in which opposition is constitutive of phenomenality,” Henry argues, “and this 
established mode is precisely that of the world.”59 Rather than escaping the oppositional 
manifestation of the horizon of visibility, the call and the response reproduces this dualistic 
structure.  
For Henry, this third reduction to the givenness of the call is insufficiently reductive—it, 
like its predecessors, fails to permit givenness to give itself in its most primordial manifestation.60 
What is necessitated, Henry argues, is a radical reduction to the self-affectivity of life. In order to 
escape every horizon of visibility that would condition the givenness of the given, Marion must 
collapse the call and the response into a single dimension. That which is given must give nothing 
but itself, and it must give it to nothing other than itself. Such a givenness can only be found in the 
immanence of life’s self-affectivity. 
Only a reduction that goes all the way to the end of its capacity of reducing, that 
suspends the ek-static dimension of visibility in which every conceivable giving 
intuition and evidence itself flow, and that suspends all possible showing, can 
discover the original givenness, the givenness that by giving life to itself, gives to 
it to be life.61 
 
                                               
59 Henry, “The four principles of phenomenology,” 18. And again: “the pair Call/ Response is substituted for the 
classic dichotomy of Subject/Object…it only reverses a relation conceived in both cases as constitutive of 
phenomenality, as preserving it. Far from escaping from the call of Being and from its implicit phenomenology, the 
structure of the call refers to Being and receives its own ‘structure’ from it: the opposition of Ek-stasis.” Ibid., 18-19. 
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Marion et Michel Henry,” in La vie et les vivants: (re)lire Michel Henry, eds. Grégori Jean et al (Louvain: Presses 
Universitaires de Louvain, 2013). 
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 Marion’s full response to this critique would not appear for over two decades, with the 
2015 publication of “The Reduction and ‘The Fourth Principle’.” Here, Marion identifies the core 
of Henry’s argument as a key presupposition: “that ecstasy, or a distance and gap, separates the 
call and the response essentially.”62 For Henry, the call and response necessarily reproduces the 
gap or distance of ekstasis because it is part of the eidetic structure of the call that it might not be 
answered. Insofar as there remains a possibility of rejecting the call, there is no total unity of that 
which is given and that which receives. This critique can be clarified through a comparison with 
Henry’s account of the inescapable manifestation of life. Life cannot be rejected (without the self-
destruction of suicide) because there is no gap between that which is given and that which receives. 
As Henry writes in Barbarism: 
Getting rid of oneself or denying oneself, however, is what neither suffering nor 
life can do. … As the phenomenological actualization of auto-affection in the 
primal Suffering and as a radical and insurmountable passivity of life with respect 
to itself, they are absolutely linked to pathos. This link cannot be disconnected. To 
try to break this link is in some way to increase its infrangibility: to experience it 
more strongly. … Life runs up against an insurmountable failure in its desire to get 
rid of oneself.63 
 
For Henry, it is not possible to have a total immanence, if there remains a gap or fissure that would 
permit the rejection or affirmation of the given. It is this fundamental presupposition that Marion 
challenges.  
 Marion’s response takes the form of a paradox. On the one hand, the call is “always already 
given, but not yet phenomenalized.”64 Within the register of givenness, the call precedes the 
response. But, at the same time, the response is “first phenomenalized but always after the fact.”65 
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63 Michel Henry, Barbarism, trans. Scott Davidson (New York: Continuum International Publishing, 2012), 71. 
 
64 Marion, “The Reduction and the ‘Fourth Principle’,” 51. 
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Within the phenomenal register, the response precedes the call. This ostensible paradox can be 
dissolved, because givenness is not beholden to the ekstatic temporality of the world: “the relation 
between the call and response cannot be conceived according to a simple chronological succession 
(physical, worldly), since their relation does not make use of the ecstatic gap of intentionality.”66 
Manifesting outside of the ekstatic horizon of visibility, the result is a simultaneity of call and 
response.  
Phenomenologically there is no I (above all no transcendental I) who precedes the 
call, who anticipates it like an intentional consciousness anticipates its object. The 
addressee of the call is born at the same time as the call, is awakened by this call 
and bursts forth out of the depths of their own absence. He who is awoken therefore 
undeniably hears the call at the very moment of the response (the awakening), to 
the point that he reconstitutes the call by the response that he brings to it, even after 
it.67 
 
The gifted receives itself from the call of givenness and simultaneously brings this call into the 
light of phenomenal visibility. Unbound by the temporality of any intentional horizon, the call and 
the response are not reducible to an oppositional duality of ekstatic phenomenality.  
 The result, for Marion, is not only that he is able to step around Henry’s critique, but more 
strongly, that he is able to ground the very possibility of Henry’s material phenomenology. “Not 
only,” he writes, “does the fourth principle (and its corollary in the structure of the call and 
response) not fall under the weight of Henry’s critique since it does not assume ecstatic 
phenomenality, but it might alone allow for the non-ecstatic phenomenality of ‘life’ to be 
conceived.”68 Henry’s dualistic phenomenological ontology presupposes a seemingly 
                                               
 
66 Ibid., 50. 
 
67 Ibid. 
 
68 Ibid., 52. 
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unbridgeable heterogeneity between “the truth according to the world” and the “truth of life.” 
Nevertheless, this relation is also conceived as a relationship of grounding, wherein the non-
ekstatic phenomenality of affectivity is presumed to ground ekstatic phenomenality. But, the 
precise means or mechanism by which the division between these heterogenous regions can be 
breached remains problematically unclarified.69 With the fourth principle and the conception of 
givenness as a call, Marion believes himself to have discovered a means of articulating the self-
givenness of affectivity that does not detach it from the mundane phenomenality of the world.  
[The fourth principle] allows us, or at least does not prohibit us from also clarifying 
self-affection as an extreme case, but one that coheres with others, with 
phenomenality in general, without having to divide phenomenality into two regions 
and into two incompatible phenomenologies: understood through the call, the 
response, and the gifted, the “embrace” of life could also extend to worldly figures 
of phenomenality and take account of them as a number of variations, more and 
more distant and doubtless ecstatic, of that which it first establishes, but not 
exclusively, as immanent unfurlings of originary givenness.70 
 
                                               
69 As Marion cites in a footnote (Ibid., 52), for example: “With what right does this second phenomenality, second in 
presentation but in reality the only true and originary phenomenality—the first being a catastrophic aberration and 
turning-away from the second—call itself phenomenal, since it has no outside, no phainesthai, no shining, no spark, 
no face or appearance, neither Schein nor Erscheinung?” Michel Haar, “Michel Henry: entre phénoménologie et 
métaphysique,” in Lectures de Michel Henry. Enjeux et perspectives, eds. Grégori Jean and Jean Leclercq [Louvain: 
Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2014], 49 [translation by Daniel Gillis]. One might also point to Jean-François 
Lavigne’s argument: “There is a double paradox in Henry’s concept of transcendence. The first paradox is that, 
although he needs to save and employ the basic distinction between ‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’, relying on 
the classical opposition between an ‘inner’ life and an ‘outward’ reality, or between consciousness and the ‘outside’ 
world, he aims at the same time, through his radical phenomenological procedure, at overcoming these oppositions, 
and cannot but reduce and blend the two dimensions into a homogeneous and continuous originary element of 
subjective (affective) events. But behind this very obvious paradox lies another one: in order to prevent his thinking 
from falling into this ontological confusion—a confusion which threatens both to cancel out the very 
phenomenological and fundamental difference between life and world, and to maintain a radical opposition between 
the two realms—he would need to free himself from his double Heideggerian heritage (the traditional horizontal-
ekstatic determination of Transzendenz), as well as from the identification of being with the appearance of being. 
Such an emancipation would imply the recognition of two dimensions of absolute transcendence, both at the 
ontological level of what appears as a ‘resisting continuum’ in worldly reality, and as the ultimate principle of 
immanent life itself. The striking fact is that, whereas Henry seems to acknowledge the independent existence of real 
material bodies in the world, he always refuses to go as far as to admit the idea of a transcendent reality as such.” 
Jean-François Lavigne, “The Paradox and Limits of Michel Henry’s Concept of Transcendence,” International 
Journal of Philosophical Studies 17, n. 3 (2009): 377–388, 386. 
 
70 Marion, “The Reduction and the ‘Fourth Principle’,” 54. 
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Under Marion’s analysis, self-affectivity constitutes the limit case of phenomenality. But this 
phenomenon, like all phenomena whatsoever, remains subordinated to the conditions of givenness 
more broadly construed.  
 This analysis of the relationship between Henry and Marion is key to the foregoing 
discussion, because, as we will see, Marion’s account of the flesh is drawn almost directly out of 
Henry’s thought. As Christina Gschwandtner notes:  
Although Marion does interact with Romano on the saturated phenomenon of the 
event, with various painters and their writings in regard to the phenomenon of the 
idol, and with Levinas in regard to the phenomenon of the icon, his reliance on 
Michel Henry’s phenomenology for the phenomenon of the flesh is much more 
extensive. Marion basically adopts Henry’s account of the self-affection of the flesh 
and merely illustrates how it can be understood as a saturated phenomenon of 
relation.71 
 
Nevertheless, as we will see, whereas for Henry the flesh stands at the very ground of 
phenomenality itself, for Marion, the self-givenness of the flesh is simply one example of a limit 
phenomenon among others. Marion designates these limit cases: “saturated phenomena.” 
 
§II: Flesh: The Saturation of Relation 
 
A. The Saturated Phenomenon 
Although Marion proffers a sharp critique of the primacy of intuition, privileging instead the pure 
givenness of the phenomenon, intuition is by no means excised from Marion’s account of 
phenomenology. Intuition is, in fact, recognized as a privileged form of givenness: “intuition 
                                               
71 Christina M. Gschwandtner, Degrees of Givenness: On Saturation in Jean-Luc Marion (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2014), 95. 
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always gives,” Marion insists, “in it and in it alone, it is a matter of giving what shows itself.”72 
Due to this privileged status, intuition is granted a central role in what might be regarded as Jean-
Luc Marion’s most significant contribution to phenomenology: the “saturated phenomenon.”  
 Under the name saturated phenomenon, Marion does not seek to inaugurate a radical break 
within phenomenology, but rather to develop “one of the possibilities that is by right already 
inscribed within the commonly accepted definition of the phenomenon.”73 This commonly 
accepted definition is that proposed by Edmund Husserl and Immanuel Kant, wherein the 
phenomenon is constituted by two autonomous factors: the concept (Kant) or intentionality 
(Husserl) on the one hand, and intuition (Kant and Husserl) on the other.74  
 In the common or mundane phenomenon, the concept/signifier/intention (Marion will 
often use these three interchangeably) exceeds the intuitive givenness. “The realm of meaning,” 
Husserl writes, is “much wider than that of intuition.”75 My concept of Boston, for example, always 
exceeds my various intuitions of Boston in such a manner that even while I continually enrich and 
clarify this concept through new intuitions—I discover this new pub, that new alleyway, this new 
overlook, etc.—these new intuitions remain subsumed under a single concept or intention 
                                               
72 Marion, Being Given, 198. 
 
73 Jean-Luc Marion, “The Banality of Saturation” in The Essential Writings, ed. Kevin Hart (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2013), 135. 
 
74 The conflation of Kantian and Husserlian accounts of phenomenality—that Marion describes as “convergent in 
the essentials ”(Jean-Luc Marion, Negative Certainties, trans. Stephen E. Lewis [Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2015], 52) risks obvious equivocations, as has been noted by critical readings. MacKinlay, for 
example, suggests that “Marion’s argument depends on taking key Husserlian terms (‘intention,’ ‘intuition,’ 
‘signification,’ ‘adequation’) and interpreting them in the context of Kant’s understanding of the relation between 
intuition and concepts. The problematic nature of this interpretation prevents Marion from successfully establishing 
the concept of saturated phenomena in terms of an excess of Husserlian intuition over intention.” Shane MacKinley, 
Interpreting Excess: Jean-Luc Marion, Saturated Phenomena, and Hermeneutics (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2010), 74. 
 
75 Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigations, 369. 
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(“Boston”). The exact proportion of this intuition/intention relationship is not static; rather, it 
remains essentially—that is, eidetically—variable; “givenness,” Marion writes, “admits of 
degrees.”76 The phenomenon might manifest with the clarity of substantial givenness (fulfillment), 
with the unclearness of empty (unfulfilled) intentionality, or it might pass from one extreme to the 
other over time. I may find myself moving to a new city (Pittsburgh, for example), where my 
intuition remains relatively empty or unfulfilled. But over a number of years, as I explore the city 
to a continually greater extent, my concept attains ever increasing levels of intuitive fulfillment—
passing from near-emptiness to substantial intuitive givenness. 
For Husserl, mundane phenomena are generally perched between the two extremes of 
complete emptiness and total fulfillment (adequate givenness): the “zero-limit is obscurity, [and] 
the unity-limit is full clearness.”77 In the case of empty intentionality, the intentional ray finds no 
intuitive givenness. Such a case does not even result in the constitution of an object, properly 
understood: “the phase of givenness is not reached at all. Consciousness … intuits no longer, in 
the strict sense it no longer ‘gives objects’ at all.”78 At the other extreme is the idea of the 
adequately given phenomenon. In such an instance, a phenomenon would be given with a full 
clarity, “which ‘excludes otherness’.”79 Such an adequate givenness is a relatively infrequent 
experience—one which is limited to eidetic phenomena. Such “adequation,” Marion writes, “can 
never be realized, or at least only rarely.”80 The majority of phenomena, including all transcendent 
                                               
76 Marion, Being Given, 25. 
 
77 Husserl, Ideas, 131. 
 
78 Ibid. 
 
79 Ibid., 287. 
 
80 Marion, Being Given, 191. 
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phenomena, are not even in principle open to adequate fulfillment.81 Rather, for such phenomena 
adequate givenness is an “idea (in the Kantian sense),”82 an ideal possibility that can only be 
approached asymptotically, but never fully achieved. The most direct case of this restriction is the 
perceptual act, wherein it is impossible to view an object from every possible perspective 
simultaneously, thereby necessarily producing gaps of intuitive lack.83  
For Marion, this account of phenomena suggests a possibility that is never explored in 
Husserl’s analyses. Whereas, in the empty intention no intuitive fulfillment is granted, and in the 
mundane phenomenon partial or adequate intuitive fulfillment is granted, what, Marion asks, 
would happen if intuition were to exceed intentionality? Or, in his own words: 
To the phenomenon characterized most often by lack or poverty of intuition (a 
deception of the intentional aim), indeed, exceptionally, by the mere equality of 
intuition and intention, why wouldn’t there correspond the possibility of a 
phenomenon where intuition would give more, indeed immeasurably more, than 
the intention would ever have aimed at or foreseen.84 
 
It is the aim of his analyses of the saturated phenomenon to perform an eidetic analysis of precisely 
this phenomenological possibility.  
Although it is absent from Husserl’s analyses, Marion does find a partial antecedent to the 
saturated phenomenon in Kant’s notion of the aesthetic idea. “It is Kant himself—the thinker of 
the intuitive shortage of the common phenomenon—who had a foretaste of what I call a saturated 
                                               
81 “There are objects—and all transcendent objects, all ‘realities’ (Realitäten) which are included under the rubric of 
Nature of World are here included—which cannot be given with complete determinacy and with similarly complete 
intuitability in any limited finite consciousness.” Husserl, Ideas, 299. 
 
82 Ibid. 
 
83 Nevertheless, the same also holds true for certain eidetic phenomena: “it belongs to the type of development 
peculiar to certain categories of essential being that essences belonging to them can be given only ‘one-sidedly,’ 
whilst in succession more ‘sides,’ though never ‘all sides’.” Ibid., 12. 
 
84 Marion, Being Given, 197. 
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phenomenon.”85 Unlike the idea of pure reason—wherein knowledge is not granted and an object 
cannot be truly constituted, because of a total lack of intuitive givenness—the aesthetic idea marks 
a representation of intuition itself, a case wherein an object cannot be constituted not because 
intuition lacks, but because no concept measures up to the excess of intuition. In Kant’s words: 
By an aesthetic idea, however, I mean that representation of the imagination that 
occasions much thinking though without it being possible for any determinate 
thought, i.e., concept, to be adequate to it, which, consequently, no language fully 
attains or can make intelligible.86  
 
The aesthetic idea is presented by Kant as the inverse of the idea of reason: the aesthetic idea “is 
the counterpart (pendant) of an idea of reason, which is, conversely, a concept to which no intuition 
(representation of the imagination) can be adequate.”87 In this regard, Kant has outlined three 
categories of phenomena:88  
1.) Object: a phenomenon in which intuition and concept coincide either partially 
or fully. This corresponds to phenomenology’s mundane phenomenon and 
                                               
85 Ibid. 
 
86 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 192. 
 
87 Ibid. Although inverted, these two are not strictly speaking “opposites.” Rather, as suggested by the language of 
“counterpart,” Kant understands the aesthetic idea as an imaginative supplement for the intuitive lack generated in 
the idea of reason. “[Aesthetic ideas] strive toward something lying beyond the bounds of experience, and thus seek 
to approximate a presentation of concepts of reason (of intellectual ideas)” (Ibid.). As Gilles Deleuze describes this 
relationship, “The Idea of reason goes beyond experience, either because there is no object which corresponds to it 
in nature (for example, invisible beings) or because it makes a simple phenomenon of nature into a spiritual event 
(death, love…). The Idea of reason thus contains something inexpressible. But the aesthetic Idea goes beyond all 
concepts because it create the intuition of a nature other than that which is given to us: another nature whose 
phenomena would be true spiritual events, and whose events of the spirit, immediate natural determinations. It 
‘gives food for thought,’ it forces one to think. The aesthetic Idea is really the same thing as the rational Idea: it 
expresses what is inexpressible in the latter.” Gilles Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson 
and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Continuum Books, 2008), 47-48. 
 
88 The following table, with minor variations, summarizes that found in Marion, Being Given, 221-233 and later 
expanded in Marion, Negative Certainties, 194-200. This table is particularly important as it highlights the rigor that 
Marion seeks to bring to the notion of saturation. As he writes, “the saturated phenomenon must not be understood 
as a limit case, an exceptional, vaguely irrational, in short, a ‘mystical,’ case of phenomenality. On the contrary, it 
indicates the coherent and conceptual completion of the most operative definition of the phenomenon: it alone truly 
appears as itself, of itself, and starting from itself.” Jean-Luc Marion, “The Saturated Phenomenon” trans. Thomas 
A. Carlson, in Dominique Janicaud (ed), Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’: The French Debate (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2000), 212. 
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adequate phenomenon, respectively. 
 
2.) The idea of reason: a phenomenon in which intuition is completely lacking. This 
corresponds to phenomenology’s empty intention. 
 
3.) The aesthetic idea: a phenomenon in which intuition exceeds every possible 
concept. This possibility is found nowhere in traditional phenomenology, and it is 
this possibility that Marion seeks to develop as the saturated phenomenon.  
 
What Marion draws from the aesthetic idea is the possibility of a saturation not only of intuition, 
but ultimately of givenness, “since according to Kant (and, for the most part, Husserl) intuition 
always gives.”89 In the aesthetic idea an object cannot be truly rendered, but not due to an absence 
of givenness. On the contrary, within the aesthetic idea conceptuality finds itself overwhelmed by 
an excess of givenness: “intuition is no longer exposed in the concept; it saturates it and renders it 
overexposed—invisible, unreadable not by lack, but indeed by an excess of light.”90 
 This Kantian precedent is essential for understanding the saturated phenomenon, as it 
decisively determines Marion’s subsequent eidetic analysis of saturation. For Marion, saturation’s 
excessive givenness not only exceeds or bypasses conceptuality, but overwhelms the very horizon 
of conceptuality itself, epitomized by the Kantian categories of the understanding.91 Thus, it is not 
only the case that the saturated phenomenon eludes conceptuality, but, more directly, that it 
                                               
89 Marion, Being Given, 198. 
 
90 Ibid. 
 
91 Marion’s assertion—that the categories of understanding constitute a horizon of phenomenality—is supported by 
the particular role granted to the categories in both the first and second editions of the First Critique. There, 
according to Guyer, a category is understood as “a concept of an object, or more precisely a general feature of any 
determinate concept of an object, which allows the application of a judgment to that object” (Paul Guyer, “The 
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories” in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer [New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992], 129). This judgment permits the manifold of intuition to be brought to 
representation. “The manifold in a given intuition,” Kant rights, “also necessarily stands under the categories” which 
perform “the logical function for bringing the manifold under a concept.” (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998], 252 [B153], 344 [A245]). 
Having subsumed the intuition under a concept, the intuition is able to attain proper representation and thus manifest 
as a cognition, rather than as a mere “blind” intuition (Ibid., 193, [A51/B75]). 
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actively inverts these Kantian categories.92 Marion therefore writes: 
I will sketch a description of the saturated phenomenon by following the lead of the 
categories of the understanding defined by Kant. The saturated phenomenon 
exceeds these categories (as well as principles), since in it intuition passes beyond 
the concept. I will therefore follow them by inverting them. The saturated 
phenomenon will be described as invisable according to quantity, unbearable 
according to quality, absolute according to relation, irregardable according to 
modality.93 
 
It is here that the necessity of the third reduction is brought to fruition. Having overwhelmed the 
categories of the understanding, the saturated phenomenon manifests outside of any possible 
horizon which would delimit or predetermine its phenomenality; saturation is givenness given in 
its purity. Such a phenomenon, Marion writes, “is freed because it does not depend on any horizon. 
In every case, it does not depend on this condition of possibility par excellence—a horizon, 
whatever it may be. I therefore call it an unconditioned phenomenon.”94  
Taking each of the four Kantian categories in turn—quantity, quality, relation, and 
modality—Marion develops four “types” of saturated phenomena. For the saturation of quantity, 
Marion marks the event; for quality, the idol; for relation, the flesh; for modality, the icon.95 To 
these four Marion also appends a fifth form wherein all four categories are simultaneously 
                                               
92 The motivation and justification for Marion’s choice to determine the phenomenality of saturation through an 
inversion of the Kantian categories remains obscure. As MacKinley writes, “Marion simply announces this choice 
without introduction or explanation.” McKinley, Interpreting Excess, 236 n.25. 
 
93 Marion, Being Given, 199 [emphasis added]. 
 
94 Ibid., 212. 
 
95 Just as Marion’s justification for the use of the categories of the understanding is unclear, it is likewise 
unexplained why saturated phenomenality should result in the saturation of a single category, rather than the 
saturation of every category. If the saturated phenomenon overwhelms the horizon of conceptuality, then it is 
unclear why every case of saturated phenomenality isn’t “revelation.” Moreover, it has been suggested that Marion’s 
attempts to “invert” these categories often appears forced or contrived. As MacKinlay argues, “this lack of 
correspondence is particularly evident in the case of saturation according to modality. … Saturation according to 
modality corresponds so poorly to Kant’s table of categories that it might be better understood as a different aspect 
of saturation in general, rather than as a distinct type of saturation.” MacKinlay, Interpreting Excess, 236 n. 26. 
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saturated, a redoubled saturation or “saturation of saturation”: revelation. An examination of all 
five of these types of saturation is certainly beyond the scope or aim of the present investigation.96 
Rather, focus will be reserved for the third mode of saturation, the flesh, the saturation of relation. 
For, it is through the flesh that Marion will introduce his deepest examinations of the body and its 
relation to the erotic and the sexual.  
 
B. The Saturation of Relation 
Jean-Luc Marion’s account of body stands directly within the phenomenological tradition that we 
have traced from Husserl to Henry. Like his French antecedents, Marion institutes a primary 
distinction between the body understood as an objective phenomenon within the visibility of the 
world and the lived experience of the body. Drawing upon the language popularized by Didier 
Franck and Michel Henry,97 Marion designates the objective manifestation of the body as “body” 
(le corps) and the lived or subjective manifestation of the body as the “flesh” (la chair). For 
Marion, as for his predecessors, the “objective body” (le corps) is an object of knowledge; it can 
be touched, dissected, and most importantly, gazed upon. The flesh (la chair), on the other hand, 
is never seen; it is rather the capacity of sensibility as such. Whereas the body is seen and touched, 
the flesh sees and touches.98 
                                               
96 For close examinations of these five types of saturation see: Marion, Being Given, 228-241; Marion, In Excess; 
MacKinley, Interpreting Excess; Gschwandtner, Degrees of Givenness; Ian Leask and Eoin Cassidy (eds.), 
Givenness and God, chs. 4, 8.  
 
97 See: Didier Franck, Flesh and Body: On the Phenomenology of Husserl, trans. Joseph Rivera and Scott Davidson 
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2014); Michel Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, trans. Karl Hefty (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2015). 
 
98 Husserl will mark this as the “double sensation” of touch. To borrow one of his favorite examples, when one uses 
their left hand to touch their right (or vice versa), their touched hand is not only felt (the body, le corps) but at the 
same moment feels itself being touched (the flesh, la chair). As Franck writes, explicating this example, “what is 
important here is the self-relation of touch, the endless exchange between the organ and the object in which they can 
no longer be distinguished from one another. If touch is privileged, it is due to this double ‘sensation’. What touches 
is also touched.” Didier Franck, Flesh and Body, 82.  
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Marion writes very little about the objective manifestation of the body. Nevertheless, given 
the Henrian pedigree of his analyses, it can be construed that the body is constituted as an object 
within the horizon of visibility. It is therefore bound by the conditions of objectivity: the body in 
its objectivity remains like “the bodies of the world[, which] are objects of sense (sentient as feel-
able) but themselves feel nothing (insentient as non-feeling).”99 As a poor or mundane 
phenomenon, the body’s intentionality essentially exceeds its intuitive fulfillment. Marion’s 
analyses instead primarily focus on the flesh. The flesh, unlike the body, exceeds the horizon of 
objectivity; it is a saturated phenomenon.100  
Because Marion thinks the flesh through a saturation of the category of relation, it will be 
helpful to begin with relation in its standard function. In “The Analytic of Concepts,” Kant 
“systematically generate[s]”101 the categories of the understanding through an examination of the 
                                               
 
99 Marion, In Excess, 84. 
 
100 It is worth marking a divergence between Henry and Marion’s respective accounts of the flesh at this point. 
Whereas Henry grants the flesh a foundational position within phenomenality, the condition of possibility for any 
phenomenality whatsoever, Marion seems to mark the flesh as merely one type of saturated phenomenality. In The 
Ego and the Flesh, Jacob Rogozinski follows Henry and challenges this subsumption of the flesh into the broader 
category of saturation: “at first glance, self-givenness of the ego could come from a phenomenology of givenness, 
such as the one elaborated by Jean-Luc Marion in Being Given, … But immanent self-givenness is not just one 
‘case’ among others of givenness in general; it radically differentiates itself from other modes of givenness that open 
to or could be subordinate to a transcendence. I am not sure that the phenomenology of givenness and of the 
‘saturated phenomenon’ takes account of this difference.” Jacob Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh: an 
Introduction to Egoanalysis, trans. Robert Vallier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 325 n. 3. 
Nevertheless, in the later “Faith and Reason,” Marion appears to waver on the relationship between the flesh and 
other phenomena, ostensibly shifting towards Henry’s position and granting the flesh a transcendental relationship to 
other forms of saturation, writing: “only the flesh reaches nonobjective phenomena, those where an excess of 
intuition saturates the limits of the concept already known and always foreseen. … The flesh exposes me to what the 
‘I’ cannot constitute as an object. It surpasses my objectifying rationality.” Jean-Luc Marion, “Faith and Reason” in 
Believing in Order to See: On the Rationality of Revelation and the Irrationality of Some Believers, trans. Christina 
M. Gschwandtner (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 8. 
 
101 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 212 (A80/B106). “There arise exactly as many pure concepts of the 
understanding, which apply to objects of intuition in general a priori, as there were logical functions of all possible 
judgments in the previous table: for the understanding is completely exhausted and its capacity entirely measured by 
these functions.” Ibid., 212 (A79/B105). According to Guyer, “His idea appears to be that since a judgment 
expresses a certain relation among its component representations … the object of the judgment must be represented 
as having parts or aspects represented by those syntactically distinct components of the judgment.” Guyer, “The 
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories,” 129. 
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table of all possible forms of judgment. The twelve judgments determined to be comprehensive 
are organized into four titles, each of which includes three moments. The third of these titles, 
Relation, includes three varieties of judgment: categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive. What 
unites these three categories under the title of “Relation” is their association of two or more 
members: “in the first kind of judgment … two concepts are considered to be in relation to each 
other, in the second, two judgments, and in the third, several judgments.”102 From these judgments, 
Kant derives three categories of relation: Inherence or Subsistence, Causality or Dependence, and 
Community. In the first instance one object is subordinated to another, in the second, one object 
temporally succeeds another, and in the third—whose connection to its related judgment 
(disjunction) Kant himself admits “is not as obvious as in the other cases”103—a number of objects 
are related “reciprocally, as in an aggregate.”104 What remains essential for our investigation is 
that in each of these instances the phenomenon in question bears a categorical, spatial, or temporal 
connection to other phenomena. Experience, Kant insists, is only possible “through a 
representation of the necessary connection of the perceptions.”105 Or as Marion paraphrases Kant, 
“we can never perceive an object of experience ... without setting it in relation to a different 
object.”106 Conversely, as we have already seen in Henry, any such relation simultaneously 
assumes a conceptual, spatial, or temporal distance between these related phenomena. This is the 
dual role played by the category of relation: connection without identification.  
                                               
 
102 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 208 (A73/B98). 
 
103 Ibid., 215 (B112). 
 
104 Ibid., 216 (B112). 
 
105 Ibid., 296 (B219). 
 
106 Marion, The Rigor of Things, 90. 
 
 157 
Marion first determines the saturation of relation in a general sense, naming this component 
of saturation the “absolute.” The saturated phenomenon, he writes, “appears absolute according to 
relation, which means it evades any analogy of experience.”107 The saturation of relation produces 
a phenomenon that is no longer found within any categorical, causal, spatial, or temporal relation 
to other phenomena. Thus, the absolute phenomenon is a phenomenon that cannot be synthesized 
within the horizon of visibility.  
Marion marks out the precise contours of this saturation through a contestation of three 
Kantian presuppositions. First, against Kant’s assertion that every phenomenon must obey the 
temporal unity of experience, Marion suggests that the saturation of relation requires precisely the 
opposite, that the phenomenon manifest as an “unforeseeable phenomenon (in terms of the past), 
not exhaustively comprehensible (in terms of the present), not reproducible (in terms of the future), 
in short, absolute, unique, coming forward.”108 Second, against Kant’s assertion that this unity be 
grounded in an analogy of experience, Marion suggests that the saturated phenomenon “will not 
maintain any measure in common with these terms [inherence, causality, commonality]; it would 
be free of them as from all other a priori determinations of experience that might claim to impose 
itself on the phenomenon.”109 Third, and finally, against Kant’s assertion that “all phenomena are 
in time,”110 Marion argues that the saturated phenomenon exceeds the temporal horizon of 
manifestation: “it does not depend on this condition of possibility par excellence—a horizon, 
whatever it might be.”111 In sum, Marion suggests that the saturation of relation would produce a 
                                               
107 Marion, Being Given, 206. 
 
108 Ibid., 207. 
 
109 Ibid., 209. 
 
110 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 300 (A182, B224). 
 
111 Marion, Being Given, 212. 
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phenomenon which is absolutely unique, set apart from any relation or analogy with other 
phenomena, and outside of the conditioning capacity of any horizon (particularly the temporal 
horizon) of manifestation.  
 Having established the characteristic features of the saturation of relation, in what might 
be roughly described as an eidetic analysis, Marion turns to the flesh as a paradigmatic case of an 
“absolute” phenomenon. This first analysis in Being Given covers a mere page and a half, 
nevertheless, this basic sketch already establishes the central themes of the flesh.112 First, the flesh, 
as in Henry, is set apart by its radical auto-affection: “the flesh is defined as the identity of what 
touches with the medium where this touching takes place (Aristotle), therefore of the felt with what 
feels (Husserl), but also of the seen and the seeing or the heard and the hearing—in short of the 
affected with the affecting (Henry).”113 This identity of the flesh’s affective capacity with its 
receptive capacity (its auto-affection), sets the flesh apart from all other phenomena. In the flesh, 
it is a matter of a self-relation that “saturates the horizon to the point that there is no longer any 
relation that refers it to another object.”114 Because there is no relationality, there is also no gap or 
distance; the flesh produces an absolute immanence devoid of opacity. In the words of Henry, it is 
“an internal, immanent relation, namely, the absence of all relation.”115 This immanence is a self-
                                               
 
112 This analysis, it should be stipulated, is not Marion’s first analysis of the flesh, but rather his first analysis of the 
flesh as a saturated phenomenon. A brief examination of the distinction between the body—which remains 
“unaffected” by any other—and the flesh—which “can affect itself with (feel) another”—can be found in Marion’s 
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presence that radically individualizes the flesh; it is always first and foremost my flesh. The flesh, 
Marion writes, “provokes and demands solipsism; for it remains by definition mine, 
unsubstitutable—nobody can enjoy or suffer for me (even if they can do so in my place).”116  
 This account of the flesh is worked through with more detail in the fourth chapter of In 
Excess. There Marion more carefully situates his analysis in relation to the Cartesian Ego and the 
Husserlian Leib, and marks the unique character of the flesh as its sentience: unlike “the bodies of 
the world,” my body is a “body gifted with sense.”117 Insofar as it is gifted with sense, it is no 
longer merely one body among other bodies, but precisely a flesh, or rather, my flesh. This 
radicality produces a qualitative gap: “the flesh of the other remains absolutely inaccessible to me, 
like mine to him or her.”118 The flesh, to borrow the language of Leibniz, is an inaccessible, 
invisible, and unbreachable monad. “Absolved” of all relation, it appears destined to manifest in 
an absolute solipsism.  
Yet, and it is here that Marion constitutes his most significant break with Henry’s account, 
the flesh cannot remain purely confined to this solipsism. At the same time that the flesh gives the 
self to itself in its auto-affection, the given also gives itself to the flesh as its hetero-affection: 
It fixes it in it as an adonné—that which receives itself from this very thing that it 
receives, according to the simultaneity characteristic of flesh since Aristotle. If a 
subjectivity must surmount the destruction of the metaphysical subject, it can only 
come from flesh, where hetero- and auto-affection are mixed.119 
 
Whereas for Henry the flesh was defined by its radical exclusion of all hetero-affection, for Marion 
the flesh—as the body gifted with sense—is the site of affectivity as such, whether that affectivity 
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finds its origin in the flesh itself or in the givenness of any phenomenon whatsoever. This capacity 
for hetero-affection finds its culmination in the only phenomenon which might permit the 
manifestation of the flesh of the other: the erotic phenomenon.  
 
C. The Flesh and the Erotic 
The relation between the flesh and the erotic relation is an early and permanent theme in Marion’s 
corpus. In his early theological treatise, Prolegomena to Charity, Marion attempts to draw a 
distinction between the theological account of charity and the “contemporary explosion of 
eroticism.”120 While Marion will ultimately insist upon the structural univocity of love,121 he 
nevertheless distinguishes these two as divergent manifestations or modalities of love.  
On the one side Marion marks the love or eroticism of the contemporary world. This love 
depends upon the reduction of the object of love to that which is objectifiable, to its visibility: “in 
the contemporary explosion of eroticism,” he writes, “we love by sight. … we have no trouble 
seeing objectifiable bodies, consumed and caught in the sex trade.”122 The object of contemporary 
eroticism is the objective body, the body constituted by an intentional gaze that originates from 
the lover. As Marion more recently stated in partisan terms, “if you are not a Christian there is no 
eroticism, there is pornography instead—it is very clear today.”123 
Authentic eroticism, on the other hand, is invisible, is centered upon the heterogeneity of 
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122 Marion, Prolegomena to Charity, 158. “Our hypersexualization,” Marion elsewhere writes of contemporary 
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the beloved, and emerges from—even as it supersedes—the domain of the flesh. “Without flesh,” 
he suggests, “no body can accede to love, for it remains unaffected by another person, or even any 
sort of other.”124 That is to say, only by means of the flesh—because the flesh, and not the body, 
is sentient—can one be affected by the beloved, and therefore granted access to a “third state of 
the body: neither physical body nor the flesh,”125 the eroticized flesh.   
Marion’s early phenomenological analyses of the flesh likewise point toward this erotic 
component of the flesh. In Being Given, Marion situates the erotic affectivity of the flesh together 
with other varieties of auto-affection: “the flesh auto-affects itself in agony, suffering, and grief, 
as well as in desire, feeling, or orgasm.”126 In In Excess, Marion supplements this notion of erotic 
auto-affection with a brief reflection on the child—the ostensible culmination of the erotic 
encounter. “Two ipse,” he suggests, “are never the same flesh, neither do they have the same flesh. 
The injunction that ‘they will become one flesh’ would remain a pious vow, unceasingly 
contradicted, if it could not be understood from the flesh of the child at birth, effectively 
common.”127 Nevertheless, these analyses remain relatively understated. It is only with the 2003 
publication of The Erotic Phenomenon, that Marion treats these erotic phenomena with the 
requisite care and depth.  
 In this later work, Marion largely continues the trajectory set by his earlier 
phenomenological analyses of the flesh, but with one central caveat. Whereas the 
phenomenological descriptions of the flesh in both Being Given and In Excess strongly emphasize 
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the impenetrable singularity and subjectivity of the flesh—its “mineness”128—The Erotic 
Phenomenon will seek to unveil the structure of a limit phenomenon, authentic eros, within which 
the flesh of the beloved might be manifest, where the flesh of the lover and the beloved might 
meet.  
Marion’s initial intuition that the flesh of the other is essentially inaccessible emerges from 
a reading of the fifth of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. There Husserl argues that the encounter 
with the alter-ego begins with the body (Körper) of the other. The recognition that this other is 
animated—is a living being like myself, with a full interiority—is the secondary product of an 
associative appresentation. “The body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as an animate 
organism” Husserl writes, “must have derived this sense by an apperceptive transfer from my 
animate organism.”129  When I encounter another, the flesh (Leib) of this other is not originally 
given within my sphere of ownness; this flesh remains inaccessible, invisible to my intentional 
gaze. Instead, I infer the interiority of the other through an analogy with myself.130 In the words of 
Marion, “the other’s flesh in effect remains merely inferred from his [sic] visible behaviors, by 
analogy with my flesh and my behaviors.”131  
While this Husserlian account of intersubjective experience seems to foreclose access to 
                                               
128 “More radically than the idol, the flesh provokes and demands solipsism; for it remains by definition mine, 
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the flesh (la chair or Leib) of the beloved, Marion already hints in Prolegomena to Charity that “a 
thinking of charity can advance further”132 than this Husserlian analysis. But to do so, this thinking 
must think outside of the horizon of visibility from which the flesh of the other is always hidden.  
 Marion orients the analyses of The Erotic Phenomenon with an existential question: “Does 
anyone out there love me?” For Marion, the attempt to access the other’s flesh in an erotic 
encounter is first and foremost an attempt to guarantee love. But what the lover engaged in this 
erotic consummation discovers is instead a series of failures. Even if the flesh of the other can be 
shared in the erotic embrace, this love is always marked by an impermanence: “the erotic 
conversation, which consists of never concluding, is going to have to conclude ineluctably (which 
signifies not success, but running aground). One can name this contradiction the orgasm.”133 This 
structural failure repeats in every modality of love. Love of self, love of the other, and love of the 
child—in each instance Marion finds an insufficiency and instability in love. Love of self becomes 
self-hatred, love of the other becomes jealousy, and love of the child faces the inevitable departure 
or independence of the child. What is instead required to guarantee love is the inversion of the 
love: the lover must take the form of a respondent to the beloved:  
The other loves me more as lover than I love myself, or rather (for I in fact never 
love myself), that the other loves me more than I hate myself. In the end, I love 
even myself, because the other lover, through her own advance, has made me a 
lover, and thus lovable in her eyes and, because I believed her, lovable in my own 
eyes. … This final swing of the center of gravity can be expressed thus: “You loved 
me first.”134 
 
In an echo of Augustine’s Confessions, this inverted love or counter-intentionality of the beloved 
finds its ultimate manifestation in the love of God: the true first lover who “loves infinitely better 
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than do we,” and who always already loved us “from the very beginning.”135 
Overall, this account of the erotic encounter deserves praise in a number of regards, 
including first and foremost, its sensitivity to the close relation between love and hate, its nuanced 
treatment of jealousy, and its choice to treat sexual consummation directly and unambiguously. 
Nonetheless, it is also within The Erotic Phenomenon and subsequent texts (e.g. Negative 
Certainties) that the contours of Marion’s reactionary and “exaggeratedly rigorous”136 sexual ethic 
and recourse to an explicit heteronormativity manifest most conspicuously. For the present 
investigation, we will treat three paradigmatic cases: beginning with the sexual act (perversion), 
passing through birth (the advent of the third), and into fatherhood (filiation).  
 
§III: The Limits of Heteronormativity137 
A: “Unnatural” Perversions 
 
The very possibility of the erotic encounter begins with an essential gap or distance between 
oneself and another.138 This gap results in an incapacity, at least at this point in Marion’s analysis, 
of the lover to access the person of the beloved through eroticization. Fearing the suspension of 
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the erotic reduction and the return of the body, the lover seeks to gain access to the beloved’s flesh 
by their own power. Ultimately, Marion will offer an account of a healthy surmounting of this gap 
through a reintroduction of the Levinasian “face of the Other.”139 But, before doing so, Marion 
offers two transgressions which attempt to illicitly bridge this gap: abduction and perversion.  
The first transgression manifests with levels of increasing, violent intensity: appearing first 
as coercion, second as rape—though Marion is, to his credit, sensitive enough to note that the first, 
coercion, is itself thoroughly violent140—and finally, in murder, wherein one accedes to the twisted 
logic “I loved her too much, I killed her.” Unfortunately, Marion’s account of the second 
transgression lacks the nuance and sensitivity of the first. In this second case, Marion once again 
posits a sequence of increasing intensity—beginning with roleplaying and Sadomasochism,141 
Marion continues to homosexuality, and ultimately bestiality. As he writes: 
I will constrain the flesh of the other as well as my own flesh at any price, through 
every trick and every convention: make-up, disguise, masks, play-acting. … it is 
necessary that I push bodies, and thus their naturalness, to their limits, or even 
beyond these limits. … Thus I will transgress the borderline of excitations, passing 
from pain to pleasure; I will transgress the borderline between the sexes; I could 
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almost end up—why not?—transgressing the borderline between species.142 
 
Here, Marion primarily employs a rhetorical strategy of association. Whereas Marion 
avoids a rigorous or direct attack upon queer sexuality, he nevertheless employs a faulty implicit 
argument. On the one hand, at a primary level, one finds a classic slippery slope argument against 
queer sexuality as the inevitable precursor to bestiality. Such arguments are not uncommon, having 
often linked homosexuality to pedophilia, incest, adultery, or, as in this case, bestiality.143 One 
might recall, for example, US Senator Rick Santorum’s assertion that “if the Supreme Court says 
that you have the right to consensual [gay] sex within your home, then you have the right to 
bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right to adultery. 
You have the right to anything.”144 A similar argument can be found in Justice Scalia’s infamous 
dissent in Lawrence v. Texas’ sodomy ruling, wherein he argued that:  
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, 
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable 
only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one 
of these laws is called into question by today’s decision; the Court makes no effort 
to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its holding.145 
 
Courtney Cahill describes this unique category of anti-queer slippery slope arguments as a “politics 
of disgust,” designed to provoke a visceral reaction. Yet, as Cahill’s argument goes on to show, 
such rhetoric also harbors a distinct ethico-legal strategy. In her analysis of the role of incest within 
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such slippery slope arguments, she writes: 
This analysis of incest as boundary violation has demonstrated the extent to which 
nature, or the notion of what is ‘natural,’ continues to shape the ideal conception 
of kinship in the context of family law. That is, same-sex relations and cloning are 
often grouped together with incest in slippery slope arguments because all three 
represent a perversion of what is considered to be a natural form of the family and 
a natural form of sexual reproduction.146 
 
It is only by way of a foundation within “nature,” or a concept of the “natural,” that the slippery 
slope argument can find its ultimate grounding. Though its affective goal is disgust, this affect can 
only be rationally justified through a recourse to clear metaphysical presuppositions.  
The applicability of Cahill’s analysis of the “politics of disgust” to Marion’s account of 
homosexuality is clear. The language of “transgression” saturating the passage suggest an 
inevitable question: “transgression of what?” The answer that Marion offers is manifold: the 
transgression of the division between pain and pleasure, between male and female, between human 
and animal. Yet, each of these distinct “borderlines” is reducible to a single source that Marion 
will mark with full clarity; these are the borders established by nature. It is the “naturalness” of 
the body, as Marion writes, that is here being transgressed.147  
Yet, even if one were to ignore the historical and cultural specificity regarding what 
qualifies as natural,148 then one still encounters a deeper methodological problem: how can the 
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only in passing, that Marion here remains consistent with his French context. For, as Guy Hocquenghem noted in 
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notion of the natural be employed following the phenomenological reduction? It is precisely the 
center of the phenomenological method to begin analysis with a “reduced phenomenon,” an 
experience stripped of all metaphysical positings—not only the general thesis of existence, but 
also any conception of the natural derived from scientific or metaphysical discourse. Without 
denying their legitimacy within their own domains, Husserl unambiguously insists upon the 
evacuation of any postulate of the natural world from phenomenological analyses: 
I do not then deny this ‘world,’ as though I were a sophist, I do not doubt that it is 
there as though I were a sceptic; but I use the ‘phenomenological’ εποχη, which 
completely bars me from using any judgment that concerns spatio-temporal 
existence. Thus all sciences which relate to this natural world, though they stand 
never so firm to me, though they fill me with wondering admiration, though I am 
far from any thought of objecting to them in the least degree, I disconnect them all, 
I make absolutely no use of their standards, I do not appropriate a single one of the 
propositions that enter into their systems, even though their evidential value is 
perfect, I take none of them, no one of them serves me for a foundation.149  
 
Such metaphysical accoutrements are the domain of the “natural attitude,” which, while they may 
be perfectly justifiable within their own domain, fail to offer phenomenological evidence. While 
many phenomenologists reject the priority of the reduction, Marion, as we have seen, is a thinker 
of the reduction par excellence. He not only defends the centrality of the phenomenological 
reduction, but also proposes his “third reduction” to pure givenness (here designated as the “erotic 
reduction”150) as a more rigorous variant of the reduction. Quite against any supposition that the 
erotic reduction could let in a conception of “naturalness” which had been bracketed by the 
phenomenological reduction, Marion’s third reduction remains markedly more stringent. Thus, 
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from a purely methodological perspective, Marion’s ethico-phenomenological judgment against 
non-heterosexual erotic relation appears deeply problematic.  
At a deeper level, the implicit argument from association becomes markedly more 
disturbing. Holding this section together in its totality, queer sexualities are here directly correlated 
not only to bestiality, but ultimately, to rape. Both abduction and perversion, it should be 
recognized, are bound to one another, for Marion, by their mutual dependence upon a reduction of 
the human person to a depersonalized manifestation. Simply put, for Marion, both abduction and 
perversion are attempts to directly access the flesh—to “capture” it—by controlling and 
manipulating the body. While this description may account for coercion and rape, a justification 
for its use as a description of queer sexuality is completely absent from Marion’s account.  
On the contrary, Marion’s analysis lacks anything that could be understood as a proper 
phenomenological analysis of queer sexuality.151 Without such an account, Marion’s correlation 
of queer eroticism and violence appears to lack the requisite phenomenological evidence. Quite to 
the contrary, countless first-person accounts of queer eroticism—both phenomenological and non-
phenomenological152—stand as evidence that not only is authentic eroticism possible in queer 
relations, but that it might there find a great depth and intensity. Julia Horncastle’s “Queer 
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orientation: Selfhood and poetics,” for example, offers numerous phenomenological analyses of 
queer erotic encounters. Analyzing the penetrative act, for example, she finds not violence, but an 
erotic communion of flesh: 
In sex, there can occur a corporeal threshold moment when one comes to be ‘inside 
someone’—with a fist, a tongue, a strap-on, with energetic focus, eye contact, any 
body part or surface, a prosthesis or object as extension of the self, even through 
utterances, or the draughts of breath onto skin, or into hearing. In this moment one 
cannot tell exactly which body parts are one’s own or another’s. Penetration 
becomes interpenetration, sensed as touching someone, whereupon one ‘feels’ and 
one is ‘felt’ (touched by the surface one is touching)—one ‘loses sight’ of which 
sense is which. In this threshold state one penetrates and cannot be anything other 
than also and simultaneously penetrated; possibly doubly-so if the other person/s 
also intentionally penetrate/s.153 
 
Within this properly phenomenological analysis of queer sexuality, there emerges a moment of 
erotic penetration within which one can no longer distinguish one’s flesh from that of the 
beloved—“in this moment one cannot tell exactly which body parts are one’s own or another’s.” 
Is this not precisely the erotic communion—wherein one is granted access to the flesh of the 
other—that Marion’s erotic reduction has sought? 
Even outside of “phenomenology proper,” narrative, depth-descriptive, and poetic 
accounts of queer sexuality open up vital venues for thinking queer eroticism. Monique Wittig’s 
The Lesbian Body, for example, stands out as a paradigmatic celebration of queer eros, “an erotic 
female song of songs.”154 Its deeply sensual, embodied prose testifies to an authentic eros that 
cannot be merely set aside on account of a pre-phenomenological prejudice. Wittig speaks from 
the site of a rapturous love:  
I have a deathly chill, I moan, I fall into an abyss, m/y head is awhirl, m/y heart is 
in m/y mouth, it feels as if m/y blood is all congealed in m/y arteries. You say 
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nevertheless that you receive an enormous quantity of it in your hands. You speak 
of the colour of m/y organs. I cannot see them. I hear your voice hissing in m/y 
ears, I concentrate on listening to you. I see m/yself stretched out, all m/y entrails 
are unwound. I open m/y mouth to sing a cantata to the goddess m/y mother. M/y 
heart fails in this effort. I open m/y mouth, I admit your lips your tongue your palate, 
I prepare to die by your side adored monster while you cry incessantly about m/y 
ears.155 
 
While such an account may lack the full methodological rigor of a properly phenomenological 
analysis, its insights may nevertheless serve the phenomenologist; for, as Gayle Salamon notes, 
“queer folks are natural (and I use that word advisedly) phenomenologists, since careful reading 
of our surroundings, of the physical and social circumstances through which we move, is often a 
matter of survival.”156  
Lacking such phenomenological or descriptive accounts, Marion instead here relies 
entirely upon a series of plays on language: equivocations upon “force,” “constrain,” “capture,” 
“transgression,” are the materials out of which an analogy between rape and queer sexuality is 
implicitly constructed. Marion speaks, for example, as though the act of “capturing” the body of 
the other in abduction is ethically equivalent to “capturing” the other in the gaze,157 or as though 
the transgression of the other’s body (e.g. rape) may be straightforwardly marked as equivalent to 
“transgressing” gender norms. However, such correlations remain wholly unsubstantiated. 
It is within the literature of queer studies and lived queer sexuality that the most direct 
challenge to Marion’s paradigm can be formulated. For, it is phenomena such as those presented 
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 172 
above—personal accounts of an undeniable eros—that strike at the very foundation of Marion’s 
heteronormative presuppositions. The phenomenologist is here faced with a choice, either one 
must presuppose (prior to an eidetic analysis) the content of love as necessarily heterosexual, and 
therefore preemptively restrict any queer phenomenological accounts of eros, or the eidetic 
analysis of the necessary structure of love, as presented by Marion, must be placed into question. 
Thus, in summary, while Marion’s arguments might hold weight in a metaphysical debate, 
they completely lack standing as phenomenological evidence. In the first case, there is direct 
recourse to a posited notion of “natural,” a presumption that appears incapable of surviving within 
Marion’s own stated methodology. In the second case, his argument appears to stand on little more 
than baseless rhetorical flourish, ultimately devoid of philosophical or phenomenological 
substance. What is lacking is a phenomenological account of queer sexualities that would justify 
their correlation to bestiality and rape. Lacking such a justification, this association becomes more 
revelatory of Marion’s pre-phenomenological sexual ethic than the diverse phenomena of queer 
sexuality.  
 
B: The Necessity (of the Possibility) of the Child 
 
The second case of heteronormative discourse follows directly from the first. Having extinguished 
the possibility of non-heteronormative sexual intercourse from the domain of authentic eros, 
Marion subsequently presumes procreative sexuality as the only legitimate consequence of 
sexuality. Thus, the denigration of queer sexuality leads inexorably to the “advent of the third 
party.” In Marion’s description, the great tragedy of the erotic is its suspension; one cannot make 
love forever, eventually climax comes and one is thrust outside of the relation. The secret desire 
of every lover, Marion suggests, is to discover a means of loving forever. Here enters the child. 
 173 
The child manifests as a culmination of the erotic relation, a concretization or reification of the 
very oath of love itself.158 “The passage to the child,” Marion suggests, “has the function of 
producing a more stable visibility of the erotic phenomenon … and thus of assuring the visibility 
of the lovers, as it is present and to come.”159  
 On its own, these passages on the child have a certain beauty and intimacy, clearly 
reflective of Marion’s own experience of fatherhood. This is not surprising, as Marion already 
admits in the opening chapter that he will intentionally undertake his analysis from a deeply 
subjective perspective. “I will say I,” he states, “and I will not be able to hide myself behind the I 
of philosophers, that I who is supposed to be universal, … I will say I starting from and in view of 
the erotic phenomenon within me and for me—my own.”160  
From a certain perspective then, Marion remains true to the particularity of his own 
experience, and his work maintains a pseudo-phenomenological character in this limited regard. 
However, the failure of Marion’s analysis manifests precisely at the point where Marion attempts 
to determine the “essential” character of love as such, without offering a sufficiently thorough 
bracketing of his own pre-phenomenological baggage.161 Simply put, the problem arises when 
                                               
158 It is here that Marion again reveals his deep indebtedness to the phenomenological work of Emmanuel Levinas. 
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas’ own “Phenomenology of eros” gives way, immediately to a discussion of 
“fecundity,” that is, of the child.  Just as in Marion’s later analyses, this child is understood primarily in temporal 
terms. The child extends love forward, into the indeterminate future. “The relation with the child—that is, the 
relation with the other that is not a power, but fecundity—establishes relationship with the absolute future, or infinite 
time.” Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 268. 
 
159 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 197. 
 
160 Ibid., 9. 
 
161 “Essential,” here, should be taken in the Husserlian sense. The “essence of love” that Marion seeks is precisely 
the phenomenological essence that Husserl suggests can be attained by eidetic analysis. Yet, and it is here where 
Marion’s analysis loses its phenomenological credentials, Husserl outlines strict methodological requirements for 
undertaking an eidetic analysis, the most central being the eidetic reduction. For Husserl’s discussion of “Eidetic 
Variation and the Acquisition of Pure Universals” see: Edmund Husserl, Experience and Judgment: Investigations 
in a Genealogy of Logic, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1973), §§ 86-90.  
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Marion attempts to make the child a necessary piece of the erotic structure. The claim that the 
child is a necessary, rather than a merely possible outcome of love, is explicitly presented by 
Marion; who writes that it is “in no way optional,” is “unconditional,” is a “phenomenological 
requirement,” and is an “unavoidable stage.”162 What precisely is meant in the claim that the child 
is necessary is here marked without ambiguity. The erotic reduction as such—that is to say, the 
very possibility of authentic love—is broken when one blocks access to the child: “we understand 
the child as an unconditional demand of the erotic reduction, which in no case the lover can even 
claim to avoid, except by suspending this reduction…”163  
For the queer erotic relationship where biological reproduction is not possible—most 
clearly the homosexual relation, but also certain heterosexual relations which include trans or 
queer members or any other number of non-normative erotic relations—authentic love is not 
possible, the reduction must be suspended.164 Even the mere use of birth control, on this account, 
disrupts the erotic relation, rendering its love incomplete or partial. Marion does not wish to punish 
the infertile, the elderly, or similar cases and therefore insists that “it is not first and foremost a 
matter of the actual child,” but rather that “the passage to the child … must first, be understood as 
the possibility of the child more than its actuality.”165 For Marion, the true loving relationship finds 
                                               
162 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 196-198. 
 
163 [Emphasis added] Ibid., 197. 
 
164 It is a—perhaps unconscious—recognition of this reality, Marion suggests, that accounts for homosexual 
advocates’ recent push for adoption rights and fertility assistance. Yet, even if this advocacy emerges from an 
authentic desire for the child, it nevertheless  suspends the erotic reduction. As he writes, “that is why one must take 
the desire of homosexual couples for a child very seriously, despite the fact that the conceivable replies often miss 
the gravity of this possibility, which one wants to make effective by taking recourse to all the mechanisms of 
objectness (biological and legal). In this way, the erotic phenomenon disappears one more time into the 
(metaphysical) mastery of the object.” Marion, The Rigor of Things, 123. 
 
165 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 197-198. “I say the child,” he elsewhere writes, “but one must also hear the 
possibility of the child, a possibility almost as strong as the real child.” Marion, The Rigor of Things, 123. 
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itself determinatively limited to the heterosexual union of cis-gender couples, open to the 
possibility of childbirth. All else suspends and disrupts this erotic reduction; all else is an 
inauthentic love.  
Marion appears to anticipate critiques of this account, and therefore preemptively insists 
that his analyses are not ideological, but rather fall from the phenomenon under investigation 
(eros): “this passage” to the child, he writes, “has nothing arbitrary or ideological about it.”166 
Marion employs two arguments to defend the ideological (and phenomenological) neutrality of 
these analyses. His first argument in this regard is quite plainly circular. Here he argues that these 
analyses are not ideological because they emerge from a phenomenological demand: “the passage 
to the child does not result from a biological or social law, but from a phenomenological 
requirement.”167 That is to say, he argues tautologically that it is properly phenomenological 
because it is phenomenological.  
His second argument offers little additional support. Here he contends that this assertion is 
not ideological because it concerns the possibility (of the child) and not the actuality.168 This 
distinction between possibility and actuality—and more specifically, the claim that the former is 
the proper domain of phenomenology, while the latter the proper domain of theology or 
metaphysics—is already attested in “Metaphysics and Phenomenology.” There, glossing 
Heidegger’s insistence that “higher than actuality stands possibility,”169 he argues that, “between 
                                               
166 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 197. This claim echoes his earlier defense of his broader project’s 
phenomenological credentials, in a discussion with Derrida: “I suggest that my proposal remains merely 
philosophical and without any theological presupposition or bias here. On the contrary, any theological bias and 
second thought would ruin my project.” Derrida and Marion, “On the Gift” in God, The Gift, and Postmodernism, 
ed. John D. Caputo and Michael Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 70. 
 
167 Ibid. 
 
168 Ibid., 197-198. 
 
169 Heidegger, Being and Time, 63. 
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phenomenology and theology, the border passes between revelation as possibility and revelation 
as historicity.”170 Simply put, for Marion, phenomenology concerns the possibility of phenomena, 
while theology argues for the reality of certain phenomena (God, the resurrection, grace, etc.). 
According to Marion’s second argument, therefore, since the requirement of “the possibility of the 
child” does not require the actuality of the child, it passes phenomenological muster.  
Here Marion once again relies upon a slippery equivocation. Unlike the authentic 
conditions of the “possibility of phenomena” revealed by the phenomenological method, 
“possibility,” in Marion’s account of the child, masks a deeper actuality or necessity. That is to 
say, what renders Marion’s requirement phenomenologically untenable is that it does not concern 
the mere “possibility of the child,” but the necessity of a subjective openness to the possibility of 
the child; “the passage to the child,” as we saw above, “responds to a requirement.”171  
Counter to Marion’s claim, this requirement is not a phenomenological requirement, but 
an ontic ethical requirement, perfectly traceable to Catholic doctrine. In fact, Marion’s conception 
of a “necessary possibility” remains directly correlated to magisterial teaching. There as well, it is 
not the child that is dogmatically mandated, but an openness to the possibility of childbearing. As 
Humanae Vitae argues, “the Church… teaches that each and every marriage act (quilibet 
matrimonii usus) must remain through itself open to the transmission of life.”172 Thus, for example, 
                                               
170 Jean-Luc Marion, “Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Relief for Theology,” Critical Inquiry 20, No. 4 
(Summer, 1994): 590.  
 
171 The Erotic Phenomenon, 197 [emphasis added]. 
 
172 Humanae Vitae, 11 [emphasis added], as cited in John Paul II, Man and Women He Created Them, 118:2. This 
English translation is derived from John Paul II’s preferred Italian translation of Humanae Vitae. The English 
translation derived from the Latin is here ostensibly stricter, reading “the church… teaches that each and every 
marital act must of necessity retain its intrinsic relationship to the procreation of human life.” Yet, even in this 
“stricter” translation, emphasis still remains upon the intrinsic (read: natural) ordering of human sexuality towards 
creation, an ordering that need not manifest in every instance (see Humanae Vitae’s discussion of licit methods of 
birth control; 15-16). This emphasis on an “openness” to procreation is reaffirmed by John Paul II in Familiaris 
Consortio, 14, where he emphasizes that “even when procreation is not possible, conjugal life does not for this 
reason lose its value.” This is repeated in Gratissimam Sane, where he writes, “the logic of the total gift of self to the 
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the supposed moral failure of contraception comes not from the lack of an actual child, but from 
the technological suspension of the natural human reproductive system’s necessary direction 
toward procreation: “they obstruct the natural development of the generative process.”173 This is 
precisely the argument that one finds in Marion’s text, where he condemns the “bio-technical 
manipulations or socio-medical traffickings which would reduce [the child] to the rank of a 
manufactured object.”174 Thus, rather than pointing beyond an ideological investment at the center 
of Marion’s phenomenology of love, his argument for the “necessity of a possibility,” rather than 
an actuality, remains true to the ideological investments that ground Marion’s analyses of 
sexuality.  
Apart from these particularly magisterial-ideological commitments—that will be examined 
with more depth in the following chapter—Marion here also enacts a more general Western 
ideology that Lee Edelman names “reproductive futurism.” In his 2004 No Future: Queer Theory 
and the Death Drive, Edelman brings to light the confluence of a certain “image of the Child” and 
anti-queer polemics. “The Child,” Edelman insists, is “not to be confused with the lived experience 
of any historical children.”175 Indeed, “the Child” is an imaginary figure, invested with the very 
possibility of a future or futurity; a figure who therefore functions as the precondition for any 
politics or collectivity. The child represents the boundaries of debate, the site wherein all political 
opinions converge: “Children,” as Max Horkheimer suggests, “symbolized the Golden Age as well 
                                               
other involves a potential openness to procreation: in this way the marriage is called to even greater fulfilment as a 
family.” John Paul II, Letter to Families From Pope John Paul II: Gratissimam Sane (Vatican: 1994), 12. 
 
173 Ibid. 
 
174 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 198. 
 
175 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 11. 
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as the promising future.”176 
Resistance to the necessity of reproduction is therefore rendered as a rejection of sociality 
in favor of hedonistic jouissance: “if, however, there is no baby … then the blame must fall on the 
fatal lure of sterile, narcissistic enjoyments understood as inherently destructive of meaning and 
therefore as responsible for the undoing of social organization, collective reality, and, inevitably, 
life itself.”177 Non-procreative eroticism is figured as a dereliction of social duty: “the homosexual 
can only be a degenerate, for he does not generate.”178 
For this reason, the figure of the Child likewise generates the necessary, imaginary counter-
figure of “the queer” as its constitutive exception, the abject figure to be cast out of society and 
social discourse. In the words of Edelman, “the sacralization of the Child thus necessitates the 
sacrifice of the queer.”179 The queer is that figure which stands outside of acceptable politics, 
because it denies the necessity of reproduction and its logic of futurity.180 Because queer sexuality 
resists the call for reproduction as the necessary end or telos of eroticism, the queer is figured as 
anti-child and anti-future: “queerness names the side of those not ‘fighting for the children.’”181 
This connection between the child and futurity could not be more explicit in Marion’s 
                                               
176 Max Horkheimer, “The End of Reason,” in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike 
Gebhardt (New York: Continuum Press, 2007), 41. 
 
177 Edelman, No Future, 12. 
 
178 Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire, 107. 
 
179 Edelman, No Future, 28.  
 
180 The depth of this figural thinking is marked by Marion’s rejection of the queer, even if they uphold the logic of 
reproductive futurism at a literal level—that is to say, they desire a child: “c’est pourquoi il faut prendre très au 
sérieux le désir d’enfant des couples homosexuels, bien que les réponses envisagées le plus souvent manquent le 
sérieux de cette possibilité, qu’on voudrait transformer en effectivité par recourse à toutes le mécaniques de 
l’objectité (biologiques et légales). Ainsi, le phénomène érotique disparaît, encore une fois, dans la maîtrise 
(métaphysique) de l’object.” Jean-Luc Marion, La Rigueur des Choses: Entrentiens avec Dan Arbib (Paris: 
Flammarion, 2012), 199. 
 
181 Ibid., 3. 
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writing. His very terminology—the advent of the third [l’avènement du tiers]—marks his 
indebtedness to the ideology of reproductive futurism. The advent—l’avènement—from the Latin 
advenire “to come,” from which the French also get l’avenir, “the future.” The third—le tiers—
Marion makes explicit is the child—“… Le tiers ou l’enfant.” Taken together, the advent of the 
third, of the child, is for Marion nothing other than the guarantee of love’s futurity, the passage to 
the child “has the function of producing a more stable visibility of the erotic phenomenon … as it 
is present and to come.”182  
What Edelman reveals is that this connection between the figure (or advent) of the child 
and futurity—reproductive futurism—is not merely contingently connected to Marion’s denial and 
denigration of queer eroticism. Indeed, this figuring of the child as a necessary component of the 
erotic structure preserves “the absolute privilege of heteronormativity by rendering unthinkable, 
by casting outside the political domain, the possibility of a queer resistance to this organizing 
principle of communal relations.”183 The child becomes necessary not on account of the 
phenomenological evidence, but because non-procreative eroticism is, for Marion and 
reproductive futurism, truly unthinkable. This unthinkability reveals a certain falsity within 
Marion’s ostensible concern for the prioritization of sexual difference: as Stephen E. Lewis  writes, 
for example, “sexual difference is to be taken seriously in [The Erotic Phenomenon].”184 This is 
not to cast even the slightest aspersions on Lewis’ translation, but rather to note the way in which 
Marion’s insistence upon sexual difference and heterosexual reproduction serves to mask a deeper 
logic which expels difference in service of a reproduction of the same. “The Child,” Edelman 
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writes, “marks the fetishistic fixation of heteronormativity: an erotically charged investment in the 
rigid sameness of identity that is central to the compulsory narrative of reproductive futurism,”185 
a futurism that “generates generational succession, temporality, and narrative sequence, not toward 
the end of enabling change, but, instead, of perpetuating sameness, of turning back time to assure 
repetition … in the service of representation and, by extension, of desire.”186 Quite against his 
ostensible insistence upon difference, Marion here reveals that his conception of the erotic is bound 
by a commitment to a reproduction of the same, precisely insofar as non-normative sexualities are 
cast out of the realm of thinkable discourse, and therefore out of the eidetic structure of eros.  
 
C. Paternity and the Name of the Father 
The third case of heteronormative, and in this instance explicitly patriarchal, discourse follows 
logically from the second. Having instituted an openness to the possibility of the child as a 
necessary component of authentic eros, Marion turns to the question of filiation, particularly the 
relationship between the father and the (implicitly male)187 child. The centrality of this 
phenomenological description is attested by its repetition and extension over a decade and a half—
appearing first in Being Given and later in an extended form in the essay “The Reason of the 
Gift,”188 itself subsequently revised into the third chapter of Negative Certainties.189  
                                               
185 Edelman, No Future, 21. 
 
186 Ibid., 60. 
 
187 While Marion’s use of the masculine pronoun in his discussion of filiation could well be understood as a merely 
grammatical convention (as attested by Lewis’ translation of pronouns associated with l’enfant with the feminine), 
this possibility is belied by Marion’s generational account which positions the father as the child of “a(nother) 
father” (Marion, Negative Certainties, 100),  and implicitly the child/son as another, or a future, father. 
 
188 Jean-Luc Marion, “The Reason of the Gift” trans. Shane MacKinlay and Nicolas de Warren in Givenness and 
God: Questions of Jean-Luc Marion, ed. Ian Leask and Eoin Cassidy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005).  
 
189 This argument can also be seen as anticipated by Marion’s conflation, in God Without Being, of the figure of the 
theologian and the bishop—“the theologian par excellence, the bishop” or again, “the theologian who doubles … for 
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 Throughout these texts, Marion draws forward the phenomenon of fatherhood (paternité) 
as a paradigmatic example of a gift that avoids absorption into the economic logic of exchange. In 
an analysis that reveals an indebtedness to Jacques Derrida’s Given Time,190 Marion argues that 
there are three standard ways—corresponding to the giver, the givee, and the gift given—in which 
the gift is “abolished in favor of its contrary: exchange.”191 First, the giver, even if they do not 
receive material equivalence, nevertheless may find symbolic gratification—esteem, contentment, 
moral superiority, etc.—from the act of giving; “the giver never loses anything in the gift, but in 
exchange, she always finds herself there, making a good deal.”192 Second, the givee “receives not 
only a good, but especially a debt.”193 This debt or poison (German: Gift),194 “whether real or 
fictive,”195 erases the gift, and through the assumption of debt, reintegrates the gift into the logic 
of exchange. Finally, the given gift itself obscures the act of giving and invariably transmutes into 
a simple commodity: “no longer to appear except as a pure and bare piece of merchandise.”196 In 
                                               
the bishop” (Marion, God Without Being, 152, 157). Here apostolic succession appears synonymous with a sort of 
paternity, whereby the (male) bishop designates or ordains the (male) theologian or priest as his rightful successor: 
“only the saintly person knows whereof he speaks in theology, only he that a bishop delegates knows wherefrom he 
speaks” (Ibid., 155).  See, also: Catherine Keller, “The Apophasis of Gender: A Fourfold Unsaying of Feminist 
Theology,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 76.4 (2008), 917. 
 
190 Jacques Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1992. For the extended debate between Marion and Derrida concerning the possibility of the gift, see: Marion, 
Being Given, 71-118; Derrida and Marion, “On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc 
Marion, Moderated by Richard Kearney” in God, The Gift, and Postmodernism, 54-78; and John D. Caputo, 
“Apostles of the Impossible: On God and the Gift in Derrida and Marion” in God, The Gift, and Postmodernism, 
185-222. 
 
191 Marion, Negative Certainties, 84. 
 
192 Ibid., 85. 
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in debt, with the result that giving amounts to hurting, to doing harm.” Derrida, Given Time, 12. 
 
195 Marion, Negative Certainties, 85. 
 
196 Ibid., 86. 
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each instance, the gift loses its unique phenomenological character, becoming a mere object of 
exchange. Thus, it initially appears that the gift must either remain a pure possibility or, insofar as 
it is actualized, lose its status as a gift.  
 Yet, even given these difficulties, Marion seeks to defend the possibility of the gift, offering 
a solution to these Derridean critiques. Through the bracketing of one or more of the components 
of the gift—giver, givee, gift given—he argues, the gift can be maintained in its excessive 
phenomenality; “there is a gift only if one of these terms of exchange is missing.”197 One can 
bracket the givee, giving to a recipient incapable of receiving the gift as gift—whether because 
they are an enemy or an ingrate.198 One can bracket the giver, paradigmatically in the example of 
inheritance, where the gift is only given in the event that the giver is no more.199 Or one can bracket 
the gift itself; one can give that which is properly speaking nothing, no-“thing”—one’s time, 
attention, etc.200  
It is within this context that Marion privileges the phenomenon of fatherhood. Fatherhood 
is a paradigmatic gift precisely because all three components of the gift find themselves bracketed. 
First, at the moment in which life is granted, the givee (child/son) does not yet exist. Second, that 
which is given—life—is precisely nothing, no-thing within the ekstatic horizon of visibility. Third, 
the giver (father), as we will see below, is fundamentally defined by his absence. Given this triple 
bracketing, the event by which fatherhood emerges—marked by the giving of the name of the 
father to the child—is drawn out as an example of the gift given in its purity.  
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The numerous difficulties that plague this analysis have already been investigated by Colby 
Dickinson in “The Problem of Having Both a Body and a Name in the Work of Jean-Luc Marion: 
Names, Fathers, and the Hopeful Possibilities of a Queer Phenomenology,”201 and the present 
investigation closely follows his lead. For Dickinson, the very delimitation of the phenomenon 
already renders the analysis suspect. Certainly, fatherhood is a worthy phenomenon for 
phenomenological investigation, as are all manifest phenomena. As Raymond Aron famously 
exclaimed to a young Jean-Paul Sartre, “you see, my dear fellow, if you were a phenomenologist, 
you could talk about this cocktail glass and make philosophy out of it.”202 Nevertheless, as 
Dickinson notes, Marion’s choice to treat fatherhood in opposition to motherhood, and without 
reference to other family configurations, predisposes his investigation to the repetition of 
questionable tropes under the guise of eidetic necessity. In Dickinson’s words, Marion’s is an 
analysis that forgets “the fact that not all fathers have a ‘wife,’ that not all children take the father’s 
name or that not every birth has a discernible father figure (as in the case of lesbian households, 
for example).”203 Unfortunately, Marion’s analyses ultimately bear out this apprehension. 
 The description of the phenomenon of fatherhood begun in Being Given is centered neither 
on the biological relation of father and child—as one might expect from a naturalistic account—
nor the relationship/interactions between the father and child—as one might expect from a 
phenomenological account. Rather, Marion “focuses solely on the name given to the child as that 
which bestows fatherhood.”204 For Marion, “the child (and the context surrounding his birth) exerts 
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Fathers, and the Hopeful Possibilities of a Queer Phenomenology,” Theology & Sexuality, 20 No. 1 (2014). 
 
202 Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life, trans. Peter Green (New York: Lancer Books, 1966), 162. 
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over him a call to recognition in paternity.”205 Yet, this call is not the call for care, nurturing, 
support, or relationship. On Marion’s account, that which calls the father into his fatherhood, is 
the call for a name; “the child silently calls the father to call him with his name—with the name of 
the father, with the name that he does not have.”206 Why does the prospective father experience 
the child as a call to grant his own name? The father gives his own name (“son propre nom”) 
because “the father knows, through intimate experience, that this child is born from his own (ses) 
deeds, from his own (sienne) wife, in his (sa) house, in front of him, etc.”207 The child carries his 
name because it is the proper name, for the child too is “his own” (propre), he belongs to him—is 
properly his child, is his property.  
Already, the absence of the mother makes itself felt. For, although Marion admits that 
“these excellent reasons nevertheless suffer from a well-known weakness,”208 this weakness is not 
the erasure of the mother, but instead is the fact that, due to “the temporal delay of birth’s initial 
belatedness to conception, biological paternity remains without immediate and direct proof, always 
doubtful.”209 As Dickinson notes, “what results from this seems to be nothing short of a certain 
paternal anxiety about whether or not the father can claim the child before him as his own.”210 The 
mother disappears as a subject—Marion “finds no room for the example of the mother,”211 indeed, 
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210 Dickinson, “The Problem of Having Both a Body and a Name in the Work of Jean-Luc Marion,” 25. 
 
211 Ibid., 28. This tendency is exemplified, for example, in the consistent slippage between “filiation” and 
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she appears only as “his wife”—in order to create the space for a masculine insecurity that haunts 
the giving of the name.  
Nevertheless, rather than confirming the givenness of fatherhood, Marion’s language belies 
the fact that it is precisely this masculine anxiety that strips the naming of the child of its gift-
character. In the giving of the patronymic, Marion seems to unconsciously recognize that the erotic 
reduction is suspended, and the relationship is abruptly thrust back into the logic of exchange: for, 
the child adopts the father’s name “as collateral for his own adoption by the father.”212 Collateral—
en gage, deposit, security, guarantee—this is not the language of the gift, but precisely that of 
exchange. The pursuit of the givenness of fatherhood does not find its completion in the anxiety 
of the absent father, but on the contrary this masculine insecurity strikes at the heart of Marion’s 
argument, rendering his reconstruction of “fatherhood as a gift” in Being Given self-contradictory.  
The later account set forward in “The Reason of the Gift” and Negative Certainties, largely 
follows the trajectory of Being Given, with one key difference: whereas Being Given 
systematically erased the role of the mother, these later texts reintroduce the mother, but only as 
the “symbolic opposite”213 of the father. As was already suggested above, for Marion the father is 
defined by absence: “the father is missing.”214 Or, in phenomenological language, “the father 
appears as the giver who is perfectly reduced to givenness, the bracketed giver.”215 The father is 
bracketed because the father is transcendent. Against the immanence of the child, the father 
manifests as a radical alterity.216 Yet, this alterity is not simply the alterity implicit in every 
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intersubjective experience, for the child is not alone in their immanence. Instead, through a 
phenomenologically unclarified merger, the father discovers both the child and the mother in the 
immanence of the child: the father “is lacking because he can never merge with the given child (in 
contrast to the mother, who can and even must do so, if only for a time).”217 From the site of this 
“happy immanence to the child,” the mother “stigmatizes the father’s miserable transcendence.”218 
This transcendence results from manifold causes: the masculine anxiety of paternity, the fact that 
the father “procreates only at the moment and then, having become superfluous, withdraws 
immediately, in contrast to the mother who remains,”219 and lastly from the fact that “he can only 
remain united with the child by taking leave—precisely so as to bestow his help, as extroverted 
provider, as hunter, warrior, or traveler; in short, as the one who constantly returns, coming back 
to the hearth from which he must distance himself if he wants to maintain it.”220 Apart from its 
obvious recourse to traditional gender norms—certainly questionable as phenomenological 
necessities, given the numerous alternate familial configurations not only possible but actual—
Marion’s analysis suffers from a number of identifiable limitations. Dickinson summarizes these 
problems in two passages worth citing in full: 
Rather than steer such a discussion toward the many fathers who in reality are 
unknown to their children, not through their inability to name them (and as many 
such children do in fact bear the absent father’s name), but through their literal 
absence, Marion tries to establish a phenomenological sketch of why such absences 
are inherent to the role of the father in the child’s life something which, practically 
                                               
 
217 Ibid., 101. 
 
218 Ibid., 100. Dickinson here rightly notes that this analysis “appears to blame the mother’s closeness to the child for 
the father’s absence, and that also has significant theological implications for understanding a ‘distant fatherly 
God—Marion likewise assumes that mother’s desire to remain (and which is certainly not true of all mothers) as 
well as the father’s apparent inability to remain with the child (and which is not necessarily true of many father’s 
experiences).” Dickinson, “The Problem of Having Both a Body and a Name in the Work of Jean-Luc Marion,” 26. 
 
219 Marion, Negative Certainties, 100. 
 
220 Ibid., 101. 
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speaking, can only appear as a most dangerous legitimation of a father’s absence, 
perhaps indirectly justifying their choices and anxieties of many truly absent 
fathers. … Marion’s presentation of fatherhood … hence appears in many ways as 
a justification for the absentee and irresponsible father, an upholding of patriarchal 
normativity and its generational legitimacy, an unfair ‘stigmatizing’ of the mother’s 
lived responsibility for her child.221 
 
It does not here seem that the phenomenon has been permitted to manifest as it gives itself 
to be. Rather, quite to the contrary, what this analysis suggests is that the phenomenon of 
fatherhood—and therefore, correlatively, its symbolic opposite: motherhood—has been bound by 
the strictures of a “quasi-theological, patriarchal agenda”222—an ideology that not only figures 
heteronormative presuppositions as eidetic necessities, but one that also codes the phenomena of 
sexuality in such a way that traditional gender norms are likewise rendered as phenomenological 
requirements. The rendering of these norms into essential characteristics appears to directly 
contradict a central principle of Marion’s phenomenology. As he writes, “that man would 
recognize himself as created ‘in the image and likeness of God’ does not imply his submission to 
some strictly defined essence, … but instead releases and exempts him from the duty of being 
conformed to any known norm,”223 or again, without the theological intonation, “man distinguishes 
himself from all the other beings in that he is defined by his very resistance to every definition.”224 
Any attempt to delimit humanity, to make of them an object, Marion rightly recognizes, constitutes 
an act of violence—or at least functions as the precondition for violence: “defining man by a 
concept does not always or immediately lead to killing him, but it does fill the first condition 
                                               
221 Dickinson, “The Problem of Having Both a Body and a Name in the Work of Jean-Luc Marion,” 26, 29. 
 
222 Ibid., 24. 
 
223 Jean-Luc Marion, “The Future of Catholicism” in Believing in Order to See: On the Rationality of Revelation and 
the Irrationality of Some Believers, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 
81. 
 
224 Marion, Negative Certainties, 41. 
 
 188 
required to have done with all that which (all of he who, quis, quisqui) does not fit this 
definition.”225 
Yet, it appears unavoidable that Marion has here imposed a defining concept, a norm, in 
short, an essence upon each and every father and mother—one ostensibly validated 
phenomenologically, but an essence nonetheless. This essence, drawing as it certainly does from 
a Western tradition of patriarchal presuppositions, bounds both mother and father, strips them of 
their dignity, because it submits them to (metaphysical) concepts—absence/transcendence 
presence/immanence—rather than recognizing that which is “undefinable” within them. 
Moreover, this essentialization likewise generates its constitutive other, the queer or the 
homosexual, as its necessary supplement—that which does not “fit this definition.” As Marion 
already insists by 1979, the queer is marked by a rejection of difference—“homosexuality [is] the 
ultimate refusal of dissimilarity.”226 Yet, the difference that is here refused is not the alterity that 
marks the indefinability of the human, the resistance to every essence, but rather the imposed 
masculine/feminine essences that Marion has himself imposed as conditions for the manifestation 
of the human person in general, and the erotic manifestation of human sexuality more specifically.  
 
§IV: Smuggling the Ontic into the Ontological 
 
 
What is revealed by this critical analysis of Marion’s account of the erotic flesh is an inability to 
think sexuality in terms that would allow the diverse phenomena of queer sexuality to manifest. 
                                               
225 Ibid., 27.  
 
226 Marion, “The Future of Catholicism,” 78. 
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These analyses are heteronormative insofar as they have, in Marion’s language,  failed to permit 
the phenomena of queer sexuality to give themselves as they are given to be. Instead, the givenness 
of the erotic phenomenon has been filtered through a mediating condition of phenomenality, a 
delimiting horizon of visibility that we might simply name—to borrow Husserl’s convention—a 
heteronormative attitude.  
 In Marion, this attitude manifests in two registers: both concealing and disclosing. What is 
concealed are the erotic components of non-normative sexual acts—whether sadomasochism, 
queer sexuality, or non-procreative sex. Read through a heteronormative lens, such acts cannot 
manifest other than as “perversions” or “transgressions.” The very possibility that they might 
manifest an authentic eros—understood here in Marion’s terms as the coming together of my flesh 
and the flesh of the other—is excluded a priori from any eidetic analysis of eros. Because these 
queer eroticisms are, as Edelman suggests, “unthinkable,” they cannot enter into Marion’s 
imaginative variation by which he seeks to uncover the phenomenological givenness of eros. 
 This concealing is grounded in a disclosing or pseudo-disclosing that presents certain 
phenomena—“nature,” a binary notion of sexual difference, the necessity of procreation, the 
maintenance of traditional gender norms, etc.—as constitutive of eros. These phenomena 
preemptively mask the phenomena of queer eroticism. That is to say, it is precisely insofar as 
something like the “naturalness of the body” steps forward, that something like queer eroticism is 
covered over or erased. Under the reign of the heteronormative attitude, they are, to use Paul’s 
language, rendered “unpresentable”: τὰ ἀσχήμονα. Indeed, insofar as these non-normative 
sexualities are permitted to manifest within this heteronormative attitude, they can only find 
themselves correlated with violence and dysfunction. 
 This tendency to present “traditional theological claims in the guise of a rigorous 
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phenomenology”227 is not unique to Henry and Marion. Indeed, this discussion strikes at the very 
center of phenomenology as a methodology. As Merleau-Ponty famously wrote, “the most 
important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction.”228 
In the present case, this passage might be read in the following manner: no phenomenological 
reduction, even a redoubled or third reduction, is immune to the creeping influence of ideological 
investments. There is, to use Heidegger’s language, a perpetual tendency to smuggle the ontical 
into the ontological, to import non-phenomenological concerns into the very heart of ostensibly 
pure phenomenological analyses. Husserl himself commented on this risk explicitly in Experience 
and Judgment, writing:  
This treatment [pure eidetic seeing] is achieved only when every connection to 
pregiven actuality is most carefully excluded. If we practice variation freely but 
cling secretly to the fact that, e.g. these must be arbitrary sounds in the world, heard 
or able to be heard by men on earth, then we certainly have an essential generality 
as an eidos but one related to our world of fact and bound to that universal fact. It 
is a secret bond in that, for understandable reasons, it is imperceptible to us. … 
Only if we become conscious of this bond, putting it consciously out of play, and 
so also free this broadest surrounding horizon of variants from all connection to 
experience and all experiential validity, do we achieve perfect purity.229 
 
Husserl’s comments on this matter are particularly helpful, as they not only diagnose the illness, 
but prescribe a cure as well: we must “become conscious of this bond, putting it consciously out 
of play.” That is to say, the means of eliminating non-phenomenological presuppositions from our 
analyses must begin with a thorough accounting of these presuppositions, their status, and their 
origin. 
 This task therefore necessitates genealogical work. For, if it is to be claimed that the 
                                               
227 Dickinson, “The Problem of Having Both a Body and a Name in the Work of Jean-Luc Marion,” 29. 
 
228 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
1962), xv. 
 
229 Husserl, Experience and Judgment, 350-1.  
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specific structure of Henry and Marion’s accounts of sexuality emerges from an ideological 
investment then it will be necessary to chart the precise contours of this investment. Specifically, 
what will be shown is that the account of sexuality proffered by Henry and Marion does not merely 
emerge from a general heteronormativity, nor even from traditional Catholic sexual ethics 
generally construed, but rather that this account of sexuality finds a specific genesis in the so-
called “communio school” of Catholic theology: epitomized by the work of Hans Urs von 
Balthasar and Karol Józef Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II). 
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CHAPTER 4 - Nuptial Theology in the Communio School 
and Radical Phenomenology 
   
Heterosexuality has difficulties in understanding sexuality outside the biological 
discourse, that is, outside the epistemological boundaries of reproductive organs. 
Marcella Althaus-Reid 
 
§I: Textual and Theological Connections1 
 
While on their own, Henry and Marion’s phenomenological analyses of the sexual body may 
appear confounding; their conclusions become considerably more comprehensible once they are 
situated within their theological context: what will here be referred to as the “Communio school.” 
It is only for simplicity's sake that I will here refer—and with some reservation—to a Communio 
“school.” For Communio, more than most other schools of Catholic theology—from liberation 
theology to transcendental Thomism—can only be understood in relation to its founder, the swiss 
theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar. As Marion notes, “everything was animated by Balthasar.”2  
 Neither von Balthasar as an individual nor Communio as a loosely connected school can 
be easily categorized. Horner, for example, suggests that Marion’s association with Communio “is 
not without significance, since it has been argued that Communio epitomizes neo-conservative 
Catholicism, and that Marion represents a conservative push within the church.”3 Yet, any simple 
designation of Communio as “conservative” requires further nuance. For as Kilby reminds readers, 
                                               
1 An early draft of portion of this and later sections of this chapter can be found in J. Leavitt Pearl, “Jean-Luc 
Marion: the reinscription of heteronormativity into postmodern theology,” Theology & Sexuality, 1 (2017), pp. 144-
163. 
 
2  Jean-Luc Marion, The Rigor of Things: Conversations with Dan Arbib, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 25. 
 
3 Robyn Horner, Jean-Luc Marion: A Theo-logical Introduction (Burlington: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 4. 
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“Balthasar, while he might be seen as a conservative, is at many points certainly not traditional.”4 
Indeed, von Balthasar’s Johannes Verlag (St. John’s Press) published many key texts in 20th 
century liberal Catholicism, including, Küng’s Justification and Rahner’s Free Speech in the 
Church. Thus, one might be served to follow Moss and Oakes suggestion that von Balthasar and 
his followers are “neither liberal nor conservative as these shopworn terms are normally 
understood.”5 Rather, in von Balthasar (and Communio), “we encounter a man teeming with 
paradoxes.”6  
 Von Balthasar found himself largely ostracized throughout the first half of his career, due 
to a variety of factors, including: his decision to leave the Jesuits in 1950 in order to found a secular 
institute with the mystic Adrienne von Speyr, his critique of natural theology in The Theology of 
Karl Barth, and his critique of anti-modernism in Razing the Bastions. As Kilby notes, for 
example, “in the 1960s, when the second Vatican Council was called, Balthasar stood alone among 
his generation of great theological minds in not being invited.”7 Nevertheless, despite his absence, 
                                               
4 Karen Kilby, Balthasar: a (very) critical introduction (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company: 
2012), 11. 
 
5 David Moss and Edward T. Oakes, “Introduction” in David Moss and Edward T. Oakes (eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2. 
 
6 Ibid., 6. Nevertheless, this notion of von Balthasar as “conservative” is certainly not without merit. As Kevin 
Mongrain notes, “in addition to his apparently ‘traditionalist’ interest in retrieving premodern theologians, after the 
Council he began writing books and essays stridently opposing many ‘progressive’ causes in the church. For 
example, he suggested there were anti-Catholic ideological motives behind such popular causes as liberation 
theology and ecumenism among world religions. Moreover, he sided with the Vatican in opposition to women’s 
ordination, artificial contraception, and optional clerical celibacy. In arguing his positions on all these issues he 
sometimes demonstrated self-righteous contempt for theological opinions different from his own; when his 
intellectual advice was not heeded, he could be a nasty and bitter polemicist. Suspicion of his ideas only grew as 
self-styled ‘conservatives’ nostalgic for Tridentine Catholicism appropriated von Balthasar as an intellectual 
champion of their causes. His image as a reactionary was also fostered by the fact that most of the English 
translations of his books were published by a company whose catalogue is filled with books written by 
theologically, politically, and culturally conservative Catholics.” Kevin Mongrain, The Systematic Thought of Hans 
Urs von Balthasar: an Irenaean Retrieval (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2002), 13. 
 
7 Kilby, Balthasar, 27. 
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Vatican II would end up serving as something like a vindication of many of his most important 
theological positions. Yet, rather than resting on his laurels, von Balthasar instead became 
increasingly worried about the majority interpretation of the council and immediately “threw all 
his energies into openly opposing the majority trend in theology, especially as advocated in the 
pages of the international journal Concilium, which he cheekily countered with his own anti-
accommodationist periodical, the journal Communio.”8  
A further confirmation of von Balthasar’s theological program would come in the form of 
two Popes, both of whom largely supported his theological agenda: John Paul II and Benedict 
XVI.9 At the event of von Balthasar’s death, John Paul II’s eulogy would describe him as “a great 
son of the Church, an outstanding man of theology and the arts,”10 and Benedict XVI (then 
Cardinal Ratzinger) would give von Balthasar’s funeral homily wherein he would state that “the 
Church itself, in its official responsibility, tells us that he is right in what he teaches of the Faith, 
                                               
8 Moss and Oakes, “Introduction,” 6. Or more precisely, close collection of related journals. “Some among them, 
Balthasar, Daniélou, Lubac, Bouyer, and the (then) young professor of systematic theology, Ratzinger, decided to 
create a different journal [than Concilium], which was called Communio. Or rather, it was a federation of 
independent journals, coming out in different countries. … Communio most often depended on lay people, some 
university trained but not only those, including women and some really young people.” Marion, The Rigor of 
Things, 23. In the words of Cardinal Ratzinger the Communio program sought to resist those who “sold goods from 
the old liberal flea market as if they were new Catholic theology.” Joseph Ratzinger, “Communio: A Program,” 
Communio: International Catholic Review 19, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 437. While these two journals are often simply read 
as the liberal and conservative positions respectively, the reality is more nuanced. As Tracey Rowland writes, 
“whereas Concilium approached the Conciliar documents with a hermeneutic of rupture, the Communio authors 
offered a hermeneutic of continuity” (Tracey Rowland. Guides for the Perplexed: Benedict XVI (London, GBR: 
Continuum International Publishing, 2010), 5). That is to say, for the Concilium school the reforms of Vatican II 
represented a radical break in the Catholic tradition, the emergence of something substantially new, while for the 
Communio school the documents of Vatican II necessitated no significant break in Catholic teaching or dogma, only 
a shift in expression or presentation. 
 
9 “He was said to be the favorite theologian of Pope John Paul II, and is held in high esteem also by Benedict XVI.” 
Kilby, Balthasar, 1. A first major recognition would come in 1984, when John Paul II granted von Balthasar the 
honor of being the first theologian to receive the International Paul VI Prize “for the development of research and 
religious knowledge.” But, the support of these two popes would never be as clear as in 1988. At the request of John 
Paul II, von Balthasar was to be made cardinal—though he would unfortunately pass two days before his 
installation.  
 
10 Ibid., 36. 
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that he points the way to the sources of living water.”11 
 
A: Communio and Phenomenology 
 
The relationship between Communio and phenomenological philosophy is quite complex. For, 
despite its distinctly theological aims and, as we will see below, its ambitions to return to patristic 
sources, it has nevertheless been the case that Communio has been continuously indebted to 
phenomenological thinking. This debt finds its earliest expression in von Balthasar’s complex 
relationship to Martin Heidegger. Indeed, the metaphysical underpinnings of von Balthasar’s 
theology might be read as something like a “Heideggerian Thomism.”12  
According to von Balthasar, the question of Being—most famously posited by Leibniz as 
“why is there something rather than nothing?,”13—perpetually remains the fundamental 
metaphysical issue: “the Greek question about the being of what exists is as new today as it was 
in the age of Heraclitus and Parmenides, of Plato and Aristotle.”14 In the 20th century, the figure 
who embodied this philosophical pursuit most fully was Heidegger.15   
                                               
11 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, “Homily at the Funeral Liturgy of Hans Urs von Balthasar,” in David Schindler (ed), 
Hans Urs von Balthasar: His Life and Work (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 295. And likewise called 
Communio “a powerful source for correct renewal as opposed to counterfeit forms.” Ibid., 294. 
 
12 Fergus Kerr, “Balthasar and metaphysics,” in David Moss and Edward T. Oakes (eds.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 237. 
 
13 G. W. Leibniz, “Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew 
and Daniel Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 210. 
 
14 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Philosophy, Christianity, Monasticism,” in Explorations in Theology II: Spouse of the 
Word (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 342.  
 
15 “Why are there beings at all, and why not rather nothing?” Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” in Basic 
Writings: From Being and Time (1927) to The Task of Thinking (1964), ed. David Darrell Krell (New York: Harper 
& Row Publishers, 1977), 110. 
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For Heidegger, the question of Being is ultimately the question of the meaning of Being.16 
In his magnum opus, Being and Time, Heidegger pursues this question of the “meaning” of Being 
through an analysis of the particular manner of being unique to the human person, what he calls 
Dasein. According to Heidegger, Dasein is that being which “is ontically distinguished by the fact 
that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it.”17 It is humans who ask, “why do I exist? Why 
does anything exist?” Indeed, “the very asking of this question is [Dasein’s] mode of Being.”18 
And because we are the being which interrogates Being, it is Dasein alone which discloses the 
meaning of Being.  
In admittedly oversimplified terms, Heidegger’s answer to the question of the meaning of 
Being, is that Being is that which permits any being to be disclosed within the horizon of the world. 
In every experience of a being, no matter how mundane,19 Dasein likewise experiences the Being 
of that being.20 Whereas beings are simply the ontical objects within the world, “‘Being’ cannot 
indeed be conceived as a being.”21 Rather, it is the ontological condition of beings; it is what 
determines beings as beings.22 This, for Heidegger, is precisely the transcendental task of 
phenomenology, not to “investigate the being itself but the possibility of the precursory 
                                               
16 “Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word ‘being’? Not at all. So it is 
fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. 
John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1962), 1. 
 
17 Ibid., 32. 
 
18 Ibid., 26. 
 
19 Heidegger will give particular emphasis, for example, to the Being of a tool (e.g. a hammer). 
 
20 “It discovers all beings, both in the fact that they are, and in their Being as they are.” Ibid., 33 [translation 
modified for consistency]. 
 
21 Ibid., 23, Or again, “The Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being.” Ibid., 26 [translations modified for consistency]. 
 
22 “We are able to grasp beings as such, as beings, only if we understand something like being.” Heidegger, The 
Basic Problems of Phenomenology, 10. 
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comprehension of the Being of the being.”23 The result of this transcendental or ontological 
distinction is a consistent insistence by Heidegger upon a fundamental difference between beings 
[Seiendes] and Being [Sein]: or as he will later name it, the “ontological difference.”24  
 Already by 1940, von Balthasar was deeply engaged with Heideggerian phenomenology, 
reading him from a distinctly “Catholic standpoint.”25 While von Balthasar’s appropriation of 
Heidegger would be anything but uncritical, it is nevertheless the case that von Balthasar was 
deeply taken by Heidegger’s reading of the history of Being and insistence upon ontological 
difference.26 Thus, von Balthasar’s reading of the history of philosophy in the fourth and fifth 
volumes of The Glory of the Lord bears the distinct marks of a Heideggerian influence.27 
Moreover, the fifth volume culminates in an explicit engagement with Heidegger’s notion of the 
fourfold, entitled: “The Miracle of Being and the Fourfold Difference.”28  
                                               
23 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1972), 20 [translation altered for consistency]. Likewise, this becomes, for Heidegger, the true 
meaning of the phenomenological reduction, “for us, phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological 
vision back from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the 
understanding of the Being of this being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed)” Martin Heidegger, The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 21. 
 
24 “We must be able to bring out clearly the difference between Being and beings in order to make something like 
Being the theme of inquiry. This distinction is not arbitrary; rather, it is the one by which the theme of ontology and 
thus of philosophy itself is first of all attained. It is a distinction which is first and foremost constitutive for ontology. 
We call it the ontological difference—the differentiation between Being and beings” (Heidegger, The Basic 
Problems of Phenomenology, 17). Or again, “we speak of the difference between Being and beings” (Martin 
Heidegger, Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh [New York: Harper & Row, 1969], 50). 
 
25 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Heidegger’s Philosophie vom Standpunkt des Katholizismus” Stimmen der Zeit 137 
(1940): 1-8. 
 
26 “For Christian theology, and particularly for the theology of God’s glory—so Balthasar contends—Heidegger’s 
project is by far the most fertile in modern philosophy.”  Kerr, “Balthasar and metaphysics,” 235. 
 
27As Kerr notes: “Unlike Rahner, Balthasar never attended lectures by Heidegger. Ironically, however, as we shall 
see, his conception of metaphysics, as well as his massive reinterpretation of the history of Western philosophy in 
the fourth and fifth volumes of The Glory of the Lord, are deeply indebted to his reading of Heidegger. Balthasar is 
far more radically ‘Heideggerian’ than Rahner ever was.” Kerr, “Balthasar and metaphysics,” 225. 
 
28 This account of the “fourfold” serves as a useful heuristic of von Balthasar’s complex relationship to Heidegger, 
insofar as he here both positively affirms and negatively critiques his predecessor. Heidegger’s fourfold marks his 
increasingly mytho-poetic speculations on Being (See: John D. Caputo, Demythologizing Heidegger [Bloomington: 
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Indiana University Press, 1993]). Here, the human person finds itself held at the cross-section of four elements—
earth and sky, divinities and mortals—which, as Kerr notes, “excludes all reference to the Christian God and equally 
any reference to human intersubjectivity” (Kerr, “Balthasar and metaphysics,” 235).  
 
Von Balthasar therefore borrows the notion of a fourfold, embracing Heidegger’s assertion that the world is 
“disclosed” rather than “posited” or “constructed,” but seeks to highlight four key differences constitutive of the 
human being’s place in the world. This fourfold difference is: “(1) The intersubjective difference of the awakening 
child’s ‘I’ from its mother (and implicitly from every other human and from all else in the world); (2) the difference 
of the to-be of beings from the beings themselves; (3) the converse difference of being from being; and (4) the 
difference between all of these and God” (Ibid., 236).  
 
In the first difference, von Balthasar seeks to strip away Heidegger’s solipsistic tendencies. Key to human being is 
the differential relationships between one’s self and others. The second difference is precisely von Balthasar’s 
appropriation of Heidegger’s “ontological difference” between beings and Being. The third difference seeks to 
highlight the symmetrical relationship between beings and Being. Not only do beings depend upon Being as their 
ontological condition. But likewise, “Being does not subsist in itself, on its own, in isolation” (Ibid., 236-237). 
Rather, it too depends upon beings. This may be read as akin to Heidegger’s assertion in Being and Time, “Insofar as 
Being constitutes what is asked about, and “Being” means the Being of beings, then beings themselves turn out to be 
what is interrogated. These are, so to speak, questioned as regards their Being. But if the characteristics of their 
Being can be yielded without falsification, then these beings must, on their part, have become accessible as they are 
in themselves. When we come to what is to be interrogated, the question of Being requires that the right way of 
access to beings shall have been obtained and secured in advance.” Heidegger, Being and Time, 26 [translation 
modified for consistency]. 
 
Von Balthasar’s most striking challenge to Heidegger is his assertion in the fourth difference that everything, 
including Being itself, is marked by a primordial difference between itself and God, the difference between creature 
and creator. Thus it is not ultimately Being that discloses the world, but rather the divine. Here von Balthasar is 
opposing Heidegger with what might be called an Irenaean phenomenology. According to von Balthasar, Irenaeus 
teaches the theologian that “the primary aim is not to think, to impose Platonic intellectual or even mythical 
categories on things, but simply to see what is” (Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological 
Aesthetics: Volume II: Studies in Theological Style: Clerical Styles, trans. Andrew Louth, Francis McDonagh, and 
Brian McNeil [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984], 45). It is therefore not surprising that the preceding volume is 
itself importantly sub-titled “Seeing the Form” (Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological 
Aesthetics: Volume I: Seeing the Form, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982]). This 
demand to “see what is” is remarkably reminiscent of Husserl’s charge: “meanings inspired only by remote, 
confused, inauthentic intuitions—if by any intuitions at all—are not enough: we must go back to the things 
themselves” [Edmund Husserl, The Shorter Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay [New York: Routledge, 
2001], 88). But, against Heidegger, von Balthasar suggests that when one genuinely sees what is—when one sees 
the Gestalt (“totality” or “form”)—what one sees is not the ontological difference, but this more originary 
theological difference, “the phenomenon of Christ” (Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Volume One: The Truth 
of the World, trans. Adrian Walker [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000], 20): “the invisible Father renders himself 
visible in his Word and Son, who reveals him to us as the loving Father and Creator of all things” (Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory: Volume II: Dramatis Personae: Man in God, trans. Graham 
Harrison [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990], 141). In Kevin Mongrain’s words: “Irenaeus’s definition of faith is 
‘seeing’ this paradoxical unity-in-difference of God and creation in Christ” (Mongrain, The Systematic Thought of 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, 31).  
 
This fourth difference can be understood as anticipating Marion’s own attempts to bypass the Heideggerian charge 
of onto-metaphysics, in God Without Being, where God’s goodness will be positioned “above” Heideggerian Being, 
(epekeina tes ousias).  
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Whereas Heidegger functions as von Balthasar’s principal interlocutor, Karol Józef 
Wojtyła (John Paul II) takes his phenomenological starting point from Max Scheler. Like von 
Balthasar, Wojtyła lacked any formal training in phenomenology, but rather, “came to 
phenomenology, contrary to popular assumption, entirely on his own.”29 It was at the prompting 
of his doctoral advisor, Father Ignacy Rozycki, that Wojtyła decided to examine the ethics of Max 
Scheler in his dissertation: “The Ethical System of Max Scheler as a Means to Elaborate Christian 
Ethics” (1953). In Scheler’s philosophical anthropology, Wojtyła discovered a means of 
articulating the human experience of moral value: thus a conception of the human as a “moral 
person.” This personalistic phenomenology would find its culmination in Wojtyła’s 1969, The 
Acting Person: A Contribution to Phenomenological Anthropology.  
Despite the subtitle to The Acting Person, it is unclear precisely how phenomenological 
Wojtyła actually remains. It is indisputable that “the departing point for Wojtyła is the experience 
of man.”30 Nevertheless, it remains methodologically unclear to what extent “experience” in 
Wojtyła can be correlated to anything like its phenomenological counterpart. For, “Wojtyła seems 
to separate himself not only from the transcendental reduction and epoché, but from the particular 
eidetic methodology of realistic phenomenology.”31 In place of this method, Wojtyła seems to 
demand a turn to “meta-phenomenological or meta-physical premises.”32 
                                               
29 Anna-Theresa Tymieniecka and Roger Duncan, “Karol Wojtyła, between phenomenology and scholasticism” in 
Anna-Theresa Tymieniecka (ed), Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations—Expanding Dynamics—Life-
Engagements. A Guide for Research and Study (Dordrecht: Springer, 2002), 497. 
 
30 Ibid., 110. He was drawn to “the phenomenological proposal [demanding] fidelity ‘to things themselves,’ i.e., the 
reaffirmation of a cognitive process, which operates after having been affected by the actual ‘givenness’ of things.” 
Carmen Beatriz Gonzalez, “Karol Wojtyła’s Ethical Thought,” Analecta Husserliana 114 (2009): 131-146, 137. 
 
31 Juan Manuel Burgos, “The Method of Karol Wojtyła,” Analecta Husserliana 114 (2009): 107-129, 118. 
 
32 “Scheler’s ethical system is not suitable for interpreting an ethics that has an objective character as Christian 
Ethics does. There is no doubt that Scheler’s insufficient objectivism springs from his phenomenological principles. 
Because of these principles the ethical value always remains in an intentional and—despite everything—subjective 
position. In order to grasp ethical value in its real and objective position, one would have to proceed from different 
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Ultimately therefore, it seems that rather than pursuing a rigorous phenomenological line, 
Wojtyła can best be understood as embracing a hybrid methodology. As he declares, “the Christian 
thinker, especially the theologian, who makes use of phenomenological experience in his work, 
cannot be a Phenomenologist.”33 Rather, maintaining the phenomenological orientation to 
experience, Wojtyła aims to supplement this with both a consideration of intersubjective 
experience34 and the metaphysical realism of Thomism. Wojtyła names this hybrid methodology 
“Thomistic Personalism.”35  
 
B. Phenomenology and Communio: Textual Connections 
 
If Communio has been marked by its engagements with phenomenological thinking, then the 
reverse is even clearer—at least in the case of radical phenomenology. For, although the 
“theological turn”36 of French phenomenology includes thinkers from a variety of theological 
perspectives—such as Emmanuel Levinas’ Judaism or Paul Ricoeur's Protestantism—the 
movement has not only been largely Catholic, but disproportionately influenced by von Balthasar 
                                               
epistemological premises, namely, meta-phenomenological and even meta-physical premises.” Karol Wojtyła, “The 
Ethical System of Max Scheler as a Means to Elaborate Christian Ethics” as translated in Michael Waldstein, 
“Introduction” in John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, trans. Michael 
Waldstein (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006), 69. Or again, later, “With the phenomenological method, for 
example, we can study experiences of morality, religion, or simply what it is to be human, and draw from them a 
significant enrichment of our knowledge. Yet we must not forget that all these analyses implicitly presuppose the 
reality of the Absolute Being and also the reality of being human, that is, being a creature. If we do not set out from 
such 'realist' presuppositions, we end up in a vacuum.” John Paul II, Memory and Identity: Conversations at the 
Dawn of a Millennium (New York: Rizzoli, 2005), 12.  
 
33 Wojtyła, “The Ethical System of Max Scheler as a Means to Elaborate Christian Ethics,” 196. 
 
34 “It is impossible to state that our experience, as experience of conscience, of one’s conscience itself, exhausts the 
perceptive horizon of the given; man’s experience as source of knowledge, is composed of self-experience as much 
as of every other man’s experience.” Gonzalez, “Karol Wojtyła’s Ethical Thought,” 137. 
 
35 Karol Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” trans. Theresa Sandok in Andrew N. Woznicki (ed), Person and 
Community: Selected Essays, (New York: Peter Lang, 1993): 165-75. 
 
36 See: Dominique Janicaud (ed), Phenomenology and the ‘Theological Turn’: The French Debate (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2000). 
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and Communio theology. Thus, although the present investigation concerns the influence on the 
radical phenomenologies of Henry and Marion, one could likewise detect the clear influence of 
Communio on a variety of phenomenological thinkers, such as Jean-Yves Lacoste and Emmanuel 
Falque.37  
Although chronologically second, it will here be helpful to begin with Marion, whose 
personal and textual relationship to Communio is much more direct than Henry’s. Xavier Tilliette 
describes the young Marion as “a brilliant Normalien and agrégé; … who emigrated to Communio 
under the leadership of Father Urs von Balthasar.”38 Indeed, it is quite difficult to describe 
Marion’s early career without reference to the key role of von Balthasar and Communio. In the 
early 70s, Marion knew relatively little of von Balthasar. Thus it must have come as quite a surprise 
when von Balthasar chose Marion (and Jean Duchesne) to found the French edition of the journal 
Communio. As Marion describes the event in his own words: 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, whom we knew a little bit due to Résurrection, for which 
he had encouraged us, was deaf in that ear: He summoned us (that’s the right word) 
to discuss it with him in Basel. I still remember it: He invited us to eat lunch in the 
restaurant of the Basel zoo (an allusion to what awaited us?) in order to tell us that, 
without a penny, without any acknowledged skill, without any institutional support, 
we should nonetheless launch the Francophone edition of Communio. Our protest 
changed nothing in his decision. We were caught in the trap. That was the summer 
of 1974.39  
 
                                               
37 It is here worth noting that, Falque likewise fails to offer a liberatory sexual ethic. As Gschwandtner notes, “one 
should probably point out in this context that Falque’s treatment is decidedly heterosexual and seems to make 
homosexuality impossible, or at least deeply problematic. While he does not explicitly condemn homosexuality, any 
consideration of it is entirely excluded from his account.” Christina Gschwandtner, Postmodern Apologetics? 
Arguments for God in Contemporary Philosophy (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), 316. 
 
38 “Brillant normalien et agrégé, élève d’Alquié et de Beaufret, il provenait du groupe ‘tala’ de Résurrection qui 
avait émigré à Communio sous la houlette du Père Urs von Balthasar.” Xavier Tilliette, “Phénoménologies 
autonomes: Michel Henry & Jean-Luc Marion,” Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 60 (2004): 473-484, 478 
[translation my own]. 
 
39 Marion, The Rigor of Things, 24. 
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Despite the inauspicious beginning of this “foolhardy undertaking,”40 Marion would go on to edit 
the journal for another decade. Thus, not only would Marion be influenced by Communio thought, 
but he would also function as a principal contributor to its international shape. In that time, Marion 
would come to regard von Balthasar as “the greatest Catholic theologian of modern times.”41  
The explicit influence of von Balthasar can be found on occasion throughout Marion’s 
corpus. He turns to Balthasar in his analysis of love in the Prolegomena to Charity (70n10, 122, 
145n17), in connection to his notion of distance in On Descartes’ Metaphysical Prism (307n30) 
and in The Idol and Distance (155).42 Yet, given Marion’s tendency to forego citation,43 it will not 
be surprising if these few references represent only a small portion of the actual influence of 
Communio thought on his work. Marion has suggested precisely as much, when he writes, “I 
always have them in mind. I do not write a single line without asking myself what Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, Jean Daniélou, Jean Beaufret, Emmanuel Levinas, or Michel Henry would think of it.”44 
The influence of Jean-Paul II was less direct; for, Marion found himself disappointed by The Acting 
Person. nevertheless, he appreciated Love and Responsibility, which “has a simultaneously 
pastoral, biological, and spiritual dimension, which is completely lacking in [his] Erotic 
                                               
40 Ibid., 22. 
 
41 Ibid., 25. 
 
42 Here he remarks, “To H. Urs von Balthasar my approach owes much.” Jean-Luc Marion, The Idol and Distance: 
Five Studies, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (New York: Fordham University, 2001), xxxviii.  
 
43 A tendency explicit in The Erotic Phenomenon, for example, where he will write that “an initial precaution, as 
insufficient as it is obligatory, will consist in avoiding scrupulously the citation of any author at all.” Jean-Luc 
Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 8. 
 
44 Marion, The Rigor of Things, 19. This, despite the fact that von Balthasar took a passing “dig” (Ibid., 184) at 
Marion in the second volume of the Theo-Logic. There, glossing Plato, von Balthasar writes that despite the fact that 
the good is marked as “beyond being”: “it must not lead us however, into removing God from being (Jean-Luc 
Marion, Dieu sans être [Paris: Fayard, 1982]). Groundless love is not prior to being but the supreme act of being.” 
Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Truth of God, trans. Adrian Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2004), 20. 
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Phenomenon.”45 Thus, to understand the full significance of Communio for Marion, it will be 
necessary to examine some key themes that Marion shares in common with this tradition. But, 
before doing so it will be helpful to remark on the connection between Henry and Communio. 
If Marion’s connection to this tradition could not be clearer—as editor of its primary 
journal—then the same cannot be said for Henry. For, even more than Marion, Henry tends to 
obscure his sources, particularly his theological sources. Where Henry does cite theological 
precedent these sources tend to either be the church Fathers or Meister Eckhart, almost never will 
Henry cite a contemporary theological voice. Thus, the task of tracing Henry’s theological lineage 
is rather difficult for the commentator. But evidence suggests that Henry was not only familiar 
with Communio, but may have at least partially subscribed to the theological tradition’s program. 
First, and most obviously, Henry published in the French edition of the journal on multiple 
occasions, over more than a decade—and at precisely the time when his own project was explicitly 
turning to theology—publishing “Représentation et auto-affection”46 in 1987,  “Archi-
christologie”47 in 1997, and “Incarnation”48 in 2000.  
Additionally, as in the case of Marion, there are clear methodological and thematic points 
of convergence. These will be explored more concretely below, but the reader will benefit from 
Rivera’s existing comparative study of Henry and von Balthasar’s conceptions of “form,”49 and 
                                               
45 Marion, The Rigor of Things, 183.  
 
46 Michel Henry, “Représentation et auto-affection” Communio XII, 3, n°71 (1987): 77-96. 
 
47 Michel Henry, “Archi-christologie” Communio XXII, 2-3 - n°130 (1997): 195-221. 
 
48 Michel Henry, “Incarnation” Communio XXV, 6 - n°152 (2000): 81-96. 
 
49 As Rivera notes, “it is perhaps instructive for us to show just how Henry may come in contact with Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, for instance, given that the latter has devoted considerable space to the concept of ‘form’” (Joseph Rivera, 
The Contemplative Self After Michel Henry: A Phenomenological Theology [Notre Dame: The University of Notre 
Dame Press, 2015], 129). According to Rivera, Henry and von Balthasar are united in this concern for the 
transcendental form of Christ (Gestalt Christi), their “deeply aesthetic mode of expression” (Ibid.) and their 
“Johannine piety and temperament” (Ibid.).  
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Kungua’s comparative study of their respective critiques of historical-critical method.50 But, apart 
from these concerns, there remains much that binds Henry—and Marion—to the Communio 
school. Before ultimately turning to the convergences surrounding sexuality which are particularly 
relevant here, I will first draw out important similarities in theological method and content.  
 
C. Theological Method: Ressourcement 
 
Since its inception, the Communio school has understood itself in opposition to the Neo-
Scholasticism dominant in early 20th century Catholic theology. Von Balthasar famously 
                                               
 
Nevertheless, despite these similarities, these two retain a key difference. Where Henry adopts a subjective 
interpretation of form, von Balthasar’s concern for the maintenance of difference necessitates a clear recourse to 
ontological distance. As Rivera notes, “while it appears there is so little that separates Henry from Balthasar: … 
Balthasar holds to the distinction between the Creator and the creature, or the form and content, and Henry simply 
does not” (Ibid., 132). Thus, Henry will instead turn to Eckhart’s assertion that “the eye with which I see God is 
exactly the same eye with which God sees me” (Meister Eckhart, “Sermon 16: Qui audi me non confunditur” in 
Selected Writings, trans. Oliver Davies [New York: Penguin Books, 1994], 179). In multiple instances Henry will 
paraphrase this famous passage, e.g.: “each of my actions is revealed to God at the same time as it is revealed to me, 
and in the very act by which it does so” (Michel Henry, I am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, trans. 
Susan Emanuel [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000], 174), or more directly, “to say it in the fashion of the 
mystics: the Eye by which God sees Cain and the one by which Cain sees himself are but one and the same Eye” 
(Michel Henry, Words of Christ, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2012], 104). This citation of Eckhart serves to mark an original identity that can only be lost by a 
“forgetting” (See: Henry, I am the Truth, Chapter 8 “Forgetting the Condition of Son: ‘Me, I’ / ‘Me, Ego’”)—and is 
therefore recovered by remembering. Put more strongly, “all men are in Christ … they are Christ himself” (Michel 
Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, trans. Karl Hefty [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015], 
237). Von Balthasar on the other hand denies such an originary identity: “this is not a question of the (gnostic) 
recovery of one’s own form, once possessed and then lost.” (Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A 
Theological Aesthetics: Volume VII: Theology: The New Covenant, trans. Brian McNeil [San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1989], 293). Rather, for von Balthasar the form of Christ, granted to humans by the grace of God, is a 
radically “new creation,” a “new man.”  
 
50 According to Kungua, Henry and von Balthasar offer markedly similar critiques of the historical-critical method: 
“comme H. Urs von Balthasar, Michel Henry a des propos absolument incendiaires, caustiques et durs conte l’hybris 
et le totalitarisme de l'exégèse historico-critique issue de la Révolution galiléenne qui sous-tend la science 
occidentale et positiviste moderne” (Benoît Awazi Mbambi Kungua, Déconstruction phénoménologique et 
théologique de la modernité occidentale: Michel Henry, Hans Urs von Balthasar et Jean-Luc Marion [Paris: 
L’Harmattan, 2014], 112). As Kungua shows, both von Balthasar and Henry “assument l’interprétation 
heideggerienne de l’essence de la technique moderne comme figure extrême du nihilisme en tant qu’oubli de l’oubli 
de la différence ontologique de l’Être irréductible aux étants manipulables” (Ibid., 109-110). From this assumption, 
they develop remarkably similar critiques of modern historical-critical methods, understood in each instance as an 
attempt to submit the “la transcendence du Dieu toujours plus grand” (Ibid., 110) to the delimited strictures of 
modernity and its scientistic rationalism.  
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described his experience of neo-scholastic training as “a grim struggle with the dreariness of 
theology, with what men had made out of the glory of revelation.”51 In response to this theological 
climate, von Balthasar took up the study of the Patristics with Henri de Lubac in 1933 at 
Fourvières.52 Although not an official student of de Lubac, the two would become important 
theological collaborators and life-long friends. Under the tutelage of de Lubac, von Balthasar 
produced a number of manuscripts on important Patristic sources, including: Origen, Gregory of 
Nyssa, Clement of Alexandria, Evagrius of Pontus, Dionysius, and Maximus the Confessor. 
Though, it was his study of Irenaeus which would be most formative for his future theological 
endeavors.53   
Following in the footsteps of de Lubac’s ressourcement tradition, von Balthasar saw these 
patristic figures as an escape from the overly rationalized—even gnostic, he will on occasion 
polemically claim—neo-scholastic theology. Where Neo-Scholasticism privileged the concept 
(Begriff), the Fathers opened a route to a theology of symbol (Vorstellung). Yet, as suggested by 
the name ressourcement (“return to the sources”), this methodology did not only aim to offer 
commentary or historical analyses of the Fathers, but rather von Balthasar “saw in them models 
for carrying on the work of theology in his own world.”54 It is precisely this approach that can 
                                               
51 As cited in Peter Henrici, “Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Sketch of His Life” in David L. Schindler (ed) Hans Urs 
von Balthasar: His Life and Work (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991), 13. 
 
52 “The imposition of neo-scholastic uniformity seems to have given birth to a tremendous collective impulse … to 
go back … beyond Thomas to the richness and beauty of patristic thought” Kilby, Balthasar, 21. 
 
53 “Von Balthasar granted Irenaeus of Lyons privileged status as the quintessential patristic figure whose theology is 
the standard by which all other patristic theologies should be judged.” Mongrain, The Systematic Thought of Hans 
Urs von Balthasar, 9. 
 
54 Daley, “Balthasar’s reading of the Church Fathers,” 189 [emphasis added]. Some have suggested that 
ressourcement thinkers are more interested in using these figures, than in accurately understanding them; that they 
are read anachronistically. As Daley notes, “when all is said and done, [von Balthasar] still treated them essentially 
as sources to support his own theological engagement with modern European culture and thought” (Brian E. Daley, 
“Balthasar’s reading of the Church Fathers” in David Moss and Edward T. Oakes (eds.), The Cambridge Companion 
to Hans Urs von Balthasar [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004], 189). it might instead be suggested that 
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likewise be found in Henry and Marion, both of whom draw upon Patristic theology at key 
moments in order to intervene in contemporary debates in phenomenology and theology.  
 As has been seen above (chapter 2) Henry traces ontological monism—the reduction of all 
phenomenality to visibility—back to its “origin in Greek truth.”55 In his Christian trilogy, this 
struggle is recast as a conflict between a Greek “truth of the world”56 and a Johannine “truth 
according to Christianity”57—between “the Christian God” and “the Greek God.”58 Nowhere is 
this conflict between Greek and Christian truth more evident, Henry will suggest, than in the 
writings of the Church Fathers, who spoke in the language of Hellenistic philosophy, but only ever 
of a Christian truth: “the Hellenization of language,” he argues, “goes hand in hand with a de-
Hellenization of the faith.”59  
Drawing upon Acts 17’s account of Paul at the Athenian Areopagus, Henry marks the 
incarnation—particularly as manifest in the resurrection of the body—as the locus classicus of this 
dispute between Greek and Christian truth: “when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some 
                                               
this tendency reflects the fact that—despite its seeming backward-facing posture—ressourcement does not advocate 
a simple or insufficiently nuanced adoption of the Patristic assumptions or metaphysics. As von Balthasar insists, 
“nothing would be more perilous than to demand from our completely different situation a pure return to patristic 
Platonism” (Hans Urs von Balthasar, “The Fathers, the Scholastics, and Ourselves” Communio: International 
Catholic Review 24 [1997], 379).  
 
55 Michel Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993), 165. 
 
56 It remains unclear if this phrase “truth of the world” refers to the title of the first volume of von Balthasar’s Theo-
logic (von Balthasar, Theo-Logic: Volume One: The Truth of the World) or if the similarity is coincidental. If an 
intentional gesture, it is nevertheless worth noting that while both conceptions of the “truth of the world” will mark 
its dependence upon a more primordial truth, von Balthasar will tend to think this dependence in relational terms, 
while Henry’s dualistic tendencies will lead to a rather harsh, polemical treatment of the “truth of the world.” 
 
57 Henry, I am the Truth, 12-32. 
 
58 Henry, Incarnation, 122. 
 
59 Ibid., 9. Here paraphrasing Bernard Sesboϋé, “Jésus Christ dans la tradition de l’église,” in Jésus et Jésus Christ, 
no. 17 (Paris: Desclée, 1993), 100. 
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scoffed.”60 This therefore becomes the heart of Henrian orthodoxy: “very great thinkers, the 
Fathers of the Church, will devote themselves to this reflection [on the incarnation],”61 while, 
Gnosticism and heresy, because they are corrupted by Greek truth, represent every theology that 
denies the incarnation.62 It is therefore the Fathers of the church that will become the champions 
avant la lettre of Henry’s phenomenology of flesh.  
If this conflict reads as an overly simplistic account of the Patristic context, this is because 
Henry here undertakes two reductions. First, despite the apparent diversity of views and clear 
disputes among these early figures, Henry will insist upon a fundamental homogeneity, a “genius 
of the Church Fathers … that weaves its way little by little through their dazzling intuitions.”63 
Thus, for example, he will breathlessly write of that “which we find in all the Fathers as well as in 
the councils.”64 Nevertheless, much like von Balthasar’s use of Irenaeus as the interpretive key for 
the Patristics, Henry too frames his discussion around a central figure. Thus, while he cites a 
variety of Fathers: Athanasius, Cyril of Alexandria, Justin Martyr, and even devotes an entire 
section to Irenaeus and Augustine’s accounts of salvation,65 it is ultimately Tertullian—and 
perhaps even more narrowly, Tertullian’s De Carne Christi—which serves as the guiding 
                                               
60 Acts 17.32 NRSV. 
 
61 Henry, Incarnation, 8. 
 
62 Here, as above, one might detect an uncited reference to von Balthasar and his rather broad (and polemical) 
conception of “Gnosticism.”  
 
63 Ibid., 9. 
 
64 Ibid., 234. 
 
65 Ibid., §46 “The Way of Salvation according to Irenaeus and Augustine.”  
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interpretive model. He will therefore unproblematically mark major claims as “according to 
Tertullian and the other Fathers…”66 or  “in the eyes of Tertullian and the Fathers…”67 
Conversely, this reduction of the Fathers to a “singular ideal sequence”68 is likewise paired 
with a reduction of all Greek philosophy, Gnosticism, and Christian heresy to a singular 
affirmation of the “Greek body” rather than the “Christian flesh” of incarnation. “In his idea,” 
Perrot writes, “heresy forms a ‘compact block,’ which is basically the homologous negative of the 
‘ideal sequence’ unique to the ‘Fathers’.”69 As Henry writes: 
All this debris of Greek thought (or of more ancient prejudices) is not only refused 
across the different forms of Gnosticism; it is pieced together immediately as a 
compact block: heresy. “Heresy” means everything that, under various masks and 
through spurious and false constructions, denies the truth (in other words the 
reality) of Incarnation.70 
 
As in the case of the Fathers, the ultimate viability of this reduction is suspect. Nevertheless, it 
serves Henry, who, like von Balthasar before him, is less concerned with properly historical or 
philological research than with the lessons that might be learned from these figures. Particularly, 
in this instance, these two simplifications permit Henry to appropriate Gnosticism and heresy into 
his figure of ontological monism.71 
                                               
66 Ibid., 130. 
 
67 Ibid., 127. 
 
68 Ibid., 9. 
 
69 “Dans son idée que l’hérésie forme un ‘bloc compact,’ qui est au fond l’homologue négatif de la ‘séquence 
idéologique’ unique des ‘Pères’.” Arnaud Perrot, “Michel Henry, Lecteur des Pères de l’Eglise,” Revue des Sciences 
Philosophiques et Théologiques 100(4) (2016): 647-660, 653 [translation my own]. 
 
70 Ibid., 10. 
 
71 As Perrot remarks, “Le philosophe peut ainsi lire, dans un auteur majeur de la littérature chrétienne du IIe siècle, la 
proposition centrale de sa théologie de la chair.” Perrot, “Michel henry, Lecteur des Pères de l’Eglise,” 655.  
 
This tendency to read the Fathers in light of his own philosophy is rather clear throughout Incarnation. This is seen 
grammatically in Henry’s unjustified use of the capitalized “Life” in his translations of Irenaeus: “the flesh is 
capable of receiving Life, this is proved by this very Life from which it already lives right not” (Irenaeus, as 
translated by Henry in Incarnation, 136). As Perrot’s instructive study notes, “l’assimilation de la doctrine d’Irénée 
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 Given his earlier engagement with Communio, it is perhaps not surprising that Marion 
assimilated Patristic thinking earlier than Henry. Indeed, much like von Balthasar, Marion was 
driven to the Fathers by his disinterest in Neo-Scholasticism.72 In the Fathers, Marion found a truly 
Christian alternative to the onto-theology critiqued by Heidegger, a “pre-metaphysical” theology 
                                               
se fait, de plus, par une subtile modification d’ordre typographique, que le texte original n’exige d’aucune façon. M. 
Henry s'écarte ici sciemment—quoique discrètement—de la traduction d’A. Rousseau qu’il suit par ailleurs, en 
écrivant le mot vie avec une majuscule” (Perrot, “Michel henry, Lecteur des Pères de l’Eglise,” 655). In this manner, 
what is in Irenaeus a mundane reference to the individual life of a living body, becomes a reference to the indwelling 
spirit of the divine source of all life: “From Life means from God,” Henry elsewhere remarks, “since according to 
Christianity, the essence of Life and that of God are one and the same” (Henry, I am the Truth, 51). 
 
Likewise, in his analysis of Tertullian, Henry imports a distinction between flesh and body that is completely foreign 
to the Father. “Dans le débat qui oppose, au IIe siècle, Tertullien à ses adversaires gnostiques, la doctrine chrétienne 
se comprend, précisément, comme la volonté de ne pas substituer à la ‘chair,’ c’est-’à-dire au corps du Christ 
compris de manière obvie, un ‘chair’ d’un autre ordre” (Perrot, “Michel henry, Lecteur des Pères de l’Eglise,” 655). 
Yet, through his introduction of a transcendental flesh over-and-against the mundane body, such a substitution is 
precisely what Henry ends up undertaking. Thus, there is “an ironic effect” (ibid.) to Henry’s appropriation of De 
Carne Christi. For, like Valentinus, Henry seems to admit “both the flesh and the nativity, [while having] interpreted 
them in a different sense” (Tertullian, “On the Flesh of Christ,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers: Volume 3: Latin 
Christianity: Its founder, Tertullian I. Apologetic; II. Anti-Marcion; III. Ethical, eds. Alexander Roberts and James 
Donaldson [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1995], I [521]); insofar as Henry redefines the muscles and 
bones of Tertullian’s analysis into a monadic, organless flesh. Other commenters have noted this irony, and 
suggested that, against his own intentions, Henry ends up advocating something like a Valentinian Gnosticism. As 
Hart argues: “Henry’s ‘philosophy of Christianity,’ at least in C’est moi la vérité, ends up being closer to certain 
strains of Gnosticism than to the current that became orthodox Christianity” (Kevin Hart, “The Reduction of 
Scripture” in The Journal of Scriptural Reasoning, 13, no. 1 [2014]). This argument is more fully worked out in Jad 
Hatem, Le sauveur et les viscères de l’être: Sur le gnosticisme et Michel Henry (Paris: L’Harmattan, 2004); Paul 
Clavier, “Un tournant gnostique de la phénoménologie française? à propos des Paroles du Christ de Michel Henry,” 
Revue thomiste 105, no. 2 (2005): 307-315; and Rivera, The Contemplative Self After Michel Henry, 160-166, 198-
199.  
 
For a phenomenological reading of Tertullian that remains closer to the text and contemporary patristic scholarship, 
see: Emmanuel Falque, God, the Flesh, and the Other: From Irenaeus to Duns Scotus, trans. William Christian 
Hackett (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 143-166. It is worth noting that, despite his differences 
with Henry, Falque offers a kinder assessment of Henry than those above: “it should be understood that I agree with 
the interpretation of Tertullian that Henry gives in Incarnation. If we can hold that ‘the flesh is life auto-affected in 
the Son by the Father’ (and here we would depend more on Irenaeus than Tertullian), the density and solidity of the 
flesh is such in Tertullian that it is related also to the ‘body’ and not only to the lived experience of the flesh. One 
would be surprised to find Gnostic leanings in an author who relies on the most virulent anti-Gnostic thinkers to 
develop his theses (see §24)!” Ibid., 324 n. 68 [emphasis added].  
 
72 “Rather than doing classical Thomism (which seemed to us anyway too wrapped up in metaphysics, in 
Heidegger’s sense), we were spontaneously inclined to a study of the Fathers and the history of spirituality. I recall 
having done workshops on the Epistle to the Hebrews, Dionysius, Saint Augustine, [and] Maximus the Confessor.” 
Marion, The Rigor of Things, 22. 
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that could address postmodern concerns with metaphysics.73 Therefore, in works like The Idol and 
Distance and In Excess, Marion would turn to Gregory of Nyssa and Dionysius74—who function 
for him much like Irenaeus for von Balthasar or Tertullian for Henry—in order to conceptualize 
an ontological difference deeper and more substantive than Heidegger’s,75 and to challenge 
Derrida’s reading of the (im)possibility of the gift and the possibility of a saturated phenomenon.76 
This influence would be so apparent that Levinas supposedly once remarked that “Marion has his 
Talmud, namely the Fathers of the Church!”77 
                                               
73 “The Fathers found themselves in a premetaphysical position, hence not yet in the (metaphysical) situation, in 
which we probably really are no longer. At the time of the Fathers, metaphysics was not yet constituted as a system; 
one can reasonably say today that this constitution is accomplished, historically, with Duns Scotus and extends all 
the way to Nietzsche. The Fathers, for the most part, obviously thought before this system of metaphysics and even 
without knowing its medieval basis, with Aristotle’s corpus and its various successive introductions.” Ibid., 132. As 
Graham Ward notes, “it is in grasping the roots of modernity that Marion’s postmodern thinking sees the possibility 
of returning to the premodern world which de Lubac, Daniélou and Gilson had reintroduced into early twentieth 
century French Catholicism.” Graham Ward, “Introducing Jean-Luc Marion,” New Blackfriars, 76, No. 895 
(July/August, 1995), “Special Issue on Jean-Luc Marion’s God without Being,” 323. 
 
74 “He cites some of the earliest Christian figures and apologists—Ignatius of Antioch, Clement of Rome, and Justin 
Martyr— as well as the Alexandrians— Clement, Origen, and Athanasius. He is clearly familiar with all three of the 
Cappadocians, and they appear throughout his writings. He cites Ambrose and Augustine, the formative ecumenical 
councils of the fourth and fifth centuries, John of Damascus, Theodore the Studite, and Maximus the Confessor. 
However, the influence most frequently present to Marion’s thought is found in the writings collected under the 
name of Dionysius the Areopagite.” Tamsin Jones, A Genealogy of Marion’s Phenomenology of Religion: Apparent 
Darkness (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 14. See, also: Wayne J. Hankey, “Jean-Luc Marion’s 
Dionysian Neoplatonism” in Perspectives sur la néoplatonisme, International Society for Neoplatonic Studies, Actes 
du colloque de 2006, ed. Martin Achard, Wayne Hankey, Jean-Marc Narbonne (Québec: Le Presses de l’Université 
Laval, 2009), 267-280. 
 
75 Here undoubtedly drawing upon von Balthasar’s “fourth difference.” As Marion describes the project, “by way of 
the Nietzschean threshold, I shall enter into commerce with other border territories of onto-theology: Hölderlin and 
Denys the Areopagite. … the same question seemed to me to traverse these figures—that which is formulated here, 
according to the naming that I brought it, by distance: a distance outside of onto-theology for Nietzsche, a filially 
received distance of the presence of a God who is paternally in withdrawal for Hölderlin, and a distance traversed 
liturgically toward the Requisite by the discourse of praise of requestants for Denys.” Marion, The Idol and 
Distance, 147-148. The importance of the Dionysian move is highlighted by the books dedication “To Denys.” Ibid., 
v. 
 
76 As he writes for example, “the saturated phenomenon par excellence—the principle, [is] declined in perfectly 
autonomous registers, where it gives itself to be seen, each time, only according to a perspective that is total as well 
as partial, conceivable and always incomprehensible: being in the act of Being, one before unity, truth of oneself and 
of the world, invisible splendor, etc. (Plotinus, Proclus, Dionysius, etc.).” Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a 
Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 210. 
 
77 Emmanuel Levinas, as recalled by Marion in The Rigor of Things, 133. 
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D. Theological Content: Gift, Distance, and Love 
 
While there are innumerable theological similarities between Henry and Marion’s radical 
phenomenologies and Communio theology, it will be helpful here to limit the discussion to three 
closely related terms, that will be preparatory for a discussion of sexuality: gift, distance, and love.  
 As we have already seen in chapter 3, givenness is the central thematic of Marion’s 
phenomenology. Thus in Marion’s reading of Husserl, it is not intuition, but givenness 
(gegebenheit) that has primacy. The same can be said of Henry. For, it should be recalled that 
Henry’s radical phenomenology aims at phenomena in their “How” (Wie), which Henry 
immediately glosses as givenness, “in the ‘How’ of their givenness.”78 Indeed, Henry marks the 
self-affectivity of Life not only as a unique mode of givenness, but as the Archi-revelation: the 
very “givenness of givenness.”79 Even the flesh itself is understood as “a power of givenness.”80 
In Marion’s Being Given this phenomenological concern for givenness is drawn into conversation 
with the ongoing French debate around “the Gift.”  
According to the French sociologist Marcel Mauss’ study of gift exchange in so-called 
“archaic societies” (particularly those of the American Pacific Northwest and Polynesia), rather 
than extra-economic, gift exchange is marked by its social and economic character. The notion of 
a “free gift,” is a “polite fiction, formalism, and social deceit, … when really there is obligation 
and economic self-interest.”81 Within the French philosophical community, this opened up a 
debate surrounding the possibility of gift-giving as such. As Jacques Derrida writes: 
                                               
78 Henry, Incarnation, 23. 
 
79 Michel Henry, “Le corps vivant,” in Auto-donation: entretiens et conférences (Paris: Beauchesne, 2004), 127. 
 
80 Henry, Incarnation, 120. 
 
81 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchanges in Archaic Societies, trans W. D. Halls (New York: 
W. W. Norton, 1990), 3. 
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If there is gift, the given of the gift … must not come back to the giving. … It must 
not circulate, it must not be exchanged, it must not in any case be exhausted, as a 
gift, by the process of exchange, by the movement of circulation of the circle in the 
form of return to the point of departure. … It is perhaps in this sense that the gift is 
impossible.82 
 
That is to say, a gift, rightly given, should be given freely and without conditions. But, at least 
according to Derrida’s reading of Mauss, every gift is ultimately reinscribed within the economic 
sphere. Thus it seems that the naive notion of simply “giving a gift” is undermined. Rather, as 
Derrida suggests, every gift is also a Gift—in the German sense; that is, a poison. To give a gift is, 
at the same time, to give an obligation to reciprocate.83 
 For both Henry and Marion the problematic of the gift demands a response that is both 
phenomenological and theological, for gift and self-givenness are, for both, central theological 
motifs, particularly integral to any understanding of the relationship between God and creation or 
of the erotic relationship.84 But this is not a novel innovation of radical phenomenology, but rather 
one again finds clear precedence in Communio theology.  
 According to von Balthasar, self-givenness is at the heart of divine reality. The very 
internal distinctions of the Godhead are themselves products of gift-giving: to be begotten is to 
have received a gift. Thus, on von Balthasar’s kenotic account of the generation of the second 
person of the trinity, “the Father strips himself, without remainder, of his Godhead and hands it 
                                               
 
82 Jacques Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1992), 7. 
 
83 It is worth noting that, despite Marion’s reading, Derrida does not actually seem to mark the gift as impossible in 
the colloquial sense. Rather, Derrida marks the inevitability of reinscription within the economic sphere as an 
impossible condition of possibility; a destabilizing condition that renders the simple gift discursively unstable, but 
does not necessary exclude the gift tout court.  
 
84 “Givenness; showing; phenomenalization; unveiling; uncovering; appearance; manifestation; and revelation. … It 
cannot escape us that there key words for phenomenology are also, in large measure, key terms for religion, or 
theology.” Henry, Incarnation, 23. 
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over to the Son.”85 But this self-givenness is not limited to the sphere of divinity, rather it likewise 
marks the essence of the created order. To be a creature is to have been given the gift of Being.86 
Likewise, John Paul II expressly interprets creation through the “hermeneutic of the gift.” 
Accordingly, he writes, “as an action of God, creation thus means not only calling from nothing to 
existence, … it also signifies gift; a fundamental and ‘radical’ gift, that is, an act of giving in which 
the gift comes into being precisely from nothing.”87 
It would be impossible here to miss the direct correlation between these notions of a 
receptive being and Marion’s refiguring of the subject as “the gifted” (l’adonné), that which 
“receives itself entirely from what it receives.”88 Marion undoubtedly understands the gifted—
who receives itself from “revelation”—in von Balthasarian terms. To be the gifted is to have 
received oneself from a phenomenon that gives itself without condition (Marion), or in von 
Balthasar’s words: “a revelation of [God’s] glory needs no justification but itself.”89  
Although Henry tends to use the notion of self-givenness in a more autistic sense, as giving 
oneself to oneself—rather than as the self-givenness of the phenomenon to itself (von 
Balthasar/Marion90)—his theological writings nevertheless ultimately recapitulate precisely these 
                                               
85 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory: Volume IV: The Action, trans. Graham 
Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 323. 
 
86 As Kilby notes, “it is never on Balthasar’s account a question of possessing anything … [but rather] on passivity 
and receptivity, on our being seized, transported, transformed.” Kilby, Balthasar, 55. 
 
87 John Paul II, Man and Women He Created Them, 180. 
 
88 Marion, Being Given, 268. 
 
89 Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: Volume I, 140. This connection is by no means forced, Marion himself 
makes it explicit, privileging “Balthasar’s argument … that Revelation has no conditions of possibility except 
itself.” Marion, The Rigor of Things, 26. 
 
90 “It is the kind of evidence that emerges and sheds light from the phenomenon itself.” Von Balthasar, The Glory of 
the Lord: Volume I, 464. 
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theological commitments, here under the figure of Archi-givenness. For Henry, prior to the 
givenness of the self to itself in its immanent flesh, the self is first given to itself by an Archi-
givenness, whereby Life (i.e. God) generates the living.91 As Henry notes in Communio, “that 
which is ‘given from above’ [John 19.11], [is] the Archi-givenness of life to all life.”92 Thus, the 
passivity or receptivity of the self to itself,93 is ultimately grounded in a deeper receptivity of the 
living to Life, of the creature to God. In the words of Paul, cited by Henry in Incarnation, “what 
do you have that you did not receive? And if you received it, why do you boast as if it were not a 
gift?”94  
For each of these figures, the giving and receiving of a gift is generative of difference and 
distance.95 Thus, although colloquially we understand the gift as creating unity,96 it is here more 
                                               
91 “Because the most ordinary of these powers are given in absolute Life, their gift is of a singular character. … The 
present that Life gives to the living—of its life, its Self, its flesh, and each of the powers that compose it—is nothing 
from which it could separate itself. This impossibility is two-fold. Inscribed in givenness, given to itself in absolute 
life’s self-givenness, generated in its Self in its Arch-Ipseity, and passible in its Arch-passibility, where each of these 
powers is exerted in the heart of an Arch-power, the gift of life that is internally built up in the latter only subsists 
within it.” Henry, Incarnation, 175. As Henry will later affirm, “a flesh such as ours … is incapable of being self-
sufficient, of bringing itself into life.” Michel Henry, Words of Christ, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2012), 50. 
 
92 “Que cette ‘donation d’en haut,’ l’Archi-donation de la vie à toute vie.” Michel Henry, “Incarnation” in Michel 
Henry, Les Dossier H: Michel Henry (Paris: L'Âge d'Homme, 2009), 105 [translation my own]. 
 
93 See: Michel Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, trans. G.J. Etzkorn (New York: Springer, 1973), §§25-26. 
 
94 1 Cor. 4.7 NRSV. Cited in Henry, Incarnation, 177. 
 
95 Remarkably, this even seems to be true for the late Henry. For, in his differentiation of immanence first into Life 
and the living, and then subsequently by the imposition of a distinction between the Father and the Archi-Son within 
Life, Henry imposes (something at least very like) a distance and this, despite his contestations to the contrary (e.g. 
his assertion of a “unity of the Father and the Son … [which is] not an ecstatic and abstract unity.” Michel Henry, 
Words of Christ, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2012], 89). 
Thus for example, Life at least logically, even if not temporally, precedes the living: “the gift of Life in us, this gift 
which always precedes us.” Ibid., 121. This may reflect an instance where theological concerns (maintaining the 
unity of the persons of the Godhead, avoiding too closely identifying the soul and God) seem to have overridden the 
Henry’s phenomenological considerations.  
 
96 As Kilby writes, “in general, we do not think of giving, and in particular giving of oneself, as creating distance, 
difference, separation between giver and receiver—at least not unless something goes wrong.” Kilby, Balthasar, 
110. 
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properly understood as generative of a unity-in-difference, a community. Due to the kenotic self-
gift of the Father to the Son, for example, there remains “an absolute, infinite ‘distance’”97 between 
the members of the Godhead. Here, Marion’s reading of Dionysian “hierarchy” is instructive. 
Rather than representing degrees of power or control—as in contemporary usage which “our 
modernity forbids us straight away from understanding correctly”98—the Dionysian hierarchy is 
grounded in the notion of the self-giving gift, wherein each rung of the ladder gives itself to the 
rung below. Thus it is not power that generates difference, but ultimately, love: “hierarchy has an 
ecstatic origin in the excessive love that goes out of itself to create.”99  
In this way, gift and distance are ultimately reducible to love: and one should therefore not 
be surprised when Marion’s “reduction to givenness” becomes, in The Erotic Phenomenon, “the 
erotic reduction.” According to von Balthasar, for example, the Father’s gift of Himself to the Son, 
is a gift given in love, is in fact nothing other than the love that the Father is; for, “‘being = giving.’ 
It is in giving that one is and has.”100 Likewise, Benedict XVI took the occasion of his first 
encyclical to write of the self-giving love of God in Deus Caritas Est: “since God has first loved 
us (cf. 1 Jn 4:10), love is now no longer a mere ‘command’; it is the response to the gift of love 
with which God draws near to us.”101 For Henry, in the Archi-givenness of the self, “it is the 
unlimited intoxication of life, the Arch-pleasure of its eternal love in its Word, its Spirit, that 
                                               
97 Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Volume IV, 325. 
 
98 Marion, The Idol and Distance, 163. 
 
99 Tamsin Jones, “Dionysius in Hans Urs von Balthasar and Jean-Luc Marion” in Coakley and Stang (eds.), Re-
thinking Dionysius the Areopagite (Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 24. 
 
100 Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: Volume VII, 391. 
 
101 Benedict XVI, God is Love, Deus Caritas Est: Encyclical Letter (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2006), 
2. 
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submerges us.”102 And for Marion, in the search for an answer to the question “does anyone love 
me?,” one only finds an answer in the one who loved first: “I discover that this first lover, from 
the very beginning, is named God.”103  
But here one should not be confused, this self-givenness of love is not simply reducible to 
the love of agape—the amor benevolentiae. Rather, Communio has universally marked the central 
thesis of Anders Nygren’s Agape and Eros104 as an overreach. As Benedict XVI remarks, “the 
more [agape and eros], in their different aspects, find a proper unity in the one reality of love, the 
more the true nature of love in general is realized. … Fundamentally, ‘love’ is a single reality.”105 
In like manner, von Balthasar insists upon “an indissoluble union of agapê and erôs, of the glory 
of God and the beauty of the soul.”106  
In Marion, this becomes the univocity of love.107 “It’s not a question of two parallel or 
opposed loves,” he writes, “but of two modes of the same love: creatures, myself or my brother, 
can therefore be loved, and even loved with enjoyment, provided that they come to be loved in the 
enjoyment of God.”108 In this way, eros, even sexuality, will be fundamentally understood through 
                                               
102 Henry, Incarnation, 262. 
 
103 Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2007), 222. 
 
104 Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip S. Watson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982). 
 
105 Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est, 11-12. 
 
106 Von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: Volume IV, 322. 
 
107 “Univocal love is only told in one way.” Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 5. 
 
108 Jean-Luc Marion, In the Self’s Place: The Approach of Saint Augustine, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2012), 277. This univocity is explicitly attained through a rejection of Nygren, whose 
infamous thesis is marked by Marion as “untenable”  and “inept” (Marion, In The Self’s Place, 273). As Marion 
writes, “all loves are hierarchically arranged solely according to the variations in the relative importance of one part 
(me) or the other (the beloved), the structure itself unvarying; thereafter, between the loves in which I constitute the 
greater part of the whole (love of the bottle, of a woman taken by force, or of hoarded money) and those in which I 
constitute only the lesser part (love of one’s wife, children, prince, or God), the difference in the objects only 
underscores the invariant structure.” Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 156. See: Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 
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the paradigm of the gift. As Henry writes, in the erotic encounter, one “gives his or her body and 
thus not only gives their body, but also this gift itself: their freedom.”109 With this propaedeutic of 
the gift, distance, and love, it will now be possible to turn to the ultimate concern: Communio’s 
theology of sexuality.  
§II: Sexual Difference, The Nuptial Body 
A. The Primacy of Sexual Difference 
 
If, as suggested above, Communio is not conservative in a traditional sense, where does its popular 
designation as a “conservative” school of Catholic theology come from? Certainly this is in part 
due to its oppositional relation to Concilium—widely regarded as “progressive”—, its seeming 
backward-facing posture in regards to the patristics, and its resistance to liberation theology. But 
most directly, this perspective seems to stem from what is regarded as its reactionary sexual ethic. 
Having risen to prominence during a period of intense intra-Catholic debate regarding birth 
control, abortion, homosexuality, and female ordination, the themes of sexuality and gender figure 
prominently among Communio thinkers. As Mongrain notes, von Balthasar “sided with the 
Vatican in opposition to women’s ordination, artificial contraception, and optional clerical 
celibacy,” in a manner, Mongrain continues, often “nasty and bitter.”110  John Paul II’s Man and 
Woman He Created Them likewise centers sexuality—Kerr naming it “a Christian anthropology 
                                               
4-5, 217-221; Marion, In the Self’s Place, 270-282. For a commentary on these claims, and their connection to 
Communio theology, see: Beáta Tóth, “Love Between Embodiment And Spirituality: Jean-Luc Marion And John 
Paul II On Erotic Love” Modern Theology 29:1 (2013).  
 
109 Henry, Incarnation, 215. 
 
110 Mongrain, The Systematic Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar, 13. 
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of sexual difference,”111 but, in such a manner that it is often read as a mere apology for the 
traditionalist sexual ethics of Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae. As Johnson writes, “by the time [John 
Paul II] reaches his explicit discussion of Humanae Vitae, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that every earlier textual choice and phenomenological reflection has been geared to a defense of 
Paul VI’s encyclical.”112 
 This traditionalist stance is central, because, in Communio thinking, discussions of sexual 
difference are not merely restricted to one corner of moral theology or theological anthropology. 
Rather, sexual difference saturates Communio theology.113 As Beattie puts it, “Balthasar’s 
theology oozes sex.”114 From communion115 and ecclesiology, to trinitarian theology and 
Mariology, nearly every aspect of Communio theology is read through the hermeneutic of sexual 
difference.116 Indeed, Moss and Gardner ask: “is Balthasar’s genius to have recognized that it has 
been decided that sexual difference is the question of our age?”117 This focus upon sexual 
                                               
111 Fergus Kerr, Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians: From Neoscholasticism to Nuptial Mysticism (Hoboken, 
NJ: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 175. 
 
112 Luke Timothy Johnson, “A Disembodied ‘Theology of the Body’: John Paul II on love, sex & pleasure,” 
Commonweal (Jan. 26, 2001), 14. 
 
113 As Kilby notes of von Balthasar, “his views on what it is to be ‘man’ and ‘woman’ are not just one topic among 
others in his writings, but flavor a great deal of his thought” Kilby, Balthasar, 123. 
 
114 Tina Beattie, The New Catholic Feminism: Theology, Gender Theory and Dialogue (New York: Routledge, 
2006), 157.  
 
115 For example, in his discussion of communion, von Balthasar writes, “what else is his eucharist but, at a higher 
level, and endless act of fruitful outpouring of his whole flesh, such as a man can only achieve for a moment with a 
limited organ of his own body.” Hans Urs von Balthasar, Elucidations, trans. John Riches (San Francisco: Ignatius, 
1975), 226. 
 
116 In Tonstad’s words, “Balthasar’s theology stands or falls by the success of his intercalation of trinitarian 
relations, God-creation relations, and sexual difference.” Linn Marie Tonstad, God and Difference: The Trinity, 
Sexuality, and the Transformation of Finitude (New York: Routledge, 2016), 28. 
 
117 David Moss and Lucy Gardner, “Difference--the Immaculate Concept? The Laws of Sexual Difference in the 
Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar,” Modern Theology 14 no. 3 (Jul 1998): 377-401, 378. Here, explicitly placing 
von Balthasar in conversation with the Irigaray quote that opened this dissertation: “each age has one issue to think 
through, and only one. Sexual difference is probably the issue of our time, which could be our ‘salvation’ if we 
thought it through” (Luce Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, trans. Carolyn burke and Gillian C. Gill [Ithaca, 
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difference likewise holds for Henry and Marion. For each, sexual difference is ultimately a central 
thematic even if, as we have seen, it appears in Marion as a principal ideological figure, and in 
Henry only in a disavowed manner, as the underside of his supposed transcendental asexuality. 
 For Communio theology, sexual difference is anthropologically ultimate: “there is no 
‘sexless’ first man.”118 This is understood both historically—there was no historical androgyne—
and ontologically—the human person is male or female all the way down. As von Balthasar writes:  
The male body is male throughout, right down to each cell of which it consists, and 
the female body is utterly female; and this is also true of the whole empirical 
experience and ego-consciousness. At the same time both share an identical human 
nature, but at no point does it protrude, neutrally, beyond the sexual difference, as 
if to provide neutral ground for mutual understanding. Here there is no universale 
ante rem, as all theories of a nonsexual or bisexual (androgynous) primitive human 
being would like to think.119  
 
Here, it seems one finds a theory of sexual difference quite close to that proposed by Marion’s 
heavily gendered account of sexuality. Conversely, von Balthasar seems to deny precisely the 
transcendental a-sexuality that Henry affirms. “Balthasar attempts,” as Crammer argues, “to affirm 
the dignity and worth of women, in contrast to theology that has either ignored women or elided 
them into a false universal of ‘man,’ meant to include all humans but which on closer examination 
                                               
NY: Cornell University Press, 1993], 5). But, the ostensible similarity between von Balthasar and Irigaray’s 
concerns for sexual difference should not obscure the fundamental difference between the two programs. As Beattie 
writes, “like Irigaray, von Balthasar defends the irreducibility of the two sexes, and both argue that the discovery or 
rediscovery of the significance of sexual difference is a vital task if we are to avoid the cultural crises confronting us 
at the end of the twentieth century. However, von Balthasar seems to think that he already knows what sexual 
difference looks like and what it amounts to, whereas Irigaray suggests we have only the vaguest of ideas. She 
argues that all present constructs of sexual difference are products of masculinity, so that what poses as the feminine 
in western culture is in fact the masculine imaginary—a projection onto women of the desires and fantasies that 
must be repressed in the acquisition of male subjectivity, in a way that denies women access to the symbolics of 
their own subjectivity.” Tina Beattie, “A Man and Three Women—Hans, Adrienne, Mary and Luce,” New 
Blackfriars 79 no. 924 (1998): 97-105, 98. 
 
118 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory: Volume III: Dramatis Personae: Persons 
in Christ, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 290. 
 
119 Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Volume II, 364-365. 
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appears to be male.”120 To borrow an image from von Balthasar, humanity is like a symphony; and 
just as “a bass trumpet is not the same as a piccolo; a cello is not a bassoon,”121 so too are men and 
women fundamentally different, in an irreducible manner. It is only through a recognition of this 
difference, that men and women can sound together as one symphony.  
 The logic underlying this symphonic metaphor is central to Communio theology, for the 
affirmation of an irreducible sexual difference between men and women is regarded as a necessary 
component of human dignity.122 Any demand for respect and justice must necessarily be made in 
deference to the unique symmetry of man and woman—their complementarity. “Man,” von 
Balthasar argues, “is always in communion with his counter-image, woman, and yet never reaches 
her. The converse is true of woman.”123 This quasi-symmetrical relationship renders each sex, on 
its own incomplete. Only in its relationship to its other, its converse, is one sex able to find its 
fulfillment: “anything that diminishes sexual difference by allowing incursions of one sex into the 
other’s natural role damages a critical balance, with baleful consequences.”124  
In this way, von Balthasar is able to simultaneously affirm and deny the equality of the 
sexes. Theologically speaking, man and woman are essentially equal (wesensgleich) before God. 
But, as Crammer notes, “equality between the sexes is held in tension with a kind of hierarchy.”125 
                                               
120 Corinne Crammer, “One sex or two? Balthasar’s theology of the sexes,” in David Moss and Edward T. Oakes 
(eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 94.  
 
121 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Truth is Symphonic: Aspects of Christian Pluralism, trans. Graham Harrison (San 
Francisco: Ignatius, 1987), 7. 
 
122 This logic has been the justification for the appropriation of von Balthasar by some Catholic feminists. As Kilby 
notes, “some see Balthasar as laying the groundwork for an authentic Christian feminism, or as pointing the way to a 
profound theology of otherness, bodiliness, and sexual difference.” Kilby, Balthasar, 124. 
 
123 Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Volume II, 366. 
 
124 Crammer, “One sex or two?,” 95. 
 
125 Ibid. 
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For, following Paul’s assertion in 1st Corinthians, “the husband is the head of his wife,”126 von 
Balthasar likewise posits a certain “primacy of the man.”127 Authority, particularly authority within 
the church, is restricted to men, whereas women are cast in the role of submissive recipients of the 
grace of the (masculine) priest.128  
While “John Paul II has a more egalitarian understanding of the relationship between man 
and woman than … Balthasar,”129 he nevertheless argues with equal insistence upon the 
primordiality of sexual difference, or as he terms it: the “spousal meaning” of the body. 
Methodologically centered in his pseudo-phenomenological recourse to experience, John Paul II 
identifies sexual difference as a phenomenologically intuitable fact, for which one need only turn 
to the “evidence of their own body in its masculinity and femininity.”130 Yet, whereas von 
Balthasar insists upon the absolute nature of this sexual difference, John Paul II’s personalism 
marks this difference as penultimate, always second to the subjectivity of the individual person. 
Thus he writes, for example, “although in its normal constitution, the human body carries within 
itself the signs of sex and is by its nature male or female, the fact that man is a ‘body’ belongs 
more deeply to the structure of the personal subject than the fact that in his somatic constitution he 
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is also male or female.”131 The result of this subordination of sexual difference to a primary 
embodiment is an emphasis upon a more egalitarian complementarianism. “Thus while he strongly 
objects to the ‘masculinization’ of woman,” Sutton argues, “he insists, more convincingly than … 
Balthasar, on her dignity and equality with man.”132 Nevertheless, one is here dealing in shades of 
emphasis rather than structural disagreements; for, like von Balthasar, John Paul II will ultimately 
institute an asymmetrical (and hierarchical) relationship between the sexes, stating that “the 
husband is above all the one who loves and the wife, by contrast, is the one who is loved”;133 the 
husband is active, the wife is passive. 
This distinction between the “active man” and “passive woman” is a defining feature of 
Communio theology’s account of sexual difference—as we saw in Marion and Henry. Thus, as 
Kilby remarks of von Balthasar, for example, “to be male is to be strong, to take initiative, to be 
active and goal-oriented; to be woman is to be open, receptive, surrendering, passive, to be 
characterized by weakness and dependence, to be contemplative.”134 Certainly, this feminine 
passivity should not be understood as a total submission of woman to man. As Crammer notes, for 
von Balthasar this “is an active passivity, arguably the opposite of passivity, since consent 
(obedience) must be freely given and this consent-giving is active.”135 Nevertheless, this caveat 
has done little to soothe the concerns of von Balthasar’s critics. As Kilby argues, “to speak of these 
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characteristics as fundamentally womanly, however, is, in the first instance at least, to see [women] 
not in relation to God but in relation to men.”136 
In John Paul II this submission is rendered in more egalitarian terms as a reciprocal 
submission: “love excludes every kind of submission by which the wife would become a servant 
or slave of the husband, an object of one-sided submission. Love makes the husband 
simultaneously subject to the wife.”137 Moreover, for both von Balthasar and John Paul II, despite 
its feminine character, submission or obedience is a virtue for both men and women. Nevertheless, 
precisely as Henry will later make thematic—in his analysis of the “the feminine character of 
anxiety”138—even when passivity is attributed to men, it is nevertheless still understood as a 
characteristically feminine comportment. Certainly, just as in Henry, von Balthasar “is portraying 
women as ahead of the game, having the edge over the men, precisely in this weakness, 
dependence, and surrender.”139 But, as we saw in chapter 2, regardless of the positive tenor given 
to passivity, it is nevertheless the case that this conception tends to lend itself towards the 
objectification of the passive woman, by the active man; as Beattie argues in strong terms, “to 
describe a sexual relationship in terms of active man taking possession of passive woman sounds 
dangerously close to offering a theological justification for rape.”140 Moreover, insofar as 
submission is essentially feminine, it becomes an irreducible character of feminine being, whereas 
it is merely a contingent or accidental feature of masculine being. Thus, while men “are able also 
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to be female and receptive,” particularly in their relationship to God, “women cannot in turn also 
be active.”141  
According to Crammer, who analyzes this recourse to sexual difference through Thomas 
Laqueur’s distinction between one-sex and two-sex paradigms of sexual difference,142 this 
privilege of the male ends up, in spite of its intention, recapitulating a one-sex paradigm:  “despite 
his attempt to construct a two-sex theological anthropology, … ultimately Balthasar reproduces 
the one-sex model in which the normative human being is implicitly male and Woman’s definition 
is based around Man, particularly around what Man is seen to need Woman to be.”143 Or, in the 
words of Beattie: 
This account of sexual complementarity entails not the affirmation but the 
eradication of genuine difference. If woman is man’s fullness, coming forth from 
within him, there cannot also be a “polarity of man and woman.’’ Woman is 
variously described by von Balthasar as man’s “answering word,” his “answering 
gaze,’ the “vessel of fulfilment specially designed for him.” But an answer, to be 
relevant and comprehensible, is defined by and bound to the question. If woman is 
the answer to man, she can exist only within the parameters of the man’s 
question.144 
 
A similar critique is leveled against John Paul II, by Johnson:  
John Paul II wants for example, to have the term “man” mean both male and female. 
But the Genesis 2 account pushes him virtually to equate “man” with “male,” with 
the unhappy result that males experience both the original solitude the pope wants 
to make distinctively human as well as the dominion over creation expressed by the 
naming of animals. Females inevitably appear as “helpers” and as complementary 
to the already rather complete humanity found in the male. In virtually none of his 
further reflections on sexuality do women appear as moral agents: Men can have 
lust in their hearts but not women, men can struggle with concupiscence but 
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apparently women do not; men can exploit their wives sexually but women can’t 
exploit their husbands sexually.145  
 
 Here one finds a curious, though incredibly important, reversal. Whereas von Balthasar, 
John Paul II, and Marion all seek to affirm sexual difference in its strongest terms, they 
nevertheless—through their affirmation of gendered stereotypes and implicit diminishing of 
feminine subjectivity—end up recapitulating an account that, rather than the opposite of the 
Henrian “universal male,” is merely its photo-negative; “the same old story of the same old 
sameness.”146 Just as Henry’s attempt to erase difference eventuated in a stereotyped notion of 
sexual difference, so too does von Balthasar, John Paul II, and Marion’s converse recourse to 
stereotyped notions of sexual difference eventuate in an erasure of difference. Despite all initial 
signs to the contrary, Henry’s transcendental asexuality and Marion’s heavily gendered account 
of sexual difference amount to one and the same thing: the submission of the feminine and the 
erasure of sexual minorities.  
  
B. Feminism and Queer Sexuality 
 
Insofar as Communio theology tends to think sexual difference in traditional imagery, it has largely 
regarded secular feminism as a direct threat. For, as Alenka Zupančič, argues: 
The traditional division between masculine and feminine worlds, … actually does 
not see sexual difference as difference, but as a question of belonging to two 
separate worlds, which are ‘different’ from a neutral bird’s-eye description, but 
otherwise coexist as integral parts in the hierarchy of a higher cosmic order, the 
wholeness and unity of which is in no way threatened by this ‘difference.’ These 
are parts that ‘know their place.’ And feminism (as a political movement) puts in 
question, and breaks, precisely this unity of the world.147  
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Thus, in his critique of calls for female ordination, von Balthasar sources this demand in the 
“worldwide offensive of ‘feminism’.”148 According to von Balthasar, feminists—“whom,” 
Crammer notes, “he appears to group together in an undifferentiated whole”149—demand an 
equality with men that can only take the form of an erasure of sexual difference: “an unnatural 
masculinization of woman or a leveling of the difference between the sexes.”150 This, according 
to von Balthasar, is a result of an increasingly technologized and “history-less” society. “Where 
positivistic, technology-oriented thinking succeeds in reigning supreme,” he writes, “the female 
element also vanishes from the attitude of the man.”151  
Here one might note a critique of technology and its “culture of death,” that runs across 
most every Communio theology. Consider the similarities between the following propositions: 
 
Meaning can be found only in creating a vital force against history-less, 
technologized existence, in abstaining from the artificial superabundance of life. 
(Von Balthasar)152 
 
This neo-Manichean culture has led, for example, to human sexuality being 
regarded more as an area for manipulation and exploitation than as the basis of that 
primordial wonder which led Adam on the morning of creation. (John Paul II)153 
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[The child] cannot be desired or conceived as the product of an intervention of 
medical or biological techniques; that would be equivalent to reducing him to an 
object of scientific technology. (Cardinal Ratzinger)154  
 
Science has reduced the living transcendental Self to a dead object of the Galilean 
field. … Everywhere such a metaphysical situation is produced: everywhere a man 
or a woman is only an object, a dead thing, a network of neurons, a bundle of natural 
processes, … one is put in the presence of a man or a woman but finds oneself in 
the presence of what, stripped of the transcendental Self that constitutes its essence, 
is no longer anything, is only death. … Men treated mathematically, digitally, 
statistically, … Men turned away from Life’s Truth. (Michel Henry)155 
 
Bio-technological manipulations or socio-medical traffickings … would reduce 
[the child] to the rank of a manufactured object, bought and sold; … moreover, the 
obsession with possessing the thing, what one then calls “my” child, can easily go 
hand in hand with its being forgotten out of indifference, its instrumentalization by 
convenience, or even its destruction by mistreatment. (Jean-Luc Marion)156 
 
For each of these figures, the modern world—understood to also be a masculine world—is 
dominated by technologization, standardization, and objectification. Thus, the passive receptivity 
of the feminine stands as a final bulwark against the total loss of culture to the “barbarism” of 
modernity—a barbarism most visible in the realms of sexuality and reproduction. From this 
perspective, feminism not only represents the erasure of sexual difference, but the possibility of a 
total erasure of humanity’s unique character: “such a change would totally destroy the disturbed 
balance, level the all-fructifying difference between the sexes in favor of an asexuality (with male 
indications, however) and consume humanity’s last ideological reserves.”157 
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For these thinkers, the feminist attack on sexual difference, and the family, has likewise 
given rise to philosophies of gender that further threaten the traditional family, through the 
normalization and propagation of queer sexualities. As Benedict XVI (then Cardinal Ratzinger) 
writes, in a letter approved by John Paul II: 
A second tendency emerges in the wake of the first. In order to avoid the domination 
of one sex or the other, their differences tend to be denied, viewed as mere effects 
of historical and cultural conditioning. In this perspective, physical difference, 
termed sex, is minimized, while the purely cultural element, termed gender, is 
emphasized to the maximum and held to be primary. The obscuring of the difference 
or duality of the sexes has enormous consequences on a variety of levels. This theory 
of the human person, intended to promote prospects for equality of women through 
liberation from biological determinism, has in reality inspired ideologies which, for 
example, call into question the family, in its natural two-parent structure of mother 
and father, and make homosexuality and heterosexuality virtually equivalent, in a 
new model of polymorphous sexuality.158 
 
This critique of queer sexuality can certainly be traced back to Christian moral theology’s 
condemnations of sodomy and other homosexual and autoerotic activities. But within the modern 
period, it is John Paul II’s Veritas Splendor, which was the first encyclical to link homosexuality 
to what John Paul II would later name a “new ideology of evil,” in opposition to “the traditional 
conception of the natural law” whereby “contraception, direct sterilization, autoeroticism, pre-
marital sexual relations, homosexual relations and artificial insemination were condemned as 
morally unacceptable.”159  
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 For Communio thinkers, there are three principle critiques of queer sexuality. In von 
Balthasar, queer sexuality is directly linked to a narcissistic autoeroticism and self-idolatry. 
“Homosexuality is so ruinous,” von Balthasar writes, “because here man has caught sight of his 
own beauty and made it into an object. If the male is involved, he has likewise objectivized his 
God-willed superiority. No being, as a matter of fact, should enmesh himself in the love that seeks 
full satisfaction in beauty, which a special grace graciously conceals from him.”160 For von 
Balthasar, homosexuality is an erasure of sexual difference that glorifies the “same” of sexual 
homogeneity. 
 The second and third critiques can already be found in John Paul II’s early work, 
particularly Love & Responsibility. There one finds both a slippery slope argument and an 
argument from reproduction, both akin to what will be later reproduced in Marion’s The Erotic 
Phenomenon. Thus, for example, John Paul II directly links fetishistic fascination with sexual 
attributes, homosexuality, and bestiality as chains in a single logic of “perversion”:  
The sexual urge in a human being is always directed towards another human 
being—this is the normal form which it takes. If it is directed towards the sexual 
attributes as such this must be recognized as an impoverishment or even a 
perversion of the urge. If it is directed towards the sexual attributes of a person of 
the same sex we speak of a homosexual deviation. Still more emphatically do we 
speak of sexual deviation if the urge is directed not towards the sexual attributes of 
a human being but towards those of an animal. The natural direction of the sexual 
urge is towards a human being of the other sex.161 
 
For this text, these various forms of sexuality constitute perversions precisely because they diverge 
from the exclusive site of sexual intimacy. As John Paul II writes, “the union of man and woman 
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needs a suitable framework, one which permits the full development of the sexual relationship 
while ensuring the durability of their union. Such a union is, of course, called marriage.”162 But 
this is not just any marriage, for “attempts to solve the problem of marriage other than by 
monogamy (which implies indissolubility) are incompatible with the personalistic norm and fall 
short of its strict demand.”163 For John Paul II, it is only the monogamous, indissoluble, 
heterosexual marriage which can be the site of sexual union. This necessity follows from two 
demands, first the personalistic norm, which demands respect for individual persons, and second, 
the natural law:164 “a man and woman who, as husband and wife, unite in a full sexual relationship 
thereby enter into the realm of what can properly be called the order of nature.”165 Moreover, the 
singular object of this nature is reproduction, “sexual intercourse, on all occasions, is in the nature 
of things affected in one way or another by its primary purpose, procreation.”166  
This argument will subsequently be rearticulated in Man and Woman He Created Them, 
There John Paul II inscribes this procreative objective directly into the body itself, writing of the 
“spousal nature” of the body revealed most conspicuously in reproduction: “there is inserted, in a 
future-related perspective, the procreative meaning of the body, that is, fatherhood and 
motherhood.”167 Here, in passages whose very language is almost identical to Marion’s, the child 
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marks the culmination of eros, the call of futurity, the “third” which seals love. “Procreation,” John 
Paul II writes, “brings it about that ‘the man and the woman (his wife)’ know each other 
reciprocally in the ‘third,’ originated in both.”168  
Insofar as many queer sexualities cannot procreate, they are written out of this account of 
sexuality and love. As Johnson notes, John Paul II’s phenomenological descriptions—much like 
Marion’s phenomenological descriptions in The Erotic Phenomenon—quietly slip from the merely 
descriptive to the normative. 
What appears in the guise of description serves prescription: human love and 
sexuality can appear in only one approved form, with every other way of being 
either sexual or loving left out altogether. Is it not important at least to acknowledge 
that a significant portion of humans—even if we take a ludicrously low percentage, 
at least tens of millions—are homosexual? Are they left outside of God’s plan if 
they are not part of the biblical story? Would not an adequate phenomenology of 
human sexuality, so concerned with ‘persons,’ after all, rather than statistics, take 
with great seriousness this part of the human family, who are also called to be 
loving, and in many fashions to create and foster the work and joy of creation?169  
 
Here, queer sexuality finds itself erased from the biblical narrative, as well as the 
phenomenological story of sexuality and love, precisely because it does not fit into the paradigm 
of sexual difference and reproductive futurity demanded by the Communio sexual ethics.170  
 But, the scathing character of the Communio critique and erasure of queer sexuality is not 
reducible to its conflict with natural law morality. Rather, the acerbic, even vitriolic tenor of this 
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critique—“the new ideology of evil”!—is a consequence of a larger role of sexual difference in 
Communio theology, one that extends well beyond the sphere of moral theology into the very heart 
and identity of the Church itself. 
 
C. From the Nuptial Body to Nuptial Ecclesiology 
 
The figure of Mary stands at the intersection of two key discourses in Communio theology: sexual 
difference and ecclesiology. For these thinkers, Mary is the epitome of femininity: she “is woman, 
pure and simple, in whom everything feminine in salvation history is summed up.”171 But, at the 
same time, she is the image of the church, which is called to “bear-Christ” and live responsively 
and obediently.  
In Mary two things become visible: first, that there is to be found the archetype of 
a Church that conforms to Christ, and second, that Christian sanctity is ‘Christ-
bearing,’ ‘Christophorous’ in essence and actualization. To the extent that the 
Church is Marian, she is a pure form which is immediately legible and 
comprehensible; and to the extent that Christians become Marian (or 
‘Christophorous,’ which is the same thing), Christ becomes just as simply legible 
and comprehensible in them as well.172 
 
This feminine image of the church—the “bride of Christ” (viz. Eph. 5; II Cor. 11; Rom. 
7)—is absolutely central to Communio ecclesiology, together with all of its associated stereotyped 
notions of femininity (e.g. fecundity, humility, virginity, passivity, etc.). As one reads in 
Ephesians:  
 
Wives, be subject to your husbands as you are to the Lord. For the husband is the 
head of the wife just as Christ is the head of the church, the body of which he is the 
Savior. Just as the church is subject to Christ, so also wives ought to be, in 
everything, to their husbands. Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the 
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church and gave himself up for her, in order to make her holy by cleansing her with 
the washing of water by the word, so as to present the church to himself in splendor, 
without a spot or wrinkle or anything of the kind—yes, so that she may be holy and 
without blemish. In the same way, husbands should love their wives as they do their 
own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. For no one ever hates his own 
body, but he nourishes and tenderly cares for it, just as Christ does for the church, 
because we are members of his body. “For this reason a man will leave his father 
and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two will become one flesh.” This is a 
great mystery, and I am applying it to Christ and the church. Each of you, however, 
should love his wife as himself, and a wife should respect her husband.173 
 
This tendency appears with considerable clarity and regularity in von Balthasar, who 
suggests that the “ordered sexual relationship,” that is, the heterosexual nuptial relation, “exists in 
Christian terms only in the encompassing space of the relationship of Christ-church, for which the 
original relationship of Adam-Eve remains an eloquent parable. … Here the Church is wholly 
female; it is conceiving, bearing, and giving birth to what she has received from Christ as his 
fruitfulness.”174 As Crammer notes, von Balthasar here “associates masculinity with divinity, and 
femininity with creation,”175 in a manner, it might be added, deeply reminiscent of Mary Daly’s 
aphorism: “if God is male, then the male is God.”176 This nuptial relationship between Christ and 
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church—and therefore sexual difference—is for von Balthasar “the central mystery of all 
theology,”177 insofar as it gathers together the disparate disputes within the Church. Thus, for 
example, von Balthasar’s insistence upon a masculine priesthood is emboldened by its analogical 
relationship to the nuptial Christ-Church relation: 
The institution [of the priesthood] guarantees the perpetual presence of Christ the 
Bridegroom for the Church, his Bride. So it is entrusted to men who, though they 
belong to the overall feminine modality of the Church, are selected from her and 
remain in her to exercise their office; their function is to embody Christ, who comes 
to the Church to make her fruitful.178 
 
 This turn to nuptiality will be continued and expanded by John Paul II’s Man and Women 
He Created Them. Like von Balthasar before him, John Paul II expands the gendered categories 
of his anthropology into an image of the greater union of the masculine Christ with the feminine 
Church, who mutually “interpenetrate”179 one another. “To the marriage of the first husband and 
wife [Adam and Eve], as a sign of the supernatural gracing of man in the sacrament of creation, 
there corresponds the marriage, or rather the analogy of the marriage, of Christ with the Church, 
as the fundamental great sign of the supernatural gracing of man in the sacrament of 
redemption.”180  
Yet, even more explicitly than von Balthasar, John Paul II insists upon the reciprocal nature 
of this analogy. That is to say, the church is not only understood by consideration of nuptiality, but 
inversely, the heterosexual nuptial relation is understood by consideration of the Christ-Church 
relation. As he writes, “the comparison of marriage (due to spousal love) with the relationship 
                                               
177 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Word and Revelation (New York: Herder and Herder, 1964), 161. 
 
178 Von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Volume III, 354. 
 
179 John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them, 431. 
 
180 Ibid., 508. 
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between ‘Yahweh and Israel’ in the Old Covenant, and between ‘Christ and the Church’ in the 
New, is at the same time decisive for the way of understanding marriage itself.”181 Therefore 
heterosexual marriage, as the proper image of the Christ-Church relation, becomes the only licit 
site for sexual intimacy. In this way, the necessarily heterosexual nature of the Communio sexual 
ethic is authorized and insured by the very structure of the church itself.  
In this regard, the theological motivation underlying Communio’s characteristically 
traditionalist reaction to the sexual liberation, feminist, and queer liberation movements—their 
retrenchment of heteronormativity and traditional gender roles—can be easily understood. The 
connection of these sexual themes to the church’s very self-identity, through its nuptial 
ecclesiology, almost inevitably fosters a dogmatic reading of sexual determination. Due to the 
nuptial correlation, any rejection of a strict relegation of sexual intimacy to heterosexual marriage 
subsequently strikes at the very meaning of the Church itself. According to Guy Hocquenghem, 
homosexual flirtation is “a formidable power of disjunction, … [an] extremely efficient … nuptial 
deconstructor.”182 But, for the Communio theologian, such a deconstruction of the ultimacy of the 
heterosexual nuptial relation is a direct attack upon the very identity and ultimacy of the Church 
itself—the “Bride of Christ.”  
Even more strongly, insofar as the Bride of Christ, the Church, is understood as the medium 
of the Holy Spirit’s activity in the world—for Communio affirms “the doctrine of a directly 
proportional relationship between the institutional church and the Holy Spirit’s work in 
                                               
181 Ibid., 502 [emphasis added]. Or again, “While the analogy used in Ephesians clarifies the mystery of the 
relationship between the Christ and the Church, at the same time it reveals the essential truth about marriage, 
namely, that marriage corresponds to the vocation of Christians only when it mirrors the love that Christ, the 
Bridegroom, gives to the Church, his Bride, and which the Church (in likeness to the wife who is ‘subject,’ and thus 
completely given) seeks to give back to Christ in return.” Ibid., 476. 
 
182 Guy Hocquenghem, The Screwball Asses, trans. Noura Wedell (South Pasadena: Semiotext(e), 2010), 76. 
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history”183—then any challenge to the primacy of heterosexual nuptiality is likewise a challenge 
to the Spirit, and even the internal constitution of the Godhead. For, as Crammer notes, “sexual 
difference, which permeates all creation, is derived analogously from something resembling sexual 
difference, ‘suprasexuality,’ within the Trinity.”184 “In trinitarian terms,” von Balthasar writes, 
“the Father, who begets him who is without origin appears primarily as (super-)masculine; the 
Son, in consenting, appears initially as (super-)feminine.”185 Thus, at least for von Balthasar, the 
nuptial relation of sexual difference is determinative of the very nature of the persons of the trinity. 
To affirm queer sexuality would be, at the same time, to destabilize this very understanding of the 
trinity itself.  
 While neither Henry nor Marion engages at length with ecclesiology, this nuptial theology 
is nevertheless subtly determinative of their phenomenologies of sexual difference. Thus, for 
example, the final division of Henry’s Incarnation is devoted to “salvation in the Christian 
sense.”186 Yet, the internal unity of this section has often eluded commentators. As Karl Hefty 
notes, “the intrinsic connections between the various parts of his analysis are here perhaps most 
difficult to decipher: power, freedom, anxiety, sin, desire, passivity, eroticism—how do these 
themes hold together under the subheading ‘salvation in the Christian sense’?”187 Communio 
nuptial theology offers at least one possible explanation for this confluence of themes—
                                               
183 Mongrain, The Systematic Thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar, 109. 
 
184 Crammer, “One sex or two?,” 94. 
 
185 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory: Volume V: The Last Act, trans. Graham 
Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 91. 
 
186 Henry, Incarnation, Division 3 “Phenomenology of Incarnation: Salvation in the Christian Sense.” For an 
analysis of Henry’s soteriology, see: Sylvain Camilleri, “Phenomenology and Soteriology in the ‘Christian Trilogy’ 
of Michel Henry,” trans. W. Christian Hackett, in Jeffrey Hanson and Michael R. Kelly (eds.) Michel Henry: The 
Affects of Thought (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012), 11-136. 
 
187 Karl Hefty, “Translator’s Preface” in Henry, Incarnation, xiv. 
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particularly the extensive discussion of the erotic, sexual sin, passivity, and the closing meditations 
on the body of Christ. Simply put, Henry seems here to be assuming, without explicitly marking 
the debt, the central features of Communio nuptial theology; wherein, the heterosexual erotic 
encounter between the active man and passive woman, is a model for the passive/receptive 
relationship of members of the Church (Body of Christ) and God (Life).  
 Precisely the same model can be found in Marion’s The Erotic Phenomenon, where an 
extended discourse on sexuality and the erotic culminates in a quasi-mystical experience of the 
divine. But here—in a phenomenological recapitulation of medieval commentaries on The Song 
of Songs—the experience of the divine is cast in decidedly erotic terms, here “God names himself 
with the very name of love.”188 More importantly still, one should not discount the subtle gendered 
language of these passages, following, as they do, Marion’s rather explicitly gendered account of 
femininity. Here, God—or more specifically, the Christ; since God “ends up … identifying himself 
in the incarnated Son”189—is the one who “loves first.” Christ, always gendered masculine, is the 
active lover. Whereas the reader, the recipient of Christ’s love, takes on precisely those 
characteristics of feminine sexuality as explicated by Marion above—passivity, receptivity, etc. 
What one finds here, albeit in covert language, is nothing other than the erotic union of the 
masculine Christ and the feminine church: or in Marion’s own language, “the nuptial distance that 
weds, without confusing, the visible and the invisible.”190  
 
 
* * *  
 
                                               
188 Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 221. 
 
189 Ibid., 222. 
 
190 Marion, The Idol and Distance, 9. 
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Given the consistent methodological and theological overlaps between Communio theology and 
radical phenomenology, it therefore becomes quite unsurprising to find Henry and Marion’s 
phenomenological analyses of sexuality and the flesh adopting an account of sexuality largely 
congruent with this traditionalist approach. In fact, the emphasis upon the stereotyped notions of 
sexual difference, the limitation of authentic love to heterosexual union, and the critique of 
technological intervention, are not only completely consistent with official magisterial doctrine, 
but more importantly, their justification borrows directly from Communio’s theological 
hermeneutic. Simply put, it appears increasingly clear that Henry and Marion’s ostensibly pure 
phenomenological analyses are, in this regard, marked by a pre-phenomenological—in this case, 
theological—source.  
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CHAPTER 5 - A Radical Phenomenology of the Sexual 
Flesh 
 
Pleasure does not derive from uniformity, for uniformity brings forth disgust and 
makes us dull, not happy: this very principle is a law of delight.  
G. W. F. Leibniz 
 
According to Martin Heidegger, “higher than actuality stands possibility.”1 This is the definitive 
role of phenomenology, to be a philosophy of the possible. For, already in Kant’s critical 
philosophy, the priority of possibility over actuality is the guiding intuition of his transcendental 
idealism,2 wherein the conditions of possibility of any experience are granted primacy over any 
particular (viz. actual) experience. Even having abandoned Kant’s transcendental I, Heidegger 
nevertheless recognizes this debt, glossing Kant: 
[Kant states,] “I entitle transcendental all knowledge which is occupied not so 
much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects insofar as this 
mode of knowledge is to be possible a priori.” Thus, transcendental knowledge does 
not investigate the being itself but the possibility of the precursory comprehension 
of the Being of the being.3  
 
This is what Heidegger understands as the proper role of the phenomenological reduction, granting 
access to the Being of beings.4  
                                               
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row 
Publishers, 1962), 63. 
 
2 “For [a thing] can never contain more in actuality than what was contained in its complete possibility.” Immanuel 
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 333 [A234/B287].  
 
3 Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James S. Churchill (Indianapolis: Indiana 
University Press, 1972), 20 [translation modified for consistency]. 
 
4 To again cite a key passage in Heidegger’s The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, “For Husserl, 
phenomenological reduction, which he worked out for the first time expressly in the Ideas Toward a Pure 
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (1913), is the method of leading phenomenological vision from 
 240 
Even Marion—who as we have seen, attempts to extend Heidegger’s decentering of the 
constituting subject even further—maintains this priority of possibility, employing it in order to 
mark the distinction between phenomenology and theology. As he writes: 
Of itself, phenomenology can identify the saturated phenomenon of the being-given 
par excellence only as a possibility—not only a possibility as opposed to actuality 
but above all a possibility of donation itself. … Its phenomenological analysis 
therefore bears only on its re-presentation, its ‘essence,’ and not directly on its 
being-given. The intuitive realization of that being-given requires, more than 
phenomenological analysis, the real experience of its donation, which falls to 
revealed theology. Between phenomenology and theology, the border passes 
between revelation as possibility and revelation as historicity. There could be no 
danger of confusion between these domains.5 
 
Thus, from Kant to Husserl, and from Heidegger to Marion, one can identify a distinct priority of 
phenomenological possibility, which must precede, even anticipate any theological claims to 
actuality. “Phenomenology from below,” Emmanuel Falque rightly recognizes, “precedes and 
grounds any theology from above.”6  
Thus, one might likewise postulate that any theological violence from above emerges from 
a more primordial phenomenological failure from below. Put another way, the previous chapter’s 
recourse to Communio theology is on its own insufficient to account for the patriarchy and 
heteronormativity endemic to radical phenomenology. In order for these theological 
presuppositions to take root, the phenomenological ground must already be fertile. Thus, the 
                                               
the natural attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the 
transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which objects are constituted as 
correlates of consciousness. For us, phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back from 
the apprehending of a being, whatever may be the character of that apprehension, to the understanding of the being 
of the being (projecting upon the way it is unconcealed).” Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 21. 
 
5 Jean-Luc Marion, “Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Relief for Theology,” Critical Inquiry 20, No. 4 (Summer, 
1994): 590.  
 
6 Emmanuel Falque, Crossing the Rubicon: The Borderlands of Philosophy and Theology, trans. Reuben Shank 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 124. 
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solution to this heteronormativity will not be found by simply evacuating these radical 
phenomenologies of their theological content. On the contrary, it will now be suggested that Henry 
and Marion’s phenomenologies of the flesh are themselves far from innocent. In Heideggerian 
language, it is failure to properly articulate the ontological that has permitted Henry and Marion 
to import an ontical account of sexuality—in place of a properly ontological account of the relation 
between sexuality and the flesh. The first half of this chapter will therefore seek to diagnose this 
phenomenological failure; while the second half will seek to undertake an alternative 
phenomenology of the sexual flesh, avoiding the respective missteps of Henry and Marion—while 
nonetheless seeking to remain true to the fundamental principles of their radical phenomenology. 
 
§I: The Monadic Flesh 
 
A. The Underlying Unity 
 
The previous chapters have sought both to explicate Henry and Marion’s phenomenologies of the 
flesh and to offer some basic critiques of their accounts of sexuality from the perspective of 
feminist and queer theory. Throughout these analyses, it has been necessary to articulate both the 
similarities and the evident differences between these two phenomenological philosophies. Thus, 
for example, it was suggested above (chapter 3) that a fundamental division between the two 
thinkers’ respective conceptions of radical phenomenology can be understood as a dispute 
regarding the notion of self-givenness: understood as the auto-affection of the self in Henry and as 
the self-givenness of the phenomenon to the gifted (hetero-affection) in Marion. This concern for 
the “same” in Henry and the “different” in Marion is likewise recapitulated at the level of their 
respective phenomenologies of sexuality: where Henry advocates a transcendental a-sexuality, and 
Marion, an explicit recourse to traditional notions of binary sexual difference. Given these 
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divergent, if not ostensibly opposed accounts of sexual difference, it will be helpful here to begin 
by articulating an underlying unity that justifies a univocal critique of these two unique figures.  
 A basic sketch of this commonality has already been seen above (chapter 4), in the figure 
of Hans Urs von Balthasar. For as Crammer made clear in her critique of von Balthasar’s account 
of sexual difference, a recourse to a traditional notion of a sexual hierarchy is by no means immune 
to the critique of “sameness.”7 The result, Crammer argues in regard to von Balthasar, is a “one-
sex” model of sexual difference. To recall the words of Alenka Zupančič, “the traditional division 
between masculine and feminine worlds, … actually does not see sexual difference as difference.”8  
Exactly the same tendency can be seen in Marion. For despite a consistent, clear recourse 
to sexual difference throughout Marion’s œuvre—just as his progenitors von Balthasar and John 
Paul II—the feminine is nonetheless rendered secondary and subservient to the theoretical (and 
theological) primacy of the masculine. The philosophical subject, as well as the subject of the 
erotic encounter is always either explicitly or implicitly masculine, whereas the (passive) recipient 
of the erotic caress is figured as distinctly feminine. Likewise, in the case of Henry, we have 
already explicitly shown (chapter 2) the way in which the seeming “a-sexuality” of his 
phenomenology actually masks an identical privilege of the masculine, the “universal male.”  
Thus, rather than opposed, these two perspectives are simply two sides of the same coin, 
photo-negatives of one another. Whether one defends a rigidly binary notion of sexual difference 
                                               
7 Corinne Crammer, “One sex or two? Balthasar’s theology of the sexes,” in David Moss and Edward T. Oakes 
(eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von Balthasar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Or, 
as Tonstad argues: “hierarchy does not and cannot provide real difference. If sexual difference turns out to mean 
merely hierarchical ordering, then it is not difference at all, because it is a repetition of the self-same in a receptive 
mode.” Linn Marie Tonstad, “Sexual Difference and Trinitarian Death: Cross, Kenosis, and Hierarchy in the Theo-
Drama,” Modern Theology 26:4 (October 2010), 619. 
 
8 Alenka Zupančič, What is Sex? (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2017), 36.  
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or seeks to erase sexual difference from the ultimate constitution of the subject entirely, the result 
is the same: the erasure and denigration of the feminine and sexual minorities.  
Are we therefore simply stuck with patriarchal and heteronormative accounts of sexuality, 
regardless of whether one seeks to amplify or diminish sexual difference? The answer, is perhaps 
yes, but only insofar as one presumes Henry and Marion’s account of the flesh. Thus, in order to 
develop a phenomenology of sexuality that is not encumbered by these pre-phenomenological 
prejudices, it will be necessary to, at the same time, reconsider the phenomenology of the flesh 
itself. Indeed, in order to construct an account of sexual difference that can thread the Charybdis 
of Henry’s transcendental a-sexuality and Scylla of Marion’s rigidly binary account of sexual 
difference—one must here undertake a phenomenology of the sexual flesh that neither erases the 
fundamental role of sexual difference nor reduces individuals to pre-established roles within a 
sexual hierarchy. 
But, before undertaking this positive phenomenological project, it will be necessary to 
name precisely that point where Henry and Marion’s respective phenomenologies have gone 
astray. Here I will draw forward a name to which I have periodically referred, but have not yet 
given a formal or systematic account: the monadic flesh. What Henry and Marion’s 
phenomenologies of the flesh have in common, despite the differences in their accounts of 
sexuality, is a presupposition that, unlike the body, the flesh must manifest in complete unity with 
itself; it is a flesh without gap or internal difference, and therefore without organs or members. The 
flesh has, in their hands, been dis-membered. Thus, we should not be surprised that, at the same 
time, the markers of these disavowed members within the social field, feminine and queer folk, 
have likewise become dysmembers—castigated and denigrated, excluded and excommunicated 
from the social body, if not (as will be suggested in chapter 7) the body of Christ.  
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 This theoretical dismemberment has replaced the truly incarnated flesh of the living 
individual, with all of its associated complexities of individual sexual difference, with the sterility 
of a disembodied soul and its mere life. For, as Kant rightly notes, “life without the feeling of the 
corporeal organ is merely consciousness of one’s existence.”9 Indeed, insofar as life is stripped of 
its members, so too are the members stripped of their life. Like the Valentinians against whom 
Henry rails, Henry and Marion have contradicted their own philosophies of life by themselves 
stripping life from the members of the flesh: “in this very manner do those men, by alleging that 
they are alive and bear life in their members, contradict themselves afterwards, when they represent 
these members as not being capable of [receiving] life.”10  
B. The Body and Soul in Leibniz’s Monadology 
To refer to Henry and Marion’s phenomenologies of the flesh as “monadic” is to immediately and 
intentionally invoke the spectre of Leibniz. For those familiar with radical phenomenology, and 
particularly the radical phenomenology of the flesh, this will undoubtedly seem an odd gesture. 
For, while the influence of Kant and Fichte, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, or the Fathers of the 
Church has been widely recognized, Leibniz seldom emerges in conversations of radical 
phenomenology. Even among the post-Cartesian rationalists, one might instead expect Spinoza, of 
whom Henry makes consistent recourse.11 Indeed, in his published works, Henry will almost never 
                                               
9 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 159. 
 
10 mIrenaeus, “Against Heresies” in The Writings of Irenaeus: Ante-Nicene Christian Library: Vol. IX, trans. 
Alexander Roberts and W. H. Rambaut (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1869), Book V, Ch. III [63]; cited by Henry in 
Incarnation, 136. 
 
11 See, e.g.: Michel Henry, Le bonheur de Spinoza: etude sur le Spinozisme de Michel Henry, (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires France, 2004). It is worth noting that Emmanuel Falque will take this Spinozist route in order to level 
a quite similar critique against Henry. What I have here called, in a Leibnizian mode, the monadic flesh, Falque will 
refer to as “a Spinozistic type of ‘carnal monism’.” Emmanuel Falque, “Is There a Flesh Without Body? A Debate 
with Michel Henry,” trans. Scott Davidson, Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy XXIV, No 1 (2016): 
139-166, 159. 
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cite Leibniz. And while Marion gives considerably more space to Leibniz, this is almost always in 
order to critique the primacy of the law of non-contradiction12 and the principle of sufficient 
reason.13 What one would search almost in vain for, is a recognition that the phenomenology of 
the flesh is indebted to Leibniz.14 In point of fact, the closest one will come to a recognition of this 
debt is Marion’s note that, according to Leibniz, the “monad is always carnal.”15  
 Despite this paucity of citation, Leibniz’s influence upon the radical phenomenology of the 
flesh is surprisingly direct, having been transmitted by a single mediator: Maine de Biran. While 
the Leibnizian character of de Biran’s spiritualism has often been recognized for its influence upon 
other French thinkers—such as Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze16—it has not been recognized 
in the phenomenological context. But, as was seen above (chapter 2), Maine de Biran constitutes 
the single greatest influence upon Henry’s conception of the relationship between the flesh and the 
body; appearing as the singular focus of Henry’s Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body and 
                                               
12 See, e.g.: Jean-Luc Marion, Negative Certainties, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2015), 104; Jean-Luc Marion, “Nothing is Impossible for God” in Believing in Order to See: On the 
Rationality of Revelation and the Irrationality of Some Believers, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2017), 94-97 
 
13 See, e.g.: Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 179-184; Marion, Negative Certainties, 106-114, 169; Jean-Luc 
Marion, “The Marches of Metaphysics,” in The Essential Writings, ed. Kevin Hart (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2013), 48-49; Marion, “Nothing is Impossible for God” in Believing in Order to See, 94-97. 
 
14 In an ironic gesture, Henry writes in Incarnation’s discussion of the organic body that the “great Cartesians could 
only avoid the aporia [of Descartes’ recourse to the pineal gland] by entrusting the possibility of the soul’s action on 
the body to wanton speculative constructions—Malebranche’s occasionalism, Spinoza’s parallelism, Leibniz’s pre-
established harmony,” thereby effacing the key influence of Leibniz on his own account of the organic body. Michel 
Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, trans. Karl Hefty (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 74. 
 
15 Jean-Luc Marion, In Excess: Studies in Saturated Phenomena, trans. Robyn Horner and Vincent Berraud (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 98. But even here, this is only noted in order to be immediately turned 
against Leibniz, “and it is why, to the contrary of Gottfried Leibniz, we understand that monads can die.” Ibid. 
 
16 This is, of course, due in part to Deleuze’s own self-recognition of the influence of Leibniz. See, e.g.: Gilles 
Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, trans. Tom Conley, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1992). For Deleuze and de Biran, see, e.g.: Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life, trans. Anne Boyman 
(New York: Zone Books, 2005), 28. 
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in key sections of Incarnation. Moreover, insofar as “Marion basically adopts Henry’s account of 
the self-affection of the flesh,”17 one can therefore also transitively mark the influence of de Biran 
on Marion.  
In fact, key terms in Henry’s account of the flesh, including the “organic body,” and the 
“resisting continuum” are original to neither Henry nor de Biran, but rather have clear precedence 
in Leibniz. For while, as Marion rightly noted, Leibniz always thinks the monad as “carnal,” his 
term for this carnality is “organic body” [corps organique or corpus organicum], for which the 
soul functions as an entelechy.18 Henry himself briefly recognizes this debt in the Philosophy and 
Phenomenology of the Body, writing, “thus it is that to the original being of our body is bound a 
sort of organic body from which, according to the word of Leibniz which Maine de Biran cites, 
the soul is never separated.”19  
 But, to what extent is de Biran actually Leibnizian? As Naert notes, the influence is so 
great, that “it is banal to repeat that Leibniz is everywhere present in the œuvre of Maine de 
Biran.”20 This influence is most clear in his 1819 Exposition de la doctrine philosophique de 
                                               
17 Christina M. Gschwandtner, Degrees of Givenness: On Saturation in Jean-Luc Marion (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2014), 95. 
 
18 “It is necessary,” he writes of the soul, for example, “that there be a persisting individual substance over and 
above the organic body.” G. W. Leibniz, “Notes on Some Comments by Michel Angelo Fardella (1690)” in 
Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 104. He will likewise 
speak often of “a certain resistance, by which a body opposes motion per se” G. W. Leibniz, “From the Letters to de 
Volder (1699-1706)” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1989), 172. 
 
19 Michel Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, trans. Girard Etzkorn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1975), 122. Although uncited, Henry probably here has in mind: Maine de Biran’s assertion: “sur quoi il est 
important d'observer que, dans le système de Leibnitz, l’âme n’étant jamais séparée d’une sorte de corps organique, 
suivant les affections duquel elle représente harmoniquement ce qui est hors d'elle, et ce corps ou cette monade 
primitive ne faisant que se développer à la naissance et s’envelopper à la mort, sans cesser d’être uni à l'âme, il ne 
saurait y avoir en aucun sens d’idées innées ou séparées de toute sensation ou affection interne.” Maine de Biran, 
Oeuvres inédites de Maine de Biran: Tome I (Paris: Dezorby, E. Magdeleine, 1839), 164. 
 
20 “Il est banal de répéter que Leibniz est partout présent dans l'œuvre de Maine de Biran” Émilienne Naert, “Maine 
de Biran lecteur de Leibniz,” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 88(4): 499-513, 499 [translation my own]. It is of 
course necessary to recognize that, like every philosopher, de Biran cites his predecessors in order to support his 
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Leibniz, but it nonetheless likewise evident in texts more directly influential on radical 
phenomenology, particularly his Essai sur les fondements de la Psychologie, de Biran’s text most 
commonly cited by Henry, which includes an extended analysis of the “Système de Leibnitz.”21 
 Entering the philosophical scene in the wake of the Galilean reduction, Leibniz’s 
philosophy of the body begins with “matter in itself.”22 This raw materiality or “primary matter,” 
is distinguished by its nature as an “aggregate”:  
A body is not a substance but an aggregate of substances, since it is always further 
divisible, and any given part always has another part, to infinity. … It necessarily 
contains in itself an infinite multitude, or an infinity of bodies, each of which, in 
turn, contains an infinite number of substances.23  
 
This aggregate, insofar as it is mere passive material extension, is “something incomplete,”24 and 
ultimately, possessed of a certain irreality: “where there are only beings by aggregation, there 
aren’t any real beings.”25 This mere aggregation of matter forces Leibniz to identify a source of 
                                               
own philosophical program. Nevertheless, as Dunham shows, de Biran did offer a genuine Leibnizianism, albeit a 
“selective Leibnizianism,” which drew upon genuinely Leibnizian insights. See: Jeremy Dunham, “A Universal and 
Absolute Spiritualism Maine de Biran’s Leibniz” in Maine de Biran, The Relationship between the Physical and the 
Moral in Man, trans. Darian Meacham and Joseph Spadola (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016).  
 
21 De Biran, Oeuvres inédites de Maine de Biran: Tome I, 157-165. 
 
22 G. W. Leibniz, “From the Letters to Johann Bernoulli (1698-99)” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 167.  
 
23 Leibniz, “Notes on Some Comments by Michel Angelo Fardella (1690),” 103. 
 
24 Leibniz, “From the Letters to Johann Bernoulli (1698-99),” 167. As he further clarifies, “what is ‘incomplete’ for 
me here? I respond: it is the passive without the active, and the active without the passive” (Ibid.). As he notes in A 
New System of Nature, “I perceived that it is impossible to find the principles of a true unity in matter alone, or in 
what is only passive, since everything in it is only a collection or aggregation of parts to infinity. Now, a multitude 
can derive its reality only from true unities, which have some other origin” (G. W. Leibniz, “A New System of the 
Nature and Communication of Substances, and of the Union of the Soul and Body [1695]” in Philosophical Essays, 
trans. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 139). Elsewhere, he will mark extension as 
such, as “incomplete” in this manner: “I don’t think that substance consists of extension alone, since the concept of 
extension is incomplete” (Leibniz, “From the Letters to de Volder [1699-1706],” 171).  
 
25 G. W. Leibniz, “From the Letters to Arnauld (1686-87)” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 85. Such purely aggregate bodies of mere extension are irreal, 
precisely insofar as they are the mere products of mental representation, “whose unity derives from thought” 
(Leibniz, “From the Letters to de Volder [1699-1706],” 175). The similarities between this account of material 
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unity outside of the body, in the soul, in order to account for the experienced unity and subjectivity 
of the individual.26 As he writes to Fardella: 
Now since I am truly a single individual substance, unresolvable into many others, 
the permanent and constant subject of my actions and passions, it is necessary that 
there be a persisting individual substance over and above the organic body. This 
persisting individual substance is completely different from the nature of body, 
which, assuming that it is in a state of continual flux of parts, never remains 
permanent, but is perpetually changed. And so, there must be some incorporeal, 
immortal substance in man, over and above the body, something, indeed, incapable 
of being resolved into parts.27 
 
Here Leibniz not only identifies the necessity of a soul, but likewise marks its key essential feature. 
The soul is defined by its incapacity for division into parts;28 it is, as he will soon name it, a 
“monad.”  As he subsequently opens his Monadology: “the Monad, which we shall discuss here, 
is nothing but a simple substance that enters into composites—simple, that is, without parts.”29 
Insofar as the monad has no parts, “neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is possible.”30 
                                               
extension and Henry’s own critique of the irreality of representation bears a striking similarity that seems to betray 
direct influence.  
 
26  “I confess that the body by itself, without the soul, has only a unity of aggregation, but that the reality inhering in 
it derives from the parts composing it.” Leibniz, “From the Letters to Arnauld (1686-87),” 88. Or again, “By means 
of the soul or form there is a true unity corresponding to what is call the self in us.” Leibniz, “A New System of the 
Nature,” 142. 
 
27 Leibniz, “Notes on Some Comments by Michel Angelo Fardella (1690),” 104. 
 
28 “For if a man is the I [Ego] itself, then he cannot be divided, nor can he perish, nor is he a homogeneous part of 
matter.” Ibid., 105. Or again, “I saw that these forms and souls must be indivisible, as our mind is.” Leibniz, “A 
New System of the Nature,” 139. 
 
29 G. W. Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology (1714)” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger 
Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 213. A substance or monad is, he earlier wrote, “a being 
capable of action. It is simple or composite. A simple substance is that which has no parts.” (G. W. Leibniz, 
“Principles of Nature and Grace, Based on Reason [1714],” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew 
[Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989], 207). 
 
30 Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology (1714),” 213. 
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 This radical division between the aggregate of the organic body and the absolute unity of 
the monadic soul only serves to exacerbate the problem of the unity of the soul and the body.31 
The solution proposed by Leibniz is his (in)famous thesis of the pre-established harmony: “God 
originally created the soul … in such a way that everything must arise from it from its own depths, 
through a perfect spontaneity relative to itself, and yet with a perfect conformity relative to external 
things.”32 Yet, as his critics were quick to point out, this speculative thesis does little to 
metaphysically unite the body and the soul. Indeed, Leibniz admits as much himself: “I must 
admit,” he writes, “that it would have been very wrong of me to object to the Cartesians that the 
agreement God immediately maintains, between soul and body, according to them, does not bring 
about a true union, since, to be sure, my pre-established harmony would do no better than it 
does.”33 Thus, rather than offer such a metaphysical unification, he writes, “I tried to account only 
for the phenomena,”34 that is, the phenomena of unification.  
But these phenomena of relation between soul and body—that is, the subjective experience 
of will, e.g. movement—remain subordinate to a more primordial phenomenological distinction 
between “two kingdoms.”35 True metaphysical unity is not possible between the soul and the 
                                               
31 “Locating a notion of body in extension alone, are thus, forced to appeal to God for explaining the union between 
soul and body, and indeed for explaining the interaction of bodies with one another. For we must admit that it is 
impossible that bare extension, containing geometrical notions alone, is capable of action and passion.” G. W. 
Leibniz, “A Specimen of Dynamics, Toward Uncovering and Reducing to Their Causes Astonishing Laws of Nature 
Concerning the Forces of Bodies and Their Actions on One Another” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), 130. 
 
32  Leibniz, “A New System of the Nature,” 145. 
 
33 G. W. Leibniz, “Remark of the Author of the System of Pre-established Harmony on a Passage from the 
Mémoires de Trévoux of March 1704 (1708)” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1989), 197. 
 
34 Ibid. 
 
35  Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology (1714),” 223. 
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body—but only conformity—because the soul and the body follow distinct “laws” or regimes of 
phenomenality: “these principles have given me a way of naturally explaining the union, or rather 
the conformity of the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own laws and the body also 
follows its own.”36  
The phenomenality of the body—as an aggregate—conforms to its material extension: 
“bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or of motions.”37 The monadic soul, on the 
other hand, acts “from its own depths”:38 “the monad’s natural changes come from an internal 
principle.”39 In fact, the central conviction of Leibnizian dynamics is the necessity, above and 
before extension, of a principle of action: “in corporeal things there is something over and above 
extension, in fact, something prior to extension, namely, that force of nature implanted everywhere 
by the Creator.”40 Thus, on this account, it is only because substances act from their own internal 
impetus (conatus or nisus) that there is any activity or movement whatsoever. Moreover, insofar 
as the soul generates its own activity from its interiority, it is likewise immune to all hetero-
affection: “monads have no windows”41 as Leibniz famously argued.   
The result of this analysis is a conception of the soul which is defined in its very essence 
by its radical exclusion of every “part” or member. This exclusion necessitates an internal—one 
                                               
36 Ibid. [emphasis added]. 
 
37 Ibid. 
 
38 Leibniz, “From the Letters to Arnauld (1686-87),” 78. 
 
39 Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology (1714),” 214. 
 
40 G. W. Leibniz, “A Specimen of Dynamics,” 118. This “primitive force” is nothing other than the soul itself: 
“Primitive force (which is nothing but the first entelechy) corresponds to the soul or substantial form” (Ibid., 119). 
 
41 Leibniz, “The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology (1714),” 214. Or, more formally, “There is no way of 
explaining how a monad can be altered or changed internally by some other creature, since one cannot transpose 
anything in it” Ibid., 213. 
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might say, following Henry, auto-affective—conception of activity. Whereas, on the other hand, 
the body is defined precisely as an aggregate relation of extensive members: partes extra partes. 
In his “selective Leibnizianism” de Biran will adopt precisely this scheme, but with one central 
caveat. Where Leibniz found the soul, de Biran finds a subjective experience of the body. Thus, 
what Henry names de Biran’s discovery of the subjective body, might instead be recognized as de 
Biran’s incarnation of the Leibnizian soul. Yet, even incarnated, this subjective flesh will carry 
forward much of its Leibnizian baggage. Including, most importantly, its monadic character; the 
Biranian subjective body—and its experience of effort—does not have parts. Thus, via this 
Biranian influence, radical phenomenology will likewise cast the organic body into the exteriority 
of the world, while the flesh will be marked by its radical exclusion of every part or member from 
its living immanence.  
 
C. The Monadic Flesh: Against the Organic Body 
 
 
According to Henry, the flesh manifests without gap, the givenness of its auto-affectivity is an 
absolute givenness of the self in its totality: “feeling could not attain the ego to a more or less strict 
relationship; the feeling could not attain the ego as something exterior, capable of touching it to a 
greater or less degree.”42 In the manifestation of affectivity the self is saturated by a givenness 
without remainder, one feels oneself in one's entirety: it is a “total exposure.”43 It is a monadic 
                                               
42 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 466. 
 
43 Michel Henry, “Material Phenomenology and Language (or, Pathos and Language),” Continental Philosophy 
Review 32 (1999): 355. 
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account of the flesh.44 This monadic character is nowhere more clearly apparent than in Henry’s 
reflections upon the “organic body.”45  
Henry first turns to the language of the organic body in an attempt to understand the 
phenomenological experience of the “I can.” This language is introduced by Husserl’s 
phenomenology of the living body in Ideas II, the subjective experience of the body is there 
particularly marked by its capacity for action. As Husserl writes, “the Ego has the ‘faculty’ (the ‘I 
can’) to freely move this Body [Leib].”46 For this tradition—from Husserl, to Merleau-Ponty, and 
Henry—the flesh is distinguished from the objective body by its unique capacity to act.  
Yet, phenomenologically investigated, this “I can”—even within the immanence of the 
radical reduction—seems to run up against concrete limits. I can only move my flesh so far, so 
fast, in specific manners, etc. Henry describes these moments of resistance through the Leibnizian 
language of the “resisting continuum,” the boundary condition of the “I can.” When this resistance 
reaches a level which not only merely resists, but fully stops the “I can”—when “this resistance, 
lived internally through this effort, no longer gives way”47—one experiences the limit of one’s 
                                               
44 Thus, for example, in the erotic experience, “le amants n’ont pas conscience de leurs organes comme organes.”  
Michel Henry, “Notes sur le phénomène érotique” in Jean Leclercq, (ed), “Michel Henry: Notes sur le phénomène 
érotique” Revue Internationale Michel Henry 4 (2013): 39. 
 
45 Itself a reflection on Leibniz’s “organic body.” 
 
46 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second 
Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 159. As Merleau-Ponty paradigmatically echoes 
the master, “consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I can’.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 1962), 159. Henry almost simultaneously 
makes the same claim, writing in 1948-49 that “the ego is a power, the cogito does not mean an ‘I think’ but an ‘I 
can’.” Although he will later nuance this claim, affirming Maine de Biran’s identification of the ‘I think’ and the ‘I 
can’; “the Biranian cogito is in no way opposed to the Cartesian cogito, there is no question of opposing an ‘I can’ to 
an ‘I think’ because the whole Biranian analysis of effort has as its sole and essential result the determining of this 
effort as a mode of subjectivity itself.” Michel Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, trans. Girard 
Etzkorn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 53, 55 
 
47 Henry, “Material Phenomenology,” 127. 
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own flesh as a novel manifestation of the body. This manifestation is distinct from the objective 
body insofar as it is internally lived. But this manifestation is likewise distinct from the flesh, 
which, insofar as it is immediately given to itself without gap or remainder, is marked by an 
“original interior unity.”48 “Consequently,” Henry writes, “it is not two bodies which we must 
distinguish, but rather three.”49 Following Leibniz and de Biran, Henry names this third 
manifestation: the organic body.50  
The organic body functions as something like a middle-ground between the flesh and the 
objective body. It is, in a sense, within immanence, but is not the original corporeity of the flesh. 
It is neither inside nor outside, but, like the skin, is the boundary-line between the immanence of 
the flesh and the exteriority of the body; it is “the limit against which [the “I can’s”] effort is 
broken.”51 Given this position, it is marked by unique phenomenological features. Thus, for 
example, whereas the various affective tonalities are fully united in the flesh, in the organic body 
these various faculties discover their own unique limits, differentiating themselves from one and 
                                               
48 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 609. 
 
49 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 129.  
 
50 Indeed, Henry’s preparatory notes for Incarnation, reveal even this tripartite conception to be limited. Henry there 
marks a seven-part “table of an exhaustive phenomenology of the body”:  
 
“L’Archi-chair; 
La chair: le je peux, le corps se mouvant et le touchant/touché; 
La chair auto-constitué; 
Le corps organique; 
Le corps résistant; 
Le corps objectif de l’expérience courante de la science; 
L’image du corps”  
 
Grégori Jean, “Désir, négativité, spectralité: Michel Henry et le problème de l’erôs,” Alter, “L’érôs,” No. 20 (2012), 
77-78. 
 
51 Henry, Incarnation, 206. 
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other in the form of organs or members;52 the organic body “allows to appear in it structures to 
which we will attribute the names of the different parts of our body, which will be for us our 
members, our torso, our neck, our muscles, etc.”53 In this way, “the original being of our body is 
bound a sort of organic body.”54 But this provokes further questions, what is the force of this 
“bound”? Does Henry affirm an originary or a derivative givenness of the organic body and its 
organs or members? Is Henry’s account of the original body truly monadic as has been suggested 
above?  
 For Henry, “the process of their constitution allows us to establish … a rigorous order”55 
between the various manifestations of the body. The flesh, insofar as its affectivity constitutes the 
                                               
52 “This division of our senses—insofar as it is a division of our organs of sensing—rests, in reality, on a 
transcendental division of our powers of sensing, on the division which exists between seeing, and hearing, 
touching, etc., and which is originally given to us in the internal transcendental experience which we have of the 
subjective being of our body” (Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 112). Thus, “our body is given 
us in a way such that each of its original powers, concerning which we have an immediate knowledge in the 
subjective experience of movement which constitutes its essence, also manifests itself to us in the form of an organ 
or some physiological or spatial determination. The difference between the original being of this power and the 
organ which seems to be its instrument is in no way situated on an ontic level, it is not a difference between 
something and something else, it is an ontological difference, not a difference in individuality, but in the manner of 
being” (Ibid., 116). 
 
53 Ibid., 122. Importantly, despite this internal differentiation, Henry remains firm that the extension of the organic 
body is phenomenologically distinct from the extension of the objective world. This is because the organic body 
represents the subjective experience of the organ. Thus, these are not the organs as understood natural-scientifically: 
“their original phenomenological being has nothing to do with anatomic or physiological determinations which 
science takes as its object” (Ibid., 123). As he will later reaffirm, “our organic body is the whole of our organs thus 
extended. And such organs are different from the anatomical structures that science takes for its object. They are 
neither dis-posed nor ex-posed partes extra partes, but are held together and are as though held up out of nothing by 
the ‘I can’ of our original corporeity” (Henry, Incarnation, 150). Nor are these organs experienced in the irreality of 
mere thought, but in the practical and existential subjectivity of reality: “it is not represented, because subjective 
movement and it alone constitutes its proof and experience, this organic or interior space has nothing in common 
with exterior space” (Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 122); or again, “if one still wants to speak 
here of exteriority, it is an exteriority fundamentally foreign to that of the world in so far as the experience in which 
it occurs excludes from itself every representative element” (Henry, Incarnation, 148). Therefore, rather than 
speaking of the exteriority of the world, Henry here speaks of an “internal extension” (Ibid., 149 and Henry, 
Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 122) or “quasi-extension” (Henry, Incarnation, 165) of the organic 
body. 
 
54 Ibid., 122 [emphasis added]. 
 
55 Ibid., 164. 
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transcendental condition of all experience whatsoever, is in no way constituted by external factors. 
In fact, for Henry, its transcendental character is so radical as to exclude it from the region of 
constitution entirely.56 The same cannot be said for the organic body. Unlike the flesh, the organic 
body undergoes a process of constitution whereby the original givenness of the sensation in the 
auto-affectivity of the flesh is localized onto a determinate member of the organic body. As Henry 
writes:  
The phenomenology of flesh has taught us to distinguish carefully original 
impressions and constituted impressions: only the former are real. Thus, only the 
original impressions of movement are real, as well as the impressions of pressure 
considered in their auto-impressionality. But situated on the organic body and on 
its limit, they are nothing more than constituted sensations.57 
 
This argument is given its most focused explication in Henry’s critique of Scheler’s account of 
sensible feelings [Empfindungsgefühle] in §66 of The Essence of Manifestation.58  
For Scheler, whereas vital feelings—such as health or fatigue—“participate in the total 
extension of the lived body,”59 the sensible feelings—such as an itch or a headache—are centered 
upon a particular part or organ of the body; the sensible feeling’s “exclusive form of existence is 
to be at some time and at some place on the lived body”60—it “is given as extended and localized 
                                               
56 “Considered in its originality, actually, our flesh is neither constituting nor constituted.” Ibid., 155. 
 
57 Henry, Incarnation, 209. 
 
58 Despite his critique of Scheler’s account of Empfindungsgefühle, Henry nevertheless finds in Scheler a 
considerable step forward from the traditional occidental conception of feelings. According to Talon-Hugon, Henry 
identifies three principal ways in which Scheler advances beyond his predecessors: “avoir compris l’autonomie des 
sentiments par rapport à la sensibilité; avoir aperçu leur positivité; [et] avoir saisi l’indépendance de l’affect par 
rapport aux circonstances.” Carole Talon-Hugon, “Affectivité et révélation: Michel Henry, lecteur de Max Scheler” 
in Michel Henry, eds. Jean-Marie Brohm and Jean Leclercq (Lausanne, Suisse: L’Age d’Homme, 2009), 303. 
 
59 Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, trans. Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 338. 
 
60 Ibid., 334. 
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in specific parts of the lived body.”61 Nevertheless, as Scheler subsequently notes, while they are 
“structured according to the more or less clearly experienced units of organs of the lived body,” 
they are not structured “on the basis of those units as perceived from the outside.”62 That is to say, 
like Henry’s organic body, Scheler denies that sensible feelings manifest within the horizon of 
objectivity, instead marking a specific subjective mode of extension unique to the organic body. 
Nevertheless, despite this nuance, Henry insists that feelings (i.e. affections or impressions) 
must be understood outside of any extension, both that of objectivity or that of the organic body. 
As he writes elsewhere, “where this self-sensing that determines affectivity as pure affective 
tonality, as pure impression, and as life, occurs, there is no space—neither that of things nor that 
of the organic body wherein impression is objected.”63 For Henry, the situation of feeling within 
any extensive field necessitates the subservience of feeling to the mode of manifestation of that 
field, a mode of manifestation that is in this case transcendent and therefore representational.64 
Thus, Henry suggests that Scheler’s account of the sensible feelings “confuses two things: on the 
one hand, the original revelation of feeling to itself … which consists in this very affectivity; on 
the other hand, the representation of this feeling … in the ontological milieu of representation.”65 
This confusion fails to recognize the “ontological heterogeneity of [these two] essences, of the 
                                               
61 Ibid., 333 [emphasis added]. They are “fundamentally different … in that [they are] local and extended, on or in a 
body.” Manfred S. Frings, Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction into the World of a Great Thinker (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1965), 30. 
 
62 Ibid. [emphasis added]. 
 
63 Michel Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993), 77. 
 
64 For every transcendent horizon of visibility is likewise the horizon of representation—as Heidegger notes “to 
represent [vorstellen] means to bring what is present at hand before oneself as something standing over against.” 
Martin Heidegger, “The Age of World Picture,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. 
William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 131. 
 
65 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 606. 
 
 257 
essence of affectivity [on the one hand] and of the transcendent spatial Being of the organic 
body,”66 on the other. In his own words: 
Because sensible feeling is a phenomenon in the organs whose feeling it is and 
because the extension of the organic body and of the time peculiar to it, viz. 
extension as such, ultimately constitutes the mode of manifestation and the reality 
of this feeling, the status of the latter, its ontological and phenomenological status, 
is clearly defined and this status determines its reality as beginning with extension 
wherein it is extended and beginning with what constitutes the foundation of this 
extension as an extended and transcendent reality.67 
 
That is to say, for Henry, Scheler’s account of sensible feelings is confused precisely because, 
while it recognizes that the purely psychic feeling or spiritual feeling “in no way participates in 
extension,”68 it fails to recognize that this applies with equal rigor to all feelings, including the 
sensible.69 Our feelings—even our sensible feelings—are not grounded in the organs or members 
of our extended organic body, Henry argues, but within the non-extended, non-temporal lived 
immanence of the flesh.  
In order to illustrate this argument, Henry draws forward the phenomenon of phantom limb 
syndrome as a particularly illuminating case study. As he writes: 
How could sensorial feeling, if it is really found in a part of the body, if its Being 
is identified with the Being of this part and with the portion of extension which 
delimits it, subsist when this part is destroyed, how could the feeling exist when the 
part does not exist? … The Being of the mnemonic image of the amputated member 
is, by definition and essence, an imaginary Being, the Being of the sensorial feeling, 
far from being able to be identified with the extended-Being of the image wherein 
the feeling is represented, rather differs in an essential manner from it, as the real 
differs from the imaginary.”70 
                                               
66 Ibid., 610. 
 
67 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 606 [translation altered]. 
 
68 Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, 342. 
 
69 “Pour Michel Henry, au contraire, tous les sentiments sont absolus.” Talon-Hugon, “Affectivité et révélation,” 
304. 
 
70 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 611. Henry repeats this argument in The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 
writing: “where this self-sensing that determines affectivity as pure affective tonality, as pure impression, and as life, 
occurs, there is no space—neither that of things nor that of the organic body wherein impression is objected. Proof 
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Thus, since the sensible feeling can be removed from its connection to the bodily organ, this 
connection is not essential (eidetic). Indeed, insofar as sensible feelings are non-intentional,71 
insofar as their manifestation presupposes no gap between feeling and feeler,72 it seems that they 
must manifest outside of any transcendent horizon.  
In sum, for Henry the organic body and its members are derivative of the first givenness of 
affectivity in the flesh.73 While sensible feelings may be projected or localized on the organs of 
this derivative body, they do not find their genesis there. Thus, despite his initial intuitions to the 
contrary, Henry ultimately affirms that “the constituted organic body is already a represented 
body,”74 and depends upon the non-constituted, non-represented flesh as its transcendental 
condition.75 Therefore, from the perspective of the flesh, the organic body can only appear as an 
“objective body whose configurations, parts, members, organs, and numerous particularities … 
have nothing in common with what it experiences originally, [these members can] appear to it only 
as incomprehensible and, to put it briefly, absurd determinations.”76 And this remains the case, 
                                               
may be found in dreams, where space is an illusion but where the dreamer seems to see that the wall is yellow, or in 
the illusion of amputees who no longer have feet and yet feel pain in them: this pain's being is solely impressive, is 
pure self-impression.” Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, 77. 
 
71 “Purely sensible feelings, therefore lack even the most primitive form of intentionality.” Scheler, Formalism in 
Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, 333. 
 
72 The Sensible feeling “does not ‘face’ contents in any way and is without any ‘intention’ toward them” (Ibid. 342), 
thus it “cannot be separated from the contents of sensation” (Ibid. 333). 
 
73 “The theory of subjective movement permits us to understand the profound unity which traverses all these 
elements and which is found in the first as original unity [the flesh/original corporeity], in the second as a founded 
unity [the organic body].” Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 91. 
 
74 Henry, Incarnation, 165. 
 
75 “The relationship of our organs among themselves, which seems to constitute the foundation for the internal 
coherence of the organic body, really rests on the relationship of each of these organs to the power which moves 
them. … [it] implies the existence of a more original subjective unity.” Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of 
the Body, 124. 
 
76 Henry, Incarnation, 195.  
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despite the fact that this organic body is lived internally, even despite the fact that it remains within 
the radical reduction.77 It is, Henry writes, “somewhat erroneous to identify [the organic body’s] 
being with that of the original body”;78 “the being of the organic body is an abstract being, that of 
itself it has neither autonomy nor ontological sufficiency.”79 The organic body is “in the world, in 
its appearing.”80  
Behind this technical critique of Scheler, the simple fact is that, for Henry, the organic 
body’s worldly character is simply evidenced by its internal differentiation into organs or 
members. For Henry’s monadic account of subjectivity, the ipseity of subjective experience—its 
mineness—necessitates a primordial transcendental unity at the origin of all affectivity, which 
would serve as “the principle of unity of a power to which is given the infinite diversity of sensible 
impressions.”81 Such a unifying power cannot emerge from an organic body which is constituted 
from a manifold of diverse parts; but only from a primordial unity which precedes all 
differentiation: the monadic flesh. As Henry writes,  
The transcendent unity of the sensible world … is that of the resisting continuum 
which traverses the various sensorial worlds and in each of them gives a foundation 
to its reality, … this unity rests on the unity of the power which constitutes this 
single and real continuum, it rests on the unity of our subjective body. The latter, 
in turn, rests on the internal structure of subjectivity itself wherein resides the 
ultimate origin and the essence of all possible unity in general.82 
                                               
 
77 Henry importantly notes: “the fact that the organic body does not fall beneath the blow of the reduction in no way 
signifies that it has the same ontological dignity as the original being of the subjective body.” Henry, Philosophy 
and Phenomenology of the Body, 126-127. “Its phenomenological status is radically different from that of our 
original body.” Ibid., 194. 
 
78 Ibid., 125-126. 
 
79 Ibid., 126. 
 
80 Henry, The Essence of Manifestation, 214. 
 
81 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 81. 
 
82 Ibid., 84. 
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Here Henry traces a hierarchical ladder of unification from the absolute diversity of the 
transcendent, sensible world to the absolute monadic subjectivity of the I—a ladder wherein the 
unity of each rung is granted by its preceding rung. For such an account, unity always precedes 
difference, and any difference or distanciation can at most be regarded as penultimate to its 
ultimate founding unity. 
D. The Monadic Flesh: The Invisability of Saturation  
 
While Marion does not undertake an analysis of the organ or member with the directness of his 
predecessor, it is nevertheless possible to establish a clear privilege of the whole over the part in 
Marion’s notion of saturation. For Marion, the saturated phenomenon—including the flesh—is 
always given in “one fell swoop.”83  
This privilege of the whole over its parts, like Marion’s account of sexuality, finds clear 
precedence in Hans Urs von Balthasar. For, according to von Balthasar, the revelatory experience 
of Christ is given by God, and grasped by the believer, as a “Gestalt”: a totality, whole, or figure.  
In this ‘figure’ there resides an inner harmony which resists every division into 
parts as well as every combination of parts. Should one want to designate the 
individual figures of the Old Testament as such ‘parts’ which, by combination, 
would result in the figure of Christ, prophet, king, priest, sacrificial lamb, servant 
of Yahweh, Son of man, etc., then we would have to say that the simple whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts, that Christ lived his simple, indivisible life without 
anxious worry about integrating all possible partial aspects.84 
 
To subordinate the Gestalt of revelation to its “parts” or “partial aspects,” would be to destroy its 
“indivisible life,” the living potency of this revelatory experience: “anatomy can be practiced only 
                                               
83 Marion, Being Given, 236. 
 
84 Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Faith and ‘Objective Evidence’ of the Gestalt of Jesus” in The von Balthasar Reader, 
ed. Medard Kehl and Werner Löser, trans. Robert J. Daly and Fred Lawrence (New York: Crossroad, 1982), 127. 
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on a dead body, since it is opposed to the movement of life and seeks to pass from the whole to its 
parts and elements.”85  
This same privilege of the whole is likewise evident in Marion’s account of revelation. For 
Marion, who aims to explicate its phenomenological possibility, revelation is the redoubled 
paradox [paradoxoton],86 the “saturation of saturation.”87 As he writes, “the phenomenon of 
revelation is therefore defined as a phenomenon that concentrates in itself the four senses of the 
saturated phenomenon”88—that is, event, idol, flesh, and icon. As such, revelation is likewise 
understood to saturate all categories of the understanding: quantity, quality, relation, and modality. 
In this regard, like the event, the phenomenon of revelation is understood as “perfectly 
unforeseeable.”89 It is, as Marion elsewhere describes it, invisable, unable to be envisaged.90 This 
invisability is likewise the defining characteristic of the event: wherein “nobody can claim for 
himself a ‘here and now’ that would permit him to describe it exhaustively and constitute it as an 
object.”91 Thus, revelation “is a case par excellence of the event.”92 
                                               
85 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics: Volume I: Seeing the Form, trans. 
Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 31. 
 
86 Marion, Being Given, 236. 
 
87 Ibid., 235. 
 
88 Ibid., 236. 
 
89 Ibid. Here Marion’s logic perfectly recapitulates von Balthasar’s analysis of the relationship between the Gestalt 
of Christ and Old Testament prophecy. As Marion writes, “the phenomenon of Christ gives itself intuitively as an 
event that is perfectly unforeseeable because radically heterogeneous to what it nevertheless completes (the 
prophecies).” Ibid. 
 
90 Marion coined the French “invisable” from the verb viser “to aim at,”—e.g. “the saturated phenomenon cannot be 
aimed at [ne peut se viser]” (Ibid., 199)—and it should be understood as that which cannot be anticipated or 
intended (in the phenomenological sense). 
 
91 Ibid., 228. 
 
92 Ibid., 237. 
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This invisability of the saturated phenomenon is a result of intuition’s overwhelming of the 
Kantian category of quantity. According to Kant, quantity (that is, extensive magnitude) is a 
determining condition of phenomenality. Every phenomenon that manifests within time or space—
i.e. every phenomenon tout court—is thus “declined by composition of the whole in terms of its 
parts.”93 For, as Kant writes, “I call an extensive magnitude that in which the representation of the 
parts makes possible the representation of the whole (and therefore necessarily precedes the 
latter).”94 Kant names the process by which the manifold of intuition is rendered quantitative the 
“successive synthesis,” a synthesis that no phenomenon as such can be constituted without.95  
The result of this successive synthesis is twofold: as illustrated by Kant’s assertion “all 
appearances are accordingly intuited as aggregates (multitudes of antecedently given parts).”96 In 
the first case, insofar as the synthesis assumes a manifold of intuition, the constituted whole is 
understood as composed of diverse parts: it is an aggregate.97 Second, as marked by the use of 
“antecedently,” this synthesis therefore necessitates a pre-comprehension, it is necessarily fore-
seen. As Marion notes, “this sort of phenomenon would always be foreseeable, literally seen before 
being seen in person or seen by procuration, on the basis of another besides itself—more precisely, 
on the basis of the supposedly finite number of its parts.”98 It is through this successive synthesis, 
                                               
93 Ibid., 200. 
 
94 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 287 [A162/B203]. 
 
95 “Since the mere intuition in all appearances is either in space or time,” Kant writes, “every appearance as intuition 
is an extensive magnitude, as it can only be cognized through successive synthesis.” Ibid., 288 [A163/B204]. 
 
96 Ibid. 
 
97 Given Kant’s training in the Leibniz-Wolffian school—at least until, on his own account, he was awakened from 
his “dogmatic slumber” by Hume’s skepticism—“aggregate” should be taken in the full Leibnizian significance 
discussed above.  
 
98 Marion, Being Given, 200. 
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which is to say, the subordination of the thing to quantity and extension as its condition of 
possibility, that the phenomenon becomes an object of experience. Or, conversely, “things become 
objects through … the elimination of that in those things which does not allow itself to be 
abstracted according to order and measure.”99  
According to Marion, insofar as saturated phenomena resist any reduction to objectivity 
and any horizon understood as a condition of phenomenality, they must likewise manifest outside 
of any quantity or magnitude: they are formally unforeseeable, invisable. The logic underlying this 
claim is laid bare. For Marion, the saturated phenomenon is invisable, precisely because it is not 
composed of parts, it is not an aggregate:  
Since the intuition that gives it is not limited by its possible concept, its excess can 
neither be divided nor adequately put together again by virtue of a finite magnitude 
homogeneous with finite parts. It could not be measured in terms of its parts, since 
the saturating intuition surpasses limitlessly the sum of the parts by continually 
adding to them.100 
 
The saturated phenomenon is therefore marked by its immeasurability: “incommensurable, not 
measurable (immense), unmeasured.”101 Like the Kantian mathematical sublime, it is “great 
beyond all comparison”;102 it is that which is “equal only to itself” and “in comparison with which 
everything else is small.”103 And just as in the mathematical sublime, “the very inadequacy of our 
                                               
99 Jean-Luc Marion, Negative Certainties, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2015), 165. 
 
100 Marion, Being Given, 200. Or again, “the intuition, which continually saturates it, forbids it from distinguishing 
and adding up a finite number of finite parts, thereby annulling all possibility of foreseeing the phenomenon before 
it gives itself.” Ibid., 202 
 
101 Ibid., 200. 
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faculty for estimating the magnitude … awakens the feeling of a supersensible faculty in us,”104 
so too does the saturated phenomenon reveal the inadequacy of the successive synthesis: “as the 
saturated phenomenon passes beyond all summation of its parts—which often cannot be 
enumerated anyway—the successive synthesis must be abandoned in favor of what I will call an 
instantaneous synthesis.”105 The saturated phenomenon is not marked by a successively constituted 
aggregate of parts, but by an instantaneous grasping of its whole; or in von Balthasar’s language, 
the immediate vision of the Gestalt.  
 While Marion will primarily unpack invisability in terms of the event and revelation, it is 
by no means limited to these cases—“since in all cases, there is on principle saturation.”106 For, it 
should not be forgotten, Marion’s “Sketch of the Saturated Phenomenon” in §21 of Being Given 
falls before the elaboration of the four figures of saturation—event, idol, flesh, icon—and should 
therefore best be understood as a prolegomenon to saturation as such. It is not merely the event 
that “cannot be aimed at,” it is “the saturated phenomenon [that] cannot be aimed at.”107 Thus 
while, as we have seen (chapter 3), the flesh is drawn forward as an exemplary case of the 
saturation of relation, it nevertheless remains the case that all saturation in principle saturates every 
category (as least to some degree).108  
                                               
104 Ibid. 
 
105 Marion, Being Given, 200. 
 
106 Ibid., 228. 
 
107 Ibid., 199. 
 
108 It is worth noting here that Marion remains extremely ambiguous on this point. As he writes at the opening of the 
discussion of the four “types” of saturation: “the guiding thread will no longer be the degree of intuition (since in all 
cases, there is on principle saturation), but the determination in relation to which saturation is each time 
accomplished (quantity, quality, relation, or modality). I will therefore distinguish, without intending any hierarchy, 
four types of saturation” (Ibid., 228). Here, it seems that the four types are divided by which category is saturated. 
But, as Marion continues, “in each case, it will be [a] question of paradoxes, never constitutable as objects within a 
horizon and by an I” (Ibid.) Insofar as these phenomena are not objects within a horizon or constituted by an I, it 
seems that, by Marion’s own account, they must saturate all four categories, as I have suggested above. But, if my 
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 In point of fact, insofar as invisability is coined by Marion as roughly synonymous with 
unforeseeability, Marion seems to admit as much during In Excess’s discussion of suffering and 
the flesh. As he there notes, “I will never be able to precede the intuition of fulfillment of my 
fleshly pain with an intentional aim able to foresee.”109 This is because, expressly following Henry, 
Marion conceives the flesh as a carnal “monad”;110 it lacks any gap or ekstasis. The flesh is defined, 
for Marion, as the identity that exists “before intentionality opens a gap”;111 it is “the immediacy 
of auto-affection [that] blocks the space where the ecstasy of an intentionality would become 
possible.”112 As he argues, in his discussion of suffering:  
As soon as I suffer, I suffer myself. I do not suffer from fire or iron, as I see the 
sword or the flame before me, their form, their colors, their dimensions, and so on, 
in short, from a distance, in being able to describe them as objects. … Thus I only 
suffer them in suffering from their phenomenality. I do not suffer from the fire and 
from the iron—but, because immediately they hurt me, they only hurt me. I suffer 
myself by them. Between the iron and the fire and me who suffers them, the gap 
disappears.113 
 
Thus, insofar as Marion understands the saturated phenomenon to be invisable, and insofar as he 
understands the flesh as a paradigmatic figure of saturation, then the flesh is understood in monadic 
                                               
reading is correct, then it becomes unclear what distinguishes “revelation,” which, on Marion’s account is unique 
insofar as it “encompasses all types of paradox” (235). Marion partially addresses these questions in “The Banality 
of Saturation,” where he writes, “each of these excesses identifies a type of saturated phenomenon, which functions 
exactly like a paradox. I then suggested the possibility of combining, on the one hand, some of these types and, on 
the other hand, all four together in order to describe other, still more complex saturated phenomena. The face of the 
Other, for example, doubtless combines the transgression of all modality with the surpassing of quantity, quality, 
and relation.” Jean-Luc Marion, “The Banality of Saturation” in The Essential Writings, ed. Kevin Hart (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2013), 136. I might here then paraphrase Marion, by suggesting that the flesh “doubtless 
combines the transgression of all relation with the surpassing of quantity, quality, and modality.”  
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terms—it bears no gaps and is constituted by no parts. Marion, as his predecessor Henry, thinks 
the flesh first and foremost as a whole, a Gestalt, irreducible to any part or member that might 
detract from its auto-affective ipseity. This irreducibility is nowhere clearer than in his discussion 
of the eroticization of the flesh in The Erotic Phenomenon. There, in language that perfectly echoes 
Henry’s condemnation of the organ, Marion writes:  
The process of eroticization admits neither interruption nor limit, since it aims at 
everything being made flesh in me as in the other, so that nothing of us any longer 
obeys the phenomenality of bodies or of the world. … Thus one cannot privilege 
any particular sense as the better operative of eroticization … if it were necessary 
to distinguish one, we would rather stigmatize the impropriety of sight, almost 
inevitably prone to objectivization. Consequently, neither could one privilege 
certain organs: there are no erotic organs, only sexual organs. First of all, this is 
because these organs belong to the physical body, not the flesh.114 
 
Such organs will only be drawn into eroticization when they lose their individuality and are drawn 
into, even “submerged” within, the monadic flesh: “the sexual organs … should remain completely 
foreign to eroticization: they belong to the body, not the flesh. … But emplacement in flesh 
includes them; it ends up by submerging them, as if by an erotic kenosis.”115 Thus the organ or 
member—the part—once again finds itself excluded or cast out of the monadic immanence of the 
flesh, or more precisely, the member must abandon its individuality and be absorbed into the 
undifferentiated unity of the monadic flesh.  
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§2. The Multiplicity of the Flesh 
A. Re-membering the Flesh 
 
In order to rethink the flesh no longer as monadic, it will be necessary to offer a phenomenological 
account of the member—not only understood as a member or organ of the objective body, or even 
of the organic body, but truly as a member of the flesh. Even Marion himself, in a rare divergence 
from his consistent reduction of the flesh to its monadic simplicity, will even speak—if only once, 
and only in passing—of “the flesh of my members, muscles and bones.”116 The present section 
will aim to extend this insight into a defining feature of flesh, no longer understood as a monadic 
subjectivity or immediate Gestalt, but as a phenomenon at once transcendental, but nevertheless 
constituted from a multiplicity.  
 In order to arrive at the member of the flesh, I will here follow a path laid by the 
phenomenologist Jacob Rogozinski, who—despite some differences in regards to sexuality, that 
will be explored below—has done much to influence the present approach to radical 
phenomenology. In particular, Rogozinski has pioneered the synthesis of radical phenomenology 
with insights from psychoanalysis and the transcendental empiricism of Deleuze and Guattari, that 
I will here aim to extend.  
 Within phenomenology, the relationship between the flesh and its members, the organism 
and its organs, has been undertaken in two directions. On the one hand, there is a monadic tradition, 
that prioritizes the whole of the part. This tradition could be traced back to Hegel, who sources 
                                               
116 Ibid., 95. This passage comes in the midst of an analysis of ageing. There Marion, speaks of the ageing of the 
face, in a manner that leaves it quite open whether the face should here be understood as a Levinasian face —the 
icon (Marion)—or perhaps as itself something like a member of the flesh.  
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bodily membership in the primordial, substantial unity of Life, “the simple substance of Life is the 
splitting-up of itself into shapes and at the same time the dissolution of these existent differences; 
and the dissolution of the splitting-up is just as much a splitting-up and a forming of members.”117 
This tradition enters phenomenology through France, where, before solidifying in Henry and 
Marion, it periodically tempts Merleau-Ponty, who—despite his often rather elaborate 
phenomenologies of the various bodily members and insistence upon bodily constitution—
nevertheless also argues that the subjective body “is not an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in 
space. I am in undivided possession of it”;118 “the spatiality of the body,” he continues, “must work 
downward from the whole to the parts.”119 
 On the other side is a tradition of thinkers who emphasize constitution. This tradition could 
perhaps be sourced in Kant, who writes of the organic being, “it is required, … that its parts be 
combined into a whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form. … For a body, … 
it is required that its parts reciprocally produce each other, as far as both their form and their 
combination is concerned, and thus produce a whole out of their own causality.”120 For Kant, the 
whole of the living body is produced by the reciprocal relations of its various constituent parts. 
This tradition enters phenomenology through Husserl, who most clearly in Ideas II (as was seen 
above in chapter 1), insists that, despite its quasi-transcendental character, the Leib nevertheless 
undergoes an elaborate process of bodily constitution. Moreover, the various sensations 
(Empfindung) or sensings (Empfindnisse) that enter into this constitution are not themselves 
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homogeneous; they are drawn together into spheres of sensation that Husserl calls “sensation-
fields.”121 Each field is granted its own relative autonomy and is differentiated from other fields. 
My hot/cold sensation-field, for example, is distinct from my balance sensation-field; my hunger 
sensation-field, from my touch sensation-field.122 The constitution of the Leib essentially involves 
the localization of diverse modalities of sensation. Thus, for Husserl, the flesh is not an organless 
monad but a multiplicity, a “system of organs,”123  “an entire system of compatibly harmonizing 
organs of perception.”124  
These two approaches could be understood as alternate solutions to the problem introduced 
by French phenomenology; insofar as French phenomenology sought to conflate the flesh and the 
transcendental ego (as we saw in chapter 1), one must ask: does the flesh take on the monadic125 
character of the ego, or conversely, does the ego take on the complex constituted character of the 
flesh? While both Henry and Marion have taken the first path, I will here follow the groundwork 
laid by Rogozinski, who draws radical phenomenology back into the Husserlian tradition of the 
flesh, recapturing a key notion from Husserl’s account: constitution by passive synthesis.  
                                               
121 Husserl, Ideas II, 162. 
 
122 While touch-sensations are given primacy of place in Husserl’s account, these are nevertheless bolstered by 
“sensations belonging to totally different groups.” Ibid., 160. 
 
123 Ibid., 168. 
 
124 Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, trans. 
Anthony J. Steinbock (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 50. 
 
125 See: Husserl, Ideas II, 118. The ego, like the soul, “has no places, no pieces. It is absolutely not a fragmentable 
unity” Ibid., 141. Although, it is importantly worth noting, even the monadic ego is understood by Husserl to 
constantly undergo a process of constitution—albeit a “self-constitution”—in order that the “the same I” might be 
continuously present within the flux of the “flowing life.” (Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: an Introduction 
to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973], 66.) Much of Husserl’s vocabulary 
here will be adopted by Rogozinski’s account of the flesh.  
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B. The Constitution of the Flesh 
 
Rogozinski’s most important contribution to radical phenomenology is The Ego and the Flesh, the 
heart of which is a critique of egocide (egicide)126—the erasure or rejection of any notion of ego 
from contemporary philosophy. For Rogozinski, Jacques Lacan and Martin Heidegger stand as the 
two principal defendants charged with this egocide. In each instance, he argues, one finds an 
identification of the genesis of the ego with a more primordial non-ego: “a Neuter, a Being, an 
Other.”127 “From the earlier to the later Heidegger, or from Freud to Lacan,” he writes, “egocide 
is inexorably worsened, and no one is ever able to explain where in each of us the absolute certainty 
of being ego comes from or how this illusory ego could derive from a more originary non-ego.”128  
Against this egocide, Rogozinski posits a “return to Descartes”129 of sorts, a retrieval of the 
notion of an ego—here understood in transparently Henrian terms130 as the absolutely unique mode 
of phenomenological givenness wherein the self gives itself to itself in a radical immanence. As 
he writes: 
Immanence [is] a manner of being given: what characterizes an immanent 
givenness is the power to be given from oneself to oneself; and in that it needs 
nothing else in order to be given, then it is a matter of an absolute givenness. I 
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follows Henry, “but only to a certain point.” 
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define immanence, then, as self-givenness, as the identity of what gives and what 
is given.131 
 
Yet, siding with post-Husserlian French phenomenology against traditional Cartesianism, 
Rogozinski thinks this ego in embodied terms; it is an ego-flesh (moi-chair, from Husserl’s 
“Ichleib”).132 “The immanent ego,” he writes, “is not lodged in its flesh in the same way that a 
captain is in his ship or that the Cartesian soul resides in the pineal gland: it is its flesh; it is Ichleib, 
an ‘ego-body’ or ‘flesh of the ego,’ an originally incarnated ego.”133 Thus his Egoanalysis134 is, at 
one and the same time, a radical phenomenology of the flesh.  
But, against Henry and Marion’s monadic conception of the flesh, Rogozinski recognizes 
that the ego-flesh does not emerge into its self-givenness whole cloth; we must not move “too 
quickly toward the one, the same, the identical.”135 Instead, Rogozinski offers a genetic account of 
the synthetic constitution of the ego out of the primordial multiplicity of immanence. 
Drawing upon a diverse set of sources—notably Deleuze, Husserl, and Kant—Rogozinski 
argues that immanence cannot be understood as the immediate, absolute  unity of self-presence 
presupposed by Henry’s phenomenology. Rather, under the guidance of the radical reduction,136 
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135 Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh, 139. 
 
136 Rogozinski self-consciously calls up the Henrian language of the “radical reduction” throughout The Ego and the 
Flesh, writing, for example, “in order to approach [the remainder], we must attempt a radical reduction…” 
(Rogozinski, 173).  
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one actually discovers that the “most originary layer”137 of the ego is not a monadic whole, but a 
manifold of “innumerable sensible impressions,”138 even a certain “chaos.”139 Thus, we must not 
imagine the ego as a primordial unity, he argues, but as “as the unity of the multiple, as an ego 
originarily divided yet unified.”140 Following Deleuze, Rogozinski names this originary 
multiplicity: the flesh’s “plane of immanence.” But, insightfully recapitulating Husserl’s notion of 
“sensation-fields,” Rogozinski recognizes that this immanent plane is not a homogeneous field. It 
is rather populated by clusters of resonating impressions, which disseminate across this plane of 
immanence.  
The field of immanence is not a pure chaos; … regularities and constant 
concordances come to order the flux of appearances; … different perspectives, 
series of divergent impressions, may also be able to converge on, intersect with, 
and cross one another; and … each point of intersection is constituted as a pole of 
identification, allowing for always larger and more stable unities to be formed.141 
 
Despite the Deleuzian resonances of this language, Rogozinski ultimately sides with Henry 
against Deleuze, insofar as he denies the Deleuzian thesis that the plane of immanence is marked 
by an “anonymous life.” For Deleuze and Guattari’s transcendental empiricism, the aim is to “do 
away with any subject in favor of an assemblage of the haecceity type that carries or brings out the 
event insofar as it is unformed and incapable of being effectuated by persons.”142 Thus, the 
multiplicities on the plane of immanence are “not a personal feeling.”143 Even when Deleuze turns 
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to a quasi-vitalism, it is an anonymous vitalism, an anonymous life: “the life of the individual,” 
Deleuze writes, “gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life.”144 This, for Deleuze, is marked 
by the use of indefinite articles, which introduce an “individuation … which does not pass into a 
form and is not effected by a subject”:145 a haecceity that is not an ipseity. “The indefinite article 
is the indetermination of the person,” Deleuze writes;146 it is not my Life, but a Life. 
For Rogozinski, to follow Deleuze and Guattari in this direction would result in precisely 
the paradox of egocide that he is attempting to critique. For how does one get from non-ego to ego, 
from a Life to my Life? The answer that Rogozinski suggests, is simple, there is no anonymous 
life, there is no primordial non-ego—at least not from a phenomenological perspective. The plane 
of immanence discovered by the radical reduction is “a singular life, each time my own, my 
life.”147 Regardless of what a turn to metaphysics might suggest, the radical reduction never digs 
below the givenness of the sensible impression to itself, its self-givenness. Such speculation is 
simply beyond the bounds of phenomenology, even a radical phenomenology.  
For this reason, Rogozinski entitles the multiplicities that disseminates across the plane of 
immanence: “larval egos” or “fragments of ego,” in order to emphasize the ipseity of these 
fragments. While each certainly carries its own haecceity—my pain is not my anxiety, nor is my 
joy identical to my impression of yellow—they are all nevertheless equally mine and all are equally 
moments in the constitution of my flesh. As he writes, these “larval egos, fragments of ego, are 
still and always will be me. If it is impossible to derive the ego from a more originary non-ego—
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from an unconscious Id or from an impersonal transcendental field—then we must conclude that 
the ego is always preceded by itself, is originally given to itself.”148  
 Having followed the radical reduction from the unified ego-flesh, to the multiplicity of 
fragments that anticipate it, it is now necessary to reverse course, to articulate the process by which 
this multiplicity is unified, the way in which these diverse parts are constituted into a whole. As 
Rogozinski writes, the ego-flesh “must be broken into shards so that we can recuperate it in terms 
of a genesis. [For] every unity is formed from out of a primitive multiplicity; every identity 
(including the ego or the ‘individual’) is constituted through syntheses of identification.”149 He 
therefore finds it necessary to return to Husserl, and suggest that the flesh emerges from “a passive 
synthesis that operates without me.”150 Or, as Husserl writes of the self-constitution of the ego:  
We encounter … a second kind of synthesis, which embraces all the particular 
multiplicities of cogitationes collectively and in its own manner, namely as 
belonging to the identical Ego, who, as the active and affected subject of 
consciousness, lives in all processes of consciousness.151 
 
If such a synthesis did not take place, he writes, “I would never be myself.”152 Rogozinski names 
this passive constitution of the flesh: the “carnal synthesis,”153 or even simply, “my birth.”154  
Drawing from the language of Merleau-Ponty, Rogozinski models the carnal synthesis 
upon the chiasm. In the passive constitution of the flesh, there is an “intertwining” wherein the 
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larval or fragmentary egos touch one another and recognize one another “as another pole of the 
same flesh.”155 In this chiasmic intertwining, these larval and fragmentary egos constitute a 
“community of resonance”156 wherein the plane of immanence is part-by-part unified into a flesh, 
a self-presence capable of giving itself to itself, not only in each individual sensible impression, 
but also above these sensible impressions as a unified ego-flesh. Nevertheless, this self-
constitution is by no means complete or final; the flesh, as Husserl famously noted, “is a 
remarkably imperfectly constituted thing.”157 Thus it is necessary to recognize a partiality to this 
constitution, certain gaps or fissures that, despite the contestations of Henry and Marion, persist 
within the flesh.  
C. The Remainder 
 
Despite the carnal synthesis, the flesh nevertheless does not manifest without break or rupture: 
“between each [ego] pole, a gap [écarte] subsists.”158 This écarte emerges from an impossibility 
already identified by Henry and Derrida’s critique of Merleau-Ponty: the impossibility of a total 
chiasm.159 “The chiasm is brought about,” Rogozinski writes, “only by a partial and precarious 
                                               
155 Ibid., 151. Here following Husserl’s suggestion that “the universal principle of passive genesis … bears the title 
association.” Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 80. Although, it is worth noting that, in that context, Husserl is 
primarily describing the constitution of “objectivities” rather than the constitution of the flesh itself. 
 
156 A term drawn from Husserl, Ideas II, 520-523. 
 
157 Ibid., 187. Merleau-Ponty was particularly drawn to this passage, paraphrasing it in Phenomenology of 
Perception and “The Philosopher and his Shadow”—“What prevents [the body] ever being an object, ever being 
‘completely constituted’ is that it is that by which there are objects” (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 
105), and “we may with equal truth say of these pre-givens (as Husserl says of the body) either that they are always 
‘already constituted’ for us or that they are ‘never completely constituted’—in short, that consciousness is always 
behind or ahead of them, never contemporaneous” (Merleau-Ponty, “The Philosopher and his Shadow” in Signs, 
trans. Richard C. McCleary [Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1967], 165. 
 
158 Rogozinski, 154. 
 
159 See: Jacob Rogozinski, “Le chiasme et le restant (la « phénoménologie française » au contact de l'intouchable)” 
Rue Descartes, No. 35, (Mars 2002): 125-144.  
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identification, endlessly put into question by some element X, a divergence or gap that destabilizes 
it.”160 For Rogozinski, there can never be complete self-presence without the total loss of identity: 
were total self-identity enacted, “the flesh would fold back on itself, sink into itself. It would 
implode without ever successfully giving itself a body with differentiated organs.”161 That is to 
say, the “remarkably imperfectly constituted” (Husserl) status of the flesh, its gaps or fissures, are 
the condition of possibility for anything like the members of the flesh. It was precisely the converse 
which was found in Henry and Marion. Their accounts of the flesh were monadic—they folded 
back on themselves—precisely because they refused to see the persistence of the écarte, because 
they imagined the total self-presence, a self-givenness sans reste.162  
Against this monadic view, Rogozinski recognizes that while the larval ego-fragments are 
brought into a chiasmic relation, they do not cease to remain themselves in a meaningful way; they 
do not lose their prior haecceity. Even following the carnal synthesis my pain remains distinct 
from the sight of green, my hearing of a tone from my taste of salt. This differentiation requires an 
unbridgeable gap between each ego-pole,163 a point of rupture that is manifest within immanence; 
it requires, to use Rogozinski’s language, a “remainder.”  
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161 Ibid., 174. 
 
162 Marion is able to posit a certain écarte within the self, as attested in The Erotic Phenomenon, §30, but this is not 
a gap within the originary manifestation of the flesh, but rather a secondary gap between the various manifestations 
of the body (akin to the gap between the subjective flesh and objective body in Henry). Thus, while it is a gap “that 
each of us has within ourselves,” it is a gap between “my eroticized flesh” and my “person,” rather than a gap within 
my flesh. Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, 156. 
 
163 “That two poles of the ego-flesh could recognize one another and be united does not imply that they are perfectly 
identified with one another.” Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh, 171. 
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This use of remainder [le restant], should not be confused with Derrida’s le restance nor 
Lacan’s le reste—both commonly translated into English as “remainder.” But neither should it be 
understood completely outside of reference to these important figures.  
For example, there is a clear resonance between Rogozinski’s remainder [le restant] and 
Lacan’s objet petit a which, in Seminar X, Lacan expressly names the remainder [le reste].164 
“What is the remainder?” Lacan asks, “it is what survives the ordeal of the division of the field of 
the Other through the presence of the subject.”165 Like le restant, it is a division or cut. As Lacan 
writes, glossing Freud’s famous dictum, anatomy is destiny: “it becomes true if we give the term 
anatomy its strict and, if I may, etymological meaning that emphasizes ana-tomy, the function of 
the cut. … Destiny, that is to say, man’s relation to the function of desire, only assumes its full 
vitality inasmuch as the fragmentation of one’s own body, the cut that lies at the locus of select 
moments of its functioning, is conceivable.”166 The very function of desire—indeed sexuality 
itself—presumes the presence of the cut or the fragmentation of the flesh. But, whereas for 
Rogozinski this cut is immanent to the process of the self-constitution of the flesh in immanence, 
for Lacan, it is the excess of an intersubjective relation: “the object [le petit a or le reste] 
functioning as the leftover of the subject’s dialectic with the Other.”167 Nevertheless, even given 
                                               
164 This resonance remains obvious, despite Lacan’s insistence that “the a is inasmuch as it precedes any 
phenomenology.” Jacques Lacan, Anxiety: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X, trans. A. R. Price (Malden: 
Polity, 2004), 284. Specifically, Lacan here seems to understand phenomenology as a phenomenology of positive 
objectivities. Thus, his description of the objet petit a as “the remainder left over from the constitution of the 
subject”(Ibid.), given its essential negativity, might be understood to elude an intentional phenomenology. But, first, 
Heidegger’s phenomenology of Angst and nothingness in “What is Metaphysics?”—which Lacan is certainly not 
unfamiliar with (Ibid., 8, 292-293)—as well as Sartre’s phenomenology of the various forms of negation in Being 
and Nothingness would suggest that even an intentional phenomenology could engage with the objet petit a. 
Moreover, it is even less clear why the a would elude a radical phenomenology, whose principal phenomena are not 
even bound by the conditions which determine the constitution of “objects” or “beings.”  
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its intersubjective genesis, Lacan’s le reste or objet petit a remains (pun intended) within one’s 
own flesh—unlike anxiety which is on the side of the Other. Thus, for example, “the a,” Lacan 
writes, “is an object separated not from the mother’s organism but from the child’s organism.”168 
It is the “pound of flesh” that one must sacrifice from one’s self.169  
Thus the two notions end up quite closely related; for Lacan le reste is the object which 
marks a certain heterogeneity in the relation to the Other, whereas for Rogozinski le restant 
functions the condition of possibility for heterogeneity. In this way, Rogozinski understands this 
remainder in the paradoxical language of “auto-hetero-givenness.”170 Yet, this should not be 
understood as a vicious paradox, but rather as a gesture toward the Derridean language of the 
condition of possibility that is at once ostensibly a condition of impossibility: for “if there were no 
remainder,” Rogozinski writes, “there would be neither flesh nor ego. … The remainder is above 
all what protects the ego-flesh and makes its genesis possible—it is my ultimate condition of 
possibility.171 
One may therefore, returning to the Lacanian vocabulary, describe the flesh through the 
Lacanian figure of the “not-all” (pas-tout). For Lacan, this feature describes the non-
universalizability and structural incompleteness of woman—“the woman does not exist”172 [il n’y 
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170 Ibid., 172. As Rogozinski writes elsewhere, “hate reveals an auto-hetero-affection where the ego is affected by 
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exist.” Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality: the Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973, Encore: The Seminar 
of Jacques Lacan Book XX, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Company), 7.  
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a pas La femme]—in opposition to masculine universality. But it might just as well stand in for 
the distinction between the flesh and the body—la chair and le corps—which by a happy 
coincidence are themselves grammatically gendered feminine (la) and masculine (le) respectively. 
Like masculine sexuation in Lacan, (the masculine-gendered) le corps is constituted by a logic of 
completion—there is no exception: ∀𝑥 𝛷𝑥.173 Insofar as the body is an object within the horizon 
of the world (Henry) or obeys the conditions of the I (Marion)—it is a common phenomenon 
whose concept, Marion might say, takes priority over its intuitive shortage. Yet, what both Henry 
and Marion fail to recognize is that insofar as the (feminine-gendered) flesh manifests outside of 
any horizon, it will not therefore manifest with complete self-presence. That which refuses 
objectification must necessarily contain a certain incompleteness—it is not whole, not-all—it bears 
the traces of a remainder.  
Therefore, the condition of possibility of a unified ego-flesh is precisely this lack of 
complete unity: the failure of complete chiasm is precisely a constitutive excess. It is the gap within 
its identity, the very inability of the ego-flesh to fully seal itself in (monadic) immanence, that 
allows it to emerge at all. This remainder “guards my flesh against disaster, offering it a mouvance, 
a playing field”;174 it is the first otherness, the Fichtean not-self175—present already within the ego-
flesh itself—which forms the condition of possibility for any experience of otherness.  
                                               
173 Roughly translatable as: every man is subject to the phallic function; or as Lacan writes, “it is through the phallic 
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174 Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh, 175. 
 
175 “Nothing is posited to begin with, except the self; and this alone is asserted absolutely. Hence there can be an 
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The Science of Knowledge, ed. and trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1982), 104-105. 
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Moreover, it is our relation to this arch-otherness that conditions the mode of our relation 
to subsequent others. Le restant, Rogozinski elsewhere suggests, “is the ‘first foreigner’ to whom 
I am confronted, the ‘first non-ego,’ which is not another me (an alter-ego), but an other in me.”176 
This is possible, because just as the impasse of anxiety incarnates itself in the Lacanian objet petit 
a, so too does the impasse or failure of complete synthesis incarnate itself in the remainder, 
understood not only negatively as a gap, but positively as an intruder within the flesh:  
When the chiasm is interrupted, when the poles of flesh cease to mutually incarnate 
one another, the remainder disfigures itself: it reappears within my flesh as a foreign 
body whose apparition provokes angst and disgust. The ego endeavors to defend 
itself against this threatening intrusion by expelling this ‘foreign’ body. This 
gesture of exclusion can however only fail, as the remainder is not truly foreign to 
the ego.”177  
 
Therefore, as will be discussed below, if we are to relate to the Other without fear, disgust, or 
horror, then we must first learn to relate to the otherness within our own flesh without fear, disgust, 
or horror.  
D. From the Organ to the Member 
Before turning to the final step of the present argument—the reintroduction of the central figure 
of sexuality—it will be helpful to mark an important semantic decision. Until this point, I have 
spoken univocally of the organ and the member—employing these two terms as synonymous 
figures of incarnate parts of the fleshly whole. It is now necessary to mark a key distinction 
between these two terms that will become increasingly important in later chapters, which will shift 
from the constitution of the individual flesh to the communal body.  
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 Surprisingly—given his emphasis upon the manifold nature of sensible impressions, the 
synthetic nature of the ego’s constitution, and the persistence of the gap or remainder within 
immanence—Rogozinski nevertheless seems to follow Henry and Marion in insisting that the flesh 
appears without organs. Within the radical reduction that centers his phenomenological 
Egoanalysis, he writes, “I no longer have the right to say that it is my eyes that see, my ears that 
hear. When I effect the reduction, my material body disappears with all its organs and physical 
qualities; what remains is not the body but rather flesh. … My flesh never crystallizes into a 
differentiated organic unity, … it has neither eyes nor hands nor sex organs.”178  
For Rogozinski, like his predecessors, to speak of the “organ” is always already to speak 
of the organic body—the body insofar as it is marked by “spatial and temporal extension.”179 Any 
discussion of “organs” must therefore be undertaken at the level of the material body (le corps), 
the body insofar as it is constituted—or “self-incorporated”—within the visibility of the world. 
This is the body that has “constitute[d] itself as one whole composed of differentiated organs.”180 
The flesh, on the other hand, manifests without organs.  
Yet, this initial exclusion of the organ from Rogozinski’s phenomenology of the flesh, must 
be nuanced. For, while he remains deeply skeptical of the language of the organ, his reasoning 
differs considerably from that of Henry and Marion—a difference that opens up the space for a 
distinction between the organ and the “pole”181 or member. 
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Contrary to Henry and Marion, Rogozinski’s critique of the organ is much more closely 
indebted to Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the Body without Organs; as he flatly admits, “the 
flesh is not very different from Deleuze’s ‘body without organs’.”182 While this language of a body 
without organs ostensibly supports a monadic rejection of all incarnate members, the reality is 
almost exactly the opposite. For, while Artaud articulated the language of the BwO, he also 
supplemented this language with a positive account of the “true organs.” As Rogozinski writes, 
“this notion [of the BwO] has the defect of being purely negative and does not invoke this 
necessary reorganization of the flesh, the ‘new dance of the organs’ of which Artaud spoke.”183 
For Deleuze and Guattari, this reorganization is not merely a supplement to the BwO, but stands 
at the heart of the BwO itself. “The BwO,” they write in A Thousand Plateaus, “is not at all the 
opposite of the organs. The organs are not its enemies. The enemy is the organism … The BwO is 
not opposed to the organs; rather, the BwO and its ‘true organs,’ … are opposed to the organism, 
the organic organization of the organs.”184 Deleuze and Guattari center their critique not on the 
notion of the organ, but on the notion of the organism: the theological, teleological, and 
hierarchical (read: authoritarian) organization of the organs—as exemplified by the organic body. 
The aim of the BwO is not the eradication of the organ, but its very liberation; the discovery of a 
line-of-flight whereby one “could patiently and momentarily dismantle the organization of the 
organs [that] we call the organism.”185  
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Precisely the same critique can be found in Rogozinski’s phenomenology. To again cite a 
key passage: “even if my flesh never crystallizes into a differentiated organic unity, if it has neither 
eyes nor hands nor sex organs…”186 While the second clause appears to disqualify anything like 
an organ or a member, this disqualification is a response to the first clause—it is not organs that 
are the problem, but “organic unity,” the implicitly hierarchical organization of the organs. It is for 
this reason that Rogozinski goes on to immediately qualify this disqualification:  
[The flesh] has nevertheless, each one of which has its singular carnal site—many 
fluid and mobile micro-organs that open and close constantly and never stop 
touching, hearing, seeing, desiring, rejoicing, suffering. In order to avoid confusing 
them with corporal organs, I will henceforth designate them as poles of flesh.”187 
 
The clause “in order to avoid confusing them…” is particularly enlightening here; it illustrates that 
Rogozinski is here making a semantic decision to avoid the language of the organ, in favor of the 
pole of flesh. Thus, Rogozinski both recognizes the danger of an organicist account of the body—
in which everything has its “proper place” and “proper role”—as well as the phenomenological 
insufficiency of a purely monadic account of the flesh. The only remaining option, the option that 
Rogozinski takes, is to both recognize the multiplicity of the flesh, as well as the contingency and 
revisibility of any distribution of this multiplicity. “The organs,” as Deleuze and Guattari  write, 
“distribute themselves on the BwO, but they distribute themselves independently of the form of 
the organism; form becomes contingent, organs are no longer anything more than intensities that 
are produced, flows, thresholds, and gradients.”188 
Insofar as the language of the organ seems to almost inevitably privilege this hierarchical 
organization—being co-opted by the organic body—the present project will therefore follow 
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Rogozinski’s semantic decision to avoid the language of the organ. But, whereas Rogozinski chose 
to replace this language with the Husserlian language of the “poles of the flesh,” I will here employ 
the language of the “member of the flesh,” in order—in subsequent discussions of community and 
political bodies—to employ the double meaning of member as both a constituent of the individual 
body and a person belonging to a social group.  
 
§3. The Irreducibility of Sexual Difference 
A. Re-Sexualizing the Flesh 
 
While I have here followed Rogozinski’s critique of the “organ” and choice to offer differing 
language—“pole” in his case, “member” in my own—it is nevertheless worth noting a certain risk 
inherent in any attempt to avoid the language of the organ: a tendency to erase sexuality. Simply 
put, as soon as one conceives of an originary flesh that is “deprived of … differentiated organs,”189 
then likewise this flesh is deprived of sexual organs. As Rogozinski argues, “under the 
phenomenological reduction, it is appropriate to put out of play every objective or worldly 
determination … In truth, the originary flesh … has neither eyes, nor hands, nor sex organs.”190 It 
is a quick step from here into a monadic erasure of every trace of sexual difference from the 
originary flesh.  
One can see this progression play out clearly in Rogozinski, who elsewhere argues rather 
straightforwardly, “I tend to consider sexual difference as being constituted on the plane of the 
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190 “Sous réduction phénoménologique, il convient de mettre hors jeu toute détermination objective ou mondaine, … 
En vérité, la chair originaire, … n'a ni yeux, ni mains, ni sexe.” Rogozinski, “Le chiasme et le restant,” 130 
[translation my own, emphasis added].  
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organic body, and therefore not belonging to the originary plane of immanence of the flesh.”191 
Thus Rogozinski, for example, writes of Freud’s Dora case-study, “on the plane of the flesh, there 
is nothing equivalent to … the gaping pit of the sexual orifice.”192 There is no sexual organ on the 
plane of the flesh, because there is simply no organ on the plane of the flesh.193  
 Yet, as has been shown above, once one has stripped sexuality from the flesh, only two 
possibilities remain: either, as in Henry, the flesh is presented as an a-sexual transcendental field, 
or as in Marion, the flesh manifests in a binary of two monadic sexualities. Either way—insofar 
as these two options ultimately collapse into one another—what is rendered impossible is a 
thinking capable of accounting for sexual difference in the strong sense, a difference-beyond-
binary exemplified by queer or trans* lived, embodied experience.  
 Thus, Rogozinski, like Henry, begins with a transcendental a-sexuality of the originary 
flesh, but nevertheless ends up (almost inevitably) recapitulating a binary account of sexual 
difference. This is evident in the transition from the a-sexual originary flesh into the sexed “body 
of flesh” [Leibkörper]. Whereas “the primordial flesh was too undifferentiated—both too 
disseminated and too homogenous”194 for the emergence of sexual difference, the body of flesh is 
                                               
191 “J'ai tendance à considérer que la différence sexuelle est constituée sur le plan du corps organique, et n'appartient 
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192 Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh, 266. 
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marked by the constitution or incorporation of the organic body. “By letting itself be traversed and 
divided by the remainder in this way,” Rogozinski argues, “the body of flesh is opened to sexual 
desire.”195 Thus, he continues, “the flesh is incorporated in the form of a sexed and sectioned body 
with its organs opening outwards, its cavities, its folds, intercellular spaces, and orificial 
crevices.”196  
It is here that the a-sexual flesh has become a sexed body. But it is likewise here that 
Rogozinski falls into a familiar, but suspect, binary thinking. For him, it is the incorporation of the 
flesh that is “able to arrange a place for the Two of sexual difference.”197 The transition from the 
primordial ego-flesh to the sexuation of the organic body is marked as a transition from the unity 
of the undifferentiated One to the binary of the sexual Two. But, as even the most rudimentary 
phenomenology of queer experience has taught, sexuality is neither one nor two, but always 
already multiple. As Deleuze and Guattari, for example, articulate the dissemination of the binary 
Two into the multiplicity of the many: “the two sexes imply a multiplicity of molecular 
combinations bringing into play not only the man in the woman and the woman in the man, but 
the relation of each to the animal, the plant, etc.: a thousand tiny sexes.”198 The question to be 
asked is: how has Rogozinski has fallen into this binary thinking?  
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I would here like to suggest that Rogozinski has misplaced the gap or fissure constitutive 
of sexuality. For, as he rightly notes:  
For sexuation to take place, a sectioning is necessary, an originary tearing 
distributed over the entire surface of the ego-skin in a series of local openings and 
differentiated orifices, thus making contact possible with different zones, on which 
desire is fixated; it makes possible displacements that let it migrate from one to 
another, distances, penetrations, ejections, and spasms—the unsettling intrigue of 
desire and of jouissance.199 
 
One finds a similar account of sexuation in Lacanian psychoanalysis, insofar as sexuation and 
sexuality as such, emerge not as a positive property of the sexed body—a fact that is always 
“secondary”200—, but as a “lack” or “fault” [faille] in the field of signification. For Lacan, sexual 
difference is never reducible-without-excess to discourse. There is no simple binary signification:  
for, while “a man is nothing but a signifier. … Woman is not-whole—there is always something 
in her that escapes discourse.”201 Thus, Lacan’s famous dictum: “there is no sexual relationship” 
[il n'y a pas de rapport sexuel].202 Yet, this seeming denial of a sexual relationship—and its 
correlative denial of binary signification: Man/Woman—should not be misunderstood as a denial 
of sexual difference. Quite to the contrary, as Žižek clarifies: 
Because the binary signifier is primordially repressed, there is no sexual 
relationship; sexual antagonism cannot be symbolized in a pair of opposed 
symbolic/differential features. However, the fact that there is no sexual relationship 
in no way implies that ‘there is no sexual difference in the unconscious,’ that the 
unconscious is beyond or beneath sexual difference, a fluid domain of partial drives 
which defy sexuation. One can even say that the unconscious is thoroughly and 
only about sexual difference.203  
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Rather than a “fluid domain,” or we might say transcendental a-sexuality,204 sexual difference 
saturates the being of the individual—their unconscious (Žižek) or their body of flesh 
(Rogozinski)—precisely as a response to this primordial negativity or lack. Here Rogozinski and 
the Lacanians are in agreement.  
But, where precisely is the necessary “sectioning” or “originary tearing” constitutive of 
sexuality? In vulgar readings of psychoanalysis, this cut is understood as the gap between the 
sexes, between man and woman. Rogozinski seems to flirt with this option when he describes the 
cut as generative of “the Two of sexual difference.”205 Yet, what the Slovenian school of 
psychoanalysis—particularly Zupančič and Žižek—have recently sought to demonstrate, is that 
this traditional reading misses the true depth of the cut formative of sexual difference. It is not a 
cut between each sex that is determinative of sexual difference, but a constitutive negativity at the 
heart of each. “The lesson here,” Žižek argues, “is that sexual difference qua the Real of an 
antagonism is not the difference between the two sexes (masculine and feminine), but a 
difference/antagonism which runs across (traverses) each of the two sexes, introducing a gap of 
inconsistency into its very heart.”206 
Despite his avowed anti-Lacanianism, one finds a similar account—albeit in a 
phenomenological register—in Rogozinski. For Rogozinski, the immanent genesis of the sexed 
                                               
204 I will here simply note my disagreement with Žižek, in regards to the primordiality of partial drives, that will be 
explored more fully in the following chapter. For Žižek sexual difference precedes the constitution of the partial 
drives, whereas I will argue the converse.  
 
205 Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh, 194. 
 
206 Ibid., 68. Or again, “the original split is not between the One and the Other, but is strictly inherent to the One; it 
is the split between the One and its empty place of inscription.” Ibid., 72. Here Žižek is glossing Zupančič’s claim, 
“this, for example, is precisely what the Lacanian formulas of sexuation force us to think: not the contradiction 
between ‘opposite’ sexes, but the contradiction inherent to both, ‘barring’ them both from within.” Zupančič, What 
is Sex?, 72. 
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body emerges from the inscription of the flesh’s remainder onto the surface—the “ego-skin”—of 
the organic body, opening up the requisite distances, orifices, and penetrations which generate “the 
unsettling intrigue of desire and of jouissance.”207 But, this does not mean that the cut is itself in 
the transcendent milieu of the world. For, although he clearly marks the organic body as the site 
of sexual difference, this difference is constituted through the intercession of the remainder—
which operates at the level of the originary flesh. Indeed, it appears the organic body itself is 
birthed through the intervention of the remainder: 
There is also an essential relation between these corporeal orifices in which the 
body’s erotic dimension finds its anchorage and the effects of the cutting up of the 
remainder. Because it hollows out a gap between my flesh and itself, impeding the 
two poles from joining up or from adhering to one another without distance, the 
flesh is incorporated in the form of a sexed and sectioned body with its organs 
opening outwards.208 
 
Yet, by making this move towards the sexed body in this manner, Rogozinski risks overturning 
the radical innovation that marks his advancement beyond his predecessors. For here, 
incorporation appears to be understood as the necessary response to a gap opened by the remainder. 
Thus, rather than introducing an écarte into the immanence of the flesh, Rogozinski here seems to 
envision this gap between “the flesh and itself” being cast out of the radical immanence of the 
flesh and into a sexed body—what Henry would call a “sexually differentiated objective body.”209  
 In this way, Rogozinski falls into the Henrian trap of the monadic flesh, and its expulsion 
of every écarte and internal differentiation (member) from the flesh. Moreover, it is precisely by 
expelling the gap out of the flesh, and into the organic body, that Rogozinski—as his 
predecessors—is motivated to limit the multiplicitous diversity of sexual difference. Precisely as 
                                               
207 Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh, 194. 
 
208 Ibid. 
 
209 Henry, Incarnation, 215. 
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in Henry’s erasure and Marion’s condemnation of sexual minorities, the expulsion of the écarte 
from the flesh produces the implicit heteronormativity of the binary terms of the “Two of sexual 
difference.”210 
But, might one instead think sexuality following Rogozinski’s own principal intuition, 
might one be more Rogozinskian than Rogozinski? For, if he is right that the remainder is a 
necessary product of the impossibility of a complete chiasm, the necessity of an écarte within the 
flesh, and, if he is likewise correct in his judgment that sexuation is the product of a gap between 
the flesh and itself—could one not simply forego reference to the organic body entirely, and 
suggest that, even prior to the incorporation of the organic body, the flesh is itself already marked 
by sexual difference?  
 Indeed, one might here note another commonality between Rogozinski and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. For, Lacanians tend to think sexuation in binary terms—“whichever way we turn,”  
Žižek argues, “the Two lurks beneath.”211 For these thinkers sexual difference is understood as the 
two exclusive means of relating to the lack of the signifier: “every speaking being situates itself on 
one side or the other.”212 Yet, even if unintentional, Žižek’s language in Incontinence of the Void 
nevertheless betrays the artificiality of this binary limitation: “the ‘transcendental’ genesis of the 
multiple resides in the lack of the binary signifier, i.e., the multiple emerges as the series of 
attempts to fill in the gap of the missing binary signifier.”213 For, what justifies a limitation of 
attempts to fill the gap to two? Neither Žižek nor Rogozinski give a satisfactory explanation. 
                                               
210 Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh, 194. This effect is almost certainly unintentional, given Rogozinski’s 
avowed concern for sexual minorities. See, e.g.: Ibid., 305-307. 
 
211 Žižek, Incontinence of the Void, 137.  
 
212 Lacan, Seminar XX, 79. 
 
213 Žižek, Incontinence of the Void, 72. 
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Moreover, the artificiality of this binary is even more conspicuous insofar as there is not a gap in 
the heart of the flesh, but a multiplicity of gaps—“a series of local openings and 
differentiations”214—each birthing new opportunities for response. Indeed, it might instead be 
suggested that the indeterminate multiplicity of sexual positions emerges from precisely the 
indeterminacy of possible attempts to fill these gaps: to the thousand possible responses to 
negativity correspond a thousand tiny sexes.  
  
B. The Irreducibility of Sexual Difference 
Insofar as sexual difference manifests within the originary immanence of the flesh, the 
phenomenologist might therefore affirm with psychoanalysis, “the subject is immanently, 
constitutively, sexed”;215 “the subject is not only secondarily sexualized, it is sexualized in its very 
formal structure.”216 In the language of radical phenomenology, one can say that there is no 
transcendental a-sexuality of the flesh. Rather, sexual difference goes “all the way down.”  
Sexual difference is strictly speaking, irreducible. This can be understood both in its 
colloquial sense, and in a properly phenomenological sense. That is to say, even the most rigorous 
phenomenological reduction—the radical reduction or the reduction to givenness—cannot 
properly speaking get beyond or beneath sexual difference. The phenomenologist must therefore 
resist the temptation to deduce (in a Kantian manner) a transcendental-self beyond or before this 
disorganized manifold of sexuality. Phenomenologically speaking, it may very well be possible to 
peek behind the sexual organization of the organic body. But, even under the most rigorous epoché, 
                                               
214 Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh, 194. 
 
215 Žižek, Incontinence of the Void, 1. 
 
216 Ibid., 72. 
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sexual difference, in all of its multiplicitous diversity, appears to stubbornly persist. This is 
precisely because, insofar as sexual difference is a product of the écarte—the necessary remainder 
of the chiasm by which the flesh is itself constituted as an ego-flesh—sexual difference is therefore 
coterminus with the ego-flesh.217 As Zupančič argues, “there is no subjectivity beyond or beneath 
(or simply outside) the sexual division. Sexual difference is not a secondary distinction of 
subjectivity, or simply culturally constructed.”218 The body, in its manifold membership, is 
originary, and this matters not only philosophically and phenomenologically, but also ethically 
and politically. As Jay Prosser argues, from a trans* perspective, “that a transsexual’s trajectory 
centers on reconfiguring the body reveals that it is the ability to feel the bodily ego in conjunction 
and conformity with the material body parts that matters in a transsexual context; and that sex is 
perceived as something that must be changed underlines its very un-phantasmatic status.”219   
Yet, this affirmation of sexual difference should not be misunderstood as a return to the 
traditional binary conception of sexual difference, this is not a rejection of Henry in favor of 
Marion (or von Balthasar). Rather, as I have hopefully illustrated above, despite its strong claims 
of respect for sexual difference, an approach that a priori delimits all sexuality to a binary 
                                               
217 Here one should challenge Žižek’s overly hasty distinction between psychoanalysis and philosophy. As he writes, 
“one of the crucial differences between psychoanalysis and philosophy concerns the status of sexual difference: for 
philosophy, the subject is not inherently sexualized, sexualization occurs only at the contingent, empirical level; 
whereas psychoanalysis promulgates sexuation into a kind of formal, a priori condition of the very emergence of the 
subject” (Ibid., 87). Against this rather simplistic distinction, it seems that if one follows the path of radical 
phenomenology, one discovers sexual difference which is not merely empirical, but rather formal or structural.  
 
218 Zupančič, What is Sex?, 50. 
 
219 Jay Prosser, “Judith Butler: Queer Feminism, Transgender, and the Transubstantiation of Sex” in Donald E. Hall, 
Annamarie Jagose, Andrea Bebell, and Susan Potter (eds.), The Routledge Queer Studies Reader (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 46. This argument highlights the unique role of phenomenology in Transgender Studies, as Henry 
Rubin writes, “in view of these tendencies for nontranssexuals to wrest away the terms through which we 
transsexuals define our lives, it seems particularly prudent to use a method that not only legitimates subjectively 
informed knowledge but also recognizes the significance of bodies for the lived experience of the I. Bodies are the 
ultimate point of view. The body as it exists for oneself is the point of reference by which the whole world unfolds.” 
Henry S. Rubin “Phenomenology as method in trans studies,” GLQ 4 (1998): 263–281; 268. 
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signification (male/female) and to a single mode of expression (monogamous and heterosexual), 
is not founded upon the respect for difference, but upon an enforced homogeneity, a binary logic 
of sameness. Thus while Enrique Dussel may describe homosexuality as “the denial of sexual 
diversity,”220 or von Balthasar may mark it as a narcissism in which “man has caught sight of his 
own beauty and made it into an object,”221 the truth is precisely the opposite. As Lee Edelman 
elegantly puts it: 
Homosexuality, though charged with, and convicted of, a future-negating sameness 
construed as reflecting its pathological inability to deal with the fact of difference, 
gets put in the position of difference from the heteronormativity that, despite its 
persistent propaganda for its own propagation through sexual difference, refuses 
homosexuality’s difference from the value of difference it claims as its own.222  
 
It is therefore this deeper value of difference, that not only affirms the difference between the 
sexes, but likewise the multiplicitous differences between and among queer sexualities—indeed, 
even the multiplicitous sexual difference that resides within each individual—that is here 
phenomenologically recognized, in order that it might also be ethically and politically affirmed.  
Therefore, if one wishes to open up an account of the body that refuses to serve as a model 
for political violence and exclusion (as will be explored below), then we are here tasked with 
thinking the member together with the flesh, of thinking members of the flesh—multiplicitous, 
momentary, mobile sites of sexual manifestation beyond the reach of the organized organic body. 
If we can learn to think such sexual members, within the flesh, rather than within the organic body, 
                                               
220 “La negación de la diversidad sexual.” Enrique Dussel, Filosofía de la liberación, (Mexico: EDICOL, 1977), 106 
[translation my own].  
 
221 Von Balthasar, The Grain of Wheat: Aphorisms, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 
1995), 89-90. 
 
222 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 60. 
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then perhaps we might discover that the flesh possesses “a much stranger unity that applies only 
to the multiple.”223 
                                               
223 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 158. 
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Chapter 6: Studies on the Sexual Member 
 
The relation of the subject with the organ is at the heart of our experience. 
Jacques Lacan 
 
 
 
If the previous chapter aimed to establish both the multiplicitous character of the flesh and its 
primordial saturation by sexual difference, then the following chapter will seek to further explore 
the relationship between these two insights, by undertaking a phenomenological account of the 
sexual member of the flesh. In order to explore the sheer multiplicity and complexity of sexual 
membership, the three studies presented here will follow a trajectory that intentionally inverts the 
Freudian stages of sexual development, aiming to thwart the traditional privilege of the genitalia 
as the sole “proper” libidinal outlet. Thus, following this trajectory, the first study will seek to 
investigate what is widely regarded as the “purely sexual organ”1—the penis—through a 
phenomenology of acute sexual impotence. The second study will examine the role of anal 
eroticism in the early European gay liberation movement through a phenomenological lens, 
deconstructing the traditional “normal”/“pathological” distinction by tying this anal eroticism to 
the traditionally “non-pathological” uses of oral eroticism in sexuality—viz. kissing. The third and 
final study will look at polymorphous character of sexual membership through a phenomenology 
of erogenous zones writ large.  
Each of these phenomenological studies aims to highlight a particular sexual phenomenon 
which has been relegated to the periphery of phenomenological considerations of sexuality. This 
design is intentional and seeks to both illuminate those aspects of sexual incarnation that have 
                                               
1 Hocquenghem is here being sarcastic, insofar as he aims to dethrone the phallus as the principal sexual outlet. Guy 
Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire, trans. Daniella Dangoor (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 95. 
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traditionally been cast aside, as well as placing traditional phenomenologies and theologies of 
sexuality in question, insofar as such accounts of sexuality have been marked by a certain “proper” 
character. Simply put, traditional philosophical and theological accounts of sexuality are often 
conspicuously sterile. They give the sense that sexuality is clean and tidy—ignoring the complex, 
aleatory, dirty, and in a word indecent character that often marks sexuality. As will be considered 
more fully in the next two chapters, this erasure of the indecent character of sexuality motivates 
and permits such philosophies and theologies to marginalize those whose sexuality cannot be 
“cleaned up,” cannot be made proper. Thus, borrowing the language of Marcella Althaus-Reid, 
who names her fusion of liberation theology and queer theory Indecent Theology,2 one might here 
speak of an indecent phenomenology. That is to say, I will here seek to undertake a phenomenology 
of these philosophically marginalized sexual phenomena—impotence, anal pleasure, 
polymorphous perversity—in an uncompromising fashion in order to uncover (undresses?)3 both 
the underlying structures of sexual incarnation as such as well as give the lie to any sterile notion 
of proper—i.e. “natural,” “normal”—sexuality.  
                                               
2 “By examining the dialectics of decency and indecency and exploring a theology of sexual stories from the 
margins, this book brings together for the first time Liberation Theology, Queer Theory, post-Marxism and 
Postcolonial analysis in an explosive mixture. … Indecent Theology is based on the sexual experiences of the poor, 
using economic and political analysis while unveiling the sexual ideology of systematic theology. Theology is a 
sexual act and Indecent Theologians are called to be sexual performers of a committed praxis of social justice and 
transformation of the structures of economic and sexual oppression in their societies. … Indecent Theology is a 
theology which problematizes and undresses the mythical layers of multiple oppression in Latin America, a theology 
which, finding its point of departure at the crossroads of Liberation Theology and Queer Thinking, will reflect on 
economic and theological oppression with passion and imprudence.” Marcella Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology: 
Theological Perversions in Sex, Gender and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000), i, 2. 
 
3 “The paradigm is an indecent paradigm, because it undresses and uncovers sexuality and economy at the same 
time.” Ibid., 19.  
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§1. “I Can’t,” a Phenomenology of Impotence 
A. The “I Can” and Impotence 
 
As we have already seen, since Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of the living body (Leib) in 
Ideas II, the subjective experience of the body, what later French thinkers will name the flesh, has 
been particularly marked by its capacity for action—its potency. As Husserl writes, “the Ego has 
the ‘faculty’ (the ‘I can’) to freely move this Body [Leib]—i.e., the organ in which it is 
articulated—and to perceive an external world by means of it.”4  
This privileging of the acting flesh, the potent organ, is echoed throughout the subsequent 
phenomenological tradition, where it serves a valuable role in the critique of the Cartesian subject, 
aiding in the conceptualization of a truly embodied manner of existence. As Merleau-Ponty 
paradigmatically notes, “consciousness is in the first place not a matter of ‘I think that’ but of ‘I 
can’.”5 Indeed, this subjectively acting body can be traced back to Maine de Biran’s thesis of the 
“impression of effort,”6 later translated into a phenomenological idiom by Henry in Philosophy 
                                               
4 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second 
Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 159. 
 
5 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 1962), 159. 
Henry almost simultaneously makes the same claim, writing in 1948-49 that “the ego is a power, the cogito does not 
mean an ‘I think’ but an ‘I can’.” Although he will later nuance this claim, affirming Maine de Biran’s identification 
of the ‘I think’ and the ‘I can’; “the Biranian cogito is in no way opposed to the Cartesian cogito, there is no 
question of opposing an ‘I can’ to an ‘I think’ because the whole Biranian analysis of effort has as its sole and 
essential result the determining of this effort as a mode of subjectivity itself.” Michel Henry, Philosophy and 
Phenomenology of the Body, trans. Girard Etzkorn (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 53, 55 
 
6 See: Maine de Biran, The Influence of Habit on the Faculty of Thinking, trans. Margaret Donaldson Boehm 
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970). This “impression of effort” can be understood as Biran’s interpretation of 
Leibniz’s conatus or nisus, which is “over and above extension.” G. W. Leibniz, “A Specimen of Dynamics, Toward 
Uncovering and Reducing to Their Causes Astonishing Laws of Nature Concerning the Forces of Bodies and Their 
Actions on One Another” in Philosophical Essays, trans. Roger Ariew (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
1989), 118. 
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and Phenomenology of the Body.7 For this tradition, from de Biran and Husserl, to Merleau-Ponty 
and Henry, the flesh is distinguished from the mere body (Körper) by its unique capacity to act.  
Moreover, for the later French tradition the flesh will be distinctly marked by the 
immediacy of its action. As Henry affirmatively notes of the Schopenhauerian will—whose very 
“mode in which it presents itself to us is our body”8—“there is only one force, never separate from 
itself, whose action is its deployment and necessary inner accomplishment.”9 For Henry, to be 
body is to be will, and to be will is to be action. Impotence (impuissance), insofar as it appears in 
Henry, only ever appears as the “impotence of thought.”10 This embodied-will therefore inverts 
the Cartesian thinking subject. The embodied-will “has nothing to do with understanding. … It 
does not regard its action as a possibility; it is that action and has already decided to accomplish 
it. It is one with its action and its content.”11 This identity of action and flesh is indebted to Henry’s 
broader commitment to the absolute ontological homogeneity of the monadic flesh [chapter 5].  
 This identification of flesh and action produces certain aporia when faced with the question 
of incapacity, impotence, or the inability to act. According to many phenomenological accounts of 
                                               
7 There Henry rights, for example, “the body which acts is neither the represented body nor the organic body; it is 
the absolute body and, consequently, action is nothing other than a modality of the life of absolute subjectivity.” 
Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 201. 
 
8 Michel Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993), 133 [emphasis added]. 
 
9 Ibid., 134. 
 
10 “L’impuissance de la pensée.” Ibid., 298 [translation altered]. Apart from the impotence of thought, Henry will 
occasionally refer to an impotence of the flesh, but this is an impotence that transfigures into potency. As Cortel 
notes, “Le «je peux » oublie la Vie, parce que celle-ci se donne totalement et sans partage. Ainsi se réalise 
l'inversion de impuissance en puissance.” Yannick Courtel, “Chair et différence sexuelle chez Michel Henry,” Revue 
des sciences religieuses 83:1 (2009), 81. In this regard Henry often speaks of a quasi-dialectical relation between 
impotence and potency—an “ontological homogeneity of activity and passivity” (Henry, Philosophy and 
Phenomenology of the Body, 166)—but this passivity is the self-given passivity in which life gives itself to itself, 
and should not be confused with impotence in the sense of incapacity to act.  
 
11 Ibid. [emphasis added]. 
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the flesh, insofar as action is understood in its moments of impossibility, this incapacity must be 
understood as a consequence of “external” factors, as resistance. In the same way that, as Sartre 
writes, “my hand reveals to me the resistance of objects,”12 so too must all incapacity, insofar as 
the body is understood as action incarnate, be understood as the imposition of external objects. 
Even when Henry attempts to account for resistance immanently in the “resisting continuum”13 of 
the organic body, he nevertheless inevitably reduces the organic body to mere representation—to 
the impotence of thought14—and subordinates this resistance to the originary power of the “I can”: 
the continuum “remains within the ‘I can’,”15 it “submits to the powers”16 of the “I can.” Thus, 
despite his use of the language of interiority, this resistance is likewise subjected to the 
transcendent reign of exteriority: “the ontological character which constitutes the being of the 
organ is transcendence,”17 therefore, “the constituted organic body is already a represented 
body.”18 
Yet, this simple schema is upset by manifold phenomena wherein the impossibility of 
acting does not phenomenologically appear as the product of external resistance, but of the very 
incapacity of the flesh itself. Paradigmatically, the phenomenon of acute sexual impotence 
                                               
12 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New 
York: Pocket Books, 1956), 402. 
 
13 “That which resists the ‘I Can’ of my originary corporeity, which reveals itself to it and to it alone, and whose 
manner of doing this is just to resist it,” Michel Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, trans. Karl Hefty 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 148. 
 
14 “The constituted organic body is already a represented body.” Michel Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, 
trans. Karl Hefty (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 165. 
 
15 Ibid., 148. 
 
16 Ibid., 149. 
 
17 Henry, Philosophy and Phenomenology of the Body, 116. 
 
18 Henry, Incarnation, 165.  
 
 300 
provides an enlightening phenomenological study, not only revelatory of impotence, but of the 
relationship between the flesh and the sexual member as such.  
B. Premodern and Psychological Conceptions of Impotence 
Despite the commonality of its occurrence, its associated psychological difficulties, and the deep 
connections to masculine anxiety,19 philosophical (and particularly phenomenological) 
discussions of impotence are few and far between. Marion tangentially approaches some of these 
concerns with his discussion of the suspension of eroticization in The Erotic Phenomenon, there 
he discusses the “puerile yet obsessive anxieties about orgasms that are too rapid or, inversely, the 
difficulty of attaining one.”20 But, if one seeks a direct philosophical engagement with impotence, 
one finds little to work with. In fact, it is quite noteworthy that, despite being four and a half 
centuries old, Montaigne’s Essays—particularly his essay “Of the Force of Imagination”—remain 
among the most substantial sustained philosophical treatments of impotence.21 While Montaigne’s 
Essays are certainly not phenomenological in a technical sense, they may nevertheless serve as a 
starting point for phenomenological investigation insofar as they offer something like a reflective 
                                               
19 “A third phrase that is difficult for me and, I suspect, for many other man is ‘I can’t.’ … ‘I can’t’ is a man’s 
admission of powerlessness. The words are difficult to say, for our conditioning is to be ‘can do’ men. In the process 
of that conditioning we learned a certain understanding of power. It was power as potency—phallic power, the 
capacity to inflict our will on others” (James B. Nelson, Body Theology [Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 
1992], 100). Lou Sullivan perfectly captures the link between this anxiety around the penis and masculine self-
identity, writing in his diary on May 31st, 1973: “and if there’s no penis, well, that’s what important isn’t it? That’s 
what makes you a man.” Lanei M. Rodemeyer, Lou Sullivan Diaries (1970-1980) and Theories of Sexual 
Embodiment: Making Sense of Sensing (New York: Springer International, 2018), 19.  
 
20 Jean-Luc Marion, The Erotic Phenomenon, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
2007), 152. 
 
21 Nevertheless, even in Montaigne’s case, it is important to recognize, as Entin-Bates has noted, that while “sexual 
impotence is at the same time one of the most intriguing themes in the Essais,” it is also “one of the least talked 
about.” Lee R. Entin-Bates, “Montaigne's Remarks on Impotence” MLN, Vol. 91, No. 4, French Issue (May, 1976): 
640-654, 640. 
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attitude. As Montaigne himself notes, “some years ago … finding myself entirely destitute and 
void of any other matter, I presented myself to myself for argument and subject.”22  
For Montaigne, impotence (l'impuissance) can be divided into two principal modes. The 
first, which Montaigne refers as the “juste faiblesse” (“genuine weakness”23) represent a physico-
medical impotence which remains the domain of doctors—and as phenomenologists we might say 
the domain of the Körper or le corps.24 The second, which forms the bulk of Montaigne’s 
considerations, is the nouements d'aiguillettes, an impotence which cannot be resolved into a 
distinct physical cause.  
In ancient and medieval literature, nouements d'aiguillettes are understood as a form of 
acute impotence, particularly common throughout the Medieval world and often associated with 
newly married men who are unable to consummate their marriage. Traditionally, this impotence 
was associated with wizardry and witchcraft. Thus one finds an extended discussion of impotence 
in the Malleus Maleficarum (Part 2, Ch. VI), where it is associated with a wizard who “confessed 
that for many years he had by witchcraft brought sterility upon all the men and animals which 
inhabited a certain house,” and another of a man bewitched such that he would remain impotent 
with every woman, save the witch who cursed him.  
This notion of impotence as a curse represented a supernatural reinterpretation of earlier 
Christian tradition. Responding to precisely the same paradox of the unruly will of the male 
                                               
22 Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1963), 278. 
 
23 Ibid., 70. 
 
24 Some phenomenological work on medical impotence can be found in nursing and care studies literature. See, e.g.: 
Birgitte Schantz Laursen, “Sexuality in men after prostate cancer surgery: a qualitative interview study,” The 
Scandinavian Journal of Caring Science 31 (2017): 120–127; Laura Morgan, Judith Carrier, Deborah Edwards, 
“Men's perceptions of the impact of the physical consequences of radical prostatectomy on their quality of life: a 
qualitative systematic review protocol,” JBI Database of Systematic Reviews & Implementation Reports, 13(12) 
(2015): 37-46. 
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member, Augustine, drawing upon Romans 7.23—“I see another law in my members, warring 
against the law of my mind”—suggests that the disruptive member, whether impotent or lustful,25 
operates by its own alien will.  
Well, then, how significant is the fact that the eyes, and lips, and tongue, and hands, 
and feet, and the bending of back, and neck, and sides, are all placed within our 
power—to be applied to such operations as are suitable to them, when we have a 
body free from impediments and in a sound state of health; but when it must come 
to man's great function of the procreation of children the members which were 
expressly created for this purpose will not obey the direction of the will, but lust 
has to be waited for to set these members in motion, as if it had legal right over 
them, and sometimes it refuses to act when the mind wills, while often it acts against 
its will!26 
 
For Augustine, this will is the unique product of human sin: “when the first man transgressed the 
law of God, he began to have another law in his members which was repugnant to the law of his 
mind.”27 Because the first humans, members of the body of Christ, rebelled against the head of 
that body, so too are they compelled to contend against their own willful members.  
Now, this ardour, whether following or preceding the will, does somehow, by a 
power of its own, move the members which cannot be moved simply by the will, 
and in this manner it shows itself not to be the servant of a will which commands 
it, but rather to be the punishment of a will which disobeys it.28  
 
As suggested by its title, Montaigne’s “Of the Force of Imagination” is marked by its 
rejection of these supernatural or theological explanations. Rather, Montaigne breaks with his 
                                               
25 Traditional discussions of impotence tend to see impotence and the inconvenient erection as two sides of the same 
coin. 
 
26 Augustine, “De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia,” trans. Peter Holmes and Robert Ernest Wallis, and revised Benjamin 
B. Warfield. in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 5. Ed. Philip Schaff. (Buffalo, NY: Christian 
Literature Publishing Co., 1887.), VII. 
 
27 Ibid. “Sexuality is not the original sin, … but the punishment for it, and the locus of its perpetuation—it is  
subsequent addition to the original creation. In other words, in Saint Augustine’s account, sexuality itself is 
problematic enough to be seen as a punishment, a curse.” Alenka Zupančič, What is Sex? (Cambridge, MA: The 
MIT Press, 2017), 13. 
 
28 Augustine, “De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia,” XXVII. 
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premodern predecessors and seeks to offer a psychological explanation of acute impotence. Thus, 
for example, he considers a man who, upon hearing a description of another’s impotence, finds 
himself immediately stricken with the same condition. Yet, just as it spontaneously emerged from 
this discussion, this impotence likewise disappears in an equally sudden manner. According to 
Montaigne, publicly admitting his condition releases the anxiety that binds him, freeing him from 
his self-imposed impotence.  
For Montaigne, this solution reflects the psychological—or one might say 
psychosomatic—origin of acute impotence. The incapacity experienced by the suffering man is a 
product of the “imagination,” not in the sense that it is an imagined malady, but rather insofar as 
the overly invested imagination takes on an obsessive character. Thus, according to Montaigne, 
“impotence can be reversed only by diverting the imagination and allowing the body to respond, 
in a relaxed and spontaneous way, to erotic stimuli.”29 More recent psychoanalytic and empirical 
research has often confirmed Montaigne’s intuitions.  
Freud, for example, writes of a “psychical impotence” that bears striking resemblance to 
Montaigne’s discussions.30 Indeed, apart from generalized anxiety, Freud suggests that impotence 
is the single most common complaint among his patients. Moreover, this complaint does not 
correlate with a lack of libidinous desire. Rather, “this singular disturbance affects men of strongly 
libidious natures.”31 Thus, its principal form is that of an internal conflict, it “manifests itself in a 
refusal by the executive organs of sexuality to carry out the sexual act, … and although a strong 
                                               
29 Lee R. Entin-Bates, 649-650. 
 
30 Ibid., 652. 
 
31 Sigmund Freud, “On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love: Contributions to the 
Psychology of Love II (1912),” trans. Alan Tyson in J. Strachey (Ed.), The standard edition of the complete 
psychological works of Freud, Volume XI (1910): Five lectures on psycho-analysis, Leonardo da Vinci and other 
works (London: The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis), 179. 
 
 304 
psychical inclination to carry it out is present.”32 Thus, “he has a feeling of an obstacle inside him, 
the sensation of a counter-will which successfully interferes with his conscious intention.”33 Freud 
offers a fairly expected etiology; psychical impotence becomes symptomatic of “psychical 
complexes which are withdrawn from the subject’s knowledge.”34 That is to say, it is the product 
of unconscious cathexes, particularly incestual desire and infantile trauma.  
Likewise, from the empirical side, one finds Masters and Johnson writing of impotence as 
a psychological phenomenon. “Fear of inadequacy,” they argue, “is the greatest known deterrent 
to effective sexual functioning, simply because it so completely distracts the fearful individual 
from his or her natural responsivity by blocking reception of sexual stimuli.”35 
 While compelling within their own domains, these analyses remain firmly situated within 
the psychological region and its various metaphysical interpretations. My interest here is instead 
to undertake a phenomenological investigation of impotence, particularly one which centers the 
flesh, and may therefore serve to illustrate certain striking features of erotic embodiment. 
C. A Phenomenology of Impotence 
In the well-functioning sexual act, a certain correspondence arises between the erotic intention of 
the acting subject and their flesh. Simply put, using the language common from Husserl to Henry, 
the flesh manifests as an “I can”—the potent organ of action manifests within the quite literal 
“potent organ.” Within this alignment of drive and result, there is manifest something like an 
                                               
32 Ibid. 
 
33 Ibid. Here Freud echoes the language of Schopenhauer who remarks: “the genitals [are] the focus of the will.” 
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. II, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1954), 514. It is also perhaps worth noting the striking similarity between Freud’s language of the 
counter-will and Augustine’s discussion of the alien will within one’s members.  
 
34 Ibid., 180. 
 
35 William Masters and Virginia Johnson, Human Sexual Inadequacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 12-13. 
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identity between action and flesh. Yet, this only represents one possible outcome of the erotic 
encounter. In reality, as Marion notes, one might find oneself struck with premature ejaculation or 
unable to achieve orgasm. Or, struck with acute impotence, one may find oneself unable to 
undertake the sexual act at all. In the case of impotence this presumed identity between subjective 
aim and incarnate act finds itself fractured by a particularly conspicuous incapacity. The flesh 
manifests as an “I can’t.”  
Certainly, one might attempt to reconcile this incapacity within the traditional framework 
by positing impotence as a case in which there is a mismatch between the objective body (le corps) 
and the flesh. One might here recall, for example, Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the ill-formed 
corporeal schema, in the case of phantom limb syndrome or anosognosia. Yet, such a solution 
seems to miss the unique character of acute impotence. Whereas in phantom limb syndrome one 
subjectively experiences a limb on le corps propre, which is not manifest objectively, and 
conversely, in anosognosia one lacks a subjective experience of a limb that is objectively present—
impotence presents a different case.  
In impotence there is no misalignment between flesh and body. Rather, 
phenomenologically the member appears within both the corporeal schema and objective 
experience. One by no means lacks the sense that this member is one’s own—as in anosognosia. 
Yet, this fleshly member refuses to act in conjunction with the subject, even one might say, with 
the flesh itself. Indeed, speaking phenomenologically, the member simply refuses to act at all—it 
lacks the power to act: it is quite literally im-puissant. Whereas the phenomenological ontology of 
the flesh which runs from Husserl to Henry tends to think the flesh as action, as capacity, 
impotence reveals a member of the flesh which simply refuses action. But this member is still 
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mine, or more precisely is still me. It still bears the unique ipseity of my flesh. Thus “it cannot,” is 
at one and the same time “I cannot.”  
Within the paradigm of Husserl, where the flesh (Leib) is itself passively constituted by a 
number of distinct fields of sensings (Empfindnisse) which through acts of localization organize 
into a “system of compatibly harmonizing organs,”36 this phenomenon may be adjusted for. The 
same cannot be said for the monadic tradition of radical phenomenology.  
What the phenomenon of impotence suggests, against the phenomenology of the flesh in 
Michel Henry and Jean-Luc Marion, is the unique ways in which the immanence of the flesh is 
itself marked by certain gaps or fissures. We are not, acute impotence suggests, in “undivided 
possession”37 of our flesh, despite the fact that this flesh is still my own. The impotent member is 
me, is my flesh, but is also not only me, insofar as it can be extracted from my action.  
 Here one finds phenomenological support for Jacob Rogozinski’s conception of the “pole 
of flesh” or what I have suggested might be called the member of the flesh. For, insofar as the 
passive synthesis of the flesh—the carnal synthesis—is only ever “a partial and precarious 
identification,”38 it is necessarily marked by a certain écarte or “remainder” (le restant). Against 
the monadic flesh of Henry and Marion, Rogozinski insists that there always remains gaps or 
fissures at the heart of the ego-flesh. It is precisely these “remainders” that are brought to the fore 
in an investigation of the phenomenon of acute impotence, the supposed total auto-affectivity of 
the flesh finds itself struck by a gap.  
                                               
36 Edmund Husserl, Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis: Lectures on Transcendental Logic, trans. 
Anthony J. Steinbock (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 50. 
 
37 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 112-113. 
 
38 Jacob Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh: an Introduction to Egoanalysis, trans. Robert Vallier (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), 171. 
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 While each member of the flesh is marked by a certain affective ipseity—each member is 
felt to be my own—the remainder’s inability to fully constitute within the flesh tends to mark it 
with a second affective characteristic: negative affect. For Rogozinski not only describes the 
constitution which produces the remainder, but also the unique way in which the remainder is 
affectively constituted as abject. Indeed, Rogozinski might just as well have been speaking of the 
impotent member when he writes of the remainder, “when this intimate Stranger reappears in our 
haunting, it necessarily takes on the appearance of a dissociated part of the whole, an errant 
fragment of the body outside of the body—a gaze without a face, an eye without a gaze, a shard 
of voice, a sliced member, excremental waste, and so on.”39 Insofar as the remainder—or the 
impotent member—refuses full incarnation into the flesh, insofar as it refuses the identification of 
flesh and action, it becomes an object of anxiety, fear, and, ultimately, hate. As Mario Mieli 
recognizes, “any male heterosexual goes wild at the idea of ‘not being able to get it up’.”40 Thus, 
for example, in Montaigne’s Essays one finds an account of a “lustful young man who, desperate 
over finding himself impotent with a beautiful mistress, cut off his penis to expiate his offense.”41  
 The impotent member—in precisely the same manner as its equally illuminating converse, 
the inconvenient erection—marks the manifestation of a flesh that is always only mostly me, 
precariously me. It is, as Augustine remarked, a member that seems to “operate [by] another 
law.”42 But its abject character does not emerge from its mere counter-will. Affectively, the 
                                               
39 Ibid., 197. 
 
40 Mario Mieli, Homosexuality and Liberation: Elements of a Gay Critique, trans. David Fernbach (London: Gay 
Men’s Press, 1980), 139.  
 
41 Entin-Bates, 648. “It is said of one young gentleman, amorous and lusty, having by his perseverance finally 
softened the heart of a beautiful mistress, despairing at the fact that on the point of the attack he had found that he 
himself was soft and failing, and that ‘Not in manly style / Had his limp penis raised its senile head’ (Tibullus) he 
bereft himself of it as soon as he returned home and sent it, a cruel and bleeding victim, for the expiation of his 
offense.” Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, 532. 
 
42 Augustine, “De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia,” VII. 
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phenomenon of impotence is quite unlike the failure to control the member of another or a mere 
object—it is not a resistance. The incapacity of impotence is quite unlike the incapacity to bend 
the arm of another in an arm-wrestling match, for example. The disobedience of the member is 
only a fit punishment for original sin, according to Augustine, because it is a member of my flesh. 
This negative affect, the abject character of the impotent member emerges precisely from its 
precarious status; it is my flesh, it should obey my aims. Instead, in both its impotent and overly 
lustful state, as Montaigne notes, this member is unruly. “People,” he writes:  
are right to notice the unruly liberty of this member, obtruding so importunately 
when we have no use for it, and failing so importunately when we have the most 
use for it, and struggling for mastery so imperiously without will, refusing with so 
much pride and obstinacy our solicitations, both mental and manual.43 
 
 
In each of these phenomena, the unruly member presents itself to the body not as a foreign object, 
but also not as a unified acting body. In Freud’s language, the patient’s impotence is experienced 
as an “obstacle,” but one that is “inside him.”44 The complexity of human incarnation, and 
particularly erotic incarnation, is precisely this inability to fully demarcate the member that is 
mine, from that member that is not; the rebellious organ, from the demonic influence; the obstacle 
outside of me, from the obstacle within me—the flesh from its own remainder.  
Yet, against Augustine’s theological reading cited above, this frustration is by no means 
limited to the genitalia. Rather, as Montaigne quite rightly notes: 
I ask you to think whether there is a single one of the parts of our body that does 
not often refuse its function to our will and exercise it against our will. They each 
have passions of their own which rouse them and put them to sleep without our 
leave. … we do not command our hair to stand on end or our skin to shiver with 
desire or fear. The hand often moves itself to where we do not send it.”45 
                                               
 
43 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, 72. 
 
44 Freud, “On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love,” 179. 
 
45 Montaigne, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, 72. 
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Every member is capable of exerting a will of its own because the carnal synthesis of the flesh is 
not a singular event; it is a synthesis renewed in each moment. And just as this synthesis is renewed 
in each moment, so too are its gaps and fissures, which move across the body in indeterminate and 
unpredictable ways. The members of the body are momentary and mobile sites; unruly characters 
“obtruding so importunately.” In like manner, so too are the erotic members. Eroticization is by 
no means limited to the genitalia. Rather, it moves across the flesh in often unexpected and 
unpredictable ways. But in order to recognize this fact, it will be necessary to break ourselves free 
from the phallic rule, by which “all sexual acts have an ‘aim’ which gives them their meaning; 
they are organized into preliminary caresses which will eventually crystallize in the necessary 
ejaculation, the touchstone of pleasure.”46 Toward this end, I will now turn to key works in early 
European gay liberation movement. 
 
§2. The Anal and the Oral: Eroticization Otherwise than the Phallus 
 
A. Normality and Political Anality 
 
For the early activists of the European gay liberation movement—Guy Hocquenghem and Mario 
Mieli—the political liberation of homosexuals was intimately bound both to the economic 
liberation from capitalism and the liberation of eroticism from the phallic law of the genital drive 
[Geschlechttrieb]. It is for this reason that both Hocquenghem’s Homosexual Desire and Mieli’s 
Homosexuality and Liberation explicitly turn to the question of anal eroticism, as a key moment 
of liberative potential. This threefold relation between economics, sexuality, and anal eroticism is 
                                               
 
46 Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire, 95. 
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perfectly captured in the title of Hocquenghem’s key chapter: “Capitalism, the Family and the 
Anus.” In the words of Mieli: 
The (re)conquest of anality contributes to subverting the system in its foundations. 
What in homosexuality particularly horrifies homo normalis, the policeman of the 
hetero-capitalist system, is being fucked in the arse; and this can only mean that 
one of the most delicious bodily pleasures, anal intercourse, is itself a significant 
revolutionary force.47  
 
This suggestion of a direct connection between “anality” and economics is not as arbitrary 
as it might first appear. For already in his earliest work, Freud believed himself to have detected a 
strange homology between money and faeces. As he writes in Character and Anal Eroticism, “the 
connections between the complexes of interest in money and of defaecation, which seem so 
dissimilar, appear to be the most extensive of all.”48 For Hocquenghem and Mieli, this homology 
suggests that the liberation of anal eroticism is uniquely positioned to disrupt the moral foundation 
of an oppressive—because repressive—“hetero-capitalism,” by breaking through its 
presumptively natural normality. “The repressive society and the dominant morality,” Mieli writes, 
“consider only heterosexuality as ‘normal’—and only genital heterosexuality at that.”49 
Hocquenghem likewise insists that “capitalism turns its homosexuals into failed ‘normal people,’ 
just as it turns its working class into an imitation of the middle class.”50  
                                               
47 Mieli, Homosexuality and Liberation, 145.  
 
48 Sigmund Freud, “Character and Anal Eroticism (1908)” in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume IX (1906-1908): Jensen's ‘Gradiva’ and Other Works (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 1976), 173. Even earlier, in a letter to Fleiss, he writes of “an old fantasy of mine, which I would like 
to recommend to your linguistic sagacity, it deals with the derivation of our verbs from originally coproerotic terms. 
I can scarcely detail for you all the things that resolve themselves into - excrement for me (a new Midas!). It fits in 
completely with the theory of internal stinking. Above all, money itself.” Freud, “Letter to Wilhelm Fleiss, Vienna, 
December 22 1897,” in The Complete Letters of Sigmund Freud to Wilhelm Fleiss, trans. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson 
(Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 1985), 288. 
 
49 Mieli, Homosexuality and Liberation, 24. 
 
50 Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire, 94. 
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 In order to challenge the supposed normality of hetero-genital sexuality, Hocquenghem 
and Mieli target the “staged” developmental approach toward genitalization as understood by a 
traditional Freudian reading of childhood development, worked out most concisely in Three Essays 
on the Theory of Sexuality and An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. In each case Freud aims to explain 
“perverts”—broadly understood as “people whose desires behave exactly like sexual ones but who 
at the same time entirely disregard the sexual organs or their normal use.”51 According to Freud, 
these perversions can be understood primarily as forms of stagnation or regression, wherein one 
fails to advance beyond, or returns to, an earlier stage of psycho-sexual development. Thus, in 
each case, his discussion of perversion quickly turns to a discussion of childhood sexuality: “the 
germs of all the perversions will only be demonstrable in children.”52 
 This work begins in 1905 with the development of a tripartite theory of sexual development 
wherein the child is understood to pass through three stages: the oral, the anal, and the phallic.53 
Each of these stages is marked by the emergence of a special sexual signification upon a certain 
bodily zone [Körperstellen] thereafter marked as an erogenous zone [Erogene Zonen]. While 
multiplicitous, Freud argues that this development nevertheless moves through a predictable 
pattern that culminates in puberty with the emergence of genital sexuality:  
Its activity had hitherto been impelled by individual drives and erogenous zones, 
which independently of one another sought a certain sort of pleasure as their sole 
sexual aim. Now [in puberty] there is a new sexual aim, for whose attainment all 
partial drives work together, while the erogenous zones become subordinated to the 
primacy of the genital zone.54 
                                               
51 Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, trans. James Strachey (New York: W. W. Norton, 1949), 22. 
 
52 Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality: The 1905 Edition, trans. Ulrike Kistner (New York: 
Verso, 2016), 32. 
 
53 In his later writings, such as An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, this will be expanded into five stages: oral, anal, 
phallic, latent, and genital. See: Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, 24-27. 
 
54 Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 61. 
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Perversion is therefore marked as a regression to an erogenous zone other than the “natural” locus 
of sexuality, the genitalia. As Freud writes, “certain zones of the body [Körperstellen], such as the 
mucous membrane of the mouth and of the anus, constantly recur in these [perverted] practices, 
clamoring, as it were, for being viewed and treated as genitals in their own right.”55  
 In their challenge to hetero-capitalism both Hocquenghem and Mieli argue that this hetero-
genital norm—and its staged understanding of sexual development—is anything but natural: “there 
is nothing in life itself that requires the child to ‘grow out’ of autoeroticism and the homosexual 
‘stage’ in order to attain this exclusive heterosexuality.”56 Rather, the establishment of such norms 
as “natural stages” serves only to reify a political heteronormativity, which itself serves to justify 
an economic order: viz. capitalism. Thus, for Hocquenghem, anal eroticism is the key to new moral 
(dis)order, a “primary sexual communism”57 which would not impose a telic organization of all 
sexuality toward genitalitalization and (re)production. In order to evidence this thesis, both 
thinkers aim to refigure anal desire, no longer as a regression or a perversion, but as an authentic 
form of erotic manifestation—for each the anus must become not merely the object of a perverse 
fetishization, but a member of the sexual flesh in its own right. 
                                               
 
55 Ibid., 16. Or again, “Like the labial zone, the anal zone is, by its position, suited to act as intermediary for the 
attachment of sexuality to other bodily functions.” Ibid., 46. 
 
56 Mieli, Homosexuality and Liberation, 24. 
 
57 Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire, 111. 
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B. A Phenomenology of Anal Pleasure 
 
While neither Hocquenghem nor Mieli undertake their discussion of anal eroticism 
phenomenologically, their reflections may nevertheless serve as a starting point for a 
phenomenological analysis.   
 In the naturalistic account of sexuality, anal eroticism generally constitutes a form of 
perversion, insofar as it breaks with the “natural” reproductive aim of sexuality. Thus, for example, 
Augustine condemns anal eroticism, not only in the case of homosexuality, but likewise in the 
heterosexual relation. Indeed, he suggests, the act is even “more damnable” in the context of 
marriage.   
Sexual intercourse for begetting is free from blame, and itself is alone worthy of 
marriage. But that which goes beyond this necessity no longer follows reason, but 
lust. … By changing the natural use into that which is against nature, which is more 
damnable when it is done in the case of husband or wife.58  
 
Indeed, even in the case of heterosexuality, such eroticism is generally coded queer by implication. 
In Thomas Aquinas’ effort to delimit the “sins against nature,” for example, anal eroticism, even 
when undertaken within the confines of the marital bed, is directly linked to homosexuality and 
summarily condemned.  
Among sins against nature …  comes the sin of sodomy, because use of the right 
sex is not observed. Lastly comes the sin of not observing the right manner of 
                                               
58 St. Augustine, “On the Good of Marriage,” in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 3, trans. C.L. 
Cornish, ed. Philip Schaff (Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1887), §12. 
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copulation, which is more grievous if the abuse regards the ‘vas’ [vessel, orifice] 
than if it affects the manner of copulation in respect of other circumstances.59 
 
 
This naturalistic argument is certainly not limited to theological accounts of the natural 
law. Within psychoanalysis, Freud’s regressive conception of anal eroticism discussed above 
largely presupposes a reproductive and naturalistic account of anal sexuality. Where such eroticism 
appears within the “normal” sexual life, it is to be understood as a merely “preparatory act,” 
ultimately oriented toward genital sexuality—which constitutes sexuality’s natural aim. Therefore, 
according to Freud, perversion “consist in lingering over the preparatory acts of the sexual 
process.”60 The pervert is the one who treats the preparatory act as a sexual end in itself.  
In order to shift from this natural standpoint to a phenomenological investigation of anal 
eroticism, in order to bring anal pleasure to the fore as a phenomenon, it will therefore be necessary 
to undertake a phenomenological reduction, whereby these naturalistic and normative 
presuppositions might be methodologically set aside. Such a reduction is anticipated by the Front 
Homosexuel d’Action Révolutionnaire (FHAR)—a French gay liberation movement of which 
Hocquenghem was one of the first male members. In its 1971 booklet, Rapport contre la normalité, 
this organization directly targeted the normalization of the naturalistic condemnation of anal 
eroticism. As they write: 
We must ask the bourgeois squarely: ‘What are your relations with your asshole 
apart from the obligation to shit? Is it part of your body, your word, your senses 
just like the mouth or the ears? And if you have decided that the anus only serves 
to defecate, why does the mouth have other uses than eating?’61 
                                               
59 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (Cincinnati: Benziger Brothers, 1920), II-II.154.12. 
 
60 Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 66. 
 
61 “Il faut carrément demander au bourgeois: «Quelles sont tes relations avec ton trou du cul à part l’obligation de 
chier? Est-ce qu’il fait partie de ton corps, de ta parole, de tes sens au même titre que la bouche ou les oreilles? Et si 
tu as décidé que l’anus ne sert qu’à déféquer, pourquoi la bouche a-t-elle d’autres usages que manger?».” 
Anonymous, “Rapport contre la normalité,” trans. in Mieli, Homosexuality and Liberation, 138. 
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Through these questions, FHAR demands that anal eroticism and its unique pleasures be taken 
seriously, that it be a subject of investigation on its own grounds, no longer delimited by 
restrictions that might here be identified as pre-phenomenological prejudices. As Mieli writes, “the 
demand for the restoration of anal pleasure is one of the basic elements in the critique made by the 
gay movement.”62 It is from this starting point that the present investigation will begin.  
 Phenomenologically, anal eroticism can be decomposed into at least two acts of sexual 
intentionality. One intentional act can be understood as roughly correlative to the historical 
category of “active sodomy,” the second, to the historical category of “passivity.” In the words of 
David Halperin—writing specifically of male anal eroticism—“the discourses of pederasty or 
‘active’ sodomy are shaped by a crucial distinction between the male desire to penetrate and the 
male desire to be penetrated.”63 In each of these cases we are dealing with an intentional direction 
toward a constituted organ—what Hocquenghem calls the “anal-organ”64—whether that of oneself 
or that of another. Insofar as this direction presupposes the distanciation of an intentional distance 
and the constitution of a thing-like object, we are in each case thinking within the categories of 
intentional phenomenology. Thus a radical phenomenological investigation will require a further 
movement into the radical reduction.  
Under such a radical reduction, all intentionality and all distance must be bracketed from 
this analysis in order that the phenomenon might be revealed in its most immanent self-givenness. 
                                               
 
62 Ibid.  
 
63 See: David M. Halperin, “How to do the History of Male Homosexuality” in Donald E. Hall, Annamarie Jagose, 
Andrea Bebell, and Susan Potter (eds.), The Routledge Queer Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 2013), 267 
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64 Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire, 103. 
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We will thus here deal not with the anus and anal desire as understood from the perspective of the 
objective body, but as an immanent givenness within the flesh. Given the “intentional” or 
directional connotations of “desire,” I will hereafter diverge from Hocquenghem and Mieli, and 
refer to this reduced phenomenon no longer as “anal desire” but as “anal pleasure” in order to mark 
a shift from intentionality to self-affectivity.65  
When a phenomenological investigation of anal pleasure is undertaken at this level, certain 
key features appear of which I will highlight five, which may be divided into two principal 
categories: the first two mark a certain sexual indeterminacy, the final three mark a certain 
incarnate particularity.  
First, a phenomenological analysis of anal pleasure reveals a certain indeterminacy or open 
possibility in regards to sexual difference. That is to say, sexual difference—whether understood 
in the narrow sense of the difference between male and female, or the broader sense as exposed in 
queer theories of sexuality—is never essential (that is, eidetically determined) by anal pleasure. 
For, as Hocquenghem rightly, albeit rather inelegantly, put it, “the anus is not a substitute for the 
vagina: women have one as well as men.”66 The same holds for other key determinations of sexual 
identity: neither sexual object choice, genital configuration, nor gender identity is essentially 
delimited by anal pleasure. Rather this pleasure reveals itself as a fundamentally indeterminate 
pleasure which, while not experienced by all, is nevertheless not essentially (eidetically) foreclosed 
to any. 67  
                                               
65 As Marcella Althaus-Reid wrote—albeit from a theological, rather than a phenomenological, perspective— 
“desire in Queer Theology needs to give a place to located desire, that is, pleasure. Queer Theology is a materialist 
theology that takes bodies seriously.” Marcella Althaus-Reid, The Queer God (New York: Routledge, 2003), 19. 
 
66 Ibid. 
 
67 This open character represents, in part, the logic underlying Hocquenghem’s identification of anality with a 
certain  “sexual communism.” Ibid., 111. 
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Second, this indeterminacy in regards to sexual and gender identity—and its neutrality in 
regard to gender configuration—correlates to a further indeterminacy of stimulation. Simply put, 
anal pleasure may be produced by manifold forms of anal stimulation, all possible in anal 
eroticism. Thus, anal pleasure refers not only to the genital penetration of the anus, but likewise to 
various manual and oral stimulations; such stimulation may be simply “organic” or assisted by any 
number of sex toys or other objects; and such stimulation of anal pleasure may be autoerotic or 
involve other partners.  
Third, despite these indeterminacies or open possibilities, anal pleasure is also marked by 
key determinations or incarnate particularities. Thus although from the natural attitude, the 
biological boundaries between various organs are rather ambiguous, in anal eroticism there 
nevertheless phenomenologically emerges a distinct member of the flesh. Thus, like any other 
member of the flesh—be it hand, eye, or genitalia—the central anal orifice is bound together with 
its surrounding flesh and sphincter musculature not only as a distinct region of the body—what 
Freud might call a Körperstelle—but also as a region of the flesh. That is, anal eroticism reveals 
or makes manifest a certain self-constitution of the anus as a pole or member of the flesh.  
Fourth, the anal-member is not only, to borrow Freud’s language, a Körperstelle but an 
Erogene Zone—an erogenous zone. That is to say, in anal eroticism one experiences a 
diversification of sexual meaning. The pleasure invoked in anal pleasure bears a distinctly sexual 
or erotic character. Not merely the passive receptacle for the genitalia of the other, in anal pleasure 
one finds a zone of pleasure within one’s own flesh which is distinct from genitalization. That is 
to say, this zone is experienced as the site of a uniquely sexual pleasure, despite the fact that it 
finds itself expanded beyond the region of the genitalia.  
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 Fifth, and following directly from above, the emergence of this member as a site of a 
distinctly sexual pleasure is likewise revealed as an end in itself. That is to say, this pleasure need 
not be a merely “preparatory act” in anticipation of genital consummation—anal pleasure is not 
telically oriented towards genital fulfillment. Here a phenomenology of the erogenous zone must 
break from its Freudian predecessor. For according to Freud, erogenous zones “are used to 
facilitate, through the medium of the fore-pleasure which can be derived from them (as it was 
during infantile life), the production of the greater pleasure of satisfaction.”68 Specifically, Freud 
here intends genital satisfaction.69 This is not to suggest that such pleasure cannot function together 
with genital sexuality, nor that it cannot serve a preparatory role. Rather, it is to suggest that such 
a preparatory role is not eidetically mandated; it is not essential to the phenomenon of anal pleasure 
that it serve the higher eroticism of a “rightly sexual” act—viz. genital copulation. While anal 
eroticism may serve as a fore-pleasure, it is also found to constitute a possible satisfaction in its 
own right. Thus we might say of anal pleasure, what Hocquenghem said of homosexual desire, 
“this leads us to desire as the plugging in of organs subject to no rule or law”70 
C. Kissing, or the Banality of Oral Pleasure 
 
Despite Freud’s naturalistic distinction between perverse and “normal” sexual function, he 
nevertheless was among the first to recognize the impossibility of unambiguously demarcating the 
two. As Freud notes, “everyday experience has shown that most of these extensions [of sexuality 
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to non-genital organs], or at any rate the less severe among them, are constituents rarely absent 
from the sexual life of healthy persons.”71 For Freud, the fetishistic bestowal of sexual meaning 
onto non-genital bodily members is not only a feature prominent in childhood sexual development 
and perverse sexuality, but also plays an important persisting role in a “healthy” or “normal” sexual 
life.72 The key example of this phenomenon according to Freud is the kiss, as he writes, “a certain 
degree of fetishism of this nature is thus a regular part of normal loving, especially in those stages 
of being in love in which the normal sexual aim seems unattainable, or its fulfillment deferred.”73 
In the kiss, one experiences the extension of a distinctly oral pleasure, beyond the boundaries of 
the oral developmental stage, yet in a manner that is, within naturalistic paradigms, almost 
universally regarded to be a “normal” sexual function.  
For this reason, a phenomenology of the kiss provides a useful supplement to the discussion 
of anal pleasure. For, within the naturalistic attitude, kissing and anal pleasure often constitute 
polar phenomena. Whereas anal pleasure is generally regarded as an abnormal, perverse, or illicit 
sexual phenomenon, kissing is generally regarded as among the most benign manifestations of 
sexual pleasure. Yet, as will be suggested below, this moral distinction stands on questionable 
grounds insofar as the two phenomena share remarkably similar phenomenological characteristics. 
In order to clarify a phenomenological analysis of the kiss, it will be helpful to contrast it with the 
kiss in Marion’s The Erotic Phenomenon.  
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Within his crucial discussion of the eroticization of the flesh, Marion employs the language 
of baiser: translatable either as “to kiss” or “to fuck.”74  Marion here intends this double meaning, 
marking the kiss as a preparatory act that provokes the eroticization of the flesh as a whole. As he 
writes: 
By touching one another mouth to mouth, our two mouths set off a wave that 
traverses our two bodies, so as to transcribe them wholly into two fleshes, without 
remainder; the mouth begins the process, because, already open, without distinction 
between exterior and interior, it offers itself from the outset as flesh. … the kiss of 
my mouth upon her mouth (where each mouth gives flesh to the other without 
distinction) inaugurates the infinite taking of flesh. All that remains for the whole 
of the other and of me to take flesh is to extend the kiss beyond the kissing and 
kissed mouth. The eroticization of everything is involved.75 
  
There is much to be commended in this phenomenological account. While uncited, there 
are here clear allusions to Luce Irigaray’s insightful account of the “lips.” According to Irigaray—
who, it should be noted, is here, unlike Marion, speaking at once of the lips of the mouth and the 
vaginal lips—draws upon Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the chiasm in order to describe the 
impossibility of distinguishing the lips as touching from the lips as touched. It is, she writes, “that 
contact of at least two [lips] which keeps woman in touch with herself, but without any possibility 
of distinguishing what is touching from what is touched.”76 Thus, she argues, woman is always 
“self-embracing.”77 Marion draws forward this analysis, linking it to a larger process of 
eroticization of the entire flesh.  
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Like the phenomenology of anal pleasure, the oral pleasure manifest in the kiss seems to 
be marked by fundamental indeterminacies. As in anal pleasure, the kiss appears essentially 
unbound by sexual difference, orientation, gender, or genital configuration—each of which remain 
an open possibility. Moreover, again as in anal pleasure, the kiss seems to manifest as a unique 
bodily zone: “the mouth,” as Marion writes, “slightly open in order to touch another flesh [or its 
own]—in order to give to the other his or her flesh.”78 This zone, and one might here return to the 
double meaning of le baiser, is likewise potentially sexualized; it is an erogenous zone. Lastly, 
while the kiss often serves as a preparatory act, this is by no means an essential characteristic.  
It is this final phenomenological characteristic that breaks with Marion’s account of the 
kiss. In his analysis of eroticization, Marion implicitly draws forward a naturalistic paradigm, that 
is, he has failed to employ the reduction in a sufficiently rigorous manner. For his analysis of the 
eroticization of the flesh, beginning with the lips, is nothing other than a quasi-phenomenological 
recapitulation of Freud’s notion of the “preparatory act.” For Marion, the kiss does not constitute 
a pleasure in itself, but rather serves the necessary role of eroticization, making possible the 
emplacement of the sexual organs within the flesh and therefore preparing for genital copulation: 
it is a fore-pleasure. Here, le baiser prepares the way for le baiser—the kiss for the fuck. Yet, 
despite its clever employment of a double entendre, it is certainly unclear that the kiss must 
essentially function as a fore-pleasure. Indeed, the kiss regularly serves as an act of romantic or 
sexual intimacy completely independently of genital sexuality. Thus, like anal pleasure, the kiss 
may serve as a fore-pleasure; but it is also found to constitute a possible satisfaction in its own 
right.  
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In this way, the nearly universal embrace of kissing as a normal function, despite the 
marked phenomenological similarity between oral and anal pleasure, calls into question the 
naturalistic endorsement of the former and condemnation of the latter, and perhaps reveals the 
arbitrary (from a radical phenomenological perspective) character of the naturalistic conceptions 
of sexual normalcy. Thus a radical phenomenology of anal and oral sexuality might say, together 
with Freud: 
We can discern in the partial drives a contribution from an organ receiving stimuli 
(e.g., the skin, the mucous membrane, or a sense organ). An organ of this kind will 
be described here as an ‘erogenous zone’—as being the organ whose excitation 
lends the drive a sexual character. The part played by the erogenous zones is 
immediately obvious in the case of those inclinations to perversion that assign a 
sexual significance to the oral and anal orifices. These behave in every respect like 
a portion of the genital apparatus.79 
 
§3. Polymorphous Perversity 
 
A. The Eroticization of Everything 
 
If our analyses to this point have been correct, if the erogenous zone emerges within the flesh itself 
as a member with its own unique haecceity, and moreover, if this member is marked by unique 
pleasures by no means reducible to genitality, then it becomes possible to recognize an 
inevitability: the sexual member, this mobile, momentary, partial site of sexual pleasure can, by 
phenomenological right, appear on any surface. Indeed, a phenomenological consideration of the  
sexual member, certainly no longer delimited as genitalia—but moreover, neither as an anal or 
oral region—reveals the essential impossibility of marking a certain surface of the flesh as 
                                               
79 Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, 29. 
 
 323 
incapable of eroticization: “sexual organs,” As Althaus-Reid suggests, “are excessive and therefore 
do not need to be biologically located.”80  
In order to establish this phenomenological possibility, it might be helpful to understand 
the work that has so far been undertaken as an extended case of what Husserl calls an “imaginative 
variation” [Phantasievariation] or “free variation” [freie Variation], a method that Husserl 
describes in the following manner: 
We let ourselves be guided by the fact taken as a model. For this it is necessary that 
ever new similar images be obtained as copies, as images of the imagination, which 
are all concretely similar to the original image. Thus, by an act of volition we 
produce free variants … It then becomes evident that a unity runs through this 
multiplicity of successive figures.81 
 
That is to say, in imaginative variation one begins with a singular model of a phenomenon, and 
varies characteristics of the phenomenon in the imagination. Those features which can be varied 
without distorting or losing the meaning [Sinn] of the phenomenon are non-essential, are not a 
component of the phenomenon’s eidos, whereas those that cannot be changed without losing the 
phenomenon under investigation are essential to the thing itself, the phenomenon as such. 
 Without attempting a comprehensive imaginative variation on the sexual member, we can 
nevertheless employ this Husserlian methodology to consider a single aspect of this phenomenon: 
incarnate location. Here the genitals have functioned as a model of the sexual member, insofar as 
they are almost indisputably recognized as an (at least potential) zone of erotic significance. In the 
subsequent section this initial model passed through a variation of incarnate location: if 
eroticization was thought in connection to the anal zone, rather than the genital, would we lose 
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sight of our phenomenon, the sexual member? Under the guidance of Hocquenghem and Mieli, it 
was suggested to the contrary that this erotic potential remains clearly manifest in the case of 
anality. Following Marion, this was again shown to be the case in oral pleasure. The mouth, as 
attested by even the most sexually conservative, is a member clearly subject to potential 
eroticization.  
But surely this method can be advanced further. Members commonly described as 
secondary sexual characteristics—such as the breast or the pubic hair—are undoubtedly 
recognized as zones of erogenous significance. As Althaus-Reid notes, “fetishism eroticizes the 
whole body, even the hairs of the head which appear powerfully erotic covered with leather 
wigs.”82 Beyond these secondary characteristics, one can consider the feet—a particularly common 
feature of fetishistic sexuality. One can consider the neck, of which Edmund Burke famously 
regarded as among the pinnacles of human beauty, writing:  
Observe that part of a beautiful woman where she is perhaps the most beautiful, 
about the neck and breasts; the smoothness; the softness; the easy and insensible 
swell; the variety of the surface, which is never for the smallest space the same; the 
deceitful maze, through which the unsteady eye slides giddily, without knowing 
where to fix or whither it is carried. Is not this a demonstration of that change of 
surface, continual, and yet hardly perceptible at any point, which forms one of the 
great constituents of beauty?83 
 
Likewise in voyeurism the eye and its visual field is cast in an erotic mode. Whereas in masochism 
the entire skin and its sensations of pain and pleasure become erotic, as Freud writes: 
In the sexual pleasure derived from watching, and in exhibitionism, the eye 
corresponds to an erogenous zone; while in the case of the component of the sexual 
drive which involves pain and cruelty, the same role is assumed by the skin, which 
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in particular parts of the body has become differentiated into sense organs and 
modified into mucous membranes, and is thus the erogenous zone par excellence.84 
  
Indeed, the final conclusion appears all but inevitable: every bodily zone is a potential site of erotic 
pleasure; the flesh is an open region of sexual potentiality: “any part of the skin and any sense 
organ could probably function as an erogenous zone.”85 This phenomenological discovery 
necessitates a final step in the reversal of the Freudian stages of sexual development. Not only 
must we step back from the hetero-genitality of the genital stage in order to account for the 
persistence of anal and oral pleasure—with their respective erogenous zones and incarnate 
members—it ultimately appears that there remains no essential limit on sexual manifestation. 
Insofar as no phenomenological necessity delimits sexual expression to certain determinate regions 
of the flesh, we must, so to speak, recognize the “polymorphous” character of sexuality. As Marion 
writes, “my entire flesh can, and thus must, be eroticized. … The eroticization of everything is 
involved.”86  
B. Polymorphous Perversity in Gay Rights and Feminist Discourse 
 
Since Freud, the earliest stages of sexual development have been characterized as a disorganized 
multiplicity of sexual stimuli—what Freud calls “partial drives.” In these early years, far from 
being concentrated in a single organ of sexuality—the genitalia—the body is instead marked by a 
diversity of partial, momentary, and independent sensations. On Freud’s account, this 
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multiplicitous sexuality—what Freud names polymorphous perversity—functions as a neutral 
state of the sexual drive, that persists in the absence of restricting structures:  
Children can become polymorphously perverse, and can be tempted to all possible 
kinds of transgressions. This shows that the child already carries an appropriate 
aptitude within its disposition; acting on such aptitude thus encounters little 
resistance, because, depending on the age of the child, the psychical dams against 
sexual excesses—shame, disgust, and morality—have either not yet been erected, 
or are still in the process of being formed.87 
 
Through the Freudian process of development, which we have here traced in reverse—genital, 
anal, oral—, the child develops these “psychic dams,” funneling or restricting this originally open 
and indeterminate sexual multiplicity into the exclusive regime of hetero-genital sexuality. As 
Zupančič describes this process: “what Freud analyzed as polymorphous perverse infantile 
sexuality shared by both boys and girls is a heterogeneous multiplicity which subsequently gets 
organized around two different positions by means of both hormonal and cultural ‘injections’ and 
demands.”88  
For Hocquenghem and Mieli, this inscription of the individual into a hetero-genital regime 
is a necessary prerequisite for the constitution of the liberal subject: the liberal-capitalist subject 
demands the abandonment of the polymorphous character of sexuality. As Hocquenghem writes, 
“to identify oneself, to bind the organs into a single person, means to leave behind the 
polymorphously perverse, or rather to initiate the perversity of the polymorphous.”89 In even 
stronger language, Mieli will mark this production of the liberal subject as a “mutilation” of 
sexuality: “the objective of educastration is the transformation of the infant, in tendency 
polymorphous and ‘perverse,’ into a heterosexual adult, erotically mutilated but conforming to the 
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Norm.”90 It is for this reason that, on their account, the political liberation of homosexuals would 
not only require the awakening of anal desire, but likewise the opening up of the body in its totality 
as the site of erotic pleasure. For these early thinkers of the gay liberation movement, homosexual 
liberation would require the return to something like polymorphous perversity. “We all know,” 
Hocquenghem paradigmatically writes—in a manner at once descriptive and normative—, “that 
homosexual caresses have a greater tendency to stray over all the zones of the body than 
heterosexual caresses, whose aim is clearly determined.”91  
One finds an analogous move in the feminist literature of the period. Already in The Second 
Sex, Simone de Beauvoir marks holism as a unique feature of feminine jouissance. As she writes: 
Feminine sex enjoyment [la jouissance féminine] radiates throughout the whole 
body; it is not always centered in the genital organs; even when it is, the vaginal 
contractions constitute, rather than a true orgasm, a system of waves that 
rhythmically arise, disappear, and re-form, attain from time to time a paroxysmal 
condition, become vague, and sink down without ever quite dying out. Because no 
definite term is set, woman’s sex feeling extends toward infinity.92  
 
What distinguishes masculine and feminine sexuality, on de Beauvoir’s account, is the 
polymorphous character of feminine eroticization. Whereas the phallic character of masculine 
desire necessitates the delimitation of sexual pleasure to the genital zone, with a particular focus 
on the achievement of orgasm as a concrete and singular experience—“male sex feeling arises like 
an arrow”93—, in feminine sexuality the feminine flesh, in its entirety, is an actually or potentially 
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erogenous zone: “the sensitivity of the erogenous zones is developing, and these are so numerous 
in woman that her whole body may be regarded as erogenous.”94  
 The subsequent French feminist tradition, itself more directly influenced by psychoanalysis 
and deconstruction than existential phenomenology, will reframe this insight in order to develop a 
philosophy of feminine difference, that moreover aims to ground a philosophy of difference as 
such. Thus, according to Luce Irigaray, “woman has sex organs more or less everywhere. She finds 
pleasure almost anywhere. … the geography of her pleasure is far more diversified, more multiple 
in its differences, more complex, more subtle, than is commonly imagined—in an imaginary rather 
too narrowly focused on sameness.”95 This multiplicity of difference is distinguished from a 
strictly Freudian conception of polymorphous perversity insofar as the latter is oriented toward the 
development of hetero-genitality: within the “polymorphous perversion of the child,” she writes,  
“the erogenous zones lie waiting to be regrouped under the primacy of the phallus.”96 The 
polymorphous character of feminine sexuality, on the other hand, is not a stage of development; it 
is not awaiting the genital organization of Freudian subjectivity. Rather, it is the multiplicity and 
diversification of sexual members without telic orientation toward the genital.  
For Hélène Cixous, this polymorphous character of feminine sexuality marks an escape 
from every hierarchical, organic organization of the body, the escape from the monarchy of the 
genitals. She writes:  
If there is a self proper to woman, paradoxically it is her capacity to depropriate 
herself without interest: endless body, without ‘end,’ without principal ‘parts’; if 
she is a whole, it is a whole made up of parts that are wholes, not simple, partial 
objects but varied entirety, moving and boundless change, a cosmos where eros 
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never stops traveling, vast astral space. … That doesn’t mean that she is 
undifferentiated magma; it means that he doesn’t create a monarchy of her body or 
her desire.97  
 
In feminine sexuality one discovers a democracy of the flesh—what Hocquenghem would name a 
primary sexual communism. Insofar as the flesh refuses to await genitalization, it has no proper 
“end.” Rather, it exists in a dis-organized state; not, Cixous emphasizes, undifferentiated, but 
precisely the opposite: hyper-differentiated. The flesh is marked by the absolute diffusion of 
difference across each and every site of erotic potential.  
 What Irigaray discovered through psychoanalysis and Cixous through deconstruction is 
precisely what I have here suggested to uncover through the methodology of a radical 
phenomenology: the flesh is marked by a multiplicitous heterogeneity of differentiated members, 
which refuse organization, telos, or genitalization. “Heterogenous, yes, to her joyful benefit, she 
is erogenous; she is what is erogenous in the heterogenous.”98  
 
C. The Generalization of Polymorphous Sexuality 
 
Yet, while taking these queer and feminist discourses as a point of departure, the 
phenomenological analyses here undertaken suggest a generalization of this diversified geography 
of pleasure. For, as was noted in the phenomenological analyses of anal and oral pleasure, such 
pleasures are by no means essentially restricted to a singular position within sexual difference.99 
Polymorphous pleasure is not a unique feature of feminine jouissance, but is rather a generalized 
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characteristic of flesh as such: all flesh, both the feminine and the masculine—as well as a thousand 
tiny sexes—are marked by an erotic potentiality that extends well beyond the narrow limits of 
hetero-genitality. We simply, as Freud remarks; “do not know to which organ or organs a person’s 
sex is attached.”100 
Exactly the same can be said of sexual orientation. Hocquenghem himself suggests 
precisely as much. Thus, although he argues that “only homosexuals make such constant libidinal 
use of this [anal] zone,”101 this privilege is by no means essential. Rather, as he clearly remarks: 
“it may be said that homosexuals are not alone in making a desiring use of the anus. … Georges 
Bataille, although heterosexual, perceived the peculiarly repressed nature of this zone of the 
bourgeois body.”102 As was suggested above, phenomenologically speaking anality is a pleasure 
bounded by no discreet sexual orientation. The same may likewise be recognized in the 
phenomenology of polymorphous pleasure more broadly. There is no sexual position or orientation 
which is granted unique access to polymorphous pleasure, the unbounded potential of eroticization 
is granted by right to all flesh.  
This generalization of polymorphous erotic potential to all flesh presents a clear risk. Does 
it not, it might rightly be asked, mark a return to precisely the “sameness” that thinkers as diverse 
as von Balthasar and Irigaray have sought to overturn? Does the dissemination of polymorphous 
pleasures coincide with the erasure of sexual difference? As Žižek argues: “the endeavor to liberate 
sexuality from all ‘binary’ oppressions in order to set it free in its entire polymorphous perversity 
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necessarily ends up in the abandoning of the very sphere of sexuality—the liberation of sexuality 
has to end up in the liberation (of humanity) from sexuality.”103  
Quite to the contrary, I would here suggest that not only does the generalization of 
polymorphous eroticization not mark the erasure of sexual difference, but rather the expansion or 
radicalization of difference. But this radicalization necessitates a reconceptualization of the site of 
difference: here it will be helpful to return to the analysis of sexual difference found in recent 
Lacanian psychoanalytic discourse. Thus, in this way we will find the present analyses landing at 
precisely the same point as the previous chapter’s discussion of Rogozinski: the necessity of 
recognizing sexual difference not as an external fault between the sexes or genders, but as an 
internal fault, a disruption of the flesh within itself that functions as the precondition for the erotic 
potential of all flesh. As Zupančič notes, “difference cuts ‘through’ each sex, not between the 
sexes.”104 
 As Philippe Van Haute and Herman Westerink note, sexuality—and I might add the sexual 
flesh—is the product of a complex process of constitution. “The sexual drive,” they write, “is most 
likely put together from various components. If the sexual activities are composites, maybe the 
source from which they spring (the sexual drive) is also something composite. … What we call 
the sexual drive is actually a composition or bundle of partial drives.”105 Yet, the multiplicitous 
disorganized sexuality of the partial drives or of non-hierarchical sexual members does not only 
temporally anticipate hetero-genital sexuality—as on a strictly developmental account. Rather, this 
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polymorphous character continually haunts even the most “normal” sexuality. As Freud himself 
recognized: “it becomes impossible in the end not to recognize that this same disposition to 
perversions of every kind is a universal and primary human characteristic.”106  
The cause of this persistence—of the inability of even the most rigorous imposition of 
cultural or environmental norms to erase non-genital sexuality—is twofold. First, as Rogozinski 
sought to establish, the chiasm is always haunted by an écarte. There is no constitution of the vast 
multiplicity of sexual drives and erogenous zones that could ever be produced without remainder; 
there is no constituted flesh that is not riven with gaps or faults. In the psychoanalytic language of 
Zupančič: “‘Genital sexual organization’ is far from being primordial. It involves unification of 
the originally heterogenous, dispersed, always-already compound sexual drive, composed of 
different partial drives, such as looking, touching, sucking, and so on. … It is always a somehow 
forced and artificial unification. … it is never really fully achieved or accomplished.”107 Second, 
and as Zupančič again emphasizes, the negativity or gap at the heart of sexuality goes even deeper. 
It is not only that gaps persist between individuals or that gaps persist within the constitution of 
the individual—rather, the very members of the flesh are themselves haunted by difference and 
negativity. “The claim is stronger,” she writes, “these partial pleasures and satisfactions are already 
(in-)formed by the negativity implied by the non-relation.”108  
In a speculative-Hegelian reversal characteristic of Lacanian psychoanalysis, the gap or 
rupture at the heart of sexuality is recognized not as the failure of sexuality, but as its very condition 
of possibility. “Taken at this level,” Zupančič ultimately concludes, “sexuality ‘unifies’ the drives 
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not by uniting them in a more or less coherent whole (of sexual activity), but precisely as the crack 
around which they circulate and to which they keep returning. The ‘sexual’ refers to the ‘crack’ 
shared (and repeated) by different drives.”109 The suggestion here is that there is no level of depth 
which can be attained, whether psychoanalytically—or, I might add, phenomenologically—where 
one discovers a pure sexual phenomenon, sexuality as wholeness or sameness, a site beyond the 
ruptures of differentiation and negativity.110 This is not only because sexuality always fails its 
unification, or in Rogozinski’s language, because as complete chiasm is impossible, but because 
the incomplete character of the chiasm is itself the genesis of sexuality. It is precisely because we 
are not monadic flesh that we experience all flesh as potentially eroticized.111 To recall the words 
of Rogozinski: “by letting itself be traversed and divided by the remainder in this way, the body 
of flesh is opened to sexual desire.”112 Thus sexuality not only emerges from the flesh insofar as 
the flesh contains irreducible gaps or ruptures within itself, but moreover, the very members of the 
sexual flesh, erogenous zones bearing sexual meaning and affect, are themselves situated in, 
among, or on these very gaps.  
The result of this situatedness is not only phenomenological, but psychological (and in the 
following chapters it will be added: political and theological). Because the sexual members of the 
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“Sexuality, considered from a phenomenological point of view, appears to be composed of several different partial 
drives, to which it provides a more or less accomplished unification. … What we should add to this from the 
Lacanian perspective—and we are clearly on a speculative level here—is that we could also see sexuation as prior to 
the partial drives: not as a kind of primary substance, but precisely as the hole/crack around which the drives 
‘congregate’.” Ibid., 115.  
 
111 This, in contradiction to Henry’s monadic insistence that erogenous zones be cast out of the flesh, into the world: 
“les zones érogènes ne sont que des pôles d’un monde érogène qui correspond à une certaine intentionalité.”  Michel 
Henry, “Notes sur le phénomène érotique” in Jean Leclercq, (ed), “Michel Henry: Notes sur le phénomène érotique” 
Revue Internationale Michel Henry 4 (2013): 37. 
 
112 Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh, 194. 
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flesh congregate in or around these gaps in our flesh—these unruly zones that have a will of their 
own and seem to manifest precariously as both flesh and other at the same time—these members 
are subject to suspicion, mistrust, and violence. They can even, as Rogozinski argues, trigger a 
crisis of disincarnation: “the texture of my flesh is torn apart, its nascent unity is undone, and I 
become anxious about being dismembered or infinitely cut to pieces.”113 The subjection of the 
sexual member to particularly harsh regulation and shaming can therefore be understood as a 
response to this phenomenological characteristic of flesh. The precepts that aim to suppress 
sexuality—whether social, political, or religious—are not arbitrary, but rather emerge from an 
anxiety produced within the flesh itself. Insofar as the flesh manifests as a precarious 
phenomenon—traversed by multiplicitous, polymorphous, and unstable sexual potential—insofar 
as it finds itself riddled with gaps and fissures around which a rich and variegated sexuality gathers, 
it refuses subjection to any rule of the same, any hierarchical or teleological organization. Every 
story of developmental stages, genital aim, evolutionary directedness, or rational ordering finds 
itself subverted by a flesh that continuously rebels against stratified organization. Anywhere that 
orderly hierarchical structuring is privileged, this flat ontology of sexual manifestation can only 
be experienced as disruptive and chaotic, even dangerous.  
But, this anxiety directed toward the sexual member is not necessary; it is not an essential 
component of incarnate being. Rather, in what Rogozinski calls redemption or Cixous liberation 
and transformation, we can catch a glimpse of an alternative possibility of relating to the remainder 
or the otherness within our own flesh. In the language of Rogozinski, this necessitates a new 
synthesis of incorporation in which [the flesh] unites itself with the remainder engendered by the 
                                               
113 Ibid., 244.  
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previous two syntheses.”114 For Rogozinski, this is the true “syn-thesis” insofar as it “puts 
differentiated elements in relation in order to unite them and identify them with one another.”115 
That is to say, a structured system of sameness is in principle precluded from entering into a 
genuine synthesis. Authentic synthesis must be the synthesis of alterity, of otherness. Whereas the 
constitution of the flesh depended upon a precarious synthesis of a multiplicity of members of the 
flesh, this second-level synthesis marks the synthesis of the flesh with its own remainder, the 
incarnation of the remainder into the flesh—yet, without an abandonment of its alterity.  
 The ability to maintain a flat ontology of the polymorphous sexual flesh is not only key to 
constructing an adequate phenomenology of the flesh or even a psychology of sexual 
embodiment—polymorphous sexuality, as queer and feminist scholars have always recognized, is 
political. On the one hand, as Cixous emphasizes, this means that the liberation of sexuality stands 
upon a transformation of the politics of difference writ large. As she writes:  
Let us imagine a real liberation of sexuality, that is to say, a transformation of each 
one’s relationship to his or her body (and to the other body), an approximation to 
the vast, material, organic, sensuous universe that we are. This cannot be 
accomplished, of course, without political transformations that are equally radical. 
… Difference would be a bunch of new differences.116 
 
On the other hand, the converse is also the case. Indeed, in the following chapters it will be 
suggested that the relationship that one maintains in regard to the alterity of one’s own sexuality 
is essential to the constitution of social, political, and religious communal bodies. The way in 
which one relates to the remainder within their own flesh prefigures the way in which they relate 
to marginalized figures in their political and religious communities.  
                                               
114 Ibid., 243. 
 
115 Ibid. 
 
116 Cixous, “Sorties,” 83. 
 
 336 
Chapter 7 - Membership and the Body of Christ 
Perhaps the body is the only factor in all spiritual development. 
 Gilles Deleuze 
 
In the final chapters of this dissertation I will seek to extend the account of the flesh laid out in the 
previous two chapters in order to elucidate the constitution of religious communities. Thus 
methodologically, I will in the following chapters institute a shift from an explicitly 
phenomenological methodology to a theological methodology that, echoing Henry and Marion’s 
own influence in the ressourcement tradition, will draw particularly strongly upon the writings of 
the Patristic fathers. 
Most fundamentally this chapter will aim to unpack and clarify the logic underlying the 
contemporary all-to-common exclusion of gender and sexual minorities from religious 
communities, while also drawing out the possibility of an alternative conception of religious 
membership, a membership conceived through the logic of the multiplicitous flesh, rather than a 
logic of exclusion of the dysmember. Therefore these final two chapters can perhaps be understood 
as something like an incarnational ecclesiology in a Christological vernacular. That is to say, I will 
here be engaging not with ecclesiology in the sense of church structures or codes of regulation, but 
at the Christological level—as the Body of Christ. Moreover, this discussion of religious 
communities is incarnational insofar as it will seek to identify a fundamental homology between 
the constitution of the flesh of the individual and the constitution of the communal body of Christ.  
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§1. The Constitution of the Community as Flesh 
A. The Body Politic 
The correlation of the human body and the socio-political community is certainly not novel. 
Communities are commonly conceived in terms of the human body in both the religious and 
secular imaginary. This image emerges clearly in the political philosophy of the ancients—Plato 
and Aristotle,1 for example—but gained particular currency within early-modern realist political 
philosophy. Thomas Hobbes, for example, famously unpacked the complex interrelation of 
political society in terms of a body, the Corpore Politico: “which may be defined to be a multitude 
of men, united as one person by a common power, for their common peace, defense, and benefit.”2 
This image is manifest most conspicuously in the frontispiece of Leviathan, where the regent is 
figured as an imposing giant, raised above the mountains, whose arms and torso are composed of 
hundreds of individual bodies. Each of these individual subjects (in the double sense), serve as a 
member—what Machiavelli had already named the membros—of the regent, members who are 
“united by covenants into one person civil or body politic.”3 Indeed, it is perhaps noteworthy that 
Hobbes divides The Elements of Law into two sections, the first describing human nature in its 
                                               
1 E.g. “What about the city is most like a single person? For example, when one of us hurts his finger, the entire 
organism that binds body and soul together into a single system under the ruling part within it is aware of this, and 
the whole feels the pain together with the part that suffers. That’s why we say that the man has a pain in his finger. 
And the same can be said about any part of a man, with regard either to the pain it suffers or to the pleasure it 
experiences when it finds itself. Certainly. And, as for your question, the city with the best government is most like 
such a person. Then, whenever anything good or bad happens to a single one of its citizens, such a city above all 
others will say that the affected part is its own and will share in the pleasure or pain as a whole.” Plato, “Republic,” 
trans. G.M.A. Grube and C.D.C. Reeve in Complete Works, Ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 
1997), 1090 (462c-e). “The state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of 
necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand.” Aristotle, 
“Politics” in The Complete Words of Aristotle, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984), 1988 (1253a 20). 
 
2 Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic (London: Simpkin, Marshall, 1889), 104 (1.19.8). 
 
3 Ibid., 108 (2.1.1). 
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sensuous and embodied character, before turning to the “erection”—or one might say, 
constitution—of the political community. In like manner, Hobbes’ trilogy, Elements of Philosophy, 
despite being written out of order, is ultimately organized around the movement from the abstract 
logical/mathematical body (De Corpore, 1655), to the physiological human body (De Homine, 
1658), before turning to the political body (De Cive, 1642). Simply put, for Hobbes, it is not 
possible to understand the right constitution of the body politic, unless one can understand it 
as homologous with the proper functioning human body.  
This understanding of the body as an image of the social community is not restricted to 
this political usage. As Hobbes himself already notes:  
And as this union into a city or body politic, is instituted with common power over 
all the particular persons, or members thereof, to the common good of them all; so 
also may there be amongst a multitude of those members, instituted a subordinate 
union of certain men, for certain common actions to be done by those men for some 
common benefit of theirs, or of the whole city; as for subordinate government, for 
counsel, for trade, and the like. And these subordinate bodies politic are usually 
called CORPORATIONS; and their power such over the particulars of their own 
society, as the whole city whereof they are members have allowed them.4 
 
Thus, just as the political, so too is the economic community understood in analogy to the body. 
The very word corporation—from the Latin corpare, “to make a body”—marks the depth of this 
metaphor within the Western imaginary. Indeed, a company or firm “incorporates” (literally, enters 
embodiment), in order to constitute itself as a legal entity: a legal person or persona ficta.5  
                                               
4 Ibid., 104 (1.19.9). 
 
5 The question of corporate personhood is particularly controversial within the United States. Since the 19th century 
(Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 1844), the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld the legal privileges 
of corporate personhood, including: the right to own property, to sue, to hire employees, etc. But, in its controversial 
2010 decision of Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the supreme court granted legal personhood the 
full protection of the first amendment, including the right to free speech, understood in this context to overturn bans 
on electioneering by corporations and other legal persons.  
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 Karl Marx was particularly fond of employing this body imagery in his descriptions of 
economic relations—particularly the industrial capitalism of his epoch. Thus, he writes of the 
structure of the capitalist economy, for example:  
The result we arrive at, is not that production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption are identical, but that they are all members of one totality, different 
aspects of a unit. . . . Thus a definite form of production determines definite forms 
of consumption, distribution and exchange as well as definite relations between 
these different elements.... A mutual interaction takes place between these various 
elements. This is the case with every organic body.”6  
 
Likewise in the first volume of Capital, Marx will tend to conceptualize the industrial worker as 
the member or organ of the factory and its machines: “the workers are merely conscious organs, 
coordinated with the unconscious organs of the automaton, and together with the latter 
subordination to the central moving force”7; or again, “in manufacture the workers are the parts of 
a living mechanism. In the factory we have a lifeless mechanism which is independent of the 
workers, who are incorporated into it as its living appendages.”8 Or, in the words of the American 
socialist activist and presidential candidate, Eugene Debs: “the capitalist refers to you as mill 
hands, farm hands, factory hands, machine hands - hands, hands! … A capitalist would feel 
insulted if you called him a hand. He’s a head. The trouble is he owns his head and your hands.”9 
                                               
6 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy, trans. Martin Nicolaus (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1973), 99-100 [emphasis added]. 
 
7 Karl Marx, Capital Volume I: A Critique of Political Economy, trans. Ben Fowkes [New York: Penguin Books, 
1976], 544-545 [emphasis added]. 
 
8 Ibid., 548 [emphasis added]. 
 
9 David Karsner, Debs: his authorized life and letters from Woodstock prison to Atlanta (New York: Boni and 
Liveright, 1919), 200. As Sara Ahmed similarly remarks, in a more contemporary feminist interpretation of this 
capitalist reality: “the arm matters. An arm is what allows you to reach, to carry, to hold, to complete certain kinds 
of tasks. Arms are identified throughout history as the limbs of labor or even the limbs of the laborer. Arms are 
supposed to be willing to labor. But not all arms. … When the laborers’ arms become tools in the creation of wealth, 
the laborers lose their arms. To become his arm is to lose your arm. The factory owner does not only acquire the 
laborers’ arms; he has his own arms freed. We can hear another sense in which arms are striking. To go on strike is 
to clench your fist, to refuse to be handy. When workers refuse to allow their arms to be the master’s tool, they 
strike. The clenched fist remains a revolutionary sign for labor movements, internationally” Sara Ahmed, Living a 
Feminist Life (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017), 85. 
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B. Phenomenology and Communal Constitution 
 
Despite its tendency to center of the individual subject, this understanding of the community as 
correlate to the body is certainly not foreign to phenomenology. Indeed, already in Husserl one 
finds precisely this logic being unpacked as a phenomenological—rather than a merely cultural—
assertion.  
 Husserl situates this idea within his language of “we-subjectivity” (Wir-Subjektivität). 
Against common (albeit unfounded) accusations of solipsism, texts such as Ideas II and the 
unpublished lectures on intersubjectivity show that Husserl became increasingly convinced of the 
necessity of thinking the constitution of the objective world as necessarily co-constituted with 
others: as an inextricably social act.10 Indeed, for Husserl, the true objective object simply is the 
object insofar as it appears across a multiplicity of intersubjective manifestations. As he writes in 
the Ideas II, “the ‘true thing’ is then the Object that maintains its identity within the manifolds of 
appearances belonging to a multiplicity of subjects, and specifically, again, it is the intuited Object, 
related to a community of normal subjects.”11  
                                               
 
10 “Rather than dividing the realm of phenomenology into two different domains – the individual and the social—
Husserl aimed at articulating this difference in terms of two modalities of the single phenomenological absolute.” 
Timo Miettinen, “The Body Politic: Husserl and the Embodied Community,” in Rasmus Thybo Jensen and Dermot 
Moran (Eds.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity (New York: Springer, 2014), 330. 
 
11 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: Second 
Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer 
(Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 87 [emphasis added]. For ease and concision of 
space, subsequent citations will simply refer to “Husserl, Ideas II.” For Husserl, this co-constitution of objectivity is 
most conspicuous at the point that it fails. In a thought experiment Husserl imagines a completely solipsistic subject, 
suddenly encountering other subjects: “let us imagine, however, that at a point of time within the time co-constituted 
along with the solipsistic world, suddenly in my domain of experience Bodies show up, things understandable as, 
and understood as, human Bodies. Now all of a sudden and for the first time human beings are there for me, with 
whom I can come to an understanding. And I come to an understanding with them about the things which are there 
for us in common in this new segment of time. Something very remarkable now comes out: extensive complexes of 
assertions about things which I made in earlier periods of time on the ground of earlier experiences, experiences 
which were perfectly concordant throughout, are not corroborated by my current companions, and this not because 
these experiences are simply lacking to them … but because they thoroughly conflict with what the others 
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This phenomenological reality of co-constitution produces “personal unities of a higher 
order.”12 Such social bodies, or communities (Gemeinschaft), are no mere fictions (persona ficta) 
or naive imaginative extensions of the individual to the communal. As Husserl insists, the notion 
of the body politic is not an “inventive coincidence of natural thinking.”13 Quite to the contrary, 
the notion of the social body identifies something “real” (wirklich) in social and communal 
relations. This objective reality is evidenced by the temporal persistence of the social body, despite 
the transience of its membership—social bodies “have their own lives, [and] preserve themselves 
by lasting through time despite the joining or leaving of individuals.”14 As Miettinen notes, “a 
certain social body is never tied to any particular subject, but has its existence regardless of the 
entry or withdrawal of particular members. … it belongs to the very notion of communal person 
that it always transgresses its particular members—it is something that cannot be reduced back to 
individual subjects.”15 Mereologically speaking, that is to say, the member of the community is a 
part—or more precisely, a “piece” (Stücke)—of the social whole, but is not a necessary 
constituent—a “moment” (Momente).16 
                                               
experience in experiences. … As I communicate to my companions my earlier lived experiences and they become 
aware of how much these conflict with their world, constituted intersubjectively and continuously exhibited by 
means of a harmonious exchange of experiences, then I become for them an interesting pathological Object, and 
they call my actuality, so beautifully manifest to me, the hallucination of someone who up to this point in time has 
been mentally ill.” Ibid., 84-85. 
 
12 Husserl, Ideas II, 191. 
 
13 As cited in Miettinen, “The Body Politic,” 335. 
 
14 Husserl, Ideas II, 191. 
 
15 Miettinen, “The Body Politic,” 338-339. 
 
16 For a mereological account of the social body, see: Sean Petranovich, “Husserlian Mereology and Intimate 
Community Membership,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 32.3 (2018): 462-474. 
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Because he draws upon this tradition of viewing the social unity as a body, Husserl tends 
to employ specifically biological language in his explication of social relations. He will thus speak 
of the “organic” relations between individuals. In fact, in a move that anticipates work that will be 
undertaken below, this organic-bodily imagery is drawn together with a decidedly theological 
vocabulary in his construction of the ideal social body: the “community of love” 
(Liebesgemeinschaft).17 To again cite Miettinen’s astute analysis, for Husserl, “it is love that opens 
up the peculiar form of ‘organic,’ reciprocal unity of perpetual striving towards good that 
constitutes the ideal form of communal life.”18 In such a community, the mere intimacy of 
proximity is transformed into the reciprocal unity of a shared project.19 “Lovers,” Husserl argues, 
“do not live alongside one another and with one another, but in one another [ineinander], actually 
and potentially.”20 Through this reciprocal interpenetration (homologically akin to the synthesis of 
empfindness in the constitution of the Leib), the community of love emerges as a quasi-personal 
social body, with a certain set of social values, memories, and even something like a communal 
subjectivity.  
This logic will be directly picked up by Michel Henry, who predictably re-centers the 
socio-ethical relationship to the other within the context of the auto-affective relationship that one 
maintains toward oneself. Thus, a cruelty directed toward the other finds its genesis within an auto-
                                               
17 For an analysis of Husserl’s Liebesgemeinschaft, see, e.g.: R. Philip Buckley, “Husserl’s Rational 
`Liebesgemeinschaft’,” Research in Phenomenology 26.1 (1996): 116-130.  
 
18 Ibid., 341.  
 
19 Or, in the words of Petranovich, “a community of love is the achievement of an intertwining of wills, such that the 
strivings and willings of one member are immediately realized through the strivings and willings of another 
member.” Petranovich, “Husserlian Mereology and Intimate Community Membership,” 466.  
 
20 Edmund Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass, Zweiter Teil, 1921–1928, 
ed. I. Kern (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), 173-174, as translated in Petranovich, “Husserlian Mereology and 
Intimate Community Membership,” 466.  
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affective masochism toward oneself. As he writes in a commentary on Nietzsche in The Genealogy 
of Psychoanalysis: 
In place of the exteriority of the relation joy-suffering, which seems sufficient to 
explain cruelty as a mode of experience of the other, interiority, as the opposite of 
that relation, is here substituted as the relationship of the individual with himself. 
For cruelty in its most general and constant form is above all cruelty toward oneself, 
a cruelty consisting of making oneself suffer in which the individual takes pleasure 
in his own suffering and for that reason makes himself suffer.21  
 
For Nietzsche, insofar as the relation to the other remains dependent upon this primordial 
relationship to self, it is this primary auto-affective relationship which must be mastered—if one 
cannot eliminate cruelty (what Henry would call “suffering”), then one must become “an artist and 
transfigurer of cruelty.”22 As Nietzsche argues, “almost everything we call ‘higher culture’ is based 
on the spiritualization of cruelty, on its becoming more profound: this is my proposition.”23  
 This connection between social communities and the auto-affective relationship to one's 
own flesh—suggested in the Genealogy of Psychoanalysis—is first worked out carefully in 
Material Phenomenology’s discussion of “pathos-with.” There—as was briefly discussed above 
(chapter 2)—Henry counters accusations that his auto-affective philosophy is necessarily 
solipsistic. Against such views, Henry posits the fundamental site of human intersubjectivity as an 
affective relationship: “pathos-with.”24 “Before intentionally grasping the other as other and before 
the perception of the other’s body,” he argues, “every experience of the other in the sense of a real 
                                               
21 Michel Henry, The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis, trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1993), 236. 
 
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The Modern Library 1968), 
§229. 
 
23 Ibid. 
 
24 As discussed in Chapter 2, this notion of “pathos-with” is self-consciously developed as a counter to the 
Husserlian conception of “association” and the Heideggerian notion “mit-sein”—both of which position the 
intersubjective relation within the intentionality of the world.  
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being with the other occurs in us as an affect.”25 In this way, Henry shifts the level at which the 
constitution of the community should be understood to occur. Rather than a worldly phenomenon 
in which temporally and spatially proximate individuals establish a relationship of mutuality, the 
community is first and foremost an affective bond between individuals outside (or before) the 
constitution of an ek-static spatio-temporal world.26 “Must we then say that, in spite of all 
appearances, every community is invisible?” Henry asks, “let us take this risk.”27  
 The theological intonation of a primary “invisible community” would not have been lost 
by Henry’s early readers, and throughout the following decade Henry will make this theological 
content explicit. Thus, by the time he writes Incarnation, this affective relation to the other—
“pathos-with”—will be understood as triangulated through Life-itself: which since I am the Truth, 
Henry had unambiguously given the name God: “from Life means from God, since according to 
Christianity, the essence of Life and that of God are one and the same.”28 As he writes, “every 
relation from one Self to another Self requires as its point of departure not this Self itself, an I—
my own or the other’s—but their common transcendental possibility, which is nothing other than 
the possibility of their relation itself: absolute Life.”29 Thus Henry’s phenomenological assertion 
of a privileged affective relationship to the other—itself grounded in a primary affective 
relationship to oneself—is ultimately transfigured into a theological claim. The true community is 
                                               
25 Michel Henry, Material Phenomenology, trans. Scott Davidson (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 
115. 
 
26 Every community is “foreign to the world and to its phenomenological categories, to space and time.” Michel 
Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, trans. Karl Hefty (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 245. 
 
27 Henry, Material Phenomenology, 124. 
 
28 Michel Henry, I am the Truth: Toward a Philosophy of Christianity, trans. Susan Emanuel (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), 51. 
 
29 Henry, Incarnation, 243. 
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the invisible community of affective resonance triangulated toward the source of all affectivity and 
life: God. Thus, he writes, “every community is by essence religious.”30 
 In the final section of Incarnation, this invisible community will be granted its traditional 
title in Christian theology: “the mystical body of Christ.”31 Here, like the Hobbesian corpore 
politico, the constitution of the community—its “process of continuous self-growth”32—is directly 
correlated to the constitution of the individual body. This body is composed of many members—
“its members are all those who, sanctified and deified in him and by him, belong to him from then 
on, to the point of becoming parts of this body itself, precisely its members.”33 It is therefore 
essential to situate this discussion of the body of Christ within its context: the phenomenology of 
the flesh and of incarnation. For Henry, it is only possible to understand the body of Christ, if one 
understands its constitution as one with the constitution of the individual body. Thus he will have 
repeated recourse to his prior investigations of the impressional constitution of the flesh—“our 
critique of Husserl’s problematic concerning the Impression has shown…”34—with the final result 
that the constitution of the body of Christ is constituted (“grows from”) the constitution of the 
individual:  
Each transcendental Self’s givenness to itself—a givenness in which that Self is 
edified within, as growing from itself and thus from its own becoming—is the 
operation of the Word, and the Word repeats it in each conceivable transcendental 
Self, whether past, present, or future. Thus the mystical body of Christ grows 
indefinitely from everyone who is sanctified in Christ’s flesh.35 
 
                                               
30 Henry, Incarnation, 244. 
 
31 Ibid., 250. 
 
32 Ibid., 244. 
 
33 Ibid., 250. 
 
34 Ibid. 
 
35 Ibid., 250-251. 
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Insofar as the constitution of the individual flesh serves as the condition of possibility for 
the constitution of the community, the latter will reflect key characteristics of the former. In this 
way, the phenomenological correlation of the flesh and the social community—whether political, 
economic, or religious—is not merely analogical, but—to use the language introduced by Lacan’s 
seminar, L’Autre á l’autre—homological. “Homology, clearly means—as I emphasized—that the 
relation is not one of analogy,” Lacan there writes, “it is indeed the same thing.”36 The constitution 
of the flesh and the constitution of the community are not comparable, analogical, or similar; they 
are two poles of one and the same logic of incarnation. The relation is, as Husserl argued, “real” 
[wirklich]. Thus the same appears in the case of the sexual member. Just as one may—through 
various philosophical or theological conjurings—seek to expel the sexual member of the 
immanence of the flesh, to dismember the flesh, so too does the community employ precisely the 
same logic of exclusion in regard to sexually divergent members. That is to say, the oppression of 
marginalized communities can in many instances be directly traced back to an unsustainable 
account of embodiment: a failure to reconcile the body with its various reminders, those disavowed 
members and gaps at the heart of the flesh itself. Thus, for example, just as Henry tends to conceive 
the flesh as monadic (Chapter 5), so too does he repeatedly speak of the body of Christ in monadic 
terms: it “is not divisible,” “neither are [its members] separated,” it is “identical,” Christ “remains 
in this ‘entire’ body.”37 This monadic conception of the Christian community—itself motivated by 
the prior expulsion from the sexual member from the flesh—in turn justifies Henry’s patriarchal 
posture and denigration of sexual minorities (Chapter 2).  
                                               
36 “Homologie, c'est bien dire—et je l'ai souligné—que leur rapport n'est pas d'analogie, il s'agit bien de la même 
chose.” Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire Livre XVI: L’Autre á l’autre (Paris: Seuil, 2006), 45 [emphasis added, 
translation my own]. 
 
37 Ibid., 251. 
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This possibility is directly picked up by Jacob Rogozinski who even more directly than 
Henry recognizes the key homological relationship between the flesh and the community—writing 
that “we can affirm too that there is a parallelism between the immanent life of the ego and the 
existence of social and political communities.”38 Specifically, Rogozinski argues that the 
constitution of the community precisely mirrors the passive synthesis of the individual ego-flesh. 
Therefore, like Husserl, he will defend the notion of the body politic, not only as a useful cultural 
metaphor, but rather as a phenomenological discovery (or in the Lacanian jargon: no mere analogy, 
but a homology): “the synthesis of incorporation, which constitutes my body, is similarly repeated 
on the intersubjective level by uniting all the singular bodies within a unique Total Body.”39  
But even more than his predecessors, Rogozinski seeks to explicitly unpack the violent and 
exclusionary potential of this process. Thus, while from the outside it appears that Rogozinski’s 
philosophical production has recently turned from phenomenological consideration of the body to 
political critique, the reality is that this constitutes a continuation of precisely the same project 
discussed above (chapters 5-6). As he writes in the concluding pages of The Ego and the Flesh:  
The corpus mysticum of the Church, the Kingdom, the Republic, or the Party … is 
grounded in the immanent syntheses that gives body to my flesh. … The haunting 
of the remainder reappears on the plane of the community by being fixated on an 
individual or particular group, on a ‘caste’ or class, a ‘racial’ or religious, political 
or sexual minority. … The ‘political body’ is grounded, like my own body, on the 
exclusion of the remainder.40 
 
                                               
38 Jacob Rogozinski, “Democracy and Terror: towards a phenomenology of (dis-)embodiment,” Conference 
Presentation, Die Phänomenologie und das Politische, Hagen (2017), 5.  
 
39 Ibid. Continuing: “most human societies represent themselves in the form of a collective body whose limbs are the 
individuals. It is the organic unity of the body and the subordination of the ‘inferior’ members that, in Plato, works 
as model for the ideal City; already with Saint Paul, the Church defines itself as a body with Christ as its head; and 
this representation will be transferred in the Middle age to the Corpus Mysticum Republicae, the Great Body of the 
State with the king at its head.” Ibid. 
 
40 Jacob Rogozinski, The Ego and the Flesh: An Introduction to Egoanalysis, trans. Robert Vallier (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), 305. 
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In a certain sense, this short passage therefore functions as a précis of his subsequent scholarship 
on politics, terrorism, and Islamism. For Rogozinski, the vast litany of 20th century violence can 
be understood as a problem of the (failed) incorporation of the remainder: “the experience that the 
twentieth century brings us,” he writes, “is the power of the opposing tendency that resists 
disincorporation, which in blood and in death strives to reinstitute the total unity of the great 
Body.”41 Multiplying examples from across modern Western History, from the French Revolution 
and Stalinism, to the rise of Nazism and contemporary Islamist violence, Rogozinski suggests each 
of these instances of authoritarian violence mark attempts to restore the unity of the body politic42 
by excluding the social remainder: 
This is what I specially take from Bataille: every political community constitutes 
itself while creating an accused share, a heterogeneous surplus. For a community 
to be capable of configuring itself as a body, it must reject part of itself—a cast, a 
class, or a sexual, racial, or religious minority—a detached fragment of its own 
flesh which it no longer recognizes as its own, though one that remains nonetheless 
flesh of its flesh. This excluded part that was rejected from the Great Body, this I 
call the remainder of the community.43 
 
 One can see this logic of social exclusion of the communal remainder across political 
discourse: in every argument that seeks to root out an internal foe (e.g. anti-Semitic discourse) 
and/or police the communal or national boundaries (e.g. immigration or border discourse). For 
Rogozinski, following Henry and Nietzsche, in each instance one finds an externalization of what 
is primordially an auto-affective, masochistic hate: “my hate toward others always finds its source 
                                               
41 Jacob Rogozinski, “Birth to the World (Nine Theses on the Possibility of the Political),”  (unpublished), 3. The 
French text was published in 2002 as Jacob Rogozinski, “Naître au monde (neuf thèses sur la possibilité du 
politique)” Lignes 9 (2002): 111-133. 
 
42 “The unrelenting energy and audacity that the totalitarian movements display is the energy of despair: they 
fiercely strive to rebuild some body matter in a society racked by an irreversible disincorporation.” Rogozinski, 
“Birth to the World,” 3. 
 
43 Ibid., 8-9. 
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in a hate toward myself, toward an internal outsider that I recognize with horror in the other. If 
someone proclaims his disgust and his hate of women or of homosexuals, we may wonder that he 
detests in them his own femininity, which he refuses in himself.”44 By projecting the rejected 
remainder of oneself or one’s community onto the other, one aims to disincorporate them, to 
remove them from the body. In this way the abject member of the community (the dysmember) is 
systematically cast out of the social body, which is itself thereby dismembered. “As soon as a 
community is configuring itself as a body,” Rogozinski writes, “it must reject a part of itself, a 
social, sexual, ‘racial’ or religious minority: a detached fragment of its own flesh, which it no 
longer recognizes as its own.”45 This communal dismemberment serves to constitute a dichotomy 
between self and other—us and them, pure and impure, clean, and dirty, good and evil.  As 
Rogozinski writes:  
Such obsessive hate brings into play primordial oppositions between the self and 
the other, the inside and the outside, the native and the foreign, which we find in all 
cultures, all epochs, because they have their origin in our relationship with our 
singular body—or, more precisely, with our flesh.46 
 
The question opened by this analysis is the question of inevitably. Must the constitution of 
the community always stand upon the exclusion of the remainder? Is something like the Husserlian 
                                               
44 Rogozinski, “Democracy and Terror,” 5. Here Rogozinski echoes Freud, “we are led to the view that masochism 
is older than sadism, and that sadism is the destructive instinct directed outwards, thus acquiring the characteristic of 
aggressiveness” (Sigmund Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, trans. James Strachey [New York: 
W.W. Norton, 1965], 131). While Rogozinski’s larger point stands on its own, one should perhaps here question the 
specific example brought to bear, which seems to echo a controversial hypothesis that homophobia is primarily a 
product of internalized homosexuality. For a critique of this argument from a natural-scientific perspective, see: 
Brian P. Meier et al, “A secret attraction or defensive loathing?: Homophobia, defense, and implicit cognition,” 
Journal of Research in Personality 40 (2006) 377–394; and Cara C. MacInnis and Gordon Hodson, “Is Homophobia 
Associated with an Implicit Same-Sex Attraction?” The Journal of Sex Research 50.8 (2013): 777-785.  
 
45 Rogozinski, “Democracy and Terror,” 7. 
 
46 Ibid., 1. Here Rogozinski echoes an argument given by Freud, who writes that: “it really seems as though it is 
necessary for us to destroy some other thing or person in order not to destroy ourselves, in order to guard against the 
impulsion to self-destruction” Freud, New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 131.  
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“Community of Love” possible? Or, as Rogozinski sometimes seems to suggest, must the very 
notion of the communal body be abandoned? Should we not, instead, seek to identify “new spaces 
of speech and action, the irruption of a multitude of ‘popular societies’ and of penniless [sans-
culottes] sections that actively resist any reconstruction of a hierarchical political body”?47  If 
Husserl, Henry, and Rogozinski are correct that the body politic is no mere “inventive coincidence 
of natural thinking,”48 then it may not be possible to simply cast it aside as an unhelpful metaphor. 
We may find ourselves instead tasked with the project of determining a new way of thinking and 
living the communal body that actively resists this tendency towards exclusion. In the following 
section, this will be attempted by turning to the specific way in which the question of the body 
politic has been worked out—both unsuccessfully and successfully—in Christian theology under 
the name of the body of Christ.  
 
§2. Bodies of Christ and the Persistence of Sexuality 
 
In the first book of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche's eponymous messiah decries the “despisers 
of the body.” These despisers speak “childishly” of a transcendent soul: “Body am I, and soul.” 
Against this theologizing impulse, Zarathustra declares to the contrary: “body am I entirely and 
nothing else; and soul is only a word for something about the body.” If these despisers wish to 
denigrate the body, Zarathustra suggests, perhaps they should simply “say farewell to their own 
bodies—and thus become silent.”49 
                                               
47 Rogozinski, “Birth to the World,” 2. 
 
48 As cited in Miettinen, “The Body Politic,” 335. 
 
49 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Thus Spoke Zarathustra” in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1954), 146. 
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 This short invective against the “despisers of the body” is paradigmatic of traditional 
critiques of Christian theology. Christianity’s privileging of the soul has at the same time effaced 
the body, so the common criticism goes. Indeed, if one understands the body—as I have throughout 
this dissertation—always already as a sexual body, the condemnation is even more forceful. To 
the extent that the body has survived the advent of the soul, it has succumbed to the asexualizing 
impulse of Christianity’s prudish sexual ethic. There is no body in Christianity, or to the extent 
that there is, such a body remains a sterile figure divorced from the concrete embodiment of lived 
sexuality. 
 It is certainly beyond the scope of this chapter to negotiate the full nuances of this perennial 
debate. Suffice it to say, it is undeniable that many Christianities have advocated—and still do—
a disembodied conception of the human person, having thereby precipitated sexual repression and 
having often stood at the forefront of the oppression of sexual minorities.50 Yet, this is not the only 
tradition of Christianity.51 The diversity of Christianity necessitates that the theology of the body 
be a contested space. Not only contested academically or intellectually, but by the very bodily 
                                               
50 Althaus-Reid relays the following unfortunate example, wherein even an ostensibly radical, justice-oriented, 
liberation theology is unable to stand for sexual minorities: “when some years ago, the Metropolitan Community 
Church in Argentina sent a letter to a selected group amongst the main liberation theologians in Argentina, Perú and 
other countries of the Southern Cone, asking them to sign an open letter repudiating the killings of homosexuals in 
Argentina by a right-wing group, none of them agreed to do so. They were not being asked to sign a letter declaring 
their support for lesbigay issues, but one declaring that the Bible did not support the killing of homosexuals. 
However, the theologians of solidarity did not want to show solidarity with victims of sexual persecution, some of 
them saying that homosexuality was not their issue.” Marcella Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology: Theological 
Perversions in Sex, Gender and Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000), 73. 
 
51 As the Medievalist Caroline Walker Bynum remarks, for example: “medieval artists and devotional writers did 
not either equate body with sexuality or reject body as evil. There was a misogynist clerical tradition, to be sure. But 
medieval piety did not dismiss flesh—even female flesh—as polluting. Rather, it saw flesh as fertile and vulnerable; 
and it saw enfleshing—the enfleshing of God and of us all—as the occasion for salvation.” Caroline Walker Bynum, 
Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human Body in Medieval Religion (New York: Zone 
Books, 1992), 116.  
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presence of alternative theologies. As Marcella Althaus-Reid argues, “Christian dogmatics is built 
upon bodily struggles.”52 
The locus of this struggle regarding the Christian conception of the sexual flesh, as 
suggested above, is Christological. The possibility of a Christian conception of the flesh depends, 
to a large extent, upon the possibility of theologizing the body of Christ. This body of Christ 
operates on countless registers, of which I will here isolate four: Jesus of Nazareth’s physical body 
of Christ, the resurrected body of Christ, the eucharistic body of Christ, and the communal body 
of Christ. While focus of later sections of this chapter will be centered on the latter—the communal 
body of Christ, insofar as that language appears with particular regularity in the writings of Paul—
I would like to at least briefly gesture toward the key role played by the first three notions of the 
body of Christ, insofar as these directly inform the latter. For, any Christian theology of the flesh 
must situate itself in relation to the incarnational logic of the assumptio carnis—the Word that 
“became flesh and lived among us” (John 1.14).  
A. The Physical Body of Christ 
 
From the very beginning, Christian orthodoxy has insisted upon a certain materiality and 
physicality of the body of Christ. This demand is exemplified in Tertullian’s, De Carne Christi, 
dedicated as it is to the task of demonstrating the reality of Christ’s flesh—it’s “solidity” 
[solidam].53 Without rehearsing the entirety of his arguments, this short text may be summarized 
in the following manner: contrary to heretical teachings, the reality of the Christ’s flesh is attested 
                                               
52 Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology, 18. 
 
53 Tertullian attempts to feel the weight of the flesh of the incarnate Word in all its solidity and makes of his weight 
the defense against all our attempts to angelize the Incarnation.” Emmanuel Falque, God, the Flesh, and the Other: 
From Irenaeus to Duns Scotus, trans. William Christian Hackett (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 
143. 
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by his earthly sufferings, his nativity, and his death. Speaking of the Christ’s suffering, Tertullian 
writes that: 
His very sufferings and the very contumely He endured bespeak it all. The 
sufferings attested His human flesh, the contumely proved its abject condition. … 
He hungered under the devil’s temptation; He thirsted with the woman of Samaria; 
He wept over Lazarus; He trembles at death (for ‘the flesh,’ as He says, ‘is weak’); 
at last, He pours out His blood.54 
 
In like manner, the birth and death of Christ bespeak a mortality and finitude only possible for a 
fully incarnate being.55 Indeed, according to Tertullian these two are but one and the same 
condition: “Christ, however, having been sent to die, had necessarily to be also born, that He might 
be capable of death; for nothing is in the habit of dying but that which is born. … The law which 
makes us die is the cause of our being born.”56 Therefore, a being that is capable of death must 
first have been capable of birth, and moreover a birth into an earthly flesh—for against Marcion, 
Valentinus, and those who would contend that the Christ was clothed in a spiritual, celestial, or 
angelic body, Tertullian insists upon the mundane condition of the Christ’s incarnation. “Christ,” 
Tertullian insists, “had human flesh derived from man, and not spiritual, and that His flesh was not 
composed of soul, nor of stellar substance, and thus it was not an imaginary flesh.”57 Quite to the 
contrary, being born into flesh, the Christ is composed of the specific material flesh of human 
being with its associated members: “this flesh suffused with blood, built up with bones, interwoven 
                                               
54 Tertullian, “On the Flesh of Christ” trans. Dr. Holmes in Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (eds.), Ante-
Nicene Fathers Vol. 3: Latin Christianity: Its Founder, Tertullian I. Apologetic; II. Anti-Marcion; III. Ethical 
(Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994), 530.  
 
55 “Since, however, it exists, it must needs have a something through which it exists. If it has this something, it must 
be its body. Everything which exists is a bodily existence sui generis. Nothing lacks bodily existence but that which 
is non-existent.” Ibid., 531. 
 
56 Ibid., 526-527. 
 
57 Ibid., 534. 
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with nerves, entwined with veins, a flesh which knows how to be born, and how to die, human 
without a doubt, as born of a human being.”58  
Nevertheless, despite this early Christian emphasis upon Jesus’ physical body, one 
immediately discovers a paucity of literary evidence regarding his sexual body. The reader of the 
New Testament may be struck by “the almost ritual silence of Jesus’ sexuality”59 and sexual body 
within the text—Althaus-Reid marks Jesus’ circumcision in Luke’s Gospel as the only exception.60 
Furthermore, one finds no references by which Jesus’ sexual practices or orientation might be 
discerned. Nevertheless, recent queer theologians have offered a number of speculative 
reconstructions of Jesus’ sexuality and sexual embodiment. Thus one will now regularly find 
scholars arguing that Jesus was bisexual, homosexual, transgender, and/or intersex.61 Yet, despite 
the constructive-theological use of these arguments, their speculative character offers little help in 
a discussion of Jesus’ sexual embodiment. As Althaus-Reid notes in her own discussion of the 
Bi/Christ: “the question of a Bi/Christ is related not to the sexual performances of Jesus, which we 
                                               
58 Ibid., 525. 
 
59 Ibid., 107. 
 
60 “After eight days had passed, it was time to circumcise the child; and he was called Jesus, the name given by the 
angel before he was conceived in the womb” (Luke 2.21). If one follows Williams, then one might also perhaps add 
the fragment of the so-called “Secret Gospel of Mark” discovered in a disputed letter of Clement of Alexandria. 
Robert Williams, Just as I Am: A Practical Guide to Being Out, Proud, and Christian (New York: HarperPerennial, 
1992).  
 
61 For Jesus as bisexual, see: Nancy Wilson, Our Tribe: Queer Folks, God, Jesus, and the Bible (San Francisco: 
Harper San Francisco, 1995); Laurel Dykstra, “Jesus, Bread, Wine, and Roses: A Bisexual Feminist at the Catholic 
Worker,” in Debra R. Kolodny (ed.) Blessed Bi Spirit: Bisexual People of Faith (New York: Continuum, 2000); and 
Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology. For Jesus as homosexual, see: Williams, Just as I Am. For Jesus as transgender, 
see: Kittredge Cherry, Jesus in Love (Berkeley: AndroGyne Press, 2006). For Jesus as intersex, see: Virginia 
Mollenkott, Omnigender: A Trans-Religious Approach (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 2001). The list presented in this 
note is by no means complete, and is deeply indebted to Patrick S. Cheng, Radical Love: An Introduction to Queer 
Theology (New York: Seabury Books, 2011), 80-86. 
 
 355 
ignore. As far we are concerned, Jesus may have been a transvestite, a butch lesbian, a gay or a 
heterosexual person.”62 We simply do not know the sexual status of Jesus of Nazareth.63  
 Despite this uncertainty regarding the particularities of Jesus’ sexuality, it may nevertheless 
be possible to speak in general terms of the necessity of Jesus’ sexual embodiment by drawing 
upon the Chalcedon affirmation of the full humanity of the incarnate Christ, and—as Tertullian 
seeks to show—that this incarnation necessitates that the Christ take on flesh in the full human 
sense. That is to say, insofar as the Christ bore a fully human flesh, so too did the Christ bear a 
sexual flesh. Turning again to the patristics, one finds precisely this argument in Gregory of 
Nyssa’s Oratio Catechetica. There, Gregory contends against those who dismiss the incarnation 
on the grounds that taking on flesh would contaminate the Christ with the evils of materiality. 
Against this view, Gregory insists that only moral evil corrupts, insofar as it is created by the 
divine, material nature is in itself good: “the only thing which is essentially degraded is moral evil 
or whatever has an affinity with such evil; whereas the orderly process of Nature, arranged as it 
has been by the Divine will and law, is beyond the reach of any misrepresentation on the score of 
wickedness.”64 For Gregory, this argument applies not only to flesh as such, but in particular to 
flesh in its sexual character. Defending the natural birth of Jesus, he questions his interlocutors on 
the nativity: 
If, then, the Deity is separate only from evil, and if there is no nature in evil, and 
if the mystery declares that God was born in man but not in evil; and if, for man, 
                                               
62 Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology, 114.  
 
63 As Graham Ward notes, “we have no access to the body of the gendered Jew. So all those attempts to determine 
the sexuality of Jesus are simply more recent symptoms of the search for the Historical Jesus—which Schweitzer 
demonstrated was pointless at the beginning of this century.” Graham Ward, “Bodies: The Displaced Body of Jesus 
Christ” in John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (New 
York: Routledge, 1998), 177. 
 
64 Gregory of Nyssa, “The Great Catechism” in Philip Schaff et al. (eds.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series 
II: Volume V: Apologetic Works, (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994), 497 (Chapter XXVIII). 
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there is but one way of entrance upon life, namely that by which the embryo passes 
on to the stage of life, what other mode of entrance upon life would they prescribe 
for God?65 
 
Rather, he contends that “the whole organization of the body is of equal value throughout.”66 
Indeed, he will go further, insisting that the unique status of sexual members in reproduction grant 
them a uniquely honorable role. In this argument, worth citing in whole, he writes: 
For the whole arrangement of the bodily organs and limbs has been constructed 
with one end in view, and that is, the continuance in life of humanity; and while the 
other organs of the body conserve the present actual vitality of men, each being 
apportioned to a different operation, and by their means the faculties of sense and 
action are exercised, the generative organs on the contrary involve a forecast of the 
future, introducing as they do, by themselves, their counteracting transmission for 
our race. Looking, therefore, to their utility, to which of those parts which are 
deemed more honourable are these inferior? Nay, than which must they not in all 
reason be deemed more worthy of honour? For not by the eye, or ear, or tongue, or 
any other sense, is the continuation of our race carried on. These, as has been 
remarked, pertain to the enjoyment of the present. But by those other organs the 
immortality of humanity is secured, so that death, though ever operating against us, 
thus in a certain measure becomes powerless and ineffectual, since Nature, to baffle 
him, is ever as it were throwing herself into the breach through those who come 
successively into being. What unseemliness, then, is contained in our revelation of 
God mingled with the life of humanity through those very means by which Nature 
carries on the combat against death?67 
 
Certainly, an analysis informed by contemporary queer theory—particularly Lee Edelman’s 
critique of “reproductive futurism” (see: Chapter 3)—should remain wary of an argument for the 
dignity of the sexual member that subordinates all sexual functions to reproduction. Indeed, even 
seemingly radical reconstructions of Jesus’ sexuality can often serve to reify a distinctly 
heterosexual theology. Althaus-Reid, for example, shows that an emphasis upon Jesus’ penis often 
merely serves to reinforce an implicit heteronormativity. “The ‘Jesus=Penis’ discourse,” she 
                                               
65 Ibid. 
 
66 Ibid. 
 
67 Ibid. 
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writes, “is part of a homophobic discourse, which homologizes heterosexuality and normativity 
through a discourse of biology and (selective) penile penetration.”68 This approach remains 
problematic, even in instances where Jesus’ exclusive masculinity appears to be placed in question. 
For example, medieval scholars such as Caroline Walker Bynum and Amy Hollywood have shown 
the extremely prominent use of female imagery in the iconography of Jesus and the mystical 
writings of the late Medieval period69—most prominently the use of vaginal imagery in the 
portrayal of the wound on Jesus’ side.70 But while such discoveries have opened new opportunities 
in queer theology—such as Virginia Mollenkott’s use of this work in Omnigender’s argument for 
an intersex Christ—they often presuppose the same implicit heterosexual logic of reproduction 
that one finds in Nyssa.71 As Linn Marie Tonstad suggests, “the womb-wound encapsulates the 
way difference—especially sexual difference—is represented in heterosexuate and agonistic 
ways.”72 Thus, despite the present dissertation’s argument for the theological power of thinking 
the member of the flesh—Althaus-Reid rightly notes that the mere presence of Jesus’ sexual 
member, divorced from a radically queer hermeneutic, is itself insufficient. The member of the 
                                               
68 Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology, 106. 
 
69 Thus, as Bynum writes, “I wish to call attention to artistic depictions that suggest another sex for Christ’s body—
depictions that suggest that Christ’s flesh was sometimes seen as female, as lactating and giving birth” Bynum, 
Fragmentation and Redemption, 82. See also: Amy Hollywood, The Soul as Virgin Wife: Mechthild of Magdeburg, 
Marguerite Porete, and Meister Eckhart (University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); Amy Hollywood, Sensible 
Ecstasy: Mysticism, Sexual Difference, and the Demands of History (University of Chicago Press, 2002).  
 
70 “No matter how implausible it might seem to us to  understand Christ’s side wound as a bloody slit that feminizes 
and eroticizes his corporeality, this is in fact what some medieval women (and men) did.” Amy Hollywood, 
“Queering the Beguines: Mechthild of Marburg, Hadewijch of Anvers, Marguerite Porete ,” in Gerard Laughlin 
(ed.), Queer Theology: Rethinking the Western Body (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 164. 
 
71 Here I should gesture towards the discussion of Lee Edelman’s notion of “reproductive futurity” in chapter 3.  
 
72 Linn Marie Tonstad, “Everything Queer, Nothing Radical?” Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift 92 (2016), 121. Or 
again, “the womb-wound in all its forms only extends divine phallicism.” Linn Marie Tonstad, God and Difference: 
The Trinity, Sexuality, and the Transformation of Finitude (New York: Routledge, 2016), 190. 
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flesh is a necessary, but insufficient condition of a post-heteronormative theology of the body of 
Christ.  
Nevertheless, this should not diminish the illustrative nature of Gregory of Nyssa’s 
argument. For, Nyssa here illustrates the explicit concern among the early church to not only insist 
upon the full incarnation of the Christ, but moreover, to insist that this incarnation was intimately 
bound to questions of sexuality—both, in the case of the nativity (a concern likewise found in 
Tertullian) and in Jesus’ own subsequent sexual embodiment.73 For both the evangelists and later 
Christian theologians this concern for the flesh of the Christ and its sexual status not only persists 
throughout the earthly life of Jesus of Nazareth, but into the resurrection and beyond.74 Therefore, 
Tertullian’s concern for the materiality of Jesus’ flesh in De Carne Christi, for example, is 
intimately bound to the second notion of the body of Christ—the resurrectional body.  
B. The Resurrected Body of Christ 
In De Carne Christi, Tertullian condemns the heretics who “cannot but be apprehensive that, if it 
be once determined that Christ’s flesh was human, a presumption would immediately arise in 
opposition to them, that that flesh must by all means rise again.”75 That is to say, for Tertullian, 
the heresies against which he contends not only strike at Christological doctrines of the Christ’s 
                                               
73 Gregory of Nyssa here, “extols human genitalia as a matter from honor rather than for shame.” Sarah Coakley, 
God, Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay ‘On the Trinity’ (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 275. As 
Symeon the New Theologian similarly remarks: “the members and parts which one is obliged to hide are unceasing 
prayer of the mind, the sweetness which derives from the shedding of tears, the joy of the heart and its inexpressible 
consolation” St. Symeon the New Theologian, On The Mystical Life: The Ethical Discourses, Vol. 2: On Virtue and 
Christian Life, trans. Alexander Golitzin (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1996), 24. 
 
74 In the words of Gregory of Nazianzen, “if any assert that He has now put off His holy flesh, and that His Godhead 
is stripped of the body, and deny that He is now with His body and will come again with it, let him not see the glory 
of His Coming.” Gregory Nazianzen, “To Cledonius the Priest Against Apollinarius (Ep. CI.),” in Philip Schaff et al 
(eds.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II: Volume 7: Cyril of Jerusalem, Gregory Nazianzen, (Peabody: 
Hendrickson, 1994), 440. 
 
75 Ibid., 521. 
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human nature, but at the same moment put the very reality of salvation in question; for, “in putting 
on our flesh, He made it His own; in making it His own, He made it sinless.”76  
Likewise, in the Gospels, one finds that the evangelists go to great lengths to highlight the 
continued fully-embodied character of the resurrected Christ. The resurrection of the Christ 
likewise means the resurrection of the bodily members of the Christ. Here the Gospels consistently 
emphasize that the manifest Christ is no phantom, but an incarnate body of flesh. Thus despite the 
Christ’s apparent miraculous capacities—passing through locked doors, traveling vast distances 
suddenly, etc.—the texts repeatedly foreclose the possibility of a spectral manifestation. In the 
Gospel according to Luke, for example, the Christ appears to his disciples in an instant, and “they 
were startled and terrified, and thought that there were seeing a ghost” (Luke 24.37). Such ghostly 
apparitions are by no means completely foreign to the scriptural tradition—the medium of Endor, 
at the prompting of Saul, for example, conjures the ghostly apparition of Samuel (1 Samuel 28)—
but in Luke, the evangelist insists upon the incarnate resurrected body of Christ, complete with its 
full diversity of incarnate members: “look at my hands and my feet [τὰς χεῖράς μου καὶ τοὺς πόδας 
μου]; see that it is I myself. Touch me and see; for a ghost does not have flesh and bones [σάρκα 
καὶ ὀστέα] as you see that I have” (Luke 24.39).  
Likewise in the Gospel according to John, the apostle Thomas—despite being passed down 
the tradition as the doubter par excellence—appears to embody precisely the same concern for 
incarnation.  
But Thomas (who was called the twin), one of the twelve, was not with them when 
Jesus came. So the other disciples told him, ‘We have seen the Lord.’ But he said 
to them, unless I see the mark of the nails in his hands, and put my finger in the 
mark of the nails and my hand in his side, I will not believe. (John 20.24-25) 
                                               
76 Ibid., 536. Here Tertullian expresses a notion akin to that popularized by Gregory of Nazianzen in the words: “for 
that which he has not assumed He has not healed; but that which is united to His Godhead is also saved.” Gregory 
Nazianzen, “To Cledonius the Priest Against Apollinarius (Ep. CI.),” 440. 
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For Thomas, no mere phantom will do. The resurrection hope of the gospel demands an incarnate 
resurrection of an incarnate Christ. As Paul articulates, “if Christ has not been raised, our preaching 
is worthless, and so is your faith” (1 Cor. 15.14). For, according to Paul, the resurrection of the 
body of Christ is the “first fruits” (1 Cor. 15.20) of a general resurrection of the dead, not only in 
spirit, but in body. Certainly, Paul continues, such bodies will not be identical to the bodies that 
have preceded: “it is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body. … flesh and blood [σὰρξ 
καὶ αἷμα] cannot inherit the kingdom of God, nor does the perishable inherit the imperishable” (1 
Cor. 15.44, 50). But this recourse to the imperishable spiritual body should not itself be overly 
“spiritualized.” While incorruptible, the spiritual body is nonetheless still, for Paul, body [σῶμα].77 
Indeed, Paul’s condemnation of the flesh [σὰρξ] must be read in the context of his broader polemic 
against sin [ἁμαρτία], corruption [φθορὰ], and the world [κόσμος]. When Paul critiques flesh, he 
does not critique incarnate membership, which for him bears the name body [σῶμα]. Thus, despite 
the similarity of phrasing, Paul’s “flesh and blood” [σὰρξ καὶ αἷμα] should not be read as analogous 
to Luke’s “flesh and bones” [σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα]. Rather than incarnate membership, what Paul 
condemns under the name of flesh is the reign of sin within the world, a reign that condemns all 
to death and corruption. In the words of Tertullian, “what has been abolished in Christ is not 
carnem peccati, ‘sinful flesh,’ but peccatum carnis, ‘sin in the flesh,’—not the material thing, but 
its condition; not the substance, but its flaw.”78 Indeed, Paul’s account of the post-resurrection 
appearances of Jesus (1 Cor 15.3-11) appear to directly cohere with that of the gospels. Therefore, 
if the resurrection of the Christ constitutes the first fruits of the resurrection, and therefore the first 
                                               
77 As Tertullian argues, “This passage, however, has nothing to do with any difference of substance.” Ibid., 529. 
 
78 Ibid., 535.  
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image of the spiritual body—as John the Elder notes “when he is revealed, we will be like him” (1 
John 3.2)—one might rightly argue that the spiritual body of 1st Corinthians might not only bear 
the incarnate members of the pre-resurrection Christ (Luke’s “τὰς χεῖράς μου καὶ τοὺς πόδας … 
σάρκα καὶ ὀστέα”), but moreover, according to John, bears the very marks of the crucifixion:  
But [Thomas] said to them, “Unless I see the mark of the nails in his hands, and put 
my finger in the mark of the nails and my hand in his side, I will not believe.” A 
week later his disciples were again in the house, and Thomas was with them. 
Although the doors were shut, Jesus came and stood among them and said, “Peace 
be with you.” Then he said to Thomas, “Put your finger here and see my hands. 
Reach out your hand and put it in my side. Do not doubt but believe.” Thomas 
answered him, “My Lord and my God!” (John 20.25-28) 
 
As in the case of Jesus’ physical or material flesh, the question of sexuality is likewise 
largely absent from the gospel accounts of the resurrected Christ. But, if we again assume an 
analogy between the resurrected flesh of Christ and the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15.20, 1 John 
3.2), then Jesus’ words in the synoptic gospels—that “at the resurrection people will neither marry 
nor be given in marriage” (Matt. 22.30)—suggest an evacuation of sexuality in the resurrected 
body of Christ.79 Yet, this approach is not uniformly affirmed by the early church. Quite to the 
contrary, in the concluding passages of Augustine’s De civitate dei contra paganos, for example, 
                                               
79 This view is affirmed by Gregory of Nyssa, for example, who explicitly evokes this passage in Matthew in his 
argument that the resurrection be understood as a return to a prelapsarian state of sexual indifference. Thus he writes 
of creation that “man, then, was made in the image of God; that is, the universal nature, the thing like God; not part 
of the whole. … But as He perceived in our created nature the bias towards evil, and the fact that after its voluntary 
fall from equality with the angels it would acquire a fellowship with the lower nature, He mingled, for this reason, 
with His own image, an element of the irrational (for the distinction of male and female does not exist in the Divine 
and blessed nature);— transferring, I say, to man the special attribute of the irrational formation, He bestowed 
increase upon our race not according to the lofty character of our creation; for it was not when He made that which 
was in His own image that He bestowed on man the power of increasing and multiplying; but when He divided it by 
sexual distinctions, then He said, Increase and multiply, and replenish the earth (Genesis 1:28). For this belongs not 
to the Divine, but to the irrational element, as the history indicates when it narrates that these words were first 
spoken by God in the case of the irrational creatures; since we may be sure that, if He had bestowed on man, before 
imprinting on our nature the distinction of male and female, the power for increase conveyed by this utterance, we 
should not have needed this form of generation by which the brutes are generated” (Gregory of Nyssa, “On the 
Making of Man,” in Philip Schaff et al. (eds.), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers: Series II, Volume V: Apologetic 
Works, [Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994], 411-412 [Chapter XXII]). Also noting, of the resurrection, that 
“the resurrection promises us nothing else than the restoration of the fallen to their ancient state” (Ibid., 411). For the 
distinction between Augustine and Nyssa on this question, see: Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 281-295. 
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Augustine directly reflects upon the question of post-resurrection sexual difference. Or, as he 
frames it, “will women rise as women?”80 Against the Manichean orientation of his interlocutors, 
Augustine contends that, indeed, “both sexes will rise.”81 In this complex passage, Augustine 
deftly moves across the various notions of the body of Christ—connecting the creation of woman 
from the rib of a sleeping man, to the emergence of the church from the pierced side of the 
“sleeping” (dead) Christ. Etymologically linking this analogy, Augustine notes that the former is 
said to be “edified” [aedificationem] and the latter to be “built up” [aedificavit]:82 “for the scripture 
used this very word,” Augustine writes, “not saying ‘He formed’ or ‘framed,’ but ‘built her up into 
a woman;’ whence also the apostle speaks of the edification of the body of Christ, which is the 
Church.”83 Because of this “edification” of the woman, whose very existence is a premonition of 
the emergence of the church, Augustine insists—against Aristotelian orthodoxy84—that the female 
sex is not merely a corruption of the male, but a necessary component of reality, and thus a 
necessary component of heavenly reality. “The woman, therefore,” he argues, “is a creature of 
                                               
80 Augustine, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: Barnes and Noble Press, 2006), 999. 
 
81 Ibid.  
 
82 See Latin Vulgate: Gen 2.22, “et aedificavit Dominus Deus costam quam tulerat de Adam in mulierem et adduxit 
eam ad Adam” and Eph. 4.12 “ad consummationem sanctorum in opus ministerii in aedificationem corporis 
Christi.” 
 
83 Augustine, The City of God, 999. 
 
84 “For the female is, as it were, a mutilated male.” Aristotle, “On the Generation of Animals,” in Jonathan Barnes 
(ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1144 (II.3) . Ostensibly, 
Thomas Aquinas will affirm this treatment, writing: “as regards the individual nature, woman is defective and 
misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; 
while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force or from some material indisposition, or even 
from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher observes (De Gener. 
Animal. iv, 2).”  Yet, he will continue, “on the other hand, as regards human nature in general, woman is not 
misbegotten, but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation.” Ultimately concluding that, 
“it was necessary for woman to be made,” and therefore striking out a position more akin to Augustine. Thomas 
Aquinas, The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 
(Cincinnati: Benziger Brothers, 1920), I-I.92.1. 
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God even as the man; but by her creation prefigured, as has been said, Christ and the Church. He, 
then, who created both sexes will restore both.”85 In this way, Augustine draws the question of the 
resurrected human body into dialogue with the Christ’s incarnate body and the nuptial conception 
of the Church (body of Christ)—a complex interplay wherein each facet interprets the others.86 
This rhetorical strategy underlies the necessity of thinking the multiple layers of the body of Christ 
together in any discussion of sexuality and the body of Christ, and serves as an impetus for turning 
to the third—eucharistic—conception of the body of Christ. 
 
C. The Eucharistic Body of Christ 
 
In 1st Corinthians, Paul offers the first attestation of the institution of the eucharist, writing: 
 
The Lord Jesus on the night when he was betrayed took a loaf of bread, and when 
he had given thanks, he broke it and said, “This is my body [τοῦτό μού ἐστιν τὸ 
σῶμα] that is for you. Do this in remembrance of me.” In the same way he took the 
cup also, after supper, saying, “This cup is the new covenant in my blood. Do this, 
as often as you drink it, in remembrance of me.” For as often as you eat this bread 
and drink the cup, you proclaim the Lord’s death until he comes.87 
 
According to Graham Ward this eucharistic annunciation of the last supper functions as “the 
displacement of the physical body”88 of Christ, that is at the same moment a dissemination of the 
                                               
85 Ibid., 999. 
 
86 One finds an analogous, but contemporary, interpretation of Jesus’ words in John Paul II’s Theology of the Body 
which suggests that, in saying “they will take neither wife nor husband” “he [Jesus] does not affirm that this man of 
the ‘future world’ will no longer be male and female as he was ‘from the beginning.’ It is thus evident that the 
meaning of being, with respect to the body, male and female in the ‘future world’ should be sought outside of 
marriage and procreation, but there is no reason to seek it outside of that which (independently from the blessing of 
procreation) derives from the very mystery of creation and thereafter also forms the deepest structure of man’s 
history on earth” (John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body, trans. Michael 
Waldstein [Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2006], 398-399). Here, and always noting John Paul II’s extreme 
gender and sexual essentialism, it is nevertheless noteworthy that he insists upon the perpetuation of sexual 
difference into the eschaton, and even admits a break with the biological-procreative logic of sexuality that generally 
marks his writing.  
 
87 This institution will be reiterated with minor variations in the synoptics: Mark 14; Matthew 26; Luke 22.  
 
88 Ward, “Bodies,” 167. 
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body of Christ. Thus, paradoxically, here “the body of Christ keeps absenting itself from the text”89 
(in the crucifixion and ascension) leaving a vacuum or lack, while at the same moment appearing 
in another register.90 It is for this reason that Ward insists, “it is not that Jesus at this point stops 
being a physical presence. It is more that his physical presence can extend itself to incorporate 
other bodies, like bread, and make them extensions of his own.”91 The eucharistic body does not 
cease to be body or embodied, but this incarnation takes on a distinct form.92 
This extension or dissemination occurs materially in the consumption of the eucharistic 
host: as the Gospel of Matthew writes: “take, eat; this is my body [Λάβετε, φάγετε; τοῦτό ἐστιν τὸ 
σῶμά μου]” (Matt. 26.26). Through this consumption, the body of Christ first passes from an 
individuated being—that body, there, of Jesus of Nazareth—to a communal being, anticipating 
already its consummation in the ecclesiastical body of Christ.93 As one reads in the Catechism of 
the Catholic Church: “the Eucharist makes the Church. Those who receive the Eucharist are united 
more closely to Christ. Through it Christ unites them to all the faithful in one body—the Church. 
Communion renews, strengthens, and deepens this incorporation into the Church.”94  
                                               
89 Ibid., 174. 
 
90 This logic of dissemination is key, as it distinguishes Ward’s account of the displacement of the body of Christ 
from the Hegelian scheme (G. W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion: One-Volume Edition: The 
Lectures of 1827, ed. Peter C. Hodgson [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006], 464-475), as it appears, for example, in 
Michel de Certeau. For Ward, on the contrary, the body is not preeminently lack, rather “the body of Jesus Christ, 
the body of God, is permeable, transcorporeal, transpositional.” Ward, “Bodies,” 176.  
 
91 Ibid., 167. 
 
92 The embodied character of the eucharist has been engaged phenomenologically through the work of Louis-Marie 
Chauvet (see: Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Reinterpretation of Christian Existence, trans. Patrick 
Madigan and Madeline Beaumont [Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1995]) and Jean-Yves Lacoste (see: Experience 
and the Absolute, trans. Mark Raftery-Skeban [New York: Fordham University Press, 2004]).  
 
93 “The eucharistic fracture, repeating differently the crucifixion, disseminates the body—of Christ and of the 
Church as body of Christ.” Ward, “Bodies,” 171. 
 
94 Catechism of the Catholic Church: With Modifications from the Editio Typica, (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 
391 (Part 2, Section 2, Chapter 1, Article 3, VII). 
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 Insofar as it constitutes a communal incarnation of the body of Christ, the eucharistic 
institution abstracts from the (presumed) sexual body of Jesus—both prior to and following the 
resurrection: “Jesus’ body as bread is no longer Christ as simply and biologically male.”95 Yet this 
by no means necessitates an evacuation of sexuality from the eucharistic body nor from the 
eucharistic experience. On the contrary, throughout church history one consistently finds the 
eucharist to be a site of erotic desire and sexual contestation. As Lacan suggests, the eucharist 
marks a distinct oral jouissance—often a sublimation of copulation96—at the heart of Christian 
liturgical life: “Christ, even when resurrected from the dead, is valued for his body, and his body 
is the means by which communion in his presence is incorporation—oral drive—with which 
Christ’s wife, the Church as it is called, contents itself very well, having nothing  to expect from 
copulation. … Everything is exhibition of the body evoking jouissance … but without 
copulation.”97 In this sense, the eucharist can indeed appear to express a certain “jouissance of the 
body,”98 appearing in both sublimated and literal form.  
 This relationship is most clearly articulated in Catholic liturgy and doctrine, which at 
almost every turn binds the eucharist to sexuality, marriage, and reproduction—even if in an often 
un-thematized manner.99 It is, in this regard, unsurprising that the eucharist holds primacy of place 
                                               
95 Ward, “Bodies,” 168. 
 
96 “For the kind of (social) bond it proposes, Christianity does not need copulation, which functions as the 
superfluous element, something on top of what would be (ideally) needed” (Alenka Zupančič, What is Sex? 
[Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2017], 12). One might here recall Paul’s words to the church in Corinth: “to the 
unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain unmarried as I am” (1 Cor. 7.8).  
 
97 Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality: the Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973, Encore: The Seminar of 
Jacques Lacan Book XX, trans. Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Company), 113.  
 
98 Zupančič, What is Sex?, 14. 
 
99 One sees in the mid-term report of the 2014 Synod on the Family, for example, calls for “a greater theological 
study … starting with the links between the sacrament of marriage and the Eucharist in relation to the Church-
sacrament.” Extraordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, Relatio post disceptationem (Vatican City: 
2014), 8. 
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in the Catholic liturgy of matrimony, and that the questions of eucharistic participation by couples 
using contraception, mixed religious households, and those who have undertaken divorce are 
common.100 “There is no doubt that theological calculations have managed to reduce the list of 
those invited to the gift-festivities of the sacramental acts to a select number,” Althaus-Reid 
remarks, “sexual calculations, to be more specific, are very alienating in the gift-economy of, for 
instance, the Eucharist.”101 Yet, the erotic dimension of the eucharist is often much more explicitly 
apparent than these doctrinal disputes regarding marriage and reproduction might suggest—as is 
manifest most clearly in the medieval mystical traditions.  
 To offer only a single example, one might turn to the thirteenth century Flemish Beguine: 
Hadewijch. Throughout her poems and writings Hadewijch portrays an—at times playful, at times 
                                               
 
100 For the question of contraception, see, for example, the concern expressed by the 2014 Synod on the Family 
regarding those who refrain from confessing the use of contraception before partaking in Eucharist: “in this regard, 
almost all the responses mention that, in areas strongly influenced by secularization, couples generally do not 
consider the use of contraceptive methods to be a sin. As a result, they tend not to consider it a matter for confession 
or a problem in approaching the Eucharist.” Extraordinary General Assembly of the Synod of Bishops, The Pastoral 
Challenges of The Family in the Context of Evangelization: Instrumentum Laboris (Vatican City: 2014), 129. 
 
On mixed religious families, the USCCB notes, “every marriage between Christians gives rise to a domestic church, 
though marriages between two Catholics most fully reflect the life of the Church, because ordinarily only Catholic 
couples can fully participate in the sacraments of the Church, including the Eucharist.” USCCB, “Marriage”, 40 
[emphasis added]. 
 
For the question of divorce, the traditional view is clearly articulated by the USCCB: “we understand the pain of 
those for whom divorce seemed the only recourse. We urge them to make frequent use of the sacraments, especially 
the Sacraments of Holy Eucharist and Reconciliation. We also offer encouragement to those who have divorced and 
remarried civilly. Although the Church cannot recognize such subsequent unions as valid marriages, she hopes that 
people in this situation will participate in parish life and attend the Sunday Eucharist, even without receiving the 
Sacrament.” USCCB, “Marriage: Love and Life in the Divine Plan: A Pastoral Letter of the United States 
Conference of Catholic Bishops” (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2009), 25 [emphasis added]. The 
2014 Synod on the Family appeared to seriously consider rescinding this doctrine, but ultimately affirmed the 
traditional view, writing: “the synod father also considered the possibility of giving the divorced and remarried 
access to the Sacraments of Penance and the Eucharist. Various synod fathers insisted on maintaining the present 
discipline, because of the constitutive relationship between participation in the Eucharist and communion with the 
Church as well as her teaching on the indissoluble character of marriage.” Extraordinary General Assembly of the 
Synod of Bishops, The Pastoral Challenges of the Family in the Context of Evangelization: Relatio Synodi (Vatican 
City: 2014), 52. 
 
101 Marcella Althaus-Reid, The Queer God (New York: Routledge, 2003), 70. 
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fraught102—erotic interchange between the soul and the Love (Minne) of God. Despite the clear 
influence of the Song of Songs and its interpretive history, Hadewijch’s writings on Love are 
rendered more sexually complex by her use of medieval courtly poetry as a theological model. 
Thus, whereas traditional interpretations of the Song of Songs, from Origen to von Balthasar, read 
God as a masculine figure positioned against His passive bride (the church), Hadewijch institutes 
a gender inversion, whereby God is generally figured as the feminine Minne,103 while Hadewijch 
herself is portrayed as the chivalrous (and masculine) courtly knight pursing his inaccessible 
beloved.104 This imagery of the soul as a knight in pursuit of its courtly beloved is paralleled by a 
number of other ostensibly somatic or erotic images; from courtly flirtation, to marriage, sexual 
consummation (including orgasm), impregnation, gestation, and birth; an entire range of sexual 
and somatic phenomena permeate Hadewijch's writings. The result is a complex—and by 
contemporary standards, surprisingly queer105—literature wherein masculine and feminine, 
passive and active, pain and pleasure, penetration and reception, desire and hate, all twist together 
in a Gordian knot of erotic—and remarkably embodied106—mystical imagery.  
                                               
102 “Hell is the seventh name / Of this Love wherein I suffer. / For there is nothing Love does not engulf and damn, / 
And no one who falls into her / And whom she seizes come out again, / Because no grace exists there. / As Hell 
turns everything to ruin, / In Love nothing else is acquired / But disquiet and torture without pity; / Forever to be in 
unrest, / Forever assault and new persecution; / To be wholly devoured and engulfed / In her unfathomable essence, / 
To founder unceasingly in heat and cold, / In the deep, / insurmountable darkness of Love.  / This outdoes the 
torments of hell. / He who knows Love and her comings and goings / Has experienced and can understand / Why it 
is truly appropriate / That Hell should be the highest name of Love.” Hadewijch, Hadewijch: The Complete Works, 
trans. Mother Columba Hart (New York: Paulist Press, 1980), 357. 
 
103 In Hadewijch, Love is almost always presented in the feminine, exempting the few cases in which the mystical 
seeker is presented as a “bride” and Love as a “Bridegroom.” E.g. “And the second eagle said: 'The loved one does 
not yet know what her highest way is!' and a third said: 'The loved one does not yet know what the great kingdom is 
that she as bride shall receive from her bridegroom.” Ibid., 294. 
 
104 “God knows, in the bliss there always remains woe. For the heart of the courtly lover, however, that is the law of 
chivalry. The only rest of such a heart is to do its utmost for the sake of its beloved.”  Ibid., 72. 
 
105 See: Hollywood, “Queering the Beguines.” 
  
106 Caroline Walker Bynum describes this as the peculiarly “somatic quality of women's piety” (Bynum, 
Fragmentation and Redemption, 16). Hadewijch will constantly write, for example, of the “touch,” “feel,” or 
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 Together with her poetry and letters, Hadewijch collected a number of visions. Of 
particular note is the regular convergence of two notions in these visions: eucharist as the impetus 
for an experience of unio mystica and the presentation of that union as a sexual embrace. The 
clearest example of this tendency is her seventh vision, appropriately titled “Oneness in the 
Eucharist.” There Hadewijch recounts her experience of a Pentecost mass, wherein she was struck 
with an irrepressible desire for God:  
My heart and my veins and all my limbs trembled and quivered with eager desire 
and, as often occurred with me, such madness and fear beset my mind that it seemed 
to me I did not content my Beloved, and that my Beloved did not fulfill my desire, 
so that dying I must go mad, and going mad I must die. On that day my mind was 
beset so fearfully and so painfully by desirous love that all my separate limbs 
threatened to break, and all my veins were in travail.107 
 
Hadewijch’s description of the content of this desire flips effortlessly between erotic and 
traditional mystical imagery.108 Thus she at once desires to “understand” and to “taste” Him; that 
“his Humanity should to the fullest extent be one in fruition with [her] humanity” and that “he 
might content [her] interiorly with his Godhead”; that she might be “God with God” and 
“experience nothing else but sweet love, embraces, and kisses.”109 
 This experience reaches fruition at the eucharistic blessing. There the priest is transfigured 
into the Christ-child, bearing the bread of the ciborium and a chalice of wine. At once the Christ-
                                               
“embrace,” of Love (Hadewijch, The Complete Works, 63, 69, 97, 98, 107, 108, 119, 140, 145, 156, 157, 158, 178, 
197, 240, 267, 281, 286, 295, 324, 334, 344, 351.); the “kiss” of Love (Ibid., 84, 97, 107, 108, 119, 135, 235, 236, 
281, 285, 295, 341, 342, 355, 356); and the “nourishment,” “consumption,” and “taste” of Love (Ibid., 69, 140, 141, 
158, 197, 240, 246, 251, 252, 280, 334, 344, 353, 355, 356). In the words of the poet Alejandra Pizarnik, “En la 
noche a tu lado / las palabras son claves, son llaves. / el deseo de morir es rey. / Que tu cuerpo sea siempre / un 
amado espacio de revelaciones.” Alejandra Pizarnik, “Revelaciones” https://www.poeticous.com/alejandra-
pizarnik/revelaciones? (accessed January 20, 2019).   
 
107 Ibid., 280. 
 
108 For, as Bataille argues, “what mysticism cannot put into words … eroticism says.” Georges Bataille, Eroticism 
(London: Boyars, 1987), 269. 
 
109 Hadewijch, The Complete Works, 280-281. 
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child is again transfigured into the adult Jesus: “with that he came in the form and clothing of a 
Man, as he was on the day when he gave us his Body for the first time.”110 As a man, the Christ 
gives Hadewijch the elements of the host, an act that Hadewijch experiences as sexual intimacy:  
After that he came himself to me, took me entirely in his arms, and pressed me to 
him; and all my members felt his full felicity, in accordance with the desire of my 
heart and my humanity. So I was outwardly satisfied and fully transported. … Then 
it was to me as if we were one without difference.111 
 
Here Hadewijch recounts an eucharistic vision that cannot be mistaken for anything other than 
sexual intimacy culminating in orgasm.112 While this vision of sexual intimacy with God or the 
incarnate Christ is not unique in Hadewijch’s corpus,113 it is particularly noteworthy in the present 
context insofar as it illustrates the inseparability of sexual or erotic desire or experience from the 
eucharistic body. The thesis of the preceding chapters—that the flesh is inextricably a sexual 
flesh—applies even when one moves outside of the realm of the specific individual person.  
This recognition will be essential to the following chapter, which will now fully turn to the 
logic of the communal or ecclesiastical body of Christ, but without forgetting that—like Hobbes’ 
                                               
110 Ibid., 281. 
 
111 Ibid. 
 
112 “Hadewijch, in a Eucharistic vision of great beauty, describes mystical union with images that evoke female 
orgasm.” Bynum, Fragmentation and Redemption, 169.  
 
113 In her ninth letter, she writes: “with wondrous sweetness the loved one and the Beloved dwell one in the other, 
and how they penetrate each other in such a way that neither of the two distinguishes himself from the other. But 
they abide in one another in fruition, mouth in mouth, heart in heart, body in body, and soul in soul, while one sweet 
divine nature flows through them both” (Hadewijch, The Complete Works, 66); and in her twelfth letter she writes: 
“think at all hours of God's goodness, and regret that it is so untouched by us, while he has full fruition of it; and that 
we are exiled far from it, while he and his friends, in mutual interpenetration, enjoy such blissful fruition, and are 
flowing into his goodness and flowing out again in all good” (Ibid., 71). Moreover, this erotic mysticism is not 
unique to Hadewijch, it can be found in other Beguines (e.g. Marguerite Porete); in other female mystics, such as the 
20th century mystic and philosopher Simone Weil, who describes “carnal love [as] a quest for the Incarnation” 
(Simone Weil, First and Last Notebooks, trans. Richard Rees [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1970], 84); and 
even among male mystics (though less regularly), such as Symeon the New Theologian, who writes, “when, 
according to the invisible movements of your heart, you find yourself in this state, you will discover Him 
immediately embracing you and kissing you mystically, and bestowing on you a right spirit in your inward parts” 
(Symeon the New Theologian, On The Mystical Life: The Ethical Discourses, Vol. 2, 110).  
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“corpore politico,” Husserl’s “Community of Love,” and Henry’s “mystical body”—the 
communal body politic is always grounded in the same syntheses that incarnate the flesh, and that 
these syntheses bear the marks of the member of the flesh, that remainder which resists easy 
identification and functions as the condition of all sexuality.  
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Chapter 8 - The Cut and the Body of Christ 
All theology is sexual theology. 
Marcella Althaus-Reid 
 
 
§1. The Pauline Body of Christ 
 
This final chapter will begin precisely where the previous chapter left off, completing the 
discussion of the body of Christ by turning toward the fourth and final sense of this term in the 
present context: the communal body of Christ; that is, the Christian community. The aim of this 
final chapter is neither to lionize nor to condemn the figure of the body of Christ, but rather, to 
suggest that this figure is deeply ambiguous; a site of hierarchical oppression that nevertheless 
may also constitute a site of transformation and emancipation. Like the previous chapter, the 
present discussion employs a theological method that privileges the voices of the early Patristic 
fathers—but not in an uncritical manner. Indeed figures like Cyprian and Augustine will here be 
directly contrasted with one another, in order to draw out the liberative potential of the body of 
Christ.  
A. The Pauline Corpus 
 
Throughout his oeuvre, Paul (and the deutero-Pauline authors) repeatedly employs the analogical 
figure of the “Body of Christ” as a metaphor for the religious communities of the early Christian 
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churches.1 This includes passages in 1st Corinthians, Romans, Colossians, and Ephesians.2 While 
the discussion below will draw from all three passages, 1st Corinthians offers the fullest and most 
worked-out account of the Body of Christ, and will therefore serve as the centerpiece of the present 
discussion. For that reason, it will be helpful to begin by citing this passage in full: 
 
Now concerning spiritual gifts [πνευματικῶν], brothers and sisters, I do not want 
you to be uninformed. …  Now there are varieties of gifts [χαρισμάτων], but the 
same [αὐτὸ] Spirit; and there are varieties [διαιρέσεις] of services, but the same 
[αὐτὸς] Lord; and there are varieties of activities, but it is the same [αὐτὸς] God 
who activates all of them in everyone. To each is given [δίδοται] the manifestation 
of the Spirit for the common good. …  All these are activated by one and the same 
[ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ] Spirit, who allots to each one individually [ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ] just as the 
Spirit chooses. For just as the body is one [τὸ σῶμα ἕν ἐστιν] and has many 
members [μέλη πολλὰ], and all the members of the body [τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος], 
though many, are one body [πολλὰ ὄντα ἕν ἐστιν σῶμα], so it is with Christ. For in 
the one [ἑνὶ] Spirit we were all baptized into one body [ἓν σῶμα]—Jews or Greeks, 
slaves or free—and we were all made to drink of one [ἓν] Spirit. Indeed, the body 
does not consist of one member but of many [σῶμα οὐκ ἔστιν ἓν μέλος, ἀλλὰ 
πολλά]. If the foot [πούς] would say, “Because I am not a hand [χείρ], I do not 
belong to the body [σώματος],” that would not make it any less a part of the body 
[ἐκ τοῦ σώματος]. And if the ear [οὖς] would say, “Because I am not an eye 
[ὀφθαλμός], I do not belong to the body,” that would not make it any less a part of 
the body [ἐκ τοῦ σώματος]. If the whole body [ὅλον τὸ σῶμα] were an eye 
[ὀφθαλμός], where would the hearing be? If the whole body were hearing, where 
would the sense of smell be? But as it is, God arranged [ἔθετο] the members [μέλη] 
in the body, each one of them [ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι], as he chose. If all 
were a single member [ἓν μέλος], where would the body [σῶμα] be? As it is, there 
are many members [πολλὰ μὲν μέλη], yet one body [ἓν δὲ σῶμα]. The eye 
[ὀφθαλμὸς] cannot say to the hand [χειρί], “I have no need of you,” nor again the 
head [κεφαλὴ] to the feet [ποσίν], “I have no need of you.” On the contrary, the 
members of the body that seem to be weaker [μέλη τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενέστερα] are 
indispensable, and those members of the body that we think less honorable we 
clothe with greater honor, and our less respectable members [ἀσχήμονα] are treated 
with greater respect [εὐσχήμονα]; whereas our more respectable members do not 
need this. But God has so constituted the body [συνεκέρασεν τὸ σῶμα], giving the 
                                               
1 “The Church in its identification becomes the body of Christ. This identification is not the logic of A=A—
ultimately the vicious logic of Narcissus. It is the identification of analogy—a participation in and through 
difference that enables co-creativity.” Graham Ward, “Bodies: The Displaced Body of Jesus Christ” in John 
Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology (New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 172. 
 
2 1 Corinthians 12.12-27, Romans 12.3-8, Colossians 1.15-20, 3.14-16, Ephesians 1.22-23, 4.1-16, 5.25-32. 
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greater honor to the inferior member [ὑστερουμένῳ], that there may be no division 
[σχίσμα] within the body [σώματι], but the members [μέλη] may have the same 
care for one another. If one member [ἓν μέλος] suffers, all the members [πάντα τὰ 
μέλη] suffer together [συμπάσχει] with it; if one member [μέλος] is honored, all 
rejoice together with it. Now you are the body of Christ [σῶμα Χριστοῦ] and 
individually members [μέλη ἐκ μέρους] of it.  (Corinthians 12.12-27) 
 
In order to introduce Paul’s notion of the body of Christ, I will here seek to unpack the specific 
language that Paul employs to discuss the body, highlighting the rhetorical and ideological 
background that they assume.  
 Body: σῶμα. Throughout these passages Paul draws upon an existing and well-established 
metaphor for thinking about the burgeoning Christian churches: the social body—the corpore 
politico.3 Here Paul employs precisely the same language with which he will speak of the 
individual human body, the resurrected body, and the eucharistic body: σῶμα (sōma, body). As he 
writes, for example, “just as the body [σῶμα] is one … so it is with Christ” (1 Cor. 12.12). In fact, 
Paul will directly connect the notion of the Body of Christ to the eucharistic body, briefly 
introducing the notion two chapters earlier with the assertion: “because there is one bread, we who 
are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread” (1 Cor. 10.17). As was noted in the 
discussion of the resurrected body above, this notion of the body should not be confused with the 
Pauline usage of the flesh [σὰρξ], which tends to refer not to the incarnate being-body of the human 
person, but rather to the reign of sin against the reign of spirit.4 In fact, only on one occasion will 
                                               
3 “In order to press the point made in the previous paragraph, the need for diversity within unity, Paul adopts a 
common analogy from antiquity and applies it to the Corinthian situation.” Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians in The New International Commentary on the New Testament (NICNT), eds. Ned B. Stonehouse et al. 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1987), 600-601. 
 
4 “It is noteworthy that, whereas he speaks of the solidarity between the Messiah and ethnic Jews in terms of ‘flesh’ 
(9:4), something has happened to create a different unity, a different solidarity, which is spoken of instead in terms 
of ‘body’. Compare Paul’s language about ‘my flesh’ in 11:14, the background to which is found in 2 Sam 5:1//1 
Chr 11:1, where the tribes of Israel say to David, ‘We are your bone and flesh’ (see also Judg 9:2, 2 Sam 19:12-13). 
This substitution of terms fits so well with Paul’s regular language about the corruptible dying self (‘flesh’) and the 
self that is to be resurrected (‘body’) that we may well wonder whether he is not suggesting that this new entity, the 
‘one body in Christ; as here or the ‘body of Christ’ as in 1 Corinthians, is as it were the  resurrected version of Israel 
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the language of σὰρξ appear in the context of the body of Christ—“for no one ever hates his own 
flesh [σάρκα]” (Ephesians 5.29)—a slippage that reflects the scholarly consensus that Ephesians 
was not authored by Paul and/or serves as an allusion to the language of the Septuagint’s translation 
of Genesis 2.24: “for this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, 
and the two will become one flesh [σάρκα μίαν].”5  
 Member(s): μέλος/μέλη. Central to this metaphor is a juxtaposition of the body with its 
various members [μέλη]. Here, one should strike out any notion of membership in the 
contemporary sense. As N. T. Wright notes, “we are so used to the word ‘member’ referring to 
someone who belongs to a society or club that we are in danger of ignoring the fact that here 
‘member’ (μέλη melē) means ‘parts of the body,’ and belongs with the extended metaphor.”6 For 
Paul, a body cannot be understood apart from its composition as a differentiated series of individual 
and unique members, each granted a unique role. Thus, he contrasts “the whole body” [ὅλον τὸ 
σῶμα] with a variety of specifically demarcated members: foot [πούς], hand [χείρ], ear [οὖς], eye 
[ὀφθαλμός], head [κεφαλὴ], internal organs [μέλη τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενέστερα], and genitalia 
[ἀσχήμονα].7 Each of these members is noted for its specific capacities—the eye for seeing, the 
ear for hearing, etc.8—and therefore serve as a metaphor, particularly in 1st Corinthians and 
Romans, of the distribution of various spiritual gifts [πνευματικῶν, χαρισμάτων, δόματα] in the 
                                               
according to the flesh’.” N. T. Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” in The New Interpreter's Bible: Commentary in 
Twelve Volumes, Vol. X, ed. Leander E. Keck et al (Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 710. 
 
5 Ephesians 5.31, citing: “ἕνεκεν τούτου καταλείψει ἄνθρωπος τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν μητέρα καὶ 
προσκολληθήσεται πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν.” Genesis 2.24 (LXX).  
 
6 Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 710. 
 
7 For the reading of  “μέλη τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενέστερα” as internal organs, see: Fee, The First Epistle to the 
Corinthians, 609. For the reading of “ἀσχήμονα” as genitalia, see the extended discussion in the introduction.  
 
8 “Not all the members [μέλη πάντα οὐ] have the same [αὐτὴν] function,” Romans 12.4. 
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early church, of their ethnic diversity (“Jews or Greeks”), and of their socio-economic diversity 
(“slaves or free”). 
One and many: ἓν/ἑνὶ/μίαν and πολλὰ. Between these two terms—body and member—
Paul identifies a complex dialectic of unity and plurality, of individuality and participation: an 
incarnate mereology. For Paul, one can neither understand the body apart from its members, nor 
the members apart from their bodily incorporation. As he writes, “the body is one [τὸ σῶμα ἕν 
ἐστιν] and has many members [μέλη πολλὰ], and all the members of the body [τὰ μέλη τοῦ 
σώματος], though many, are one body [πολλὰ ὄντα ἕν ἐστιν σῶμα]” (1 Cor. 12.12). Yet, this 
insistence upon the interplay of the one and the many could serve two distinct rhetorical functions: 
either demanding unity despite diversity, or diversity despite unity. While it is undeniable that Paul 
intends both readings simultaneously,9 it is nevertheless the case that Paul strictly biases the 
second. In the words of Fee: 
Paul’s primary concern with this imagery is not that the body is one even though it 
has many members, thus arguing for their need for unity despite their diversity. 
Rather, his concern is expressed in v. 14, that even though the body is one, it does 
not consist of one member but of many, thus arguing for their need for diversity, 
since they are in fact one body.10 
 
Given/activated/distributed/arranged/assigned: δίδοται/ἐνεργῶν/ἔθετο/ἐμέρισεν. For Paul 
the differences within the community, like those within the body, are inspired by the spirit.11 Just 
as God has constituted the body [συνεκέρασεν τὸ σῶμα, 1 Cor. 12.18] with its internal 
differentiation and multiplicity, so too has God given [δίδοται], worked/activated [ἐνεργῶν], 
                                               
9 “The metaphor … maintains a claim for unity—one body—while recognizing and honoring differences—many, 
quite different members.” J. Paul Sampley, “The First Letter to the Corinthians,” in The New Interpreter's Bible: 
Commentary in Twelve Volumes, Vol. X, ed. Leander E. Keck et al (Nashville: Abingdon, 2002), 947. 
 
10 Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 601.  
 
11 “Paul sees the differences as being inspired by the Holy Spirit and as enriching the community by God’s design.” 
Sampley, “The First Letter to the Corinthians,”  943. 
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distributed [διαιρέσεις], arranged [ἔθετο], and assigned [ἐμέρισεν] the various gifts of the spirit. 
In the same way, Paul does not erase ethnic difference, but affirms its spiritual source.12 A body 
composed of a single member—Paul conjures the monstrous image of a body composed entirely 
of eyes or ears (1 Cor. 12.17)—cannot function. Rather, he insists, “God arranged [ἔθετο] the 
members [μέλη] in the body, each one of them [ἓν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι], as he chose” (1 
Cor. 12.18). 
 Same and different: αὐτὸς and διαίρεσις/ἑτέρῳ/διάφορα. Nevertheless, despite this concern 
for difference, Paul does not affirm division [σχίσμα]. Indeed, the context of Paul’s use of the body 
of Christ—particularly in 1st Corinthians—is the very real threat of internal schism [σχίσμα] within 
the early church. Having received a report of “quarrels” and division among the community—
“each of you says ‘I belong to Paul,’ or ‘I belong to Apollos,’ or ‘I belong to Cephas,’ or ‘I belong 
to Christ’” (1 Cor. 1.12)—Paul tasks himself with “distinguish[ing] proper diversity from schisms 
and from divisive subgroups within the community.”13 Toward this end, Paul insists upon a 
distinction between division and variety—between σχίσμα and διαιρέσεις. This distinction 
ultimately depends upon the foundation of Christian unity-through-difference within the unity of 
Christ and of the spirit: “now there are varieties of gifts, but the same [αὐτὸ] Spirit; and there are 
varieties [διαιρέσεις] of services, but the same [αὐτὸς] Lord; and there are varieties [διαιρέσεις] of 
activities, but it is the same [αὐτὸς] God who activates all of them in everyone” (1 Cor. 12.4-6). 
For Paul, what distinguishes diversity/difference from division/schism is that, whereas the former 
stands in a dialectical relation with unity, the latter merely disintegrates unification; whereas the 
                                               
12 “Paul has affirmed their unity, which was grounded in their baptism, [and] has recognized once again their 
differences (in the expression ‘whether Jews or Greeks,’ etc.).” Ibid., 945. 
 
13 Ibid., 943. 
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former offers an integration of the dysmember into the community, the latter institutes the 
dismemberment of the community.  
 Unity, love, peace: ἑνότητα, ἀγάπῃ, εἰρήνης. For Paul, this unity-through-difference finds 
its source in the divine, but is manifest through acts of love [ἀγάπῃ] and peace [εἰρήνης]. For these 
Pauline authors, this love and peace functions as “the key to communal solidarity.”14 Thus, one 
reads in Colossians, for example, “above all, clothe yourselves with love [ἀγάπην], which binds 
everything together in perfect harmony. And let the peace [εἰρήνη] of Christ rule in your hearts, to 
which indeed you were called in the one body [ἑνὶ σώματι]” (Col. 3.14-15). This sentiment is 
directly echoed in Ephesians,15 which writes, 
Bearing with one another in love [ἀγάπῃ], making every effort to maintain the unity 
[ἑνότητα] of the Spirit in the bond of peace [εἰρήνης]. There is one body [ἓν σῶμα] 
and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope of your calling, one Lord, 
one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all and through all 
and in all. (Ephesians 4.2-5)16 
 
 
The result of this unification through love and peace is a mutuality in which the members do not 
lose their unique ipseity17—“now you are the body of Christ and individually members [μέλη ἐκ 
                                               
14 Pheme Perkins, “The Letter to the Ephesians,” in The New Interpreter's Bible: Commentary in Twelve Volumes, 
Vol. XI, ed. Leander E. Keck et al (Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 423. 
 
15 This is standard practice for Ephesians, which appears to draw a large portion of its argument directly from 
Colossians: “for the majority [of scholars] it is clear that the dependency is the other way and that the author of 
Ephesians has used Colossians as the model on which he builds.” Andrew T. Lincoln, “The Letter to the 
Colossians,” in The New Interpreter's Bible: Commentary in Twelve Volumes, Vol. XI, ed. Leander E. Keck et al 
(Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 577. 
 
16 Or again: “Husbands, love your wives, just as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her, in order to 
make her holy by cleansing her with the washing of water by the word, so as to present the church to himself in 
splendor, without a spot or wrinkle or anything of the kind—yes, so that she may be holy and without blemish. In 
the same way, husbands should love [ἀγαπᾶν] their wives as they do their own bodies [σώματα]. He who loves [ὁ 
ἀγαπῶν] his wife loves himself. For no one ever hates his own flesh [σάρκα], but he nourishes and tenderly cares for 
it, just as Christ does for the church, because we are members [μέλη] of his body [τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ]. “For this 
reason a man will leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two will become one flesh [σάρκα 
μίαν].” This is a great mystery, and I am applying it to Christ and the church. (Ephesians 5.25-32) 
 
17 Henry makes precisely this point in his phenomenological analysis of the Mystical Body in Incarnation: “This 
absolute unity (i.e. identity, see same page above) between all living Selves, far from signifying or implying the 
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μέρους] of it” (1 Cor. 12.27)—but, gain an affective intimacy. Thus Paul will commend the church 
in Rome to “love one another with mutual affection” (Romans, 12.10), or, as he writes to the 
church in Corinth, “if one member [ἓν μέλος] suffers, all the members [πάντα τὰ μέλη] suffer 
together [συμπάσχει] with it” (1 Cor. 12.26).18 
 
B. Hierarchy and Sexuality in the Body of Christ 
  
The articulation of the body of Christ in 1st Corinthians 12 opens up invaluable possibilities for 
thinking the sexual member of the flesh, through the introduction of the language of the ἀσχήμων 
discussed above (introduction). This language, as was already noted, literally refers to that which 
is “less respectable” or “unpresentable,” but in its context indisputably refers to the genitalia. The 
introduction of this term—together with the “weaker” [ἀσθενέστερα] members, i.e. internal 
organs—serves the function, for Paul, of shattering expectations of incarnate hierarchy. That is to 
say, an ideology of strength and respect would privilege those members which conspicuously 
manifest their strength (e.g. arms, legs, etc.) and which are shown without shame (e.g. face, hands, 
                                               
dissolution or destruction of the individuality of each one, is on the contrary constitutive of it, in as much as each of 
them is joined to himself or herself in the phenomenological effectuation of Life in its Word, and generated in 
themselves as this irreducibly singular Self, irreducible to any other.” Michel Henry, Incarnation: A Philosophy of 
Flesh, trans. Karl Hefty (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015),  248. Joseph Rivera provides a 
commentary of Henry, noting: “I cannot, as this member of the body occupying my own space, somehow ‘merge’ 
with or become one with another member of the body. My ‘here’ as this particular limb is here by virtue of its 
relation to the other’s ‘there’ as a different limb.” Joseph Rivera, The Contemplative Self After Michel Henry: A 
Phenomenological Theology (Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press, 2015), 315. 
 
In a similar manner Karl Barth, in his characteristically Kierkegaardian tenor, will emphasize the persistence of 
individuality, writing: “it must be fellowship that is encountered in community: but this means an encountering of 
the OTHER in the full existentiality of his utter OTHERNESS. In the neighbour it must be the ONE who is 
disclosed. Thus understood, Fellowship is not an aggregate of individuals, nor is it an organism. In fact, Fellowship 
is no concrete thing at all. … Fellowship is communion. It is, however, not a communion in which the ‘otherness’ of 
each particular individual is blurred or limited or dissolved, but that ONENESS which both requires the ‘otherness’ 
of each individual and makes sense of it.” Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 443. 
 
18  Here we have perhaps discovered the (not particularly well-hidden) source of Husserl’s “community of love” and 
Henry’s “pathos-with.”   
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etc.). Against this ideology, Paul institutes a distinctly Christian logic of reversal, wherein “the last 
will be first, and the first will be last” (Matt. 20.16), or, as Paul himself puts it earlier in the same 
letter: “God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise; God chose what is weak in the 
world to shame the strong” (1 Cor. 1.27). Through this logic of reversal, Paul suggests that despite 
their apparent weakness, the internal organs are “indispensable” [ἀναγκαῖά]; those organs which 
manifest a conspicuous strength, invisibly draw their strength from the internal organs without 
whom they could not function. In like manner, the cultural and religious imposition of regulations 
against nudity19 would seem to suggest that the genitalia are shameful and abject, a dysmember, 
as I suggest translating ἀσχήμονα. Yet, Paul suggests to the contrary, that the care in modesty and 
clothing represent a “greater respect” [εὐσχήμονα] and “honor” [τιμήν] for these members.  
Within the text itself, Paul gives no precise explanation for this greater respect, leading to 
various interpretations. Gregory of Nyssa, for example, as was seen above, in a move that perfectly 
captures the logic of “reproductive futurism,” grants primacy of place to these members because 
of their reproductive function: “the generative organs … involve a forecast of the future, 
introducing as they do, by themselves, their counteracting transmission for our race. … By those 
… organs the immortality of humanity is secured.”20 More recently, John Paul II has suggested 
that this passage institutes a reversal of Eden, and a partial intimation of prelapsarian humanity. 
“In Paul’s expression about ‘unpresentable members’ of the human body as well as about those 
that ‘seem to be weaker’ or those ‘that we think less honorable,’ we find, it seems to us, the 
testimony of the same shame that the first human beings, male and female, had experienced after 
                                               
19 One might consider, for example, the ban on (even accidental) nudity in the presence of the altar: “you shall not 
go up by steps to my altar, so that your nakedness may not be exposed on it” (Exodus 20.26), and the attendant 
requirements regarding priestly clothing: “you shall make for them linen undergarments to cover their naked flesh; 
they shall reach from the hips to the thighs” (Exodus 28.42). 
 
20 Gregory of Nyssa, “The Great Catechism,” 497. 
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original sin,” but, John Paul II continues, Paul institutes a key reversal, whereby “one can say that 
from shame is born ‘reverence’ for one’s own body, a reverence that Paul asks us to keep (1 Thess. 
4:4).”21 But, here I would like to highlight neither Gregory’s model of reproductive futurism, nor 
John Paul II’s model of a return to primordial harmony. I will instead turn to the 10th-11th century 
mystic and hymnographer Symeon the New Theologian, who suggests a reading of 1st Corinthians 
that is at once mystical and eschatological.  
According to Symeon, incorporation into the Body of Christ should be understood in the 
double sense; that is, not only should one recognize that the individual Christian becomes a 
member of the corporate body, but conversely, that in a sort of coincidentia oppositorum (to 
borrow a term from Nicholas of Cusa), in the same moment Christ inhabits every member of the 
individual’s body—granting a presentiment or intuition of the resurrection body. This double 
character marks the uniquely embodied conception of mystical union (θεωρία) in Symeon’s 
theology. To be one with God—or here, particularly, Christ—is not to leave or abandon the body 
for a platonic contemplation, but to experience the incarnation within one’s own flesh.22 This is 
explicated nowhere more clearly than in his “Hymn 15,” where he writes:  
                                               
21 John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them, 347. Continuing: “we wish to call attention to the fact that 
according to the author of the letter the particular effort to reach reverence for the human body and especially for its 
‘weaker’ or ‘unpresentable’ members corresponds to the Creator’s original plan or to the vision about which Genesis 
speaks: ‘God saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very good’ (Gen 1:31). Paul writes, ‘God has so 
arranged the body, giving the greater honor to the member that lacked it, that there may be no disunion within the 
body, but the members may have care for one another’ (1 Cor 12:24-25). ‘Disunion within the body,’ the result of 
which is that some members are considered weaker,’ less’ honorable,’ and thus ‘unpresentable,’ is a further 
expression of the vision of man’s—that is, historical man’s—interior state after original sin. The man of original 
innocence, male and female, about whom we read, ‘both were naked … but they did not feel shame’ (Gen 2:25), did 
not feel that ‘disunion within the body’ either. An analogous harmony in man’s innermost [being], the harmony of 
the ‘heart,’ corresponded to the objective harmony that the Creator gave to the human body, which Paul explains as 
reciprocal care of the various members (1 Cor 12:25).” Ibid., 347-348. 
 
22 Here Symeon articulates a logic akin to that of Meister Eckhart, who will later write, “we celebrate here in 
temporality with a view to the eternal birth, which God the Father has accomplished and accomplishes unceasingly 
in eternity, so that this same birth has now been accomplished in time within human nature. What does it avail me if 
this birth takes place unceasingly and yet does not take place within myself? It is quite fitting, however, that it 
should take place within me.” Meister Eckhart, Breakthrough: Meister Eckhart’s Creation Spirituality in New 
Translation (New York: Doubleday, 1980), 293. 
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We become members of Christ—and Christ becomes our members, Christ becomes 
my hand, Christ, my miserable foot; and I, unhappy one, am Christ’s hand, Christ’s 
foot! … If you so wish you will become a member of Christ, and similarly all our 
members individually will become members of Christ and Christ our members, and 
all which is dishonorable in us He will make honorable by adorning it with His 
divine beauty and His divine glory, since living with God at the same time, we shall 
become gods, no longer seeing the shamefulness of our body at all, but made 
completely like Christ in our whole body, each member of our body will be the 
whole Christ; because, becoming many members, He remains unique and 
indivisible, and each part is He, the whole Christ. Now, well you recognized Christ 
in my finger, or in my penis23—did you not shudder, or blush? But God was not 
ashamed to become like you and you, you are ashamed to be like Him? No, I am 
not ashamed to be like Him, but, when you said, like a shameful member, I feared 
that you were uttering blasphemy. Well, you were wrong to fear, for there is nothing 
shameful, but they are the hidden members of Christ, because one covers them, and 
for that reason they are more worthy of honor than the others, as hidden members, 
invisible to all, of the One who is hidden.24  
 
In this way, Symeon suggests, the indwelling of Christ within our members glorifies our 
members, such that we should feel no shame in affirming not only the presence of God in our soul 
or in our heart, but in an affirmation no less shocking today as it was in the 11th century, our very 
penis (βἁλανος). In fact, it is nowhere more clear that Symeon’s message of the glorification and 
divination of the body has not been received, then in the very translations of his own hymn, where 
reference to the penis is generally rendered ambiguously in order to obscure his direct use of sexual 
imagery. The word marked here as “penis” is the Greek βἁλανον (from βἁλανος), which comes 
from the word for “acorn” and, according to the Liddell-Scott, refers to the “glans membri 
                                               
 
23 Translation altered to reflect Symeon’s use of explicitly sexual language. I have here opted for the more literal 
translation of βἁλανον as “penis,” for what should be obvious reasons, following Thomas Arentzen’s discussion of 
Symeon (The Virgin in Song: Mary and the Poetry of Romanos the Melodist [Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2017], 48-49).  
 
24 St. Symeon The New Theologian, “Hymn 15” in Hymns of Divine Love, trans. George A. Maloney (Denville: 
Dimension Books, 1976), 54-55 [translation modified, see prior footnote]. 
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virilis.”25 In Maloney’s translation of “Hymn 15,” it is rendered simply as “this organ,”26 here 
likely following Sources Chrétiennes, which renders it as “cet organe.”27  
Unlike his interpreters, Symeon is here bold, noting the likelihood of scandalizing his 
audience (“did you not shudder, or blush?”), and generating accusations of blasphemy (“I feared 
that you were uttering blasphemy”), within the text of the hymn itself. But this possibility of 
scandal, as Thomas Arentzen points out, arises not only because of the simple use of “penis” in a 
hymn—despite the fact that this would still be unheard of in our supposedly “liberated” modern 
context. More radically still, Symeon not only uses βἁλανον, but places it “in a rhyming 
homeoteleuton construction”28 with “Christ” (Χριστον καἰ βἁλανον). What, within the context of 
a hymn, could more directly symbolize the glorification of the sexual member than this ostensibly 
blasphemous juxtaposition of the sacred and the profane—or more precisely, the sacred and the 
now sacralized sexual member?  
This is precisely the power of Symeon’s reading of the body of Christ and the sexual 
member; he here neither subordinates it to a heterosexual logic of reproductive futurism, nor does 
he relegate its glorification to a prelapsarian goodness. Rather, he suggests a direct transfiguration 
of the supposedly shameful dysmember in its incorporation into the body of Christ. Moreover, he 
understands this logic to have direct repercussions within the social realm. Thus, not only should 
the reader no longer feel shame in their sexual member(s), but they should themselves, as an 
individual, no longer feel shame. For his invocation of the “shameful member” here refers not to 
                                               
25 Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Seventh Edition (New York: Harper and 
Brothers, 1889), 273. 
 
26 Symeon, “Hymn 15,” 54. 
 
27 Syméon le Nouveau Théologien, Hymnes: 1-15, trans. Joseph Paramelle (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1969), 291. 
 
28 Arentzen, The Virgin in Song, 48-49. 
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the sexual member itself, but rather to the member of the community: “but, when you said, like a 
shameful member …”29  
 Nevertheless, despite Paul’s incorporation of the sexual member—or dysmember—into his 
discourse on the body of Christ, and its radical reading in Symeon, one should not permit these 
openings to obscure the less liberative aspects of Paul’s theology of the body of Christ, in regards 
to gender and sexuality. For, despite this affirmation of the sexual member in 1st Corinthians 12, 
Paul will elsewhere, within the same letter and in other letters, manifest a less-than-open stance 
towards deviations from sexual and gender norms: what he will generally denote by the umbrella 
term “sexual immorality” (πορνεία).30 The most extended discourse on πορνεία in the communal 
context can be found in 1st Corinthians 5. There, Paul relays that “it is actually reported that there 
is sexual immorality [πορνεία] among you, and of a kind that is not found even among pagans; for 
a man is living with his father’s wife” (1 Cor. 5.1). For Paul, this incestuous relationship between 
a man and his step mother, is redoubled by the Corinthian church’s inaction.31 Therefore, Paul 
attempts in this letter to intervene and suggest a course of action. According to Paul, the male 
offender32 is to be expelled from the community: “you are to hand this man over to Satan for the 
destruction of the flesh” (1 Cor. 5.5). The precise nature of this “handing over” and of the 
“destruction of the flesh” remains ambiguous. Regarding the first, it is likely that the language of 
                                               
29 St. Symeon The New Theologian, “Hymn 15,” 55 [emphasis added]. 
 
30 “The word porneia (“sexual immorality”) in the Greek world simply meant ‘prostitution’ in the sense of going to 
the prostitutes and paying for sexual pleasure. … But the word had been picked up in Hellenistic Judaism, always 
pejoratively, to cover all extramarital sexual sins and aberrations, including homosexuality.” Fee, The First Epistle 
to the Corinthians, 200. 
 
31 “Should you not rather have mourned, so that he who has done this would have been removed from among you?” 
(1 Cor. 5.2). 
 
32 “The fact that the woman herself is not mentioned, especially since women are more often condemned for sexual 
sins than men (cf. John 8:1-11), is a sure indication that only the man was a member of the Christian community.” 
Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 200-201. 
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handing one over to Satan was quasi-technical language for expelling someone from the Christian 
community.33 Regarding the second, it is unlikely that Paul understands the destruction of the flesh 
literally, and that this constitutes a death penalty. More likely, Paul understands “flesh” in the 
theological sense discussed above, and is hoping for a purgation, “so that his spirit may be saved 
in the day of the Lord” (1 Cor. 5.5).34 Through this expulsion or “handing over,” the community 
seeks to establish clear boundaries between what is inside (sexually permissible) and what is 
outside (sexual impermissible).35  
For Paul, this boundary creation is not a one-time affair, rather he immediately seeks to 
generalize this course of action: “but now I am writing to you not to associate with anyone who 
bears the name of brother or sister who is sexually immoral [πόρνος] or greedy, or is an idolater, 
reviler, drunkard, or robber. Do not even eat with such a one. … ‘Drive out the wicked person 
from among you’” (1 Cor. 5.11-13). As Sampley notes, “the vice list here functions in an et cetera 
fashion to suggest that porneia serves to typify the larger problem.”36 This thesis is justified by 
Paul’s subsequent expansion of this list in the following chapter which condemns: “fornicators 
[πόρνοι], idolaters, adulterers [μοιχοὶ], male prostitutes [μαλακοὶ], sodomites [ἀρσενοκοῖται], 
                                               
33 “The similar usage in 1 Tim. 1:20 suggests that for Paul this was quasi-technical language for some kind of 
expulsion from the Christian community, probably from the gatherings of the assembly for worship, including the 
meals and supper in honor of the Lord.” Ibid., 208. See also, “[Paul] directs the community, at their next assembly, 
to give the man over to Satan—that is, to put him out of the community.” Sampley, “The First Letter to the 
Corinthians,” 847. 
 
34 “Nowhere else does Paul express death in terms of ‘destruction of the flesh’... with some degree of confidence, 
therefore, we may put aside the idea that Paul intended that the man should die. … What this means, then, is that we 
have a typically Pauline contrast between ‘flesh’ and ‘spirit,’ although not necessarily typically expressed. What 
Paul was desiring by having this man put outside the believing community was the destruction of what was ‘carnal’ 
in him, so that he might be ‘saved’ eschatologically.” Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 212.  
 
35 “Paul assumes that it is the community’s responsibility to preserve its own God-given integrity by giving to Satan, 
by cleansing, and by driving out the violator. … By community action, the boundaries of the community must be 
redrawn so that this man is outside.” Sampley, “The First Letter to the Corinthians,” 850. 
 
36 Ibid. 
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thieves, the greedy, drunkards, revilers, robbers—none of these will inherit the kingdom of God” 
(1 Cor. 6.9-10).  
Here, of particular note are the terms μαλακοὶ and ἀρσενοκοῖται. Due to the ambiguity of 
these terms, one finds a variety of translations.37 The first term, literally meaning “soft,” seems to 
refer to effeminate men—but, despite a tradition of identifying this term exclusively with 
homosexuality, in its original context it was probably considerably more general.38 As David 
Halperin notes, “in various European cultural traditions men could be designated as ‘soft’ or 
‘unmasculine’ (malthakos in Greek, mollis in Latin and its Romance derivatives) either because 
they were inverts or pathics—because they were womanly, or transgendered, and liked being 
fucked by other men—or because, on the contrary, they were womanizers, because they deviated 
from masculine gender norms insofar as they preferred the soft option of love to the hard option 
of war.”39 The second, ἀρσενοκοῖται, is equally difficult to translate insofar as the term does not 
appear in earlier literature. Literally, it is a neologism of “male” (ἄρσην) and “fucker” (κοῖται),40 
                                               
37 To give just a few examples, the King James Version translated the first as “effeminate” and the second as 
“abusers of themselves with mankind,” whereas the New King James version renders the first “homosexuals” and 
the second “sodomites”; while the New International Version simply conflates the two terms into the single: “men 
who have sex with men.”  
 
38 Biblical scholarship has often sought to link this term with the passive member of a pederastic relationship, but 
even this attribution appears difficult to maintain with certainty. “The first word, malakoi, has the basic meaning of 
‘soft’; but it also became a pejorative epithet for men who were ‘soft’ or ‘effeminate,’ most likely referring to the 
younger, ‘passive’ partner in a pederastic relationship—the most common form of homosexuality in the Greco-
Roman world. … The problem is that there was a technical word for such men, and malakos is seldom, if ever, so 
used.” Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 243-244. 
 
39 David M. Halperin, “How to do the History of Male Homosexuality” in Donald E. Hall, Annamarie Jagose, 
Andrea Bebell, and Susan Potter (eds.), The Routledge Queer Studies Reader (New York: Routledge, 2013), 266.  
 
40 I have chosen “fucker” here—rather than the more clinical “intercourse”—following John Boswell, in order to 
reflect the use of this term as a crude or vulgar term within its context. “The claim that this word ‘obviously’ means 
‘homosexual’ defies linguistic evidence and common sense. The second half of the compound ‘κοῖται,’ is a coarse 
word, generally denoting base or licentious sexual activities (see Rom. 13.13), and in this and other compounds 
corresponds to the vulgar English word ‘fucker,’ i.e. a person who, by insertion, takes the ‘active’ role in 
intercourse.” John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1980), 342.  
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and seems to refer either to the active partners of a pederastic relationship (where “male” is the 
object) or to male prostitutes (where “male” is the subject).41 While John Boswell’s seminal 
Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality (1980) opened up an extensive and ongoing 
discourse regarding the applicability of “homosexual” to either or both of these terms, settling that 
debate, even were such a thing possible, is unnecessary to the argument at hand. For, regardless of 
which interpretation is followed, it is undeniable that Paul is here using this constellation of 
terms—together with fornicators [πόρνοι] and adulterers [μοιχοὶ]—in order to flesh out the general 
category of “sexual immorality” [πορνεία], in such a way that it would condemn all deviations 
from strict monogamous, heterosexual norms.42  
One might suggest that this condemnation be held apart from the notion of the body of 
Christ, but Paul soon forecloses this possibility. In the conclusion to these sections, Paul writes: 
The body is meant not for fornication [πορνείᾳ] but for the Lord, and the Lord for 
the body. … Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Should I 
therefore take the members of Christ and make them members of a prostitute 
[πόρνης]? Never! Do you not know that whoever is united to a prostitute [πόρνῃ] 
becomes one body with her? For it is said, ‘The two shall become one flesh.’ But 
anyone united to the Lord becomes one spirit with him. Shun fornication 
                                               
41 “This word (arsenokoitai), however, is also difficult. This is its first appearance in preserved literature, and 
subsequent authors are reluctant to use it, especially when describing homosexual activity. The word is a compound 
of ‘male’ and ‘intercourse.’ There is no question as to the meaning of the koitai part of the word; it is vulgar slang 
for ‘intercourse.’ … What is not certain is whether ‘male’ is subject (= ‘males who have intercourse’; thus a word 
for male prostitutes of all kinds) or object (= ‘intercourse with males’; therefore male homosexual).” Fee, The First 
Epistle to the Corinthians,  244. 
 
42 For, even if Boswell is right that these terms should be conceived through the lens of prostitution, rather than 
homosexuality (and it is more likely that Paul intends some combination of both), Paul is clear elsewhere (Romans 
1) that he does not condone same-sex sexuality. There, Paul offers yet another vice list, preceded by an 
unambiguous condemnation of same-sex eroticism: “for this reason God gave them up to degrading passions. Their 
women exchanged natural intercourse for unnatural, and in the same way also the men, giving up natural intercourse 
with women, were consumed with passion for one another. Men committed shameless acts with men and received in 
their own persons the due penalty for their error. And since they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them 
up to a debased mind and to things that should not be done. They were filled with every kind of wickedness, evil, 
covetousness, malice. Full of envy, murder, strife, deceit, craftiness, they are gossips, slanderers, God-haters, 
insolent, haughty, boastful, inventors of evil, rebellious toward parents,  foolish, faithless, heartless, ruthless. They 
know God’s decree, that those who practice such things deserve to die—yet they not only do them but even applaud 
others who practice them.” (Romans 1.26-32) 
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[πορνείαν]! Every sin that a person commits is outside of the body; but the 
fornicator [πορνεύων] sins against the body itself [ἴδιον σῶμα]. (1 Cor. 6.l3-18) 
  
Here Paul explicitly links his account of πορνεία to his account of the body of Christ. One is to 
refrain from sexuality, he suggests, for two reasons. Because, as the second half of the passage 
argues, this sin contaminates the interiority of the body, it is inside “the body itself” [ἴδιον σῶμα]. 
Second, and more directly applicable to the discussion at hand, this contamination of one’s own 
body is redoubled at a communal and Christological level. Because one has become a member of 
the body of Christ, one is uniquely bound both to the community and to Christ. To commit an act 
of sexual immorality [πορνεία], therefore, is to bring into the closed boundaries of the community, 
that which is to be expelled from the community, thereby risking the shattering or rupturing of the 
community itself. As Althaus-Reid writes of homosexual relations, “sodomy, by its mere structure 
of the man/man relating pattern, presented to society a fracture into the hierarchical men/women 
ethos; this was considered to be damaging for the life of society, the constitution of states and the 
relationship of humanity with God.”43 To commit an act of sexual deviancy (to deviate from the 
sexual norm) is to contaminate the community and to contaminate Christ.44  
                                               
43 Marcella Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology: Theological Perversions in Sex, Gender and Politics (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), 195. 
 
44 This linkage between sexual immorality and logics of “contamination” are particularly prominent within 
American evangelical purity culture. The following is a particularly visceral example, that I can personally attest is a 
regular occurrence in evangelical sexual education curriculum: 
 
“Special Brownies 
February 6, 2006 
Title: Special Brownies (A.K.A.–Chocolate Covered Poop!) 
 
Bake 3 batches of brownies. Leave one batch plain, put some extras on the second batch (I used nuts, chocolate 
chips, and marshmallows on the top) and add peanut butter chips (or leave plain) to the third batch. For each batch, 
write out a recipe card with the ingredients – but for the 3rd batch, write down 1 Tbs. of dog poop at the end. 
 
Have a student read off the ingredients for each batch – starting with the first and take a vote to see which students 
would eat that brownie. They will go nuts when he/she reads the last ingredient on the 3rd batch!! Most likely, no 
one will want to eat that batch – but that's the point. (I had one who thought he would eat it anyway … there's 
always one!) 
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 This rigid attempt to establish the boundaries outside or around the Christian community 
is supplemented with periodic reintroductions of hierarchical boundaries within the Christian 
community. For Paul, the body is specifically arranged by God, “God arranged the members in the 
body, each one of them, as he chose” (1 Cor. 12.18). In the same manner, as was seen above, God 
distributes difference within the community—in the context of 1 Cor., the difference between the 
gifts of the spirit—in an ordered manner: “God has appointed in the church first apostles, second 
prophets, third teachers; then deeds of power, then gifts of healing, forms of assistance, forms of 
leadership, various kinds of tongues.” (1 Cor. 12.28). Nevertheless, as his analogy with the body 
sought to expose, these differences are not hierarchical.45 Here, it will be helpful to begin by briefly 
noting the general Pauline conception of sexual difference, in order to more clearly highlight those 
moments—within Paul, and more commonly within the Deutero-Pauline literature—where 
something considerably less liberative emerges. 
 For obvious historical reasons, Paul’s account of sexual difference is certainly far from 
identical to that proposed by contemporary queer theory or feminist discourse. Nevertheless, Paul 
                                               
THE EXPLANATION … 
We are all called to be pure and whole. Even a little bit of sin in our lives makes us unacceptable to God (brownies 
with dog poop). If we keep ourselves free from sin, and seek reconciliation to God, then our lives can be decorated 
with good things, and unique gifts that make us special brownies in God's eyes (brownies with extra stuff). But at 
the very minimum, we have to be pure. Even a little bit of dog poop makes the whole brownie bad.”  
 
Jonathan McKee, “Special Brownies,” The Source for Youth Ministry, https://thesource4ym.com/special-brownies/ 
(retrieved 01/14/19). 
 
For a recent autobiographical account of evangelical purity culture, see: Linda Kay Klein, Pure: Inside the 
Evangelical Movement That Shamed a Generation of Young Women and How I Broke Free (New York: Touchstone, 
2018). 
 
45 “The eye cannot say to the hand, ‘ I have no need of you,’ nor again the head to the feet, ‘I have no need of you.’ 
… there may be no dissention within the body, but the members may have the same care for one another” (1 Cor. 
12.21, 25). As Fee notes, “this is demonstrated by the further elaborations in vv. 22-24a, which emphasize the 
strictly apparent nature of such ‘hierarchy.’ He argues that the apparently weaker, the internal organs, are the more 
necessary, and that the apparently less seemly, the sexual organs, are the more necessary, are accorded the higher 
honor (of clothing being implied).” Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 609. 
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does seem to go to great lengths to undercut a hierarchical-subordinationist account of sexual 
difference. For Paul, sexual difference appears to play a role akin to ethnic or socio-economic 
difference. Thus, he can write: “there is no longer Jew or Greek, there is no longer slave or free, 
there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus” (Galatians 3.28). As has 
already been seen in the discussion of membership above, Paul does not seek to erase these 
distinctions (as the so-called “New Perspective on Paul” definitively established in regard to Paul’s 
persistent Jewish self-identity, for example). But, while Paul exhibits a great respect for difference, 
he does oppose any production of division within the body of Christ. In the discussion of the 
Eucharist in 1st Corinthians 11, for example, Paul laments that “I hear that there are divisions 
among you” (1 Cor. 11.18). Specifically, Paul here targets those who “show contempt for the 
Church of God and humiliate those who have nothing” (1 Cor. 22)—that is, the poor. By 
replicating the socio-economic divisions, and not merely difference, of Roman society within their 
practice of the Lord’s supper, the church in Corinth “eats the bread [and] drinks the cup of the 
Lord in an unworthy manner” ( 1 Cor. 11.27). The consequence for such a divisive humiliation of 
the poor is decisive: “all who eat and drink without discerning the body, eat and drink judgment 
against themselves,” in fact, he continues, “for this reason many of you are weak and ill, and some 
have died.” (1 Cor. 11.29-30).  
Within the specific context of sexual difference, this resistance to hierarchy tends to take 
the form of parallel and complementary suggestions for conduct. Thus Paul writes that “the wife 
does not have authority over her own body, but the husband does;” before immediately adding the 
complementary converse, “likewise the husband does not have authority over his own body, but 
the wife does” (1 Cor. 7.4). Here Paul upends the normative assumptions of his contemporary 
society which presumed an asymmetrical relationship between the sexes.  
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 But this egalitarian—or at least complementarian—account of sexual difference does not 
persist without exception. This is evidenced by Paul’s discussion of head coverings within the 
religious service. Without delving into the extreme complexities of this passage,46 what is 
particularly relevant here is Paul’s allusion to the body of Christ image, not for the purpose of 
deconstructing hierarchies, but seemingly toward the end of affirming an asymmetrical 
relationship between men and women. As he writes, “I want you to understand that Christ is the 
head of every man and the husband is the head of his wife, and God is the head of Christ” (1 Cor. 
11.3). Here a first of two figures emerges that will become increasingly important within the 
deutero-Pauline writers: “the head” [κεφαλή].47 This emphasis upon the head serves to disrupt the 
flat social-ontology established in Paul’s fuller examination of the body of Christ, through the 
introduction of a layered hierarchy of authority. Here, the head is no longer conceived as one 
member among many, manifesting a logic of mutual care and shared affection. Rather, the head 
becomes the source of bodily authority, controlling and directing its subordinate members.48 
Unsurprisingly, this image of the authoritative head at the bodily level, likewise manifests as 
asymmetrical relations at the communal level, generated first in regards to the church and its 
                                               
46 “This passage is full of notorious exegetical difficulties, including (1) the ‘logic’ of the argument as a whole, 
which in turn is related to (2) our uncertainty about the meaning of some absolutely crucial terms and (3) our 
uncertainty about prevailing customs, both in the culture(s) in general and in the church(es) in particular (including 
the whole complex question of early Christian worship).” Ibid., 492. 
 
47 “The term ‘head’ (κεφαλὴ kephalē) denotes Christ’s rule or authority over the church as his body.” Lincoln, “The 
Letter to the Colossians,” 599. 
 
48 This language of subordination appears explicitly in a short passage in 1 Cor. 14, widely regarded as a 2nd century 
interpolation: “as in all the churches of the saints, women should be silent in the churches. For they are not permitted 
to speak, but should be subordinate, as the law also says” (1 Cor. 14.33-34 [emphasis added]). For an argument 
against the Pauline authorship of these passages, see: Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 699-702. 
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generative principle—Christ—, and second in regards to the sexual difference found within the 
church: (viz. husbands and wives or men and women49). 
This opening to asymmetrical relations of authority within the logic of the body of Christ 
is picked up by the deutero-Pauline authors and expanded into the definitive image of the body of 
Christ. Colossians, for example, writes of the Christ: 
He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all 
things in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and invisible, whether 
thrones or dominions or rulers or powers—all things have been created through him 
and for him. He himself is before all things, and in him all things hold together. He 
is the head of the body [κεφαλὴ τοῦ σώματος], the church; he is the beginning, the 
firstborn from the dead, so that he might come to have first place in everything. 
(Colossians 1.15-18) 
 
Here, the analogy of the body has been radically reconfigured. Where 1st Corinthians 12 directly 
targeted a notion of superiority between members, Colossians (following 1 Cor. 11) explicitly 
posits the superiority of a head, which is to be granted “first place in everything,” over and against 
the members of the body. This logic is brought to fruition in Ephesians, where the figure of the 
head is paired with its rhetorical opposite, the foot (ποδός). As one reads in Ephesians, “he has put 
all things under his feet [ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας αὐτοῦ] and has made him the head over all things 
[κεφαλὴν ὑπὲρ πάντα] for the church, which is his body, the fullness of him who fills all in all.” 
(Eph. 1.22-23). Whereas in 1st Corinthians 12 the head and the foot serve as ontologically equal 
members of the body—“the head [cannot say] to the feet, ‘I have no need of you” (1 Cor. 12.21)—
here the foot becomes symbolic of the radical transcendence of the head vis-a-vis the members of 
the body. These shifts suggests the introduction of the image of the body of Christ into a completely 
new rhetorical context, whereas Paul drew upon the figure in order to tackle the question of 
                                               
49 Insofar as the Greek lacks separate words for man/husband [ἀνήρ] and woman/wife [γυναικὸς], the Greek is 
ambiguous regarding whether the difference at hand refers to the context of marriage specifically, or to any instance 
of sexual difference as such.  
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division within the church, and to articulate a logic of unity-through-difference, Colossians and 
Ephesians instead evidence a concern for right authority.50  
Just as in Paul’s discourse on head coverings, this concern for the authority of Christ, and 
the hierarchical figure of the body of Christ emerges onto the social plane, generating an 
asymmetrical account sexual and social difference. Thus, in Colossians, one finds a radically 
multi-layered hierarchical household code:  
Wives, be subject to your husbands, as is fitting in the Lord. Husbands, love your 
wives and never treat them harshly. Children, obey your parents in everything, for 
this is your acceptable duty in the Lord. Fathers, do not provoke your children, or 
they may lose heart. Slaves, obey your earthly masters in everything, not only while 
being watched and in order to please them, but wholeheartedly, fearing the Lord. 
Whatever your task, put yourselves into it, as done for the Lord and not for your 
masters, since you know that from the Lord you will receive the inheritance as your 
reward; you serve the Lord Christ. … Masters, treat your slaves justly and fairly, 
for you know that you also have a Master in heaven. (Colossians, 3.18-4.1) 
 
Here one finds a household code that structurally mimics the complementarity of Paul’s account 
of sexual difference in 1st Corinthians 7.4, but with a key difference. Whereas Paul identifies 
                                               
50 “Unlike the use of the ‘body’ metaphor in 1 Corinthians and Romans, Ephesians does not point to a crisis of 
disunity” Perkins, “The Letter to the Ephesians,” 423; “in Ephesians and Colossians a subtly different point is made, 
Christ there being spoken of as the head of the body.” Wright, “The Letter to the Romans,” 709. 
 
This is not to suggest that Ephesians never shares Paul’s concern. In Chapter 4 the image of the Body of Christ is 
worked out in a manner considerably more reminiscent of 1 Cor. 12: “Therefore, the prisoner in the Lord, begs you 
to lead a life worthy of the calling to which you have been called, with all humility and gentleness, with patience, 
bearing with one another in love [ἀγάπῃ], making every effort to maintain the unity [ἑνότητα] of the Spirit in the 
bond of peace [εἰρήνης]. There is one body [ἓν σῶμα] and one Spirit, just as you were called to the one hope of your 
calling, one Lord, one faith, one baptism, one God and Father of all, who is above all and through all and in all. But 
each of us was given grace according to the measure of Christ’s gift [δωρεᾶς]. Therefore it is said, “When he 
ascended on high he made captivity itself a captive; he gave gifts [δόματα] to his people.” (When it says, “He 
ascended,” what does it mean but that he had also descended into the lower parts of the earth? He who descended is 
the same one who ascended far above all the heavens, so that he might fill all things.) The gifts he gave were that 
some would be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers, to equip the saints for the 
work of ministry, for building up the body of Christ [σώματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ], until all of us come to the unity 
[ἑνότητα] of the faith and of the knowledge of the Son of God, to maturity, to the measure of the full stature of 
Christ. We must no longer be children, tossed to and fro and blown about by every wind of doctrine, by people’s 
trickery, by their craftiness in deceitful scheming. But speaking the truth in love [ἀγάπῃ], we must grow up in every 
way into him who is the head [κεφαλή], into Christ, from whom the whole body [πᾶν τὸ σῶμα], joined and knit 
together by every ligament with which it is equipped, as each part [μέρους] is working properly, promotes the 
body’s growth in building itself up in love [ἀγάπῃ].” (Ephesians 4.1-16) 
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mutual commands of care—“the wife does not have authority over her own body, but the husband 
does; likewise the husband does not have authority over his own body, but the wife does”—in 
Colossians, these imperatives are only structurally symmetrical. Thus wives are to be “subject” to 
their husbands, who are themselves only commanded not to “treat [their wives] harshly”; children 
are to “obey” their parents, while fathers (notably, mothers abruptly disappear here) are not to 
“provoke”; likewise, slaves are to “obey,” whereas masters are merely to “treat … justly and 
fairly.” The extreme asymmetry of this passage is nowhere more evident than in the final passage, 
where the master’s leniency is grounded not in mercy or respect for the slave, but in the master’s 
own submission to a higher authority. The mutuality, equality, and shared affection that marked 
the Christian community in Romans and 1st Corinthians has been fully effaced in the deutero-
Pauline quest for authority.51  
C. The Ambivalence of the Pauline Body of Christ 
 
When the evidence of the prior two sections is taken together, the result is a conflicted conception 
of the body of Christ. For, on the one hand, at points (e.g. 1 Cor. 12) the body of Christ seems to 
represent a profound logic of unity-through-difference. Here, agapic love serves the function of 
bridging divisions and generating mutual affective relations, such that the diffusion of difference 
and multiplicity is no longer a roadblock to unity, but is instead its very condition of possibility. 
Here the dysmember [ἀσχήμων] finds itself fully incarnated into the body, not as a merely abject 
remainder, but as a member in full standing, granted equal respect and dignity [εὐσχήμονα]. Yet, 
on the other hand, Paul simultaneously undertakes a theology of exclusion or dismemberment (e.g. 
                                               
51 Certainly, this should not be overly exaggerated, there is still something of a “transcending of divisions” (Lincoln, 
“The Letter to the Colossians,” 648) in these epistles. See, e.g.: “in that renewal there is no longer Greek and Jew, 
circumcised and uncircumcised, barbarian, Scythian, slave and free; but Christ is all and in all!” (Col. 3.11). But, it 
is perhaps important in the present context to note that this revision of the formula from Galatians 3.28 has erased 
reference to the radical equality of “male and female.” 
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1 Cor. 5-6), whereby any practitioner of non-normative sexuality is cast out of the community in 
order to secure the borders of the community against any corruption or impurity; a logic which is 
taken up by the later deutero-Pauline authors (Colossians and Ephesians) and worked out into an 
elaborate multi-tiered cosmological and social hierarchy—descending from the father into the son, 
the husband, the wife, the child, and finally, the slave.   
 For these reasons, the construction of a properly liberatory social community will require 
more than a mere gesture toward the earliest Christian tradition. That is to say, despite the fact that 
“the body of Christ is a multigendered body,”52 and therefore necessarily displays queer moments 
of profound opening, it will be necessary to resist the temptation to simply cast the traditional 
account of the body of Christ as always already queer.53 Such approaches, even if well-intentioned, 
Tonstad shows, “domesticate both queerness and Christianity, reducing them to flat reflections of 
widely shared liberal assumptions.”54 In resistance to this approach, Tonstad recommends a pivot 
toward the anti-social turn in queer theory, exemplified by Guy Hocquenghem and Lee Edelman, 
and already profoundly influential on the account of the sexual flesh developed in the two 
preceding chapters.  
According to Edelman, the proper posture of queer theory should not be that of a liberal 
universalism.55 “Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, th[e] ascription of negativity to the 
                                               
52 Ward, “Bodies,”  177. 
 
53 “It has, in other words, become almost de rigueur for aspiring queer or radical theologians to advance claims that 
authentic or orthodox Christianity is at least potentially and often, more strongly yet, inherently queer.” Linn Marie 
Tonstad, “Everything Queer, Nothing Radical?” Svensk Teologisk Kvartalskrift 92 (2016), 118. 
 
54 Ibid. Queer theologies must avoid becoming what Althaus-Reid names “dictionary theologies,” that is, theologies 
which simply offer an “explanation of a center-based theology in the native’s terms.” Marcella Althaus-Reid, The 
Queer God (New York: Routledge, 2003), 51. 
 
55 As Althaus-Reid similarly suggests, “in theology, to repeat can be associated with many modern habitual 
trappings, such as those into which ‘theologies at the margins’ may fall when they become simple attempts to induce 
oppressed multitudes to invest their identities in the centre-defined theological exercise by a simple economy of 
inclusion.” Ibid., 51. 
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queer, we might … do better to consider accepting and even embracing it.”56 In this way, Edelman 
provocatively suggests that queer theory should recognize itself in the discourse of conservatism: 
“conservatives acknowledge the radical potential, which is also to say, the radical threat, of 
queerness.”57 Thus, citing a “hyperbolic rant” of Donald Wildmon, founder of the American 
Family Association—“acceptance or indifference to the homosexual movement will result in 
society’s destruction”58—Edelman recommends against an all-too-easy recourse to liberal 
totalism. Perhaps, he ventures, “Mr. Wildmon might be right—or more important, ought to be 
right: that queerness should and must redefine such notions as ‘civil order’?”59Against a discourse 
that moves too quickly toward a logic of universal tolerance and acceptance—and therefore de-
radicalization—Edelman instead affirms queerness as the very site where every social body finds 
its own failure to fully incorporate. Queerness, in its very otherness, refuses simple incorporation 
into the body; or, as Althaus-Reid suggests, “queer theologies are a refusal to normalization.”60 
Rather, like the impotent member that will not cooperate with the incorporation (and therefore 
control) of a hierarchical organization of the body, queerness disrupts the self-presence of the body 
politic—“queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one.”61  
Queerness, on the social level, therefore plays precisely the role granted the dysmember in 
the preceding chapters. The queer is the social remainder, that which cannot be made “same.” Or, 
                                               
 
56 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 4. 
 
57 Ibid., 14. 
 
58 Ibid., 16. 
 
59 Ibid. 16-17. 
 
60 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 50. 
 
61 Edelman, No Future, 17.  
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in Edelman’s terms, the queer is the “sinthomosexual”62: “a surrogate for the perpetual failure of 
universalism.”63 Just as radical phenomenology—in its monadic aspirations—has imagined a total 
access to the flesh sans faille, so too have they participated in and perpetuated the sexual-political 
imaginary which seeks to construct a social body sans faille. Any gap or fault within the social 
body—notably that produced by the queer body, the social dysmember—necessarily had to be cast 
out of the flesh in order preserve the purity and boundaries of the flesh. Thus, the dismemberment 
of the flesh has served the role of preserving the unity—or more precisely, the unanimity—of the 
social body. This conception of the social body is “a universalization at the expense of 
particularity.”64 Moreover, this dismemberment is not merely rhetorical or philosophical, but in its 
political dimension often takes the form of concrete violence against particular populations, 
notably queer folk. As Tonstad remarks, “the hope of a fully unified community becomes an alibi 
for the violence directed against whoever stands in for “the obstacle destabilizing every unity.”65 
In this way, in an unexpected reversal, it is precisely the apologists of unity without gap or fault 
who become the champions of dismemberment. In their quest for a social whole, they seek to 
excise every social hole. In the name of a total presence of the social body to itself, they constitute 
the Other of this body as an “unpresentable member” [ἀσχήμονα], who may be justly “handed over 
to Satan,” expelled from the community on behalf of the community’s sense of self-presence.  
                                               
62 This neologism is coined by Edelman; “bringing together the Lacanian sinthome, which defines the specific 
formation of the subject’s access to jouissance, and a homosexuality distinctively abjected as a figure of the 
antibiotic, a figure opposed, in dominant fantasy, to life and futurity both, the sinthomosexual conjures a politicality 
unrecognizable as such by virtue of its resistance to futurism’s constraining definition of the political field.” Lee 
Edelman, “Ever After: History, Negativity, and the Social,” South Atlantic Quarterly Vol. 106 No. 3 (2007): 469-
476, 471-472. 
 
63 Ibid., 473. 
 
64 Ibid., 474. 
 
65 Tonstad, “Everything Queer, Nothing Radical?,” 123. 
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It therefore becomes necessary to rethink the social body no longer on the terms of direct 
presence of the self to itself without gap, but from the perspective of the rupture. Unity, on such 
an account, is no longer the product of a violent excision of difference, but rather takes difference 
as its condition of possibility. Within the early Christian community, this possibility and its 
opposite manifested through two competing social metaphors around division within the body of 
Christ. Each of these models drew upon medical terminology in order to think through the 
possibility of mending a divided community—of building “unity.” Yet, despite these similarities 
in method and aim, the means by which these two imaginaries generate unity are nearly opposite. 
I have named these two models the surgical model and the healing model, and it is with a 
comparison of these two models that this dissertation will conclude. 
 
§2. The Cut 
A. The Surgical Model — Cyprian 
 
 
The surgical model, as I have already begun to suggest, is constructed upon the tension of self-
presence and dismemberment. Simply put, the surgical model suggests that the proper form of 
unity within a social body is the direct presence of the body to itself, a logic of sameness wherein 
difference functions as an obstacle to uniformity and therefore unity. Because difference functions 
as an obstacle, any form of difference or otherness (or queerness) must be cast as external to the 
body politic. This is the logic of the policed border; the community, in its deepest etymological 
sense, the com-munus: those who take up arms (munire) together (com), that is to say, those who 
maintain a common defense.66 While external opposition is easily dealt with under such a 
                                               
66 For an analysis of community as com-munus, see the work of Robert Esposito, e.g. Communitas: The Origin and 
Destiny of Community, trans. Timothy Campbell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009) and Terms of the 
Political: Community, Immunity, Biopolitics, trans. Rhiannon Noel Welch (Fordham University Press, 2012). 
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paradigm, internal difference or otherness necessarily constitutes a crisis. It is here that the 
“surgical” aspect of this model appears. For, any otherness within the community itself, within the 
borders or boundaries that have been established to ward off difference, constitutes an existential 
threat, often thought in terms of the gangrenous or the cancerous. Ontologically speaking, “in order 
to speak of ‘being qua being,’ one has to amputate something in being that is not being.”67 Simply 
put, for exponents of the surgical model—whether explicit or implicit—internal difference 
necessitates the institution of a “cut”; the dysmember, the abject figure of otherness, must be cut 
out of the body politic in order to maintain the health of the community.68 “Walls,” as Althaus-
Reid notes, “have teeth and can bite and can dismember.”69  
 Within the specific context of the Christian community—the body of Christ—this  
tendency can be identified from the very beginning. As the reader has no doubt gathered, this 
paradigm appears already in the Pauline corpus, first in Paul’s own discussion of the necessity of 
expelling those members of the community who engage in sexually unpermitted activities—
πόρνοι, μοιχοὶ, μαλακοὶ, ἀρσενοκοῖται—and subsequently in the deutero-Pauline authors who 
likewise employ its logic of exclusion, unveiling at the same moment the necessary hierarchical 
supplement. A logic of sameness which demands uniformity of practice and unanimity of thought 
                                               
 
67 Alenka Zupančič, What is Sex? (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2017), 129. 
 
68 Within the domain of sexuality, this can often appear in a literal form, as in the Sentences of Sextus, which 
suggest: “every part of the body which persuades you to not practice moderation, cast [it] away! For it is better to 
live in moderation without this part than destructively with it” (Sent. 13), or again, “you see men cutting off and 
casting away part of their body to keep their health. How much better to do so on behalf of moderation?” (Sent. 
273).” Here, the maintenance of sexual purity and the conquering of lust is attained through self-castration. The text 
above is presented as cited in Origen who, despite the almost certainly spurious claim that he self-castrated, regards 
the text with disdain, and as a failure to read the Matthew 19’s discussion of “eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven” 
in a properly allegorical fashion. Origen of Alexandria, “Commentary on the Gospel according to Matthew, Books 
15 & 16: Translation & Notes,” trans. Justin M. Gohl (unpublished, 2017), 15.3. 
 
69 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 105. 
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under the guise of unity, requires an asymmetrical hierarchical structure as a political support for 
this uniformity/unanimity.  
The link between this uniformity/unanimity and hierarchy can already be found in the 
generations of Christian leadership immediately following the Pauline authors. On this point the 
early Christian bishop Ignatius of Antioch is particularly enlightening, insofar as he reveals the 
hierarchical character implicit in the surgical model. For Ignatius, the unity of the Christian 
community is threatened by heretics—what he will call “wildlings,”70 or offshoots of Satan. Such 
wildlings, despite their apparent presence in the community are not truly “members of his body,”71 
for “God means complete oneness.”72 While the Ignatian conception of unity or “oneness” is 
unspecified in the letter to the Trallians, it will be marked with full clarity in the letter to the 
Ephesians. There, Ignatius glosses Jesus’ promise “where two or three are gathered in my name, I 
am there among them” (Matt. 18.20), writing that “when you meet frequently in the same place, 
the forces of Satan are overthrown.”73 But for Ignatius, it is not merely the gathering together that 
overthrows, but more specifically, “his baneful influence is neutralized by the unanimity (ὁμονοίᾳ) 
of your faith.”74 This unanimity, as Ignatius makes perfectly clear, is defined not simply by the 
community, but by the authoritative word of the bishop: “it is therefore proper in every way to 
glorify Jesus Christ who has glorified you, so that you, fully trained in unanimous submission 
                                               
70 St. Ignatius of Antioch, “The Epistle of Ignatius to the Trallians” in James A. Kleist (trans.), The Epistles of St. 
Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch, Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation 
No. 1 (New York: Newman Press, 1946), 78 (11). 
 
71 Ibid. 
 
72 Ibid. 
 
73 St. Ignatius of Antioch, “The Epistle of Ignatius to the Ephesians” in James A. Kleist (trans.), The Epistles of St. 
Clement of Rome and St. Ignatius of Antioch, Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation 
No. 1 (New York: Newman Press, 1946), 65 (13). 
 
74 Ibid. [emphasis added]. 
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(ὑποταγῇ), may be submissive (ὑποτασσόμενοι) to the bishop and the presbytery, and thus be 
sanctified in every respect.”75 In this episcopal ecclesiology, the authority of Christ, the head of 
the body of Christ, has been hierarchically delegated to the bishop and the presbyters. Thus, the 
congregant is expected to submit themselves to the authority of the bishop precisely as they would 
Christ, just as the deutero-Pauline authors demand wives’ submission to their husbands, as an 
extension of the husbands’ submission to Christ (e.g. 1 Cor. 11.3, Col. 3.18).76 It is only through 
this submission that the congregant is to gain access to the eucharistic body of Christ: “show 
obedience with undivided mind (ἀπερισπάστῳ κιανοίᾳ) to the bishop and the presbyter, and to 
breaking of the same Bread, which is the medicine of immortality, the antidote against death, and 
everlasting life in Jesus Christ.”77 This “medicine of immortality” is available only to those who 
have submitted themselves to the patriarchal authority of the bishop, all others must be purged 
from the community for the sake of the community.78 
Despite its appearance in Paul and echoes in Ignatius, this model finds its apogee in  
Cyprian’s De ecclesiae catholicae unitate and De lapsis. The context of these texts is the Decian 
                                               
75 Ibid., 61 (2). 
 
76 This parallel between patriarchal authority in sexuality (paternity) and patriarchal authority vis-a-vis the bishop is 
manifest quite clearly in Marion’s own discussion privilege of the bishop in God Without Being (see: chapter 3). 
  
77 Ignatius, “The Epistle of Ignatius to the Ephesians,” 68 (20). 
 
78 The deep connection between the sole patriarchal authority of the bishop, the eucharist, sexuality, and the logic of 
the “cut,” is exemplified in a remarkable manner by the 4th Lateran Council (1215). There a single church council 
proffered canons: demanding that regions maintain a single bishop (“We altogether forbid one and the same city or 
diocese to have more than one bishop, as if it were a body with several heads like a monster” [Canon 9]), defined the 
doctrine of transubstantiation (“His body and blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the forms 
of bread and wine, the bread and wine having been changed in substance, by God's power, into his body and blood” 
[Canon 1]), reaffirmed clerical chastity (“Let them beware of every vice involving lust …  so that they may be 
worthy to minister in the sight of almighty God with a pure heart and an unsullied body” [Canon 14]), specific 
regulations regarding marriage (Canons 50-52) and incest (“moreover the prohibition against marriage shall not in 
future go beyond the fourth degree of consanguinity and of affinity … The number four agrees well with the 
prohibition concerning bodily union about which the Apostle says, that the husband does not rule over his body, but 
the wife does; and the wife does not rule over her body, but the husband does; for there are four humours in the 
body” [Canon 50]), and regulated excommunication (Canons 47-49).  
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persecution which began at the end of 249.79 These texts offer a pathos driven plea for the unity of 
the Christian Church in the wake of this disaster. As De lapsis notes, this persecution greatly 
fragmented the church, not simply in its execution and direct persecution of Christians, but in a 
sense more traumatically, in its creation of a caste of Christians, the “lapsi”—those who “fell 
away” from the church during the persecution—whose status was a source of great conflict in the 
North African church. On the one side stood the Novatianists, who utterly rejected any re-
admittance of the lapsi into the Christian community. On the other side stood those bishops who 
re-admitted without condition. In this sense, Cyprian attempts to offer a moderate or middle-route 
between these two extreme positions vis-à-vis the lapsi. 
         Given the great upheaval and fragmentation generated by this catastrophe, Cyprian offers 
De ecclesiae catholicae unitate in order to address the question of Christian unity. Toward this 
end, De ecclesiae catholicae unitate is primarily addressed not to those who would threaten the 
church from without (those outside of the borders), but to the inconspicuous forces that threaten 
the church from within: the heretics and the schismatics (e.g. the Novatianists). “Thereupon the 
Enemy,” Cyprian writes, “seeing his idols abandoned and his temples and haunts deserted by the 
ever growing numbers of the faithful, devised a fresh deceit, using the Christian name itself to 
mislead the unwary. He invented heresies and schisms so as to undermine the faith, to corrupt, to 
sunder our unity.”80 Being primarily addressed to the question of Christian unity in the context of 
heresy and schism, it is unsurprising that Cyprian's approach would make consistent reference to 
                                               
79 “Le De ecclesiae catholicae unitate est d'abord un cri d'alarme et un appel passionné à l'unité de l'Église auquel 
l'évêque Cyprien a probablement donné un retentissement public à l'occasion du synode provincial qui s'est tenu à 
Carthage vers la fin de l'année 251.” Paolo Siniscalco and Paul Mattei “Préface” in L'unité de L'Église (Paris: Les 
Éditions du Cerf, 2006), VI. 
 
80 St. Cyprian, “The Lapsed and the Unity of the Catholic Church,” in Ancient Christian Writers No. 25, trans. 
Maurice Bévenot S.J. (Westminster MD: The Newman Press, 1957), 45. 
 
 402 
dogmatic conformity, even going so far as interpreting Christian unity primarily in the language 
of doctrinal unanimity. 
         From the beginning of De ecclesiae catholicae unitate, Cyprian identifies the body of 
Christ as one of the central images of the Catholic church, writing, “if a man does not hold fast to 
this oneness [unitatem] of the Church, does he imagine that he still holds the faith? If he resists 
and withstands the Church, has he still confidence that he is in the Church, when the blessed 
Apostle Paul gives us this very teaching and points to the mystery of Oneness [unitatis] saying 
'One body and one Spirit, one hope of your calling, one Lord, one Faith, one Baptism, one God'?”81  
         In De ecclesiae catholicae unitate, Cyprian employs a wide array of interrelated terms in 
order to express his notion of unity—including: unitas, concordia/discordia, pacem, unanimis, and 
consentio/dissideo—the entirety of which must be put into play if the subtlety of his notion, and 
its divergence from competing notions of unity is to be revealed with requisite clarity. The clearest 
exposition of this notion of unity can be found in De ecclesiae catholicae unitate’s exegesis of 
Matt. 18.19-20: “truly I tell you that if two of you on earth agree about anything they ask for, it 
will be done for them by my Father in heaven. For where two or three are gathered in my name, I 
am there among them.” For Cyprian, the exegetical center of this passage is to be found in the 
“agree on earth” [συμφωνήσωσιν ἐξ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς], through which the “two or three” [δύο ἢ 
τρεῖς] are to be interpreted and limited. As he writes, “for Our Lord was urging His disciples to 
unanimity [unanimitatem] and peace [pacem] … showing that it is not the number but the 
unanimity [unanimitatem] of those praying that counted most.”82 
                                               
81 Ibid., 47 [emphasis added]. 
 
82 Ibid., 54.  
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         Two points are essential to this exegesis: first, is the linguistic shift from unitas to unanimis. 
While certainly these terms are not unrelated, both referring fundamentally to a coming together, 
they do nevertheless bear quite distinct connotations. Unlike the broader unitas, unanimis directly 
connotes a conformity of opinion, as the English equivalent “unanimous” indicates. Thus, having 
slipped from the broader unitas to unanimis, it is unsurprising that the numerical coming together 
of the “two or three,” the gathering [συνηγμένοι], is relegated to a secondary role, beneath the 
primacy of the “agree on earth,” understood by Cyprian in dogmatic/doctrinal terms. The dogmatic 
nature of this concern can be seen in Cyprian's assertion that “Our Lord is speaking of His Church, 
… He is telling those who are in the Church, that if they are of one mind [si ipsi concordes fuerint] 
…”83 Thus, for Cyprian, the impetus of this passage is primarily a call to agreement [concordes 
fuerint], and a call to physical or ecclesial gathering [συνηγμένοι] only tangentially.84 
         In this way, Cyprian has not only transitioned from unitas to unanimis, but further, from 
unanimis to concordia. This transition is made explicit in Cyprian’s continuing exegesis: 
“He [Jesus] condemns the discord [discordiam] of the faithless; and with His own 
lips He commends concord [pacem] to His faithful, by making clear that He is with 
two or three who pray in harmony [unianimiter], rather than with any number of 
dissenters [dissidentibus pluribus], and that more can be obtained by the united 
[concordi] prayers of a few than by the petitioning of many who are in disagreement 
[discordiosa].”85 
  
Cyprianic unity, can thus be seen to primarily revolve around the suppression of dissidence and 
disagreement—otherness and difference are obstacles to unity. And lest this dissidence be 
understood in overly schismatic terms (as a breaking of communion, rather than primarily as 
                                               
83 Ibid., 55 [emphasis added]. 
 
84 “Corruptors and false interpreters of the Gospel,” he insists, “quote the end [οὗ γάρ εἰσιν δύο ἢ τρεῖς συνηγμένοι 
… ἐκεῖ εἰμὶ ἐν μέσῳ αὐτῶν] and ignore what has gone before.” Ibid., 54. 
 
85 Ibid., 55. 
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doctrinal dissonance), Cyprian writes elsewhere that “our Mother should have the happiness of 
clasping to her bosom all her people in one like-minded body [consentientis populi corpus 
unum].”86 Thus consentio, agreement or assent, joins unanimis and concordia, further cementing 
the doctrinal bent of Cyprianic unitas. 
         For Cyprian, the heretic or schismatics break in unanimis/concordia/consentio corrupts the 
flesh of the body of Christ. Thus, Cyprian insists that dissent is a disease or a cancer which 
violently tears apart the internal organs of the church. “God is one, and Christ is one, and his church 
is one; one is the faith and one the people cemented together by harmony into the strong unity of 
a body,” Cyprian writes, “that unity cannot be split; that one body cannot be divided by any 
cleavage of its structure, nor cut up in fragments with its vitals torn apart.”87 Simply put, the church 
cannot fragment and survive; the unity and therefore survival of the Christian community depends 
upon the erasure or excision of any rupture or gap within the body of Christ. “Nothing that is 
separated from the parent stock,” Cyprian insists, “can ever live or breathe apart; all hope of its 
salvation is lost.”88  
         Thus for Cyprian, the manner by which schism grows and develops is clear. Schism begins 
in discordia or dissideo, where it festers in the body of the church, spreading until it is “cut out.” 
For as Cyprian writes in De lapsis, “he is a poor doctor whose timid hand spares the swelling, 
festering wound, and who, by letting the poison remain buried deep in the body, only aggravates 
the ill. The wound must be cut open, the infected parts cut out, and the wound treated with stringent 
remedies.”89 For Cyprian, such a “cutting out” of the heretical infection is not the generation of 
                                               
86 Ibid., 64-65. 
 
87 Ibid., 65. 
 
88 Ibid.  
 
89 Ibid., 24 [emphasis added]. 
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schism, for already in their discordia and dissideo these dissenters have committed the sin of 
schism; “for it is not we who have left them, but they who have left us … they have cut themselves 
off from the source and origin of [Christian] realities.”90 
         One will find consistent echoes of this logic throughout the subsequent medieval and 
modern periods, both in religious and secular contexts. Thus, for example, Aquinas employs 
precisely the same argument in his justification of the death penalty, writing:  
For this reason we observe that if the health of the whole body demands the excision 
of a member, through its being decayed or infectious to the other members, it will 
be both praiseworthy and advantageous to have it cut away. Now every individual 
person is compared to the whole community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man 
be dangerous and infectious to the community, on account of some sin, it is 
praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to safeguard the common 
good, since “a little leaven corrupteth the whole lump” (1 Corinthians 5:6).91 
 
More recently, Jacob Rogozinski has also traced the way in which this logic informed political 
violence in the terror of the French revolution,:   
When Saint-Just strikes out at the “factions” (i.e., mostly the “Enragés” and the 
most radical penniless “Sansculottes”) who enter “into the bowels of the Republic” 
to “corrupt” it, when his colleague Billaud-Varenne denounces to the committee of 
Public Safety, “the members who want to act without the direction of the head” and 
wants to “give back to the political body a strong health,” cutting off the “gangrened 
members,” they bring to light the ultimate purpose of the Jacobin Terror: the project 
of rebuilding the body and rebuilding a One, of re-founding the unity of the political 
body while eliminating those that, from the bottom, oppose any form of tentative 
reincorporation.92 
 
                                               
 
90 Ibid., 54-55. Tertullian employs a similar logic in regard to Marcion, suggesting that Marcion’s cutting out of 
certain texts from the canon, in order to cut out suffering from Christ’s flesh— “have you, then, cut away all 
sufferings from Christ, on the ground that, as a mere phantom, He was incapable of experiencing them” (Tertullian, 
“On the Flesh of Christ,” 525)—, results in the heretics cutting themselves out of the Christian community. 
 
91 Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican 
Province (Cincinnati: Benziger Brothers, 1920), II-II 64.2. 
 
92 Jacob Rogozinski, “Birth to the World (Nine Theses on the Possibility of the Political),”  (unpublished), 2. The 
French text was published in 2002 as Jacob Rogozinski, “Naître au monde (neuf thèses sur la possibilité du 
politique)” Lignes 9 (2002): 111-133. 
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In an analogous way, he argues, one finds this surgical logic of the One-body, that nevertheless 
demands dismemberment, in mid-20th century fascism and contemporary Islamist violence, 
writing of the two: 
In what bodily configuration does fascism or its inverse, Islamist totalitarianism, 
root themselves? That of a body in crisis, a sick body, invaded by a foreign Enemy 
seeking to destroy it. They claim to “heal” it, to soothe its pain by throwing out its 
blistering gangrene.93 
 
Yet, despite its historical importance within the Western imaginary, this surgical logic of 
community exclusion is by no means the only viable option. Rather, there remains a strain of 
thinking which does not constitute difference as an obstacle to unity, but rather—as was already 
seen in the case of 1st Corinthians 12—this alternative understands difference as unity’s very 
condition of possibility, because for these thinkers, the gap or fault within the individual and the 
social body is unavoidable. Paradoxically, it is precisely these thinkers who affirm the ruptured 
heart of every body—whether sexual or social—who articulate a logic capable of offering an 
alternative to dismemberment. It is to this model that I will now turn. 
 
B. Circumcision and the Cut 
 
Before turning to the alternative healing model of community health, it may be helpful to briefly 
consider Paul’s discussion of “the cut” in the letter to the Galatians. This letter perhaps constitutes 
Paul’s most sustained single argument, challenging the movement traditionally designated the 
“Judaizers,” “legalists,” or “nomists,” an early group of Christian missionaries who preach “a 
different gospel” [ἕτερον εὐανγγέλιον] (1.6) than that first proclaimed by Paul.94 The Pauline 
                                               
93 Ibid., 11. For a phenomenological analysis of this logic, within the specific context of Nazi Germany, see: Boaz 
Neumann, “The Phenomenology of the German People's Body (Volkskörper) and the Extermination of the Jewish 
Body” New German Critique, no. 106 (2009): 149-81. 
 
94 The word ἀκροβυστίας is often rendered in a sanitized fashion as “uncircumcised”—as in the gospel of the 
uncircumcised—a translation that is certainly not completely inappropriate insofar as the term is also a slang term 
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argument functions on two levels simultaneously: at the level of the body of the gentile believer, 
Paul challenges the requirement of gentile circumcision, while at the level of the social-body of 
the burgeoning Christian community, Paul will seek to universalize the Abrahamic covenant 
without universalizing the law.95 Drawing these levels together, Paul suggests that these teachers’ 
insistence upon circumcision as a prerequisite for communal participation stands in for the broader 
character of this different gospel, a perverse (μεταστρέψαι) orientation that substitutes the law for 
the role justly reserved for love.  
The culminating thesis of the Pauline argument finds clear statements at two points: first 
in 5.6 where Paul declares that “in Christ Jesus neither the circumcision nor the foreskin has any 
value” [ἐν γὰρ Χριστῷ (Ἰησοῦ) οὔτε περιτομή τι ἰσχύει οὔτε ἀκροβυστία], and second, in the 
closing of the letter, where this phrase is repeated almost verbatim: “for neither circumcision nor 
the foreskin are anything” [οὔτε γὰρ περιτομή τι ἔστιν οὔτε ἀκροβυστία] (6.15). In these passages, 
Paul ostensibly dismisses the “value” (ἰσχύει) of these concrete differences, if not their very reality 
(ἔστιν). Does he not therefore repeat the central gesture of exclusion of the remainder against 
which I have been developing an argument? Is this condemnation of difference (ἕτερον) not 
counter to the affirmation of bodily, sexual, and social difference developed throughout the 
preceding sections? Examining Paul’s argument more closely, it can be shown that the reality is 
precisely the opposite.96  
                                               
for gentiles (akin, to the modern colloquial use of “goy”). But, given the focus on the sexual member, I will here 
employ its most direct meaning, “foreskin.”  
 
95 “The passage is all about the covenant, membership in which is now thrown open to Jew and Gentile alike.” N. T. 
Wright, What Saint Paul Really Said: Was Paul of Tarsus the Real Founder of Christianity? (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans Publishing, 1997), 128. 
 
96 The following argument will proffer a generous reading of Galatians, akin to that offered by Mollenkott. For a 
more critical reading of Galatians, see: Joseph A. Marchail “Bodies Bound for Circumcision and Baptism: An 
Intersex Critique and the Interpretation of Galatians” Theology & Sexuality 6.2 (2010): 163-182. As Marchail writes, 
“in the arguments of these texts, circumcision and specific forms of gendered behavior become focal points for 
eliminating ambiguities and valorizing a particular vision of community” (166), continuing, “to Paul's constrained 
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These agitators—“those who unsettle” [οἱ ἀναστατοῦντες] (5.12)—are, for Paul, marked 
by their disruption of the agapic unity of the community: that is, they “cut in” [ἐνέκοψεν] (5.7) on 
the community (pun intended), separating the gentile converts from the truth: that is, from “faith 
working through agapic love” [πίστις δι᾽ ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη] (5.6). What is at stake here is not 
primarily the ritual activity of circumcision as such; Paul is not concerned with the maintenance 
of the physical member and its foreskin. Rather, the target of Pauline condemnation is not the act 
of circumcision, but the disruption and disunity introduced by these advocates and the logic which 
would underlie such a demand.97   
Paul—in his idiomatic, sarcastic (even crass) manner—satirizes this alternative gospel’s 
logic of mandated circumcision. Since, he suggests, these agitators insist that the cut [περιτέμνω] 
is a necessary condition for the constitution of the social-body, perhaps they should simply go the 
rest of the way and fully “castrate themselves” [ἀποκόψονται] (5.12).98 Here Paul not only denies 
the necessary sacrifice of the remainder in the constitution of the social-body, but openly mocks 
those who would substitute such a symbolic exclusion—or perhaps more precisely, who would 
                                               
anatomy of belonging, … treatment of the ‘member’ centers around the presence or absence of the appropriate kind 
of genitalia as an exemplary signifier” (166). Thus, rather than the inclusive interpretation that will here be 
suggested, Marchail finds a logic of exclusion in this text akin to the Cyprianic surgical model: “Paul seems … 
much more concerned with keeping certain embodied experiences, sensations, and subjects out of (his version of) 
the assembly communities” (174). 
 
97 As Lacan will later suggest, “this object a [foreskin] as something cut off presentifies a quintessential relation to 
separation as such” (Jacques Lacan, Anxiety: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X, trans. A. R. Price [Malden: 
Polity, 2004], 213). That is to say, insofar as circumcision is not merely a surgical, but a ritual act, its function is 
always additionally social. Drawing from Jeremiah 9.5’s critique of “all those who are circumcised only in the 
foreskin,” Lacan suggests that “what’s really involved here is some permanent relation to a lost object as such. This 
object a as something cut off presentifies a quintessential relation to separation as such. … What’s involved is in no 
way localized, far from it, in that little piece of flesh that forms the object of the rite. … The essential separation 
from a particular part of the body, a particular appendage, comes to symbolize for the now alienated subject a 
fundamental relationship with his body” (Ibid.). 
 
98 Marchail will particularly target this rhetorical flourish in his critique, writing, “in this letter Paul curses and 
name-calls, insults and isolates, cuts out and cuts off. Rhetorically speaking, Paul is militantly masculine in 
Galatians.” Ibid., 173. 
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substitute the social distinction between the foreskin and its symbolic rejection—with the role 
properly apportioned to love (ἀγάπη/caritas). To those who might ask, “must one ‘cut away’ a 
basic part of oneself in order to approach God?,”99 Paul therefore offers a clear “no!”  
Paul situates love as the alternative to “the cut,” as the true guarantor of unity. This is 
clarified in the two summary statements discussed above. In each instance, Paul posits an alternate 
source of value [τι ἰσχύει] (5.6.) or being [τι ἔστιν] (6.15) that supersedes the social distinction 
between foreskin and circumcision. In the first case, he writes that “the only thing that has value 
is faith working through love” [πίστις δι᾽ ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη] (5.6)—that is, as Paul will 
subsequently make clear, simply a repetition of the greatest commandment: “love your neighbor 
as yourself” [ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς σεαυτόν] (5.14). Likewise in the second iteration he 
repeats the same disjunctive, ἀλλὰ, contrasting the disunity of the Galatian community with “the 
new creation” [καινὴ κτίσις] (6.15). Given the near identity of the first clause of each statement, 
we might therefore tentatively presume an identity, or at least a deep conformity between these 
two statements. Against the exclusion of the remainder, Paul posits a new creation, a new 
community of mutual self-giving love.  
This agapic love is defined by two principles. First, as we have already seen in the gesture 
toward the greatest commandment, agapic love is marked by a reciprocal self-giving: “through 
love become slaves to one another” [διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης δουλεύετε ἀλλήλοις] (5.13). Second, this love 
cuts across traditional socio-ethnic boundaries. For Paul, “there is not Jew nor Greek, not slave nor 
                                               
99 Thomas Bohache, “‘To Cut or not to Cut?’ Is Compulsory Heterosexuality a Prerequisite for Christianity?” in R. 
Goss and M. West (eds.), Take Back the Word: A Queer Reading of the Bible (Cleveland: The Pilgrim Press, 2000), 
231. According to Bohache, Paul’s discourse on circumcision “is directly comparable to homosexuality because 
both [homosexuality and non-circumcision] challenge long-accepted standards of religious entry requirements.” 
Ibid. 
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free, not male and female; for all of you are one in Christ Jesus” (3.28).100 Simply put, for Paul, 
love functions as the means of unification or identity formation for the burgeoning Christian 
community; “it is love itself that enjoins us to ‘unplug’ from the organic community into which 
we were born.”101 The dismemberment of the body—the symbolic exclusion of the remainder—
cannot achieve this end. This is because, for Paul, the agitators’ insistence upon the bodily cut is 
inevitably recapitulated in a cut across the social-body (the distinction between those who are “in” 
and those who are “out”). Paul decries this logic of dismemberment in scandalous language, 
insisting “that if you should be circumcised, then Christ will be of no benefit to you” (5.2). The 
gentile does not face the requirement to submit to the law, because the gospel exceeds such 
demarcations: “we know that a person is not justified by the law, but through the faith of Christ 
Jesus” (2.16). 
Of course, as has been clear since the emergence of the so-called New Perspective on Paul, 
and counter to anti-Semitic readings of the Pauline corpus, Paul is not here advocating for the 
rejection or condemnation of Judaism, nor the total erasure of any social, ethnic, or sexual 
difference.102 Such differences are not, as Alain Badiou suggests “obsolete.”103 As Hays writes, 
                                               
100 “In this new world in Christ, three binary oppositions that characterized all human existence in the old age have 
been dissolved.” Richard B. Hays, “The Letter to the Galatians,” in The New Interpreter's Bible: Commentary in 
Twelve Volumes, Vol. XI, ed. Leander E. Keck et al (Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 272. 
 
101 Slavoj Žižek, The Fragile Absolute—or, Why is the Christian legacy worth fighting for? (New York: Verso, 
2000), 121. 
 
102 Here, Paul’s arguments for difference in 1st Corinthians constitute a helpful supplement, resisting a totalizing 
interpretation: “[Paul’s] concern is for its essential unity. That does not mean uniformity. That was the Corinthian 
error, to think that uniformity was a value, or that it represented true spirituality. Paul’s concern is for their unity; but 
there is no such thing as true unity without diversity” (Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, 602). 
 
103 This is against the position that Alain Badiou attributes to Paul: “universalizable singularity necessarily breaks 
with identitarian singularity” (Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism, trans. Ray Brassier 
[Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003], 11) or again, in less technical jargon, “this is the driving force behind 
Paul’s universalist conviction: that ‘ethnic’ or cultural difference, of which the opposition between Greek and Jew is 
in his time, and in the empire as a whole, the prototype, is no longer significant with regard to the real, or to the new 
object that sets out a new discourse (the resurrection)” (Ibid., 57). While Badiou rightly sees a political necessity to 
read Paul against identitarianism (he cites, for example, the French identitarianism of Le Front Nationale), and 
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“does Paul mean that Jews cannot be believers? Clearly he cannot mean that; Paul himself, as a 
Jew, was circumcised.”104 Rather, Paul remained a Jew, “an Israelite from the seed of Abraham” 
(Rom. 11.1), a “Hebrew born of the Hebrews … according to the righteousness of the law, 
blameless” (Phil 3.5-6). Paul is here instead proposing that the Christian community can only be 
unified through an agapic spiritual unity, the traditional means of socio-ethnic community 
formation are, for the Christian, mere division.105 It is for this reason that the Pauline Gospel is 
“the gospel of the foreskin [τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τῆς ἀκροβυστίας]” (2.7). For Paul, neither the body nor 
the social-body must be dismembered, the remainder need not be cast-off, in order to constitute a 
community. Indeed, if the community removes difference, through the exclusion of the gentile as-
gentile, than love has been lost, and the community cannot hold. It is precisely this conception of 
unity-through-difference in love, that Augustine will draw from Paul in his turn from Cyprianic 
surgical metaphors to healing metaphors.  
 
C. The Healing Model — Augustine 
 
Like the surgical model, the healing model has deep roots in the earliest Christian tradition. In his 
own letter to the Corinthians, for example, Clement of Rome (cf. Phil. 4.3) manifests precisely the 
same concern for the maintenance of difference within the Christian community that Paul had 
                                               
rightly sees the exegetical necessity of relativizing all prior identities in relating to that of the Gospel (Gal. 3.28), he 
seems to read this relativizing in an overly strict manner, that pushes against the grain of contemporary Pauline 
scholarship. Thus, for example, retreating from the work of the “New Perspective” on Paul, Badiou attributes to Paul 
the tropes of a vaguely Lutheran antinomianism: “In [Paul’s] eyes, the event [of the resurrection] renders prior 
markings obsolete, and the new universality bears no privileged relation to the Jewish community” (Ibid., 23).  
 
104 Hays, “The Letter to the Galatians.” 
 
105 “God established the family of Abraham. Paul reaffirms it. What matters is who belongs to it. Paul says that all 
those in Christ belong, whatever their racial background.” Wright, What Paul Really Said, 121. 
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expressed in 1st Corinthians 12. In a passage that seems intent to directly echo the apostle’s earlier 
analogy, Clement writes of the body of the burgeoning Christian community; 
The great cannot exist without the small, nor can the small without the great. A 
certain organic unity binds all parts, and therein lies the advantage. Let us take our 
body. The head is nothing without the feet, and the feet are nothing without the 
head. The smallest organs of our body are necessary and valuable to the whole 
body; in fact, all parts conspire and yield the same obedience toward maintaining 
the whole of the body. Therefore let the whole of our body be maintained in Christ 
Jesus, and let each submit to his neighbor’s rights in the measure determined by the 
special gift bestowed on him. Let the strong care for the weak, and the weak respect 
the strong; let the rich support the poor, and the poor render thanks to God for giving 
them the means of supplying their needs; let the wise man show his wisdom not in 
words but in active help; the humble man must not testify for himself, but leave it 
to another to testify on his behalf.106 
 
Here one does not find the language of the head [κεφαλή] employed in contradistinction to that 
which is “under His feet” (Eph. 1.22), but rather, as that which, against any hierarchical 
organization of the body, exists in an axiological and ontological equality with the supposedly 
lesser member (cf. 1 Cor. 12.21). For Clement, this is symbolic of the social relations of the early 
church which are intended to subvert the ostensibly “obvious” social hierarchies of the Roman 
world—particularly here, economic inequality.  
Yet, as should be clear at this point, Clement’s reference to the “whole of our body” is 
profoundly ambiguous, for the unity or integrity of the body can be obtained or maintained through 
a recourse to the “cut,” as the Cyprianic surgical model suggests. Yet, Clement expresses a deep 
antipathy toward any dismemberment of the body. As he writes, against schismatic tendencies 
within the church, “why do we tear apart and disjoint the members of Christ and revolt against our 
own body, and go to such extremes of madness as to forget that we are mutually dependent 
                                               
106 Clement of Rome, “Epistle to the Corinthians,” in James A. Kleist (trans.), The Epistles of St. Clement of Rome 
and St. Ignatius of Antioch, Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation No. 1 (New York: 
Newman Press, 1946), 32 (37-38). 
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members?”107 Here, Clement seems to suggest some alternative to the surgical model, a possibility 
that will be picked up by his younger contemporary, Polycarp of Smyrna, who writes in a letter to 
the Church in Philippi, “I am deeply grieved, therefore, brethren, for him (Valens) and his wife; to 
whom may the Lord grant true repentance! And be then moderate in regard to this matter, and do 
not count such as enemies (2 Thessalonians 3:15) but call them back as suffering and straying 
members, that you may save your whole body.”108 
Here schism109 is not treated as a cancerous growth that must be excised for the sake of the 
body. Rather, drawing from medicinal—rather than surgical—imagery, Polycarp suggests that the 
health of the community be understood as a holistic phenomenon. It is not that schismatics or 
heretics should be “cut out” from the community in order to safeguard the purity and health of the 
body, but rather, insofar as these schismatics are understood as “straying members,” who 
nevertheless remain legitimate members (not enemies), the health of the community can only be 
attained when these “mutually dependent” members—to borrow Clement’s phrase—are brought 
back into the fold; the health of the community depends directly upon the healing of the schismatic 
member.  
It is this alternative model, and its grounding in a metaphor of medicinal healing, that I will 
here seek to draw out of the later Christian tradition, particularly the work of Augustine. What will 
be suggested is that whereas the surgical model privileges unity (understood as unanimity and 
                                               
107 Ibid., 46. 
 
108 St. Polycarp, “Epistles to the Philippians” in James A. Kleist (trans.), The Epistles of St. Clement of Rome and St. 
Ignatius of Antioch, Ancient Christian Writers: The Works of the Fathers in Translation No. 6 (New York: Newman 
Press, 1948), 81 (11). 
 
109 Contemporary research suggests that the sin of Valens may have been a recantation of the faith in the face of 
economic persecution, making Valens a useful comparison to Cyprian’s Lapsi or Augustine’s Traditores. See, e.g.: 
Harry O. Maier, “Purity and Danger in Polycarp’s Epistle to the Philippians: The Sin of Valens in Social 
Perspective,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 1.3 (1993): 229–247.  
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uniformity), but eventuates in the establishment of a social cut against all difference within the 
community; the healing model begins with an affirmation of difference and multiplicity, but ends 
up generating a theology of unity-through-difference, by its emphasis upon love [caritas]. For, as 
Gregory of Nyssa remarks, “it is only in the union of all the particular members that the beauty of 
[Christ’s] body is complete.”110  
Any attempt to place Augustine in conversation with Cyprian, particularly in a critical 
manner, must first contend with the great debt owed by Augustine to “the holy Cyprian, whose 
dignity is only increased by his humility.”111 While I will below argue that Augustine offers a 
considerably more tenable interpretation of the body of Christ, it is worth noting that he does not 
appear to have conceived his reading of Christian unity to have been markedly divergent from his 
predecessor. In fact, given the similarity between Augustine’s context and Cyprian’s situation with 
the lapsi, Augustine relies on a considerable amount of Cyprianic material in his defense of 
Christian unity, particularly in De baptismo contra donatistas. Yet, as will be shown below, even 
his direct use of Cyprianic material is offered in a different register, that of caritas, which, in the 
Augustinian corpus, supplants unanimis or concordia as the mechanism of unification. 
         This divergence can be identified in Augustine's adaptation of the medical metaphor of 
Cyprian's De lapsi and De ecclesiae catholicae unitate. In a passage undeniably drawn from the 
former, Augustine writes: 
If anyone is brought to the surgeon, afflicted with a grievous wound in some vital 
part of the body, … they entrust him to the surgeon to be cured [curandum]. Nor, 
again, because they so entrust him, do they ask the surgeon to cure the limbs that are 
sound as well; but they desire him to apply drugs with all care to the one part from 
which death is threatening. … What will it then profit a man that he has sound faith, 
                                               
110 Gregory of Nyssa, Commentary on the Canticles, 13 (1049B– 1052A), as cited in Ward, “Bodies,” 177. 
 
111 St. Augustine, The Seven Books of Augustin, Bishop of Hippo, On Baptism, Against the Donatists, trans. Rev. J. 
R. King, M.A. (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library), 2.4.5. 
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or perhaps only soundness in the sacrament of faith, when the soundness of his 
charity [caritatis] is done away with by the fatal wound of schism, so that by the 
overthrow of it the other points, which were in themselves sound, are brought into 
the infection of death?112 
  
Three points are worth noting in this passage. First, as a strictly exegetical note, it should be 
recognized that, whereas in Cyprian this image functioned primarily in regards to the body of 
Christ—the “member” representing an individual Christian (or schismatic)—for Augustine, this 
image is here employed at the level of the individual Christian—thus the “member” or “limb” 
represents aspects of the individual: faith, charity, etc. Yet, this shift to the individual should not 
be taken as absolute, for as will be shown below, Augustine's account of the “individual body” is 
completely homologous with his conception of the body of Christ at large. Second, whereas in 
Cyprian's account of schism, the imagery tends to focus upon the necessity of a cutting out 
[amputatis]113 and removal of the diseased member, Augustine maintains healing or curing 
[curandum and sanetur]114 as the principle metaphors of a proper Christian response to schism.115 
Thus, where in Cyprian one finds quite literally “divisive” language of separation and expulsion 
of the corrupt, Augustine manifests a decidedly more inclusive posture, emphasizing health, 
reintegration, and reincorporation. This emphasis upon the individual health of the schismatic will 
be reiterated in his larger inclusive notion of the church as body of Christ. Third, and connected to 
this emphasis upon integration, the principal mechanism for the maintenance of ecclesial 
                                               
112 Ibid., 1.8.11. 
  
113 St. Cyprian, Libri De Catholicae ecclesiae unitate: De lapsis et De habitu virginum (H. Laupp, 1852), 79. 
 
114 St. Augustine, Traités Anti-Donatistes Vol. II: De baptismo libri VII, trans. G. Finaert (Henao: Desclée de 
Brouwer, 1964), 82-84. 
 
115 It is worth noting that Cyprian does use the language of curandum, but exclusively in the context of amputatis. 
That is to say, while the two share the language of curandum, for Cyprian, the only appropriate cure is a 
metaphorical amputation. 
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communion is caritas. As seen above, it is neither discordia nor dissideo which generates schism, 
but rather, schism is directly tied to a failure or lack of caritas. Thus, in the same way that Cyprian's 
understanding of unity of the body of Christ was elaborated through an examination of the web of 
related terminology, Augustine’s thought too may be clarified through an analogous examination.  
Primacy of place, for Augustine—as was already seen in his examination of the “individual 
body”—is given to love and health [caritas and sanitas]. These two terms can be found throughout 
Augustine’s corpus, and appear with conspicuous regularity in reference to the body of Christ. In 
De doctrina christiana, for example, we read that “the Church is His body, as the apostle's teaching 
shows us; …  His body, then, which has many members, and all performing different functions, 
He holds together in the body of unity and love, which is its true health.”116 Given this intimate 
connection between unity, love, and health, it is unsurprising that Augustine's account of the 
schism in De baptismo directly correlates schism and a failure of caritas. Where love succeeds, 
unity flourishes; where love fails, schism spreads. The theological consequences of this conception 
of the body of Christ—constructed from a model of love and health, rather than from a model of 
unanimity and consent—can be found throughout Augustine’s corpus, but I will here limit myself 
to two examples: the relation between married and widowed women, and a refutation of 
Manichaean anti-materialism.117 
         In this first example, taken from Augustine's De bono viduitatis, Augustine attempts to 
moderate any potentially excessive interpretations of his commendation of widowhood. 
                                               
116 St. Augustine, St. Augustine's City of God and Christian Doctrine [a Select Library of the Nicene and Post-
Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church - Volume II], trans. J.F. Shaw (Peabody MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 
1994), 526. 
 
117 One might also benefit from a consideration of post-resurrectional sexual difference discussed above. 
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Specifically, as in the case of Paul's famous exhortation  in 1st Corinthians 7.8-9,118 Augustine does 
not wish his call to celibacy to be taken as an absolute requirement. Rather, drawing upon the 
image of the body of Christ, Augustine insists that “assuredly he was addressing married persons 
also, [when] he saith, 'Know ye not that your bodies are the members of Christ?' So great then is 
the good of faithful marriage, that even the very members of are (members) of Christ.”119 
Continuing in this vein, Augustine—citing Romans 12.4-6—emphasizes the “diverse” gifts of 
those who are members of the body of Christ. Thus, rather than a model of unanimity, Augustine 
here emphasizes the Pauline conception of the body of Christ as a symbol of unity-through-
difference.  
         Analogous concerns can be identified in Augustine's rejection of the Manichaean dualistic 
ontology. For Augustine, the Manichean rejection of the material world, the questions of bodily 
resurrection, and the body of Christ are all intimately united concerns. This interrelation relies 
upon the bi-directionality of the symbol “body of Christ.” Just as “the body of Christ” informs the 
church that it should be structured as the healthful members of a human body, so too does it inform 
the body that it is to be structured as the mystical unity of the church. Thus, Augustine is able to 
ask, in the midst of a polemic against the Manichaeans: 
How is the flesh evil, when the souls [of the church] themselves are admonished to 
imitate the peace of its members? How is it the creation of the enemy, when the souls 
themselves, which rule the bodies, take pattern from the members of the body, not 
to have schisms of enmities among themselves, in order that, what God hath granted 
unto the body by nature, this themselves also may love to have by grace?120 
                                               
118 “To the unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain unmarried as I am. But if they are not 
practicing self-control, they should marry. For it is better to marry than to be aflame with passion” 
 
119 St. Augustine, “On the Good of Widowhood” in St. Augustine's On the Holy Trinity, Doctrinal Treatises, and 
Moral Treatises [a Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church - Volume III], 
trans. Rev. C.L. Cornish, M.A. (Peabody MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994), 442. 
 
120 St. Augustine, “On Continence” in St. Augustine's On the Holy Trinity, Doctrinal Treatises, and Moral Treatises 
[a Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church - Volume III], trans. Rev. C.L. 
Cornish, M.A. (Peabody MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1994), 389. 
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Here, the common interpretation of the symbol has been inverted. Because the body is able to 
function as a model for the church, it is accorded an added dignity. Drawing upon this bi-
directionality, Augustine is able to make use of the symbol in two distinct contexts: in defense of 
the unity of the church and in defense of a positive affirmation of material embodiment. When 
combined with the more “literal” reading of the body of Christ as the physical body of Jesus of 
Nazareth, Augustine models a tripartite symbol, whose complexity permits his arguments to move 
with great speed and in quite unexpected directions, as I have sought to emulate above.121 
         What marks these three examples as exceptional is not their conclusions—e.g. the 
acceptance of both the married and the unmarried into the church, the rejection of Manichaeism, 
etc. Rather, the particular interest of these examples is the specific way in which the discourse 
regarding the body of Christ functions. Having interpreted the unity of the body of Christ as 
unanimis, concordia, and thus, uniformity, Cyprian's potential use of the body is contextually 
limited to the controversies of De ecclesiae catholicae unitate and De Lapsis, or similar disputes: 
that is, the affirmation of dogmatic unity against heretics and schismatics. Augustine, on the 
contrary, by viewing the unity of the body of Christ through the lens of caritas and sanitas is able 
to, on the one hand, use the symbol in such manners, as exemplified in his critiques of the Donatists 
or Arians, but also in a precisely inverted manner, as a tool in the pure affirmation of difference. 
In De bono viduitatis the body of Christ appears, not to demand conformity in sexual expression, 
but to admit to a variance or “diversity” in sexual “gifts.” In De civitate dei contra paganos, the 
                                               
 
121 Linguistically, it is worth noting that the use of “corpus christi” is reserved for the church alone, for, “when he 
speaks of Christ’s human nature or of its components, he refers to it or to them as anima, caro, homo, humana 
natura and corpus” (Stanislaus Grabowski, “St. Augustine and the Doctrine of the Mystical Body of Christ,” 
Theological Studies, 7 no. 1, March 1946, 73). Yet, this fact does not deter Augustine from seeing a symbolic or 
analogical relationship between the two.  
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body of Christ appears, not to regulate sexual determination, but rather to justify this differentiation 
as such. While Augustine’s conception of the body of Christ certainly privileges unity, this unity 
is not undertaken at the cost of difference, but rather presupposes difference as its condition. 
         The unity of caritas cannot presuppose a prior uniformity, because, for Augustine, caritas 
is always the union of the diverse.122 Augustine attests to this necessity throughout his corpus—
and it is thus no coincidence that his principal image of love is the union of the sexually 
differentiated male and female in marriage.123 As Augustine writes of marriage in De civitate dei, 
“but we, for our part, have no manner of doubt that to increase and multiply and replenish the earth 
in virtue of the blessing of God, is a gift of marriage as God instituted it from the beginning before 
man sinned, when He created them male and female—in other words, two sexes manifestly 
distinct.”124 God's creation here is presented as the generation of two “manifestly distinct” [evidens 
utique in carne] sexes; distinct not only socially or politically, but distinct in the flesh, in carne; 
that is to say, God creates humanity as a materially differentiated substrate. It is not simply the 
case that this differentiation is posited as static, but rather, as illustrated by Augustine's emphasis 
upon the call to increase and multiply [crescere and multiplicari], the unity of these diversities in 
marriage is understood as a generative process. From the unity of difference springs further 
                                               
122 As Hegel will summarize a dialectical conception of love, closely akin to Augustine’s notion of love as unity-
through-difference: “love is a distinguishing of two, who nevertheless are absolutely not distinguished for each 
other. The consciousness or feeling of the identity of the two—to be outside of myself and in the other—this is love. 
I have my self-consciousness not in me but in the other. … This other, because it likewise exists outside itself, has 
its self-consciousness only in me, and both the other and the I are only this consciousness of being-outside-ourselves 
and of our identity; we are only this intuition, feeling, and knowledge of our unity. This is love, and without 
knowing that love is both a distinguishing and the sublation of the distinction, one speaks emptily of it.” Hegel, 
Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, 418. 
 
123 And often, emphasizing the previous analysis of the plurivocity of the body of Christ, these images will appear in 
tandem with images of the body of Christ and the church. E.g. Augustine “On Continence,” 388. 
 
124 Augustine, The City of God, 560. Latin: St. Augustine, “La cité de Dieu: Livres XI-XIV, formation des deux 
cités,” in Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, trans. G. Combés (Henao: Desclée de Brouwer, 1959), 440. 
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difference. Or as Augustine writes, “‘male and female’ cannot be understood of two things in one 
man, as if there were in him one thing which rules, another which is ruled; but it is quite clear that 
they were created male and female, with bodies of different [diversi] sexes, for the very purpose 
of begetting offspring, and so increasing, multiplying, and replenishing the earth.”125 
         In light of this insistence that an affirmation of difference stood at the ground of human 
existence, is not surprising that Augustine would immediately move into a consideration of the 
possibility of prelapsarian procreation.126 For Augustine, to deny the possibility of such 
procreation is to affirm that “man's sin was necessary to complete the number of the saints.”127 Or 
said differently, for Augustine, the multiplication and differentiation of humanity is not external 
to the inherent good of creation, but rather, a manifest component of that good. Thus, even when 
Augustine seeks to uphold sexual norms, for example the condemnation of incest, his critique is 
centered around the dissemination of difference. “It is very reasonable and just [ratio rectissima 
caritatis],” Augustine insists, “that man [sic], … should not himself sustain many [diversarum] 
relationships, but that the various relationships should be distributed among several.”128 That is to 
say, one man should not hold the relation “father” and “father-in-law” to the same child, nor should 
one woman hold the relationship “sister” and “mother” to the same sibling. It is not that such 
relations are unnatural in a strong sense,129 but rather, that by limiting the distribution of difference, 
                                               
125 Augustine, The City of God, 561. 
 
126 Ibid., Book IV, Chapter 23 (561-564). 
 
127 Ibid., 561. 
 
128 Ibid., 597. 
 
129 For, as Augustine points out, it was necessary that Adam and Eve's children reproduce in precisely this manner. 
“And as there were no human beings except those who had been born of these two, men took their sisters for 
wives—an act which was as certainly dictated by necessity in these ancient days as afterwards it was condemned by 
the prohibitions of religion.” Ibid. 
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they discourage the multiplication which strands at the ground of Augustine’s anthropology. That 
is to say, the act of incest represents the fullest case of unity as uniformity, wherein several 
relationships are maintained by a single individual. The demand of caritas, on the other hand, here 
translated as the “reasonable and just” [ratio rectissima caritatis], is once again understood as a 
command to unity-through-difference. It is neither the case, Augustine insists, that unity be 
understood as a call toward incestuous anti-differentiation, nor that such differentiation be 
permitted to fragment the social fabric. Rather, this act of differentiation, “should thus serve to 
bind together the greatest number in the same social interests.”130 
 Like the surgical model, this paradigm continues to echo through the subsequent tradition. 
To cite only one prominent example, Symeon the New Theologian meditates constantly upon the 
theme of the body of Christ and its members. And yet, for Symeon, any loss or cut of membership 
is a source of great tragedy: “for my part, I will naturally grieve and weep at the breaking up of 
my own members, my own race, of brothers according to flesh and spirit.”131 Like Augustine 
before him, therefore, Symeon aims toward a medicinal healing: “true repentance through 
confession and tears, like a kind of medicine and dressing, cleanses and clears away the wound of 
the heart and the scar which the sting of spiritual death had opened in it.”132 Indeed, for Symeon, 
the entire Christian narrative can be understood as a process of restitution. As Symeon argues in 
his “Second Ethical Discourse,” the taking of one member from Adam (his rib), opened up a wound 
which would be repeated historically throughout the Biblical narrative. At Babel, for example, “it 
is as if he cut limbs off from the body of Adam, separating and scattering them away from him 
                                               
130 Ibid. 
 
131 Symeon, On The Mystical Life: The Ethical Discourses, Vol. 2, 112. 
 
132 Ibid., 123. 
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and each other. To each limb He gave a separate language so that never again would they be able 
to join together.”133 And yet, despite this seeming impossibility of reconstitution of the body, this 
is precisely, according to Symeon, what one discovers in the incarnation, where God reverses the 
extraction of Adam’s member  by taking a member from Eve (Jesus), and repairing the breach.   
Yet, while this Augustinian paradigm offers a powerful model of health, wherein the social 
body is maintained through love-grounded-in-difference, it is nevertheless the case that Augustine 
often finds himself falling into precisely the same traps as Paul and the Deutero-Pauline authors. 
Just as with Paul, the construction of a post-heteronormative account of the body of Christ will 
require more than an uncritical appropriation of Augustine. For, while Augustine privileges 
difference, it should always be recognized that he has a tendency to cast this difference in dualistic 
terms of a binary sexual difference—thereby generating precisely those failures that will later 
manifest in von Balthasar and Marion’s attempt to construct a theology of eros from difference 
understood in an essentialist manner. Thus, while Augustine identifies sexual differentiation as a 
fundamental good, and as a constitutive structure of human embodiment, he will generally cast 
this difference as the difference between “male and female,” or more specifically, the difference 
manifest in the monogamous heterosexual male and female. This is because, despite the positive 
valence that I have given to his discussion of multiplicity above, this multiplicity is generally 
thought in terms of heterosexual reproduction; difference is “for the very purpose of begetting 
offspring, and so increasing, multiplying, and replenishing the earth.”134 One should not forget that 
(as noted in chapter 1) it is precisely by recourse to a Levinasian account of difference, among the 
                                               
133 St. Symeon the New Theologian, On The Mystical Life: The Ethical Discourses, Vol. 1: The Church and the Last 
Things, trans. Alexander Golitzin (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995), 90. 
 
134 Augustine, The City of God, 561. 
 
 423 
most extreme articulations of difference as an intrinsic value, that Dussel constructed his critique 
of feminism and homosexuality as pursuits of “the same”—or in Marion’s words “homosexuality 
[is] the ultimate refusal of dissimilarity”135—here echoing precisely the same logic that Augustine 
employed in his critique of incest. In this manner, Augustine falls prey to precisely the privileging 
of heterosexual reproduction that marks the logic of “reproductive futurism” that I have been 
seeking to challenge throughout this dissertation. And while Augustine’s discussion of chastity as 
a viable (even preferable) alternative to monogamy prevents a total subsumption of his account of 
bodily and sexual difference into reproductive futurism, the clear rhetorical privilege of the 
reproducing monogamous couple ends up undeniably coloring his theology. The result is a 
tendency to construct sexual relations in a hierarchical manner, eventuating with the claim that 
only men are independently the image of God, whereas women require the union with a husband 
to achieve full standing and dignity: “the woman together with her own husband is the image of 
God … but when she is referred separately to her quality of help-meet, with regards the woman 
herself alone, then she is not the image of God; but as regards the man alone, he is the image of 
God as fully and completely as when the woman too is joined to him as one.”136  
For these reasons, and without belittling the contribution that Augustine’s “curandum” and 
“sanetur” make to a reimagining of the body of Christ, it is necessary to again invoke Tonstad’s 
warning against attempts to simply recast Christian orthodoxy as always already radical, and 
                                               
135 Jean-Luc Marion, “The Future of Catholicism” in Believing in Order to See: On the Rationality of Revelation and 
the Irrationality of Some Believers, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner (New York: Fordham University Press, 2017), 
78. 
 
136 St. Augustine, “On the Trinity” in  Philip Schaff (ed), Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 2, Augustin: On the 
Holy Trinity, Doctrinal Treatises, Moral Treatises (Peabody: Hendrickson, 1995), 159 (12.7) [emphasis added]. 
Glossing this passage, Sarah Coakley remarks that “Augustine confronts the paradox of equality and difference, but 
the dice are this time … loaded toward the latter, to subordinate difference, He bows, significantly, to authority, 
‘order,’ and subordination. Yet another instinct, equally mandated by scripture (in Galatians 3.28), continues to draw 
him in a different direction. And so the paradox remains.” Coakley, God, Sexuality, and the Self, 292.  
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always already queer. Indeed, Augustine, together with his predecessors and successors (Paul, 
Clement, Polycarp, Symeon, etc.) provide invaluable resources to the contemporary thinker of the 
political and social body, but these resources must be read together with contemporary resources 
in radical and queer thinking in order to guard against their inherent limitations.  
§3. In the Position of the Dysmember 
 
Drawing forward what is liberatory from these traditions, while holding in abeyance those aspects 
which have historically lent themselves toward sexual hierarchy and dismemberment, what can 
then be said of the body of Christ? What can the religious community learn from a phenomenology 
and theology of the sexual flesh?  
 If the prior chapters have sought to unveil the way in which a monadic insistence upon the 
direct presence of the flesh to itself without gap, motivates problematic and rhetorically violent 
claims about women and sexual minorities, then the present chapter has sought to suggest that the 
same privilege of the direct presence of the community to itself, without the ruptures of otherness 
and difference, creates the condition for patriarchal and heteronormative hierarchy and violence at 
a social level. And yet, as has been shown, this tendency toward hierarchical constructions of the 
body of Christ—of the Christian community—are not the only tradition available. For, in their 
most creative and generative moments Paul, Augustine, and other members of the Christian 
tradition reveal the possibility of a genuinely new mode of organizing social relations that submits 
unity to a love grounded in embodied difference, and that rejects the privilege of the unanimous 
and uniform community of dogmatic and sexual conformity.  
 In order to achieve a post-heteronormative theology of the body of Christ, it will therefore 
be necessary to reject any account which privileges a monadic wholeness, and instead construct a 
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community that founds itself in the abject sexual member that is constituted as a dysmember: the 
ἀσχήμων. As Rogozinski argues, “those who want to discover the truth about community must 
first reject the fantasy of the One-Body, and for that purpose place themselves in the position of 
the remainder.”137  
 One can find precisely this logic being worked out in the early Christian community, where 
Jesus’ death, particularly his death on a cross, is understood as a kenotic self-emptying into an 
abject condition: “but [Christ] emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human 
likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point 
of death—even death on a cross” (Phil. 2.7-8). For the Christians of the early church, such a death 
was a true scandal (σκάνδαλον, 1 Cor. 1.23) because execution on a “tree” was a mark of 
accursedness. As the law stated: “for anyone hung on a tree is under God’s curse” (Deut. 21.23).138 
Paul draws out this connection unambiguously, arguing that the Christ becomes the very curse of 
Deuteronomy 21; the Christ is the abject remainder. “Christ redeemed us from the curse of the 
law,” Paul suggests, “by becoming a curse for us—for it is written, ‘Cursed is everyone who hangs 
on a tree’” (Gal. 3.13). For the early church, the proper posture of the Christian is to likewise take 
up precisely this abject condition, to—like the Christ—kenotically empty oneself and become the 
accursed remainder. As Jesus proclaims in the gospels, “if any want to become my followers, let 
them deny themselves and take up their cross daily and follow me” (Luke 9.23, cf. Luke 14.27; 
Matt 10.38, 16.24).  Or, as Lacan describes this logic, “the Christian has learnt, through the 
                                               
137 Rogozinski, “Birth to the World,” 9. 
 
138 Key passages in the New Testament will even substitute “tree” [ξύλον] for cross in order to explicitly mark this 
connection to the curse of Deuteronomy 21: “when they had carried out everything that was written about him, they 
took him down from the tree and laid him in a tomb.” Acts 13.29. 
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dialectic of Redemption, to identify ideally with he who made himself identical with this same 
object, the waste object.”139  
 When a community is structured in this way, no longer around a logic of the “head” but of 
the dysmember, there is opened a possibility of a reconstitution of the flesh of the community, no 
longer on the logic of the exclusion of the remainder, but on the logic of the universalization of 
the remainder, and therefore the incarnation of the dysmember. This universalization should not 
be misread as assimilation, as a return to the logic of the same, but rather as the instigation of a 
disruption of the social itself. As Rogozinski argues, “the position of the remainder creates the 
possibility of dissidence, of revolt, a position capable of tearing down the establishment.”140 One 
sees this logic play out in the political sphere in Karl Marx’s Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right. There Marx names the proletariat as the “positive possibility of a German emancipation.”141 
And while many have noted the religious character of Marx’s socialism, this character is not a 
product of his substitution of the proletariat for a victorious messiah, as has often been claimed.142 
To the contrary, the truly “Christian” gesture in Marx is the identification of the figure of salvation 
with that of the abject remainder. The proletariat are not the center of a socialist hope because they 
are by some dialectical necessity determined for victory. It is rather their embodied suffering that 
picks them out as the site of the universal. As Marx argues, liberation depends upon: 
The formulation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not 
a class of civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere 
                                               
139 Lacan, Anxiety, 220.  
 
140 Rogozinski, “Birth to the World,” 9. 
 
141 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, trans. Joseph O’Malley (Oxford University Press, 1970), 
141.  
 
142 “The old liberal slander which draws on the parallel between Christian and Marxist ‘Messianic’ notion of history 
as the process of the final deliverance of the faithful (the notorious ‘Communist-parties-are-secularized-religious-
sects’ theme).” Žižek, The Fragile Absolute, 2. 
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which has a universal character by its universal suffering and claims no particular 
right because no particular wrong, but wrong generally, is perpetuated against it; 
which can invoke no historical, but only human, title; which does not stand in any 
one-sided antithesis to the consequences but in all-round antithesis to the premises 
of German statehood; a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself without 
emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and thereby emancipating all 
other spheres of society, which, in a word, is the complete loss of man and hence 
can win itself only through the complete re-winning of man. This dissolution of 
society as a particular estate is the proletariat.143 
 
What Marx here argues, is that the abject remainder offers a privileged position for universal 
emancipation, precisely because the emancipation of this class-which-is-no-class, precipitates the 
dissolution of the fantasy of the One-body.144 
 If the early Christian church sought the abject dysmember in the executed body, and Marx 
in the political body of the proletariat, then the present work can perhaps be read as a suggestion 
that it is precisely in the figure of the sexual body—the body of the marginalized woman, of the 
marginalized sexual minority—that this abject dysmember might be found today. For if Irigaray 
is correct that sexual difference is the question of our time; if sexuality, in other words, constitutes 
the horizon of all politics, sociality, and theology,145 then it is within the realm of sexual difference 
that one might expect to find the figure of universal resistance, the figure of an otherness that 
refuses to capitulate to the logic of the same. Such a figure, I hope to have established, can be 
found in the queer sexual body: “the queer comes to figure,” as Edelman writes, “the resistance, 
                                               
143 Ibid. 
 
144 As Žižek argues, what we need is “not an organic seamless Whole, but an assemblage of disparate elements, a 
bricolage full of gaps and inconsistencies—the name for this mess is overdetermination. … So far from being a 
seamless Whole, a differential structure is by definition unbalanced, traversed by antagonisms.” Slavoj Žižek, 
Incontinence of the Void: Economico-Philosophical Spandrels (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2017), 41. 
 
145 For as Edelman argues, reproductive futurism and its compulsory heterosexuality “invariably shapes the logic 
within which the political itself must be thought” (Edelman, No Future, 2); or, in Althaus-Reid’s words, “all 
political theories are sexual theories with theological frames of support” (Althaus-Reid, Indecent Theology, 176), 
adding also that “all theology is sexual theology” (Ibid., i).  
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internal to the social, to every social structure.”146 Or, in theological language, “queer holiness,” 
as Althaus-Reid suggests, “is always the holiness of the Other.”147 
The hope incarnated by the queer sexual body, is precisely the hope of a radical social, 
even political, transformation:148 “the flesh of the community comes to the surface in the shape of 
a wild democracy.”149 It is this that Hocquenghem named “sexual communism,”150 the hope 
incarnate in the dysmember, which interrupts every wholeness: insisting upon its own reality, 
refusing assimilation, and demanding transformation. “The more we insisted on the body,” Negri 
declares, “the more communist we became.”151 This is the sexual member which reminds us that 
our communities, as our bodies, are constituted with gaps and fissures; this is the member of the 
flesh that could be our redemption, if only we could learn to see the irreducible power of 
incarnation.  
  
                                               
146 Edelman, No Future, 4. 
 
147 Althaus-Reid, The Queer God, 134. 
 
148 This more optimistic employment of the language of “hope” here, in distinction to Edelman’s “queer negativity,” 
is drawn from José Muñoz, according to whom, “queerness is essentially about the rejection of a here and now and 
an insistence on potentiality or concrete possibility for another world”; and for whom hope, is “indispensable to the 
act of imagining transformation.” José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity 
(New York: NYU Press, 2009), 2-3. 
 
149 Rogozinski, “Birth to the World,” 2. 
 
150 Guy Hocquenghem, Homosexual Desire, trans. Daniella Dangoor (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 111. 
 
151 Antonio Negri, The Labor of Job: The Biblical Text as a Parable of Human Labor, trans. Matteo Mandarini 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), xx. 
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